Illinois
Illinois Smart Glasses Recording Laws: Audio, BIPA & Consent
Independently fact-checked against primary sources (last audited August 24, 2026). · Reviewed by the RecordingLaw editorial team. · Law checked current as of August 24, 2026. How we verify our legal content

You can legally wear smart glasses in Illinois, but two independent statutes create serious legal exposure. Illinois is an all-party consent state: recording the audio of a private conversation with smart glasses requires everyone's consent under 720 ILCS 5/14-2. Illinois also has the nation's strongest biometric privacy law, BIPA (740 ILCS 14), which requires written consent before any app captures your face geometry and gives individuals a private right of action for $1,000 to $5,000 per violation.
Are smart glasses legal to own and wear in Illinois?
Smart glasses are legal to purchase, own, and wear in Illinois. No Illinois statute bans the devices, classifies them as restricted surveillance equipment, or limits their sale. Devices like Meta Ray-Ban AI glasses are sold at retail and may be worn in public without any special registration or permit.
The legal questions arise not from owning the glasses but from using them. Smart glasses differ fundamentally from a phone or handheld camera because they are visually indistinguishable from ordinary eyewear. A person standing next to you has no way of knowing whether you are recording unless they notice the capture LED. That invisibility places smart glasses directly within the concern that Illinois eavesdropping law and biometric privacy law were each designed to address.
Illinois has two overlapping frameworks that reach smart-glasses use: its eavesdropping statute, which governs audio, and the Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA), which governs any capture of face geometry or other biometric identifiers. Illinois is unique among all fifty states because BIPA gives private citizens a direct right to sue, with statutory damages ranging from $1,000 to $5,000 per person. Both layers of law require attention from anyone using smart glasses in the state.
Recording video in public vs. private spaces
The starting point for video-only recording is the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine established in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). People in publicly accessible spaces accept that they may be observed. A pedestrian on Michigan Avenue, a shopper in a grocery store, or a commuter on the CTA cannot reasonably claim a right not to be seen or video-recorded.
Using smart glasses to capture video in a public setting is therefore generally lawful in Illinois. The federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510, reinforces this conclusion: the Act's definition of "aural transfer" limits its reach to communications containing the human voice. Silent video recording without audio does not constitute an interception under § 2510(18), and no Illinois statute separately criminalizes video-only capture in a public space.
Private spaces change the analysis. Recording video inside a private home, medical office, law firm, or other location where individuals have a genuine expectation of privacy from visual observation can create civil liability for intrusion upon seclusion under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B, even without audio and even if the footage is never shared. The act of recording itself is the tortious intrusion when it would be "highly offensive to a reasonable person." Pointing smart-glasses cameras through the windows of a private residence, recording inside a private workplace office without permission, or capturing intimate scenes in a hotel room all satisfy that standard.
Illinois video law also includes the unauthorized video recording statute at 720 ILCS 5/26-4, addressed in the section below, which imposes criminal liability for recording someone without consent in specific locations.
Audio recording and Illinois's all-party consent rule
This is where the primary criminal risk lies. Illinois requires all-party consent for the audio recording of private conversations. The eavesdropping statute, 720 ILCS 5/14-2, makes it a crime to use an eavesdropping device in a surreptitious manner to record a private conversation without the consent of all parties to that conversation.
Two elements must both be present for the statute to apply. First, the recording must be surreptitious, which 720 ILCS 5/14-1(g) defines as obtained or made by stealth or deception, or executed through secrecy or concealment. Second, the conversation must be private. Under 720 ILCS 5/14-1(d), a private conversation is an oral communication in which at least one party intended privacy and circumstances objectively justified that expectation. A quiet meeting between colleagues behind a closed office door qualifies. A loud argument on a city sidewalk, audible to passersby, does not.
This version of the Illinois eavesdropping statute was enacted by Senate Bill 1342 (P.A. 098-1142), effective January 1, 2015, following companion Illinois Supreme Court decisions in People v. Clark, 2014 IL 115776, and People v. Melongo, 2014 IL 114852, both decided March 20, 2014. The prior statute was struck down as unconstitutionally overbroad because it criminalized a wide range of innocent conduct, including recording conversations that cannot be deemed private, such as a loud argument on the street, a political debate on a college quad, or yelling fans at an athletic event. The narrowed statute cured those defects by adding the "surreptitiously" element and the private-conversation anchor. Open recording of public events, police activity in public, and government proceedings is not covered by the current statute.
Smart glasses create a specific compliance problem under 720 ILCS 5/14-2. Unlike a raised phone, which provides a visible signal that recording may be occurring, smart glasses are designed to look like ordinary eyewear. Wearing functioning recording glasses into a business meeting, a doctor's appointment, or a one-on-one workplace conversation and capturing audio without disclosing the recording to all participants is the paradigm case of surreptitious recording of a private conversation. The statute's "surreptitiously" requirement is met precisely because the glasses look like glasses.
The federal one-party consent exception under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) allows a participant in a conversation to record it without notifying the others at the federal level. But that exception explicitly yields to more restrictive state laws, and Illinois's all-party requirement is more restrictive. Any person recording in Illinois must comply with Illinois law regardless of where the other participants are located.
For a full analysis of Illinois's consent framework, see the Illinois recording laws parent page.
Where recording is absolutely barred: voyeurism and private spaces
Some locations carry felony exposure for recording without consent. 720 ILCS 5/26-4 is Illinois's unauthorized video recording statute. It makes it unlawful to knowingly make a video record or transmit live video of another person without that person's consent in a restroom, tanning bed, tanning salon, locker room, changing room, or hotel bedroom, or in that person's own residence. It also bars recording another person's intimate parts without consent. The statute applies to any device, including recording glasses.
Making such a recording in violation of 720 ILCS 5/26-4 is a Class 4 felony, carrying 1 to 3 years imprisonment. The offense is a Class 3 felony, carrying 2 to 5 years, when the victim is under eighteen years of age or when the offender is a registered sex offender, whether or not it is a first offense. A conviction can also trigger sex offender registration requirements.
Smart glasses are particularly problematic in the context of this statute. Because they look like ordinary eyewear, the wearer can enter a space without detection. The statute does not require proof that a recording was shared or published. Making the recording or transmitting live video without consent in a covered location is itself the offense. The federal Video Voyeurism Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1801, provides a parallel floor on federal property; 720 ILCS 5/26-4 extends equivalent protection to all locations in Illinois.
Never wear smart glasses that have recording capability active in any restroom, locker room, changing area, or private residential space in Illinois. The felony exposure is immediate, and a claim of consent that cannot be proven is a poor defense.
Facial recognition and BIPA: Illinois's unique biometric exposure
This is where Illinois stands entirely apart from every other state in the country. The Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14, enacted in 2008 and unique in granting individuals a private right of action, is the most consequential legal framework a smart-glasses user faces anywhere in the United States.
What BIPA protects. Section 10 of BIPA defines "biometric identifier" to include retina or iris scans, fingerprints, voiceprints, and scans of hand or face geometry. "Biometric information" means any information derived from a biometric identifier that is used to identify a person. Facial geometry, the data extracted from a face scan to identify or verify an individual's identity, is squarely covered. Unlike a Social Security number or a password, a facial geometry scan cannot be changed if compromised; the permanent nature of biometric data is the explicit reason the legislature created stronger protections for it.
What BIPA requires before collection. Section 15 of BIPA imposes three obligations on any private entity that collects or stores biometric data. The entity must: (a) develop and follow a written policy governing the retention and destruction of biometric data; (b) inform the person in writing that biometric data is being collected, explain the specific purpose, and disclose how long the data will be stored; and (c) receive a written release from the individual before any collection or storage occurs. All three obligations must be satisfied before the first scan takes place. There is no cure-after-the-fact option under BIPA.
How BIPA applies to smart glasses. A smart-glasses wearer who uses a facial-recognition application to identify passersby is collecting biometric identifiers under BIPA at the moment of each face scan. This is not a theoretical risk. In October 2024, Harvard students AnhPhu Nguyen and Caine Ardayfio demonstrated the "I-XRAY" project: by pairing Meta Ray-Ban glasses with PimEyes (a third-party reverse facial-recognition engine) and AI analysis tools, they identified strangers on the street in real time and retrieved names, home addresses, and partial Social Security numbers within minutes of capturing a face. Meta provided only the camera hardware; the identification layer was entirely third-party software. But the demonstration proved the technical feasibility of passive, covert biometric identification via consumer smart glasses, and it illustrated exactly the conduct BIPA was designed to prevent.
Every person whose face geometry is scanned without prior written consent is a separate BIPA violation. Because BIPA has no de minimis threshold, walking through a crowd while running a facial-recognition app could generate dozens of independent statutory claims simultaneously.
The private right of action and damages. Section 20 of BIPA gives any individual whose biometric data was collected or used in violation of the Act a direct cause of action in Illinois courts. Statutory damages are:
- $1,000 per negligent violation, or actual damages if greater
- $5,000 per intentional or reckless violation, or actual damages if greater
- Attorney fees, costs, and injunctive relief in addition to damages
A 2024 amendment, Public Act 103-769, addressed the issue of "per scan" damages in cases involving repeated collection of the same person's biometric data. Under P.A. 103-769 (740 ILCS 14/20), when the same entity repeatedly collects or discloses the same individual's biometric identifier or biometric information from that same person using the same method of collection, that counts as a single violation rather than one violation per scan. Switching to a different collection method for the same person, such as moving from a static photo scan to continuous live video capture, is not automatically covered by this single-violation rule. However, each distinct person whose face geometry is scanned without consent remains a separate violation. If twenty people walk past a smart-glasses wearer running a facial-recognition app and twenty faces are scanned without written consent, that is twenty separate violations, potentially $100,000 in statutory damages at the intentional level.
BIPA's litigation track record. BIPA has produced the largest biometric-privacy settlements in United States history, including Meta ($650 million in the Facebook facial-recognition class action), Google ($100 million), TikTok ($92 million), and Clearview AI ($51.75 million). These cases involved corporate defendants using automated systems at scale, but the statutory text contains no exemption for individual users or small-scale collection. Any private entity, including an individual acting in a commercial context, that captures face geometry without written consent is within the statute's reach.
Practical implications for smart-glasses users in Illinois. The clearest safe approach is to disable any facial-recognition application before wearing smart glasses in any setting where identifiable individuals are present. If facial-recognition functionality is a necessary part of an intended use, BIPA's written-consent requirement must be satisfied before any scan takes place, which as a practical matter means obtaining written consent from every individual whose face may be captured. That requirement is incompatible with using facial-recognition apps in any crowd or semi-public setting.
For the full scope of Illinois biometric law, see the Illinois Biometric Privacy Laws page.
Penalties for recording violations in Illinois
Illinois combines criminal penalties for eavesdropping with civil liability that runs in parallel. A single unlawful smart-glasses recording session can produce exposure under both simultaneously.
Under 720 ILCS 5/14-4, eavesdropping penalties are:
- First offense: Class 4 felony, 1 to 3 years imprisonment, fine up to $25,000
- Subsequent offense: Class 3 felony, 2 to 5 years imprisonment, fine up to $25,000
- Corporate defendants: same imprisonment ranges, fines up to $50,000
Enhanced penalties under 720 ILCS 5/14-4(b) apply when the conversation intercepted involves a law enforcement officer, State's Attorney or assistant, the Attorney General or an assistant, or a judge performing official duties; those offenses are Class 3 felonies, or Class 2 felonies for a second or subsequent offense.
On the civil side, 720 ILCS 5/14-6 allows any person whose private conversation was unlawfully recorded to seek an injunction, actual damages, and punitive damages. Third parties who knowingly assisted in the eavesdropping, including landlords, carriers, or building operators who permitted the recording to occur, face matching civil exposure.
For BIPA violations, the separate civil damages of $1,000 to $5,000 per person apply on top of any eavesdropping remedies if both statutes are violated in the same recording session. A smart-glasses recording that captures both private audio and facial geometry without consent triggers both frameworks simultaneously.
Illinois also generally bars illegally obtained recordings from use as evidence in civil, criminal, and administrative proceedings under 720 ILCS 5/14-5. The exceptions are narrow: relevant portions may be admitted in a criminal trial or grand jury proceeding against the person charged with eavesdropping, and the evidence may be admitted when all parties to the conversation consent. The recorder faces criminal and civil consequences and generally derives no procedural benefit from the recording.
Practical tips for smart-glasses users in Illinois
Following these practices substantially reduces legal exposure under Illinois law.
Disable facial-recognition apps before use in public. This is the single most important step for Illinois compliance. No Illinois exemption exists for "casual" or non-commercial face scanning. Any app that captures or processes facial geometry of identifiable individuals without written consent violates BIPA. Disable the app before the glasses go on; do not rely on turning it off when you see someone you recognize.
Announce audio recording before starting in any private setting. In any setting where participants might have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their spoken words, say clearly before you start: "I am recording this conversation." Verbal disclosure and continued participation by the other parties establishes consent under 720 ILCS 5/14-2. The statute requires only that the recording not be surreptitious; announced recording with no objection satisfies that requirement.
Let the capture LED shine. Meta's guidance states that users should let the capture LED illuminate and not cover it. In Illinois, covering the LED while recording a private conversation removes the only external indicator that recording is occurring, which strengthens a finding of surreptitious recording under 720 ILCS 5/14-2. Keep the LED visible and unobstructed at all times.
Obtain written consent for sensitive conversations. For business meetings, legal or medical consultations, or any conversation with professional significance, get written confirmation that all participants consent before recording begins. A text or email exchange before the meeting creates a record.
Switch to video-only or mute audio in semi-private settings. Many smart glasses models allow video-only recording or offer a microphone mute function. In Illinois, the eavesdropping statute reaches only audio of private conversations. Switching to video-only in any semi-private setting eliminates 720 ILCS 5/14-2 exposure while preserving video capture.
Never activate recording glasses in restrooms, locker rooms, or private residential spaces. The voyeurism statute at 720 ILCS 5/26-4 makes recording someone without consent in these spaces a Class 4 felony. The felony attaches to the act of recording, not to any subsequent disclosure.
This article provides general legal information about Illinois smart-glasses recording laws, not legal advice. Laws can change and individual circumstances vary. Consult a licensed Illinois attorney before recording in any situation where legal liability is a concern.
More Illinois Laws
Frequently Asked Questions
Are smart glasses legal to use in Illinois?
Yes, smart glasses are legal to own and wear in Illinois. No statute bans the device. The legal risk is in how you use them: recording video in public is generally lawful, but recording the audio of a private conversation without all parties' consent violates 720 ILCS 5/14-2 and can result in felony charges and civil liability. Using facial-recognition apps without written consent from each scanned individual also violates BIPA and can result in statutory damages of $1,000 to $5,000 per person.
Do I need consent to record audio with smart glasses in Illinois?
Yes. Illinois requires all-party consent under 720 ILCS 5/14-2 for recording a private conversation. A first offense is a Class 4 felony carrying 1 to 3 years imprisonment and a fine up to $25,000. You must ensure all participants in a private conversation know they are being recorded and do not object before audio capture begins.
What is BIPA and does it apply to smart glasses?
BIPA is the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14. It requires private entities to obtain written consent before collecting biometric identifiers, which include scans of face geometry. A smart-glasses user who runs a facial-recognition app that scans people's faces without their written consent violates BIPA. Statutory damages are $1,000 per negligent violation or $5,000 per intentional violation per person, plus attorney fees. Every individual whose face is scanned without consent is a separate violation.
Can I be sued individually under BIPA for using smart glasses?
Yes. BIPA's private right of action in Section 20 applies to any private entity that violates the Act, not only large corporations. An individual who uses a facial-recognition app with smart glasses to scan identifiable people without written consent is a private entity acting in violation of BIPA. That person is directly exposed to statutory damages of up to $5,000 per intentional violation per person, plus attorney fees.
What was the I-XRAY demonstration and why does it matter in Illinois?
In October 2024, Harvard students showed that Meta Ray-Ban glasses paired with the third-party facial-recognition engine PimEyes could identify strangers in real time and retrieve home addresses and partial Social Security numbers within minutes. Meta provided only the camera hardware. The demonstration illustrated the practical feasibility of passive biometric identification via smart glasses. In Illinois, replicating this technique without written consent from each person identified would violate BIPA and create statutory damages of up to $5,000 per person identified.
Do I need consent to record video with smart glasses in Illinois?
For video-only capture in a public space where people have no reasonable expectation of privacy, consent is generally not required under Illinois law. However, recording video in private spaces can create civil liability for intrusion upon seclusion even without audio, and recording in restrooms, locker rooms, or private residential spaces without the person's consent is a Class 4 felony under 720 ILCS 5/26-4.
What happens if I secretly record a private conversation in Illinois?
Secretly recording a private conversation in Illinois is a Class 4 felony under 720 ILCS 5/14-2 for a first offense, carrying 1 to 3 years imprisonment and a fine of up to $25,000. A subsequent offense is a Class 3 felony carrying 2 to 5 years. The victim can also sue for an injunction, actual damages, and punitive damages under 720 ILCS 5/14-6. The recording is generally inadmissible as evidence, although 720 ILCS 5/14-5 allows it in a criminal case against the person charged with eavesdropping or when all parties consent to its admission.
Can I cover the recording LED on my smart glasses in Illinois?
Covering the LED is not separately criminalized in Illinois as of June 2026. However, covering the LED while recording a private conversation removes the only external signal that recording is occurring, which strongly supports a finding that the recording was surreptitious under 720 ILCS 5/14-2. Surreptitious recording of a private conversation is a Class 4 felony. Keep the LED unobstructed at all times.
Are smart glasses legal in a two-party consent state like Illinois?
Smart glasses are legal to own and wear in Illinois. Recording video in public is generally lawful. Recording audio of a private conversation without all participants' knowledge and consent is a Class 4 felony under 720 ILCS 5/14-2. Using facial-recognition apps without written consent from each scanned individual separately violates BIPA with damages of $1,000 to $5,000 per person. Illinois combines the audio-consent requirements of an all-party state with the nation's strictest biometric law.
Updates
Corrected the description of People v. Melongo to the overbreadth reasoning the Illinois Supreme Court actually gave, which concerned recording conversations that cannot be deemed private rather than recording police officers.
Corrected our description of Illinois's unauthorized video recording law (it requires lack of consent and covers specific places), the civil remedies for eavesdropping (no attorney-fee award), the exceptions to the evidence rule, and the enhanced-penalty categories.
Corrected the description of BIPA's 2024 single-violation amendment (P.A. 103-769): the statutory test for collapsing repeated scans into one violation is the same method of collection, not merely the same purpose.
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources; governing law re-checked for recent changes
Reviewed and approved by an editor
The Law Behind This Article
This article rests on the statutory provisions below, held in our own legal record and retrieved from the official source. Tap a section to read the operative text.
Illinois Compiled Statutes Chapter 720, Act 5 (Criminal Code of 2012)
§ 14-2Elements of the offense; affirmative defenseIn forcecited in 63 of our articles
(a) A person commits eavesdropping when he or she knowingly and intentionally: (1) Uses an eavesdropping device, in a surreptitious manner, for the purpose of overhearing, transmitting, or recording all or any part of any private conversation to which he or she is not a party unless he or she does so with the consent of all of the parties to the private conversation; (2) Uses an eavesdropping device, in a surreptitious manner, for the purpose of transmitting or recording all or any part of any private conversation to which he or she is a party unless he or she does so with the consent of all other parties to the private conversation; (3) Intercepts, records, or transcribes, in a surreptitious manner, any private electronic communication to which he or she is not a party unless he or she does so with the consent of all parties to the private electronic communication; (4) Manufactures, assembles, distributes, or possesses any electronic, mechanical, eavesdropping, or other device knowing that or having reason to know that the design of the device renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious overhearing, transmitting, or recording of private conversations or the…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-23 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ilga.gov
Cited in 92 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- People v. Melongo (Illinois Supreme Court 2014, 2014 IL 114852)“…ations of section 14-2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/14-2 (West 2008)), which defines the offense…”
- People v. Smith (Appellate Court of Illinois 2025, 2025 IL App (1st) 220116)“…ropping violated section 14-2 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/14-2 (West 2014)) and that then State’s Att…”
- Cook Au Vin, LLC v. Mid-Century Insurance Co. (Appellate Court of Illinois 2023, 226 N.E.3d 694)“…onversation by one who is not a party to the conversation. 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1) (West 2020). In enacting the stat…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Illinois Recording Laws (2026): All-Party Consent Rules, Illinois Audio Recording Laws: All-Party Consent Rules and Penalties (2026), Illinois Security Camera Laws: BIPA, Audio Rules, and Placement (2026)
§ 14-1DefinitionsIn forcecited in 5 of our articles
(a) Eavesdropping device. An eavesdropping device is any device capable of being used to hear or record oral conversation or intercept, or transcribe electronic communications whether such conversation or electronic communication is conducted in person, by telephone, or by any other means; Provided, however, that this definition shall not include devices used for the restoration of the deaf or hard-of-hearing to normal or partial hearing. (b) Eavesdropper. An eavesdropper is any person, including any law enforcement officer and any party to a private conversation, who operates or participates in the operation of any eavesdropping device contrary to the provisions of this Article or who acts as a principal, as defined in this Article. (c) Principal. A principal is any person who: (1) Knowingly employs another who illegally uses an eavesdropping device in the course of such employment; or (2) Knowingly derives any benefit or information from the illegal use of an eavesdropping device by another; or (3) Directs another to use an eavesdropping device illegally on his or her behalf. (d) Private conversation.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ilga.gov
Cited in 65 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- People v. Rodriguez (Appellate Court of Illinois 2000, 313 Ill. App. 3d 877)“…tion of the amended version of section 14-1(a) of the Code (720 ILCS 5/14-1(a) (West 1998)). Defendant alternativel…”
- People v. Smith (Appellate Court of Illinois 2025, 2025 IL App (1st) 220116)“…onsent of all parties or prior judicial authorization. See 720 ILCS 5/14-1 et seq. (West 2014). The conversations…”
- Hurst v. Board of the Fire and Police Commission (Appellate Court of Illinois 2011, 2011 IL App (4th) 100964)“…vesdropping statute contained in the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/14-1 through 14- 9 (West 2008)), and…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Illinois Laws on Recording Police: Your Rights and Protections (2026), Illinois Laws on Recording in Public: What You Can and Cannot Record (2026), Illinois Ring Doorbell Laws: What You Need to Know in 2026
§ 14-4SentenceIn forcecited in 9 of our articles
(a) Eavesdropping, for a first offense, is a Class 4 felony and, for a second or subsequent offense, is a Class 3 felony. (b) The eavesdropping of an oral conversation or an electronic communication of any law enforcement officer, State's Attorney, Assistant State's Attorney, the Attorney General, Assistant Attorney General, or a judge, while in the performance of his or her official duties, if not authorized by this Article or proper court order, is a Class 3 felony, and for a second or subsequent offense, is a Class 2 felony.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ilga.gov
Cited in 5 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- People v. Jenkins (Appellate Court of Illinois 2012, 2012 IL App (2d) 91168)“…y if the officer was engaged in his or her official duties. 720 ILCS 5/14-4(b) (West 2008). A person commits eavesd…”
- Morris v. Ameritech Illinois (Appellate Court of Illinois 2003)“…acts of high managerial agents. Eavesdropping is a felony. 720 ILCS 5/14-4 (West 1994). Therefore, Ameritech can…”
- Acuff v. IBP, Inc. (District Court, C.D. Illinois 1999, 65 F. Supp. 2d 866)“…4. Illinois’ Eavesdropping Statute, 720 ILCS 5/14-2 and 720 ILCS 5/14-4; and 5. Illinois Constitution Ar…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Illinois AI Meeting Recording Laws (2026), Illinois Surveillance Camera Laws (2026 Guide), Illinois Medical Recording Laws: Patient Rights, HIPAA, and Consent Rules (2026)
§ 14-6Civil remedies to injured partiesIn forcecited in 2 of our articles
(1) Any or all parties to any conversation or electronic communication upon which eavesdropping is practiced contrary to this Article shall be entitled to the following remedies: (a) To an injunction by the circuit court prohibiting further eavesdropping by the eavesdropper and by or on behalf of his principal, or either; (b) To all actual damages against the eavesdropper or his principal or both; (c) To any punitive damages which may be awarded by the court or by a jury; (d) To all actual damages against any landlord, owner or building operator, or any common carrier by wire who aids, abets, or knowingly permits the eavesdropping concerned; (e) To any punitive damages which may be awarded by the court or by a jury against any landlord, owner or building operator, or common carrier by wire who aids, abets, or knowingly permits the eavesdropping concerned. (2) No cause of action shall lie in any court against any common carrier by wire or its officers, agents or employees for providing information, assistance or facilities in accordance with the terms of a court order entered under Article 108A of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ilga.gov
Cited in 11 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Morris v. Ameritech Illinois (Appellate Court of Illinois 2003)“…opping even if the principal is not criminally responsible. 720 ILCS 5/14-6(1)(b)(West 1994). In the context of ci…”
- Hannant v. Culbertson Memorial Hospital Foundation (District Court, C.D. Illinois 2025)“…miss 18 (second and third alteration in original) (quoting 720 ILCS 5/14-6). And she cites to cases for the propo…”
- Kurowski v. Rush System for Health (District Court, N.D. Illinois 2024)“…720 ILCS 5/14-6. Rush argues that, under Illinois law,…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
§ 26-4Unauthorized video recording and live video transmissionIn forcecited in 9 of our articles
(a) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly make a video record or transmit live video of another person without that person's consent in a restroom, tanning bed, tanning salon, locker room, changing room, or hotel bedroom. (a-5) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly make a video record or transmit live video of another person in that other person's residence without that person's consent. (a-6) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly make a video record or transmit live video of another person in that other person's residence without that person's consent when the recording or transmission is made outside that person's residence by use of an audio or video device that records or transmits from a remote location. (a-10) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly make a video record or transmit live video of another person's intimate parts for the purpose of viewing the body of or the undergarments worn by that other person without that person's consent.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-08-31 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ilga.gov
Cited in 16 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- People v. McCavitt (Illinois Supreme Court 2021, 452 Ill. Dec. 456)“…o Recording/Live Video Transmission in violation of 720 ILCS 5/26-4,” and the warrant authorized th…”
- People v. Van Syckle (Appellate Court of Illinois 2020, 2019 IL App (1st) 181410)“…in violation of section 26-4(a) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/26-4(a) (West 2014)). Defendant filed a…”
- People v. Maillet (Appellate Court of Illinois 2019, 2019 IL App (2d) 161114)“…of section 26-4(a-5) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/26-4(a-5) (West 2012)). Count II alleged tha…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Illinois Video Recording Laws: Consent, BIPA, and Surveillance Rules (2026), Illinois Employee Monitoring Laws (2026): BIPA, Recording & More, Illinois Landlord-Tenant Recording Laws: Camera Rules and Privacy Rights (2026)
§ 14-5Evidence inadmissibleIn force
Any evidence obtained in violation of this Article is not admissible in any civil or criminal trial, or any administrative or legislative inquiry or proceeding, nor in any grand jury proceedings; provided, however, that so much of the contents of an alleged unlawfully intercepted, overheard or recorded conversation as is clearly relevant, as determined as a matter of law by the court in chambers, to the proof of such allegation may be admitted into evidence in any criminal trial or grand jury proceeding brought against any person charged with violating any provision of this Article. Nothing in this Section bars admission of evidence if all parties to the private conversation or private electronic communication consent to admission of the evidence.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ilga.gov
Cited in 19 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- People v. Davis (Appellate Court of Illinois 2020, 441 Ill. Dec. 719)“…nterpret section 14-5 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/14-5 (West 2012)). Section 14-5 bars the…”
- People v. Rodriguez (Appellate Court of Illinois 2000, 313 Ill. App. 3d 877)“…Article is not admissible in any civil or criminal trial." 720 ILCS 5/14-5 (West 1998). Our role in construing a s…”
- Blount v. Stroud (Appellate Court of Illinois 2009, 915 N.E.2d 925)“…tatute from being used in any criminal or civil proceeding. 720 ILCS 5/14-5 (West 2000). However, contrary to defen…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Illinois Compiled Statutes Chapter 740, Act 14 (Biometric Information Privacy Act)
§ 10DefinitionsIn forcecited in 4 of our articles
In this Act: "Biometric identifier" means a retina or iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or scan of hand or face geometry. Biometric identifiers do not include writing samples, written signatures, photographs, human biological samples used for valid scientific testing or screening, demographic data, tattoo descriptions, or physical descriptions such as height, weight, hair color, or eye color. Biometric identifiers do not include donated organs, tissues, or parts as defined in the Illinois Anatomical Gift Act or blood or serum stored on behalf of recipients or potential recipients of living or cadaveric transplants and obtained or stored by a federally designated organ procurement agency. Biometric identifiers do not include biological materials regulated under the Genetic Information Privacy Act. Biometric identifiers do not include information captured from a patient in a health care setting or information collected, used, or stored for health care treatment, payment, or operations under the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ilga.gov
Cited in 109 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- West Bend Mutual Insurance Co. v. Krishna Schaumburg Tan, Inc. (Illinois Supreme Court 2021, 451 Ill. Dec. 1)“…ual’s biometric identifier used to identify an individual.” 740 ILCS 14/10 (West 2018). The Act regulates the…”
- Watson v. Legacy Healthcare Financial Services, LLC (Appellate Court of Illinois 2021, 458 Ill. Dec. 267)“…fingerprint” or “scan of hand,” such as what was used here. 740 ILCS 14/10 (West 2018). The same sectio…”
- Mosby v. Ingalls Memorial Hospital (Appellate Court of Illinois 2022, 2022 IL App (1st) 200822)“…Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,’ 740 ILCS 14/10, when the…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: BIPA Compliance for Employers (2026): Step-by-Step, Illinois Biometric Privacy Laws: Collection, Consent & Penalties (2026)
§ 15Retention; collection; disclosure; destructionIn forcecited in 12 of our articles
(a) A private entity in possession of biometric identifiers or biometric information must develop a written policy, made available to the public, establishing a retention schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying biometric identifiers and biometric information when the initial purpose for collecting or obtaining such identifiers or information has been satisfied or within 3 years of the individual's last interaction with the private entity, whichever occurs first. Absent a valid warrant or subpoena issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, a private entity in possession of biometric identifiers or biometric information must comply with its established retention schedule and destruction guidelines.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-08-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ilga.gov
Cited in 208 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Cothron v. White Castle System, Inc. (Illinois Supreme Court 2023, 466 Ill. Dec. 85)“…15(d) of the Biometric Information Privacy Act (Act) (740 ILCS 14/15(b), (d) (West 2018)) in an action…”
- Tims v. Black Horse Carriers, Inc. (Illinois Supreme Court 2023, 466 Ill. Dec. 12)“…15(a) of the Biometric Information Privacy Act (Act) (740 ILCS 14/15(a) (West 2018)), providing for the rete…”
- Watson v. Legacy Healthcare Financial Services, LLC (Appellate Court of Illinois 2021, 458 Ill. Dec. 267)“…d, and (4) to obtain his or her written consent. 740 ILCS 14/15(a), (b) (West 2018). The complaint alle…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: BIPA Explained: Illinois Biometric Privacy Act (740 ILCS 14), Do You Have a BIPA Claim? Check Your Eligibility (2026), Illinois Data Privacy Laws: BIPA, Consumer Rights & Penalties (2026)
§ 20Right of actionIn forcecited in 11 of our articles
(a) Any person aggrieved by a violation of this Act shall have a right of action in a State circuit court or as a supplemental claim in federal district court against an offending party. A prevailing party may recover for each violation: (1) against a private entity that negligently violates a provision of this Act, liquidated damages of $1,000 or actual damages, whichever is greater; (2) against a private entity that intentionally or recklessly violates a provision of this Act, liquidated damages of $5,000 or actual damages, whichever is greater; (3) reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, including expert witness fees and other litigation expenses; and (4) other relief, including an injunction, as the State or federal court may deem appropriate.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-08-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ilga.gov
Cited in 94 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp. (Illinois Supreme Court 2019, 2019 IL 123186)“…Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/20, and may seek statutory liquidated…”
- Cothron v. White Castle System, Inc. (Illinois Supreme Court 2023, 466 Ill. Dec. 85)“…scretionary rather than mandatory under the Act. See 740 ILCS 14/20 (West 2018) (detailing the amounts and…”
- Tims v. Black Horse Carriers, Inc. (Appellate Court of Illinois 2021, 451 Ill. Dec. 879)“…ainment Corp., 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 1 (quoting 740 ILCS 14/20 (West 2016)). ¶ 25 The Act works…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: BIPA Damages: What a Violation Is Worth (2026), BIPA Statute of Limitations: The 5-Year Deadline (2026)
United States Code Title 18
§ 2510DefinitionsIn forcecited in 137 of our articles
As used in this chapter— “wire communication” means any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception (including the use of such connection in a switching station) furnished or operated by any person engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications or communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce; “oral communication” means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation, but such term does not include any electronic communication; “State” means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States; “intercept” means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.1 So in original. The period probably should be a semicolon.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 2,382 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):United States v. New York Telephone Co. (1977) held that pen registers fall outside Title III because they do not acquire the contents of a communication as Section 2510(4) and (8) define interception. Forsyth v. Barr (1994) applied the same definitions, treating the defendant officers as law enforcement officers under Section 2510(7).
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Forsyth v. Barr (Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 1994, 19 F.3d 1527)✓Neighbors tapped an informant's home line and the overheard charges reached Dallas internal affairs; the Fifth Circuit saw no evidence the police defendants intercepted anything and held they were 2510(7) law enforcement officers, so 2517(1) and (2) allowed their use of it.
- Nixon v. Administrator of General Services (Supreme Court of the United States 1977, 433 U.S. 425)“…of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2510 et seq. 408 F. Supp., at 363 . We…”
- Gannett Co. v. DePasquale (Supreme Court of the United States 1979, 443 U.S. 368)“…of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. § 2510 et seq., be preserved prior to the d…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Surveillance Camera Laws by State (2026 Guide), US Recording Laws by State (2026): All 50 States Explained, Georgia Recording Laws (2026): One-Party Audio, All-Party Video
§ 2511Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications prohibitedIn forcecited in 441 of our articles
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who— intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication; intentionally uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to use or endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral communication when— such device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a signal through, a wire, cable, or other like connection used in wire communication; or such device transmits communications by radio, or interferes with the transmission of such communication; or such person knows, or has reason to know, that such device or any component thereof has been sent through the mail or transported in interstate or foreign commerce; or such use or endeavor to use (A) takes place on the premises of any business or other commercial establishment the operations of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or (B) obtains or is for the purpose of obtaining information relating to the operations of any business or other commercial establishment the operations of which affect interstate or foreign…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-17 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 2,045 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Griggs-Ryan v. Smith (1990) applied the Section 2511(2)(d) prior-consent exception, treating a tenant repeatedly told that all incoming calls were taped as having impliedly consented. United States v. United States District Court (1972) read the then-current Section 2511(3) as conferring no presidential surveillance power.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Mitchell v. Forsyth (Supreme Court of the United States 1985, 472 U.S. 511)✓The Attorney General authorized a warrantless 1970 national security wiretap that caught the plaintiff's calls; the Court held the since-repealed Section 2511(3) disclaimer left the tap lawful under Title III, and that Mitchell had qualified immunity.
- United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (Supreme Court of the United States 1972, 407 U.S. 297)✓The Attorney General approved warrantless wiretaps on members of a domestic group accused of bombing a CIA office; the Court read Section 2511(3) as a congressional disclaimer conferring no surveillance power, then held the Fourth Amendment required prior judicial approval.
- Forsyth v. Barr (Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 1994, 19 F.3d 1527)✓Dallas police used, in an internal affairs probe of an officer, calls private parties allegedly intercepted illegally; assuming that was unlawful, the Fifth Circuit held Section 2517(1) and (2) allowed the disclosure and use, defeating the Section 2511(1)(c) and (d) claims.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Connecticut Recording Laws (2026): Hybrid Consent Rules Explained, Oregon Recording Laws (2026): Hybrid One-Party and All-Party Rules, Hawaii Recording Laws (2026): Hybrid Consent State Rules
§ 1801Video voyeurismIn forcecited in 81 of our articles
Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, has the intent to capture an image of a private area of an individual without their consent, and knowingly does so under circumstances in which the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. In this section— the term “capture”, with respect to an image, means to videotape, photograph, film, record by any means, or broadcast; the term “broadcast” means to electronically transmit a visual image with the intent that it be viewed by a person or persons; the term “a private area of the individual” means the naked or undergarment clad genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or female breast of that individual; the term “female breast” means any portion of the female breast below the top of the areola; and the term “under circumstances in which that individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy” means— circumstances in which a reasonable person would believe that he or she could disrobe in privacy, without being concerned that an image of a private area of the individual was being captured; or circumstances in which a…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 53 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Courts have applied 18 U.S.C. 1801 mainly at its edges. United States v. Johnson (2010) read it as Congress's answer to secretly filming nudity on federal property, acquitting on a child exploitation charge instead. EPIC v. Department of Homeland Security (2011) applied the Section 1801(c) law enforcement exception to a TSA scanner claim.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- United States v. Anthony Helton (Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 2019, 944 F.3d 198)“…from this list of federal offenses is video voyeurism under 18 U.S.C. § 1801. Rather than list this statute as an enu…”
- United States v. Johnson (District Court, W.D. Missouri 2010, 719 F. Supp. 2d 1059)✓A weightlifting coach hid a camera to film minors weighing in nude; acquitting him under the child exploitation statute, the court called that conduct plain video voyeurism under section 1801, but noted the section reaches only federal maritime and territorial jurisdiction.
- Electronic Privacy Information Center v. United States Department of Homeland Security (Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 2011, 653 F.3d 1)✓Privacy groups challenged TSA body scanners under the Video Voyeurism Prevention Act; the D.C. Circuit held the statute's exception for lawful law enforcement, correctional, or intelligence activity applied to airport screening, so the section 1801 claim failed.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: South Dakota Voyeurism Laws, Is It Illegal to Video Record Someone Without Their Consent? (2026), California Smart Glasses Recording Laws (2026)
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