Self-Defense Laws by State: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)
Independently fact-checked against primary sources (last audited September 16, 2026). · 65 primary sources cited on this page. How we verify our legal content
Most states are stand-your-ground states, with no general duty to retreat before using otherwise justified force, while a minority, including New York, impose a duty to retreat before deadly force when retreat is safely possible, usually with exceptions such as the home. Castle doctrine is the separate set of home-defense rules, which in many states presume a reasonable fear when an intruder unlawfully and forcibly enters a dwelling, and neither rule authorizes force outside its stated conditions. This hub separates the public-retreat question from home-entry presumptions and links to a detailed guide for every state and the District of Columbia.
Information last verified on September 11, 2026.
Jurisdiction scope: This guide compares general self-defense rules in the 50 states and the District of Columbia. It does not decide whether force was justified in a particular event, cover federal or military rules, or replace the full statutes and cases linked in each state guide.
How to use this self-defense laws hub
Start with the state where the incident occurred, then treat the table as an index rather than a legal conclusion. The second column identifies how the cited state authority treats retreat in public. The third reports whether that authority establishes a defined presumption of reasonable fear tied to an entry or removal, a limited presumption, or no broader presumption established by that source. Each state name opens a guide with the rule's conditions, exceptions, and sources.
The labels answer narrow questions. "No duty by statute" and "no duty under case law" identify the source of a retreat rule. "Duty to retreat, with exceptions" signals that the state's rule must be read with its exceptions. "Qualified or location-specific" is used where a single yes-or-no label would hide a material limit. Wisconsin receives its own qualified label because its authority does not state a general retreat duty, but an opportunity for safe retreat may bear on reasonable necessity outside the statutory home, vehicle, and business conditions.
For more detail, use the stand-your-ground states comparison for retreat rules, conditions, and immunity procedure. Use the castle-doctrine states comparison for protected locations, entry triggers, exceptions, and the limits of each presumption. Those pages carry the larger source record; this hub is the shorter route to the right jurisdiction.
Stand your ground answers the retreat question
A stand-your-ground provision removes a retreat requirement only within its stated scope. For example, Fla. Stat. Section 776.012(2) ties its no-duty language to a person who is not engaged in criminal activity and is in a place where the person has a right to be. New York Penal Law Section 35.15(2), by contrast, addresses retreat before deadly physical force and includes exceptions. These provisions illustrate why the table describes retreat treatment rather than declaring a state broadly favorable or unfavorable to self-defense.
Retreat is also only one part of the analysis. The governing law may ask whether the defender reasonably believed force was immediately necessary, whether the response matched the threatened harm, whether the defender provoked the encounter, and whether an initial aggressor withdrew. A no-duty rule does not erase those requirements. A duty rule also must be read precisely because the availability and safety of retreat, the location, and the type of force can change the result.
Case-law rules require the same care. Some jurisdictions derive their retreat treatment from decisions rather than an express stand-your-ground section. Others use a mixed or qualified rule in which the possibility of avoiding an encounter can remain relevant even without a categorical duty. The state guide and the detailed comparison identify the authority type so readers can distinguish a statute from a judicial rule or an official legal synthesis.
Castle doctrine and a fear presumption are not interchangeable
"Castle doctrine" is a convenient label for several different rules associated with defending an occupied home or another protected place. A jurisdiction may remove a retreat duty in a dwelling, authorize defensive force against specified conduct, create a presumption about the defender's reasonable belief, or combine some of those features. The table deliberately reports only the presumption question because a single "castle doctrine: yes or no" column would conceal these differences.
An entry-or-removal presumption usually depends on detailed conditions. The statute may require unlawful and forcible entry, an attempt to remove a person, the defender's presence, or knowledge about the entry. It may exclude a lawful resident, a person exercising custody rights, an identified officer acting officially, or a defender engaged in specified unlawful activity. Protected locations also differ. A provision may cover a dwelling alone, or may name a residence, occupied vehicle, workplace, or business.
"Presumption unresolved" means the cited authority does not establish the broader location-based fear presumption measured in the table. It does not mean that a state lacks home-defense law, a dwelling exception to retreat, a justification defense, or another rule relevant to an intrusion. Virginia illustrates the distinction: its castle doctrine comes from decisions rather than a statute, so the cited opinion reaches persons within the home or curtilage without establishing the broader fear presumption measured here.
Immunity and the defense at trial are separate questions
Self-defense can operate at different procedural stages. One law may define when force is justified. Another may create a pretrial procedure for resolving criminal immunity, limit arrest, restrict civil liability, authorize fees, or allocate a burden of proof. A ruling that conduct is justified can affect more than one stage, but readers should not assume that every state joins these consequences in one rule.
Florida shows why the distinction matters. Fla. Stat. Sections 776.032 and 776.013 address immunity and home-protection rules in separate provisions from the core use-of-force rule in Section 776.012. Wisconsin also separates its self-defense privilege and home-entry presumption in Wis. Stat. Section 939.48 from the limited civil-immunity provision in Section 895.62. The presence of one protection therefore does not establish the others.
This hub does not assign an immunity label in its quick table. The detailed stand-your-ground and castle-doctrine comparisons describe the criminal and civil categories separately and preserve an unresolved result where the cited authority does not support a categorical answer. That approach avoids turning silence in one statute or case into a statewide claim that no other procedure exists.
Self-defense rules in all 50 states and DC
The table is a navigation aid based on authority current through September 11, 2026. The retreat column describes public-retreat treatment. The fear-presumption column describes the narrower statutory or decisional presumption stated in the cited authority. It does not summarize every protected location or condition. Select a state before relying on a label.
Authority current through September 11, 2026. A label summarizes only what the cited authority establishes; it does not authorize force, and grey means not assessed. Select a state for its conditions and exceptions.
View all 50 states and DC as a table
| State | Public-retreat treatment | Fear presumption | Cited authority |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alabama | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption | Retreat: Ala. Code Section 13A-3-23(b) (effective until Oct. 1, 2026) (opens the official source)Presumption: Ala. Code Section 13A-3-23(a)(4)-(5) (effective until Oct. 1, 2026) (opens the official source) |
| Alaska | No duty by statute | None in cited statute | Retreat: Alaska Stat. Section 11.81.335(b)(5) (opens the official source)Presumption: Alaska Stat. Section 11.81.335(b)(1), (3), (5) (opens the official source) |
| Arizona | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption | Retreat: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Sections 13-405(B), 13-411(B), 13-418(B) (opens the official source)Presumption: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Sections 13-411(C)-(D), 13-419(A)-(D) (opens the official source) |
| Arkansas | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption | Retreat: Ark. Code Ann. Sections 5-2-606(c), 5-2-607(b), as amended by 2021 Ark. Acts 250 (opens the official source)Presumption: Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-620 (opens the official source) |
| California | No duty under case law | Entry or removal presumption | Retreat: Judicial Council of California, CALCRIM2026, Nos.505 and3470 (opens the official source)Presumption: Cal. Penal Code Section 198.5 (opens the official source) |
| Colorado | No duty under case law | None in cited statute | Retreat: Colorado Judicial Branch, COLJI-Crim 2025, H:12 (applying Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-704) (opens the official source)Presumption: Colo. Rev. Stat. Section 18-1-704.5(2) (opens the official source) |
| Connecticut | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | None in cited statute | Retreat: Conn. Gen. Stat. Section 53a-19(b) (opens the official source)Presumption: Conn. Gen. Stat. Sections 53a-19(b)(1), 53a-20 (opens the official source) |
| Delaware | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | None in cited statute | Retreat: 11 Del. C. Section 464(e)(2) (opens the official source)Presumption: 11 Del. C. Sections 464(e)(2), 466(c), 469 (opens the official source) |
| District of Columbia | Qualified or location-specific rule | Presumption unresolved | Retreat: In re Robertson, D.C. Ct. App. Nos. 00-FM-925 & 04-FM-1269, slip op. at 24-25 (Jan. 24, 2008), quoting Gillis v. United States, 400 A.2d 311, 313 (D.C. 1979) (opens the official source)Presumption: In re Robertson, D.C. Ct. App. Nos. 00-FM-925 & 04-FM-1269, slip op. at 24-25 (Jan. 24, 2008) (opens the official source) |
| Florida | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption | Retreat: Fla. Stat. Section 776.012(1)-(2) (2026) (opens the official source)Presumption: Fla. Stat. Section 776.013(2)-(3) (2026) (opens the official source) |
| Georgia | No duty by statute | Presumption unresolved | Retreat: Ga. Code Section 16-3-23.1, enacted by 2006 Ga. Laws Act 599 (SB 396) (opens the official source)Presumption: Medina v. State, S26A0362 (Ga. Mar. 3, 2026) (applying OCGA §§ 16-3-23 and 16-3-24.1) (opens the official source) |
| Hawaii | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | None in cited statute | Retreat: Haw. Rev. Stat. Section 703-304(5)(b) (opens the official source)Presumption: Haw. Rev. Stat. Section 703-304(5)(b)(i) (opens the official source) |
| Idaho | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption | Retreat: Idaho Code Section 19-202A(3) (opens the official source)Presumption: Idaho Code§§19-202A(5),18-4009(2)-(3) (opens the official source) |
| Illinois | No duty under case law | None in cited statute | Retreat: Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions-Criminal 24-25.09X, Committee Note (citing People v. Hughes and People v. Miller) (opens the official source)Presumption: 720 ILCS5/7-2(a),2-6(a) (opens the official source) |
| Indiana | No duty by statute | None in cited statute | Retreat: Ind. Code Section 35-41-3-2(c) (official 2021 code volume; current-body verification pending) (opens the official source)Presumption: Ind. Code Section 35-41-3-2(d) (official 2021 code volume; current-body verification pending) (opens the official source) |
| Iowa | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption | Retreat: Iowa Code Section 704.1(3) (opens the official source)Presumption: Iowa Code Section 704.2A (opens the official source) |
| Kansas | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption | Retreat: Kan. Stat. Ann. Sections 21-5222(c), 21-5230 (opens the official source)Presumption: Kan. Stat. Ann. Sections 21-5223, 21-5224 (opens the official source) |
| Kentucky | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption | Retreat: Ky. Rev. Stat. Sections 503.050(4), 503.055(3) (opens the official source)Presumption: Ky. Rev. Stat. Section 503.055 (opens the official source) |
| Louisiana | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption | Retreat: La. Rev. Stat. Sections 14:19(C)-(D), 14:20(C)-(D) (opens the official source)Presumption: La. Rev. Stat. Sections 14:19(B), 14:20(B) (opens the official source) |
| Maine | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | None in cited statute | Retreat: 17-A Me. Rev. Stat. Section 108(2)(C)(3)(a) (opens the official source)Presumption: 17-A Me. Rev. Stat. Section 108(2)(B) (opens the official source) |
| Maryland | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | Presumption unresolved | Retreat: Shae-Von Edwards v. State, No. 0799, Sept. Term 2023 (Md. App. Ct. Oct. 31, 2025) (opens the official source)Presumption: Joiner v. State, No. 1949, Sept. Term 2023 (Md. App. Ct. May 30, 2025) (opens the official source) |
| Massachusetts | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | None in cited statute | Retreat: Massachusetts Model Jury Instructions on Homicide III, notes 81-84 (discussing G.L. c. 278, Section 8A) (opens the official source)Presumption: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, Section 8A (opens the official source) |
| Michigan | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption | Retreat: Mich. Comp. Laws Section 780.972 (opens the official source)Presumption: Mich. Comp. Laws Section 780.951 (opens the official source) |
| Minnesota | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | None in cited statute | Retreat: State v. Blevins, 10 N.W.3d 29, 35-40 (Minn. 2024) (discussing State v. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d 392, 402 (Minn. 2001)) (opens the official source)Presumption: Minn. Stat. Section 609.065 (opens the official source) |
| Mississippi | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption | Retreat: Miss. Code Section 97-3-15(4) (opens the official source)Presumption: Miss. Code Section 97-3-15(2)(c), (3) (opens the official source) |
| Missouri | No duty by statute | None in cited statute | Retreat: Mo. Rev. Stat. § 563.031.3 (opens the official source)Presumption: Mo. Rev. Stat. § 563.031.2-.5 (opens the official source) |
| Montana | No duty by statute | None in cited statute | Retreat: Mont. Code Ann. § 45-3-110 (opens the official source)Presumption: Mont. Code Ann. §§ 45-3-103, 45-2-101(47) (opens the official source) |
| Nebraska | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | None in cited statute | Retreat: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1409(4)(b) (opens the official source)Presumption: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1409(4)(b)(i) (opens the official source) |
| Nevada | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption | Retreat: Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.120(2) (opens the official source)Presumption: Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 200.120-.130 (opens the official source) |
| New Hampshire | No duty by statute | None in cited statute | Retreat: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 627:4 III(a) (opens the official source)Presumption: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 627:4 II (opens the official source) |
| New Jersey | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | Presumption unresolved | Retreat: N.J. Model Criminal Jury Charge, Justification - Self Defense (N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4) (opens the official source)Presumption: N.J. Model Criminal Jury Charge, Justification - Self Defense (opens the official source) |
| New Mexico | No duty under case law | Presumption unresolved | Retreat: UJI 14-5190 NMRA (opens the official source)Presumption: UJI 14-5170 NMRA (opens the official source) |
| New York | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | None in cited statute | Retreat: N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15(2) (opens the official source)Presumption: N.Y. Penal Law §§ 35.15(2)(a)(i), 35.20(3) (opens the official source) |
| North Carolina | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption | Retreat: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.3(a) (opens the official source)Presumption: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2 (opens the official source) |
| North Dakota | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption | Retreat: N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-05-07(2)(b)(2) (opens the official source)Presumption: N.D. Cent. Code §§ 12.1-05-07(2)(c), 12.1-05-07.1 (opens the official source) |
| Ohio | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption | Retreat: Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.09(B)-(C) (opens the official source)Presumption: Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.05(B)(2)-(4) (opens the official source) |
| Oklahoma | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption | Retreat: Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1289.25(D) (opens the official source)Presumption: Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1289.25(B)-(C) (opens the official source) |
| Oregon | No duty under case law | None in cited chapter | Retreat: State v. James, 350 Or. App. 71, 80 (2026) (opens the official source)Presumption: Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 161.219, 161.225 (opens the official source) |
| Pennsylvania | Qualified or location-specific rule | Entry or removal presumption | Retreat: 18 Pa.C.S. § 505(b)(2.3)-(2.4) (opens the official source)Presumption: 18 Pa.C.S. § 505(b)(2)-(2.5) (opens the official source) |
| Rhode Island | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | Entry or removal presumption | Retreat: State v. Urena, No. 2004-199-C.A., slip op. at 8-9 & n.4 (R.I. June 16, 2006) (quoting State v. Quarles) (opens the official source)Presumption: R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-8-8 (opens the official source) |
| South Carolina | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption | Retreat: S.C. Code § 16-11-440(C) (opens the official source)Presumption: S.C. Code § 16-11-440(A)-(B) (opens the official source) |
| South Dakota | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption | Retreat: S.D. Codified Laws § 22-18-4.1 (opens the official source)Presumption: S.D. Codified Laws §§ 22-18-4.3 to -4.4 (opens the official source) |
| Tennessee | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption | Retreat: Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-611(b), enacted by 2007 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 210 (opens the official source)Presumption: Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-611(c)-(d); 2008 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 1012; 2026 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 886 (opens the official source) |
| Texas | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption | Retreat: Tex. Penal Code §§ 9.31(e)-(f), 9.32(c)-(d) (opens the official source)Presumption: Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(b) (opens the official source) |
| Utah | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption | Retreat: Utah Code § 76-2-402(4) (opens the official source)Presumption: Utah Code §§ 76-2-405(3), 76-2-407(3) (opens the official source) |
| Vermont | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | None in cited statute | Retreat: Vermont Office of Legislative Counsel, Meaning of ‘Necessary’ When Using Force in Self-Defense (Mar. 23, 2022) (discussing State v. Tubbs and State v. Hatcher) (opens the official source)Presumption: 13 V.S.A. § 2305(a) (opens the official source) |
| Virginia | Qualified or location-specific rule | Presumption unresolved | Retreat: Taylor v. Commonwealth, No. 0753-09-3, slip op. at 4 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2010) (opens the official source)Presumption: Horne v. Commonwealth, No. 1267-22-1, slip op. at 10-11 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2023) (opens the official source) |
| Washington | No duty under case law | None in cited statute | Retreat: State v. Courtney, No. 76108-1-I, slip op. at 22-25 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2018) (unpublished) (quoting WPIC 16.08) (opens the official source)Presumption: Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.16.050 (opens the official source) |
| West Virginia | No duty by statute | None in cited statute | Retreat: W. Va. Code § 55-7-22(b)-(c) (opens the official source)Presumption: W. Va. Code § 55-7-22(a)-(b) (opens the official source) |
| Wisconsin | Qualified no-duty rule | Entry or removal presumption | Retreat: State v. Wenger, No. 98-1739-CR, slip op. at 7 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 1999) (opens the official source)Presumption: Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1m) (opens the official source) |
| Wyoming | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption | Retreat: Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-602(e) (opens the official source)Presumption: Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-602(b)-(c) (opens the official source) |
Northeast states
The table below covers 9 states in the Northeast.
| State | Public-retreat treatment | Fear presumption |
|---|---|---|
| Connecticut | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | None in cited statute |
| Maine | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | None in cited statute |
| Massachusetts | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | None in cited statute |
| New Hampshire | No duty by statute | None in cited statute |
| New Jersey | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | Presumption unresolved |
| New York | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | None in cited statute |
| Pennsylvania | Qualified or location-specific rule | Entry or removal presumption |
| Rhode Island | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | Entry or removal presumption |
| Vermont | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | None in cited statute |
Midwest states
The table below covers 12 states in the Midwest.
| State | Public-retreat treatment | Fear presumption |
|---|---|---|
| Illinois | No duty under case law | None in cited statute |
| Indiana | No duty by statute | None in cited statute |
| Iowa | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption |
| Kansas | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption |
| Michigan | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption |
| Minnesota | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | None in cited statute |
| Missouri | No duty by statute | None in cited statute |
| Nebraska | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | None in cited statute |
| North Dakota | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption |
| Ohio | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption |
| South Dakota | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption |
| Wisconsin | Qualified no-duty rule | Entry or removal presumption |
Southern states
The table below covers 16 states in the South, plus the District of Columbia.
| State | Public-retreat treatment | Fear presumption |
|---|---|---|
| Alabama | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption |
| Arkansas | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption |
| Delaware | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | None in cited statute |
| District of Columbia | Qualified or location-specific rule | Presumption unresolved |
| Florida | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption |
| Georgia | No duty by statute | Presumption unresolved |
| Kentucky | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption |
| Louisiana | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption |
| Maryland | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | Presumption unresolved |
| Mississippi | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption |
| North Carolina | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption |
| Oklahoma | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption |
| South Carolina | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption |
| Tennessee | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption |
| Texas | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption |
| Virginia | Qualified or location-specific rule | Presumption unresolved |
| West Virginia | No duty by statute | None in cited statute |
Western states
The table below covers 13 states in the West.
| State | Public-retreat treatment | Fear presumption |
|---|---|---|
| Alaska | No duty by statute | None in cited statute |
| Arizona | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption |
| California | No duty under case law | Entry or removal presumption |
| Colorado | No duty under case law | None in cited statute |
| Hawaii | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | None in cited statute |
| Idaho | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption |
| Montana | No duty by statute | None in cited statute |
| Nevada | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption |
| New Mexico | No duty under case law | Presumption unresolved |
| Oregon | No duty under case law | None in cited chapter |
| Utah | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption |
| Washington | No duty under case law | None in cited statute |
| Wyoming | No duty by statute | Entry or removal presumption |
How to read an unresolved or qualified result
An unresolved result means the cited authority does not establish the broader rule stated in the column. It prevents a missing proposition in one source from becoming a statewide negative. The state may have a dwelling rule, a pattern jury instruction, a later decision, or a separate civil provision that the authority cited for this particular field does not establish. Readers should follow the state link and check the source's effective date.
A qualified result serves a different purpose. It identifies an affirmative rule whose application depends on location, safe avoidance, the type of force, or another stated condition. District of Columbia authority, for example, permits the fact finder to consider safe avoidance when assessing imminent danger without reducing the jurisdiction to a simple statewide yes-or-no retreat label. Wisconsin's safe-retreat opportunity can bear on reasonable necessity outside the conditions specified in Wis. Stat. Section 939.48(1m).
These labels are designed for comparison, not outcome prediction. Facts that often require separate analysis include whether the person was lawfully present, whether the threat was imminent, whether force was proportionate, whether the person provoked the encounter, whether an aggressor withdrew, what location the statute covers, and whether a statutory exception applies. The full state guide is the appropriate starting point for those details.
What to check after selecting a state
First, confirm the current text and effective date of the cited authority. Then identify the location and whether the incident involved public space, a dwelling, a vehicle, or a workplace. Read the rule for the type of force at issue because some provisions distinguish physical force from deadly force. Finally, keep the merits of justification separate from criminal procedure and civil exposure.
After an actual incident, evidence and procedure can matter as much as a comparison label. Records may include emergency calls, photographs, medical records, video, witness accounts, and the physical layout of the location. Preserve existing materials and obtain advice from a lawyer licensed in the state whose law applies. This page supplies general legal information and cannot evaluate credibility, admissibility, charging decisions, or the effect of disputed facts.
Legal information notice: This page provides general information about self-defense law in the 50 states and the District of Columbia as of September 11, 2026. It is not legal advice and does not determine whether force was lawful in a specific event. Consult a lawyer licensed in the relevant jurisdiction for advice about particular facts.
Related self-defense guides
- Compare stand-your-ground and duty-to-retreat rules
- Compare castle-doctrine locations and presumptions
- Select any state in the table for its jurisdiction-specific self-defense guide.
Last updated: September 11, 2026. Authorities cited were reviewed for the classifications stated on this page.
Frequently Asked Questions
Does stand your ground give someone permission to use force?
No. It addresses retreat when force is otherwise justified. The state's rules for necessity, proportionality, reasonable belief, unlawful activity, provocation, and initial aggression still control.
Does castle doctrine mean any force against an intruder is lawful?
No. Home-defense rules and presumptions have defined triggers and exceptions. The manner of entry, the defender's knowledge, the people involved, the location, and the kind of force can all matter.
What does 'presumption unresolved' mean in the table?
It means the authority reviewed here did not establish the broader location-based fear presumption being measured. Follow the state link because other self-defense rules may still protect conduct in a dwelling.
Does 'duty to retreat' mean a person must take an unsafe escape route?
The listed duty rules are qualified, and their exact wording differs. Review the linked state authority for how that jurisdiction treats a safe and available retreat, dwelling exceptions, and sudden attacks.
Does a fear presumption prove self-defense?
No. A presumption applies only if its statutory conditions are met, and listed exceptions may defeat it. Other disputed elements and evidence can remain for the court.
Is self-defense immunity the same in every state?
No. A state may provide a trial defense, a pretrial criminal-immunity procedure, a civil-liability rule, an arrest restriction, some combination of them, or leave part of the issue unresolved in the sources reviewed.
Where can I compare the detailed rules?
Use the stand-your-ground comparison for retreat classifications and conditions, the castle-doctrine comparison for protected locations and presumptions, and the linked state guide for jurisdiction-specific detail.
Updates
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources
Rebuilt the 51-jurisdiction comparison, separated retreat treatment from fear presumptions and immunity, removed unsupported national counts, corrected qualified and unresolved categories, and linked the detailed stand-your-ground and castle-doctrine comparisons.
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources
Corrected the description of Alabama's 2026 self-defense law change (it creates a rebuttable presumption tied to disposing of the weapon used, not a burden-shift to prosecutors at immunity hearings, and does not take effect until October 1, 2026); fixed an inverted duty-to-retreat classification for California and an incorrect castle-doctrine presumption claim for Arkansas in the 51-state comparison table; corrected Alabama's table entry to accurately reflect where its use-of-force presumption applies; and filled in a few incomplete state examples in the FAQ.
Fixed an inverted burden-of-proof claim about Florida's 2017 stand-your-ground immunity amendment: Fla. Stat. 776.032(4) puts the burden on the PROSECUTION (clear and convincing evidence) to overcome immunity, not on the defendant.
Corrected the South Dakota row and HB1212 summary in the 51-state comparison table: SDCL 22-18-4 establishes a no-duty-to-retreat rule for non-deadly force only, with no castle-doctrine presumption language.
Scoped South Dakota's stand-your-ground listing to non-deadly force, matching SDCL 22-18-4.
State-by-state comparison
Each state guide below is paired with the governing statute our editors adjudicated for it, held in our own legal record and verified against the official source.
Each statute shown is the same adjudicated anchor its state guide renders, independently verified against primary sources. A dash means not yet adjudicated in our record — never that no law exists.
The Law Behind This Article
This article rests on the statutory provisions below, held in our own legal record and retrieved from the official source. Tap a section to read the operative text.
Florida Statutes
§ 776.012Use or threatened use of force in defense of person.In forcecited in 8 of our articles
(1) A person is justified in using or threatening to use force, except deadly force, against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other’s imminent use of unlawful force. A person who uses or threatens to use force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat before using or threatening to use such force. (2) A person is justified in using or threatening to use deadly force if he or she reasonably believes that using or threatening to use such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony. A person who uses or threatens to use deadly force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground if the person using or threatening to use the deadly force is not engaged in a criminal activity and is in a place where he or she has a right to be.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at leg.state.fl.us
Cited in 101 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Little v. State (2013) read section 776.012, as then numbered, as an independent basis for Stand Your Ground immunity, so a felon unlawfully armed could still claim it; the court certified conflict. Ivester v. State (1981) read section 776.012 with section 776.051 to allow self-defense against excessive force by an officer.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Smiley v. State (Supreme Court of Florida 2007, 966 So. 2d 330)“…reasoned that section 776.013 made a substantive change to section 776.012, Florida Statutes (2004), and it therefore would be a vio…”
- Hill v. State (Supreme Court of Florida 1996, 688 So. 2d 901)✓Hill shot and killed an abortion provider and an escort outside a Pensacola clinic, then sought to justify it under section 776.012; the court held legal abortion is not a cognizable harm under the statute and upheld barring that defense.
- Ivester v. State (District Court of Appeal of Florida 1981, 398 So. 2d 926)✓Ivester was convicted of resisting arrest with violence after a struggle with an officer witnesses said had kicked and threatened him; reading section 776.012 together with section 776.051, the court held self-defense against excessive force is relevant to that charge.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Florida Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026), Oregon Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026), Washington Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)
§ 776.013Home protection; use or threatened use of deadly force; presumption of fear of death or great bodily harm.In forcecited in 7 of our articles
(1) A person who is in a dwelling or residence in which the person has a right to be has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground and use or threaten to use:(a) Nondeadly force against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other’s imminent use of unlawful force; or (b) Deadly force if he or she reasonably believes that using or threatening to use such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at leg.state.fl.us
Cited in 37 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- In Re: Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases-Report 2017-07. (Supreme Court of Florida 2018, 257 So. 3d 908)“…w enforcement officer” from § 943.10(14), Fla. Stat. § 776.013(4), Fla. Stat. § 776.013(5), Fla. Stat.…”
- In Re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases—report No. 2014-06 (Supreme Court of Florida 2016, 191 So. 3d 411)“…of “law enforcement officer” from § 943.10(14), Fla. Stat. § 776.013(4), Fla. Stat. § 776.013(5), Fla. Stat.…”
- In Re: Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases - Report 2019-01 (Supreme Court of Florida 2019)“…enforcement officer” from § 943.10(14), Fla. Stat. § 776.013(4), Fla. Stat. § 776.013(5), Fla. Stat.…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Maryland Self-Defense Laws: Duty to Retreat & Castle Doctrine (2026), Stand Your Ground States: Rules in All 50 States and DC, Castle Doctrine States: Rules in All 50 States and DC
§ 776.032Immunity from criminal prosecution and civil action for justifiable use or threatened use of force.In forcecited in 10 of our articles
(1) A person who uses or threatens to use force as permitted in s. 776.012, s. 776.013, or s. 776.031 is justified in such conduct and is immune from criminal prosecution and civil action for the use or threatened use of such force by the person, personal representative, or heirs of the person against whom the force was used or threatened, unless the person against whom force was used or threatened is a law enforcement officer, as defined in s. 943.10(14), who was acting in the performance of his or her official duties and the officer identified himself or herself in accordance with any applicable law or the person using or threatening to use force knew or reasonably should have known that the person was a law enforcement officer. As used in this subsection, the term “criminal prosecution” includes arresting, detaining in custody, and charging or prosecuting the defendant.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at leg.state.fl.us
Cited in 104 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Dennis v. State (Supreme Court of Florida 2010, 35 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 731)“…ss asserting immunity from criminal prosecution pursuant to section 776.032, Florida Statutes (2006), commonly known as the “Stand Yo…”
- Velasquez v. State (District Court of Appeal of Florida 2009, 9 So. 3d 22)“…he trial court’s failure to find the defendant immune under section 776.032, Florida Statutes (2008), the “Stand Your Ground” law. Th…”
- Finkelstein v. State (District Court of Appeal of Florida 2015, 157 So. 3d 1085)“…fied to defend himself. See §§ 776.012, 776.013, 776.031, Fla. Stat. Section 776.032 provides that if a defendant establishe…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: California Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026), New Mexico Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)
New York Penal Law
§ 35.15Justification; use of physical force in defense of a personIn forcecited in 6 of our articles
Justification; use of physical force in defense of a person. 1. A person may, subject to the provisions of subdivision two, use physical force upon another person when and to the extent he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend himself, herself or a third person from what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by such other person, unless: (a) The latter's conduct was provoked by the actor with intent to cause physical injury to another person; or (b) The actor was the initial aggressor; except that in such case the use of physical force is nevertheless justifiable if the actor has withdrawn from the encounter and effectively communicated such withdrawal to such other person but the latter persists in continuing the incident by the use or threatened imminent use of unlawful physical force; or (c) The physical force involved is the product of a combat by agreement not specifically authorized by law. 2.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislation.nysenate.gov
Cited in 780 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):People v. Goetz (1986) held that the reasonableness required by Penal Law 35.15 is objective, not simply what the defendant himself thought reasonable, though the jury weighs his circumstances and prior experiences. People v. McManus (1986) held justification is an ordinary defense the People must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- People v. Taylor (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York 2017, 2017 NY Slip Op 7649)“…s testimony that defendant was the initial aggressor ( see Penal Law § 35.15 [1] [b]; [2]; see generally People v W…”
- People v. Goetz (New York Court of Appeals 1986, 68 N.Y.2d 96)✓Goetz shot four youths on a subway train after one asked him for five dollars; the court held Penal Law 35.15's "reasonably believes" keeps an objective element, so the prosecutor's "reasonable man in the defendant's situation" charge was right, and reinstated the indictment.
- People v. McManus (New York Court of Appeals 1986, 67 N.Y.2d 541)✓McManus fired a rifle into a group he said was beating and robbing his companion and was convicted of depraved indifference murder after the court refused a justification charge on that count; the court held Penal Law 35.15 applies regardless of mens rea and ordered a new trial.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: New York Self-Defense Laws: Duty to Retreat & Castle Doctrine (2026)
§ 35.20Justification; use of physical force in defense of premises and in defense of a person in the course of burglaryIn forcecited in 6 of our articles
Justification; use of physical force in defense of premises and in defense of a person in the course of burglary. 1. Any person may use physical force upon another person when he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate what he or she reasonably believes to be the commission or attempted commission by such other person of a crime involving damage to premises. Such person may use any degree of physical force, other than deadly physical force, which he or she reasonably believes to be necessary for such purpose, and may use deadly physical force if he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate the commission or attempted commission of arson. 2. A person in possession or control of any premises, or a person licensed or privileged to be thereon or therein, may use physical force upon another person when he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate what he or she reasonably believes to be the commission or attempted commission by such other person of a criminal trespass upon such premises.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislation.nysenate.gov
Cited in 76 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2024
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- People v. Cox (New York Court of Appeals 1998, 92 N.Y.2d 1002)“…harge the defense of justification to terminate a burglary (Penal Law § 35.20 [3]), and defendant was convicted. The…”
- People v. White (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York 2010, 75 A.D.3d 109)“…ury on the defense of justification in defense of premises (Penal Law § 35.20 [3]) as it pertained to the count of ma…”
- People v. Hernandez (New York Court of Appeals 2002, 98 N.Y.2d 175)“…defined and used elsewhere in the Penal Law. Most notably, Penal Law § 35.20, which describes when a defendant may u…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Wisconsin Statutes, Chapter 939: Crimes
§ 939.48Self-defense and defense of others.In forcecited in 6 of our articles
(1) A person is privileged to threaten or intentionally use force against another for the purpose of preventing or terminating what the person reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference with his or her person by such other person. The actor may intentionally use only such force or threat thereof as the actor reasonably believes is necessary to prevent or terminate the interference. The actor may not intentionally use force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm unless the actor reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself. (1m) (a) In this subsection: 1. “Dwelling” has the meaning given in s. 895.07 (1) (h). 2. “Place of business” means a business that the actor owns or operates.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at docs.legis.wisconsin.gov
Cited in 39 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):State v. Head (2002) held Wis. Stat. 939.48(1) sets a reasonable objective threshold for perfect self-defense: a reasonable belief in unlawful interference and that the force used was necessary. State v. Hamdan (2003) applied it to hold that generalized high-crime fear is not the actual unlawful interference the statute requires.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. Head (Wisconsin Supreme Court 2002, 255 Wis. 2d 194)✓Head shot her husband after he threatened her during an argument about their daughter. The court held section 939.48(1) requires objectively reasonable beliefs for perfect self-defense, while imperfect self-defense needs only actual beliefs, and ordered a new trial.
- State v. Payano (Wisconsin Supreme Court 2009, 2009 WI 86)“…tat. § 904.01 ; Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772 ; see also Wis. Stat. § 939.48 (1) and (4). ¶ 73 In terms of contex…”
- State v. Hamdan (Wisconsin Supreme Court 2003, 264 Wis. 2d 433)✓Hamdan, a grocer in a high-crime area, was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon in his store. The court rejected his self-defense privilege because section 939.48 requires an actual unlawful interference, absent that night, but reversed his conviction on other grounds.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Wisconsin Self-Defense Laws: Castle Doctrine & Duty to Retreat (2026)
Wisconsin Statutes, Chapter 895: Damages, Liability, And Miscellaneous Provisions Regarding Actions In Courts
§ 895.62Use of force in response to unlawful and forcible entry into a dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business; civil liability immunity.In forcecited in 6 of our articles
(1) In this section: (a) “Actor” means a person who uses force that is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm to another person. (b) “Dwelling” has the meaning given in s. 895.07 (1) (h). (c) “Place of business” means a business that the actor owns or operates. (2) Except as provided in sub. (4), an actor is immune from civil liability arising out of his or her use of force that is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm if the actor reasonably believed that the force was necessary to prevent imminent death or bodily harm to himself or herself or to another person and either of the following applies: (a) The person against whom the force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcibly entering the actor’s dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business, the actor was on his or her property or present in the dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business, and the actor knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry was occurring.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at docs.legis.wisconsin.gov
Cited in 2 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Brandon Velez, Plaintiff v. Rachael Eutzy, Erik Slocum, Casey Seigle, and The City of Manchester, N.H., Defendants (District Court, D. New Hampshire 2025, 2025 DNH 061)“…and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8340.2; Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-622; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 895.62(5); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-204(c). Yet,…”
- Velez v. Eutzy (District Court, D. New Hampshire 2025)“…at. Ann. § 8340.2; Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-622; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 895.62(5); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-2…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Connecticut General Statutes, Title 53a (Penal Code), Chapter 951
§ 53a-19Use of physical force in defense of person.In forcecited in 6 of our articles
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, a person is justified in using reasonable physical force upon another person to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of physical force, and he may use such degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for such purpose; except that deadly physical force may not be used unless the actor reasonably believes that such other person is (1) using or about to use deadly physical force, or (2) inflicting or about to inflict great bodily harm.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at cga.ct.gov
Cited in 227 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):State v. Corchado (1982) held it reversible error to charge that a defendant must be without fault, because section 53a-19 imposes no such requirement and turns on what he reasonably believed, subject to the exceptions in subsection (c). State v. Miller (1982) upheld a charge tracking subsection (b) on retreat.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. Miller (Supreme Court of Connecticut 1982, 186 Conn. 654)✓Miller shot an unarmed man in the head outside a mall after being asked to step outside; the court held that defining deadly physical force as force liable or certain to cause death favored him, and a stray feasible retreat remark did not dilute the 53a-19(b) charge.
- State v. Corchado (Supreme Court of Connecticut 1982, 188 Conn. 653)✓Corchado slapped a man through his car window, was met with a drawn gun, and shot him several times; the court ordered a new trial, holding common law aggressor and without fault instructions displaced 53a-19 and took his intent and reasonable belief from the jury.
- State v. Cruz (Supreme Court of Connecticut 2004, 269 Conn. 97)“…artinez and, therefore, his use of force was justified. See General Statutes § 53a-19. 4 The defendant testified that he *1…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Connecticut Self-Defense Laws: Duty to Retreat & Castle Doctrine (2026)
§ 53a-20Use of physical force in defense of premises.In forcecited in 6 of our articles
A person in possession or control of premises, or a person who is licensed or privileged to be in or upon such premises, is justified in using reasonable physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate the commission or attempted commission of a criminal trespass by such other person in or upon such premises; but he may use deadly physical force under such circumstances only (1) in defense of a person as prescribed in section 53a-19, or (2) when he reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent an attempt by the trespasser to commit arson or any crime of violence, or (3) to the extent that he reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate an unlawful entry by force into his dwelling as defined in section 53a-100, or place of work, and for the sole purpose of such prevention or termination.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at cga.ct.gov
Cited in 25 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2024
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. Amado (Supreme Court of Connecticut 2000, 254 Conn. 184)“…to use reasonable force in defense of premises pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-20, 6 and the defendant’s duty to retreat…”
- State v. Erickson (Supreme Court of Connecticut 2010, 297 Conn. 164)“…to resist unlawful entry, 9 (3) defense of premises under General Statutes § 53a-20, 10 and (4) Orr’s failure to serve the…”
- Burke v. Mesniaeff (Supreme Court of Connecticut 2019, 334 Conn. 100)“…d the jury on criminal trespass, we turn first to General Statutes § 53a-20, which governs the use of phy…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Kentucky Revised Statutes, Chapter 503: GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTIFICATION
§ 503.055Use of defensive force regarding dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle -- ExceptionsIn forcecited in 6 of our articles
(1) A person is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another when using defensive force that is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm to another if: (a) The person against whom the defensive force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcibly entering or had unlawfully and forcibly entered a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle, or if that person had removed or was attempting to remove another against that person's will from the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle; and (b) The person who uses defensive force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and forcible act was occurring or had occurred.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at apps.legislature.ky.gov
Cited in 53 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Kentucky courts have applied KRS 503.055 mainly through its 2006 enactment. Rodgers v. Commonwealth (2009) held the provision is substantive and does not apply retroactively to conduct before July 12, 2006. Commonwealth v. Hasch (2013) held that where the statute applies, the court must give a requested no duty to retreat instruction.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Rodgers v. Commonwealth (Kentucky Supreme Court 2009, 285 S.W.3d 740)✓Rodgers shot a man during a backyard argument in 2004 and sought the benefit of Kentucky's 2006 self-defense amendments at his later trial; the court held KRS 503.055 is a wholly new substantive statute that does not apply retroactively to his conduct.
- Hannah v. Commonwealth (Kentucky Supreme Court 2010, 306 S.W.3d 509)✓Hannah shot a man who kept fighting after being disarmed in 2004; the court held KRS 503.055(3) and the rest of the 2006 no duty to retreat amendments are not retroactive, so no such instruction was required, but reversed because he was barred from arguing retreat to the jury.
- Commonwealth v. Hasch (Kentucky Supreme Court 2013, 421 S.W.3d 349)✓Hasch shot her husband between the eyes during a struggle over a handgun at home; the court held KRS 503.055(3) bars using evidence of an available escape to show defensive force was unnecessary, but found the error harmless and reinstated her reckless homicide conviction.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Kentucky Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)
§ 503.050Use of physical force in self-protection -- Admissibility of evidence of prior acts of domestic violence and abuseIn forcecited in 6 of our articles
(1) The use of physical force by a defendant upon another person is justifiable when the defendant believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by the other person. (2) The use of deadly physical force by a defendant upon another person is justifiable under subsection (1) only when the defendant believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious physical injury, kidnapping, sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat, felony involving the use of force, or under those circumstances permitted pursuant to KRS 503.055. (3) Any evidence presented by the defendant to establish the existence of a prior act or acts of domestic violence and abuse as defined in KRS 403.720 by the person against whom the defendant is charged with employing physical force shall be admissible under this section. (4) A person does not have a duty to retreat prior to the use of deadly physical force.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at apps.legislature.ky.gov
Cited in 135 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Springer v. Commonwealth (Kentucky Supreme Court 1999, 998 S.W.2d 439)“…ing her with the "imminent use of unlawful physical force." KRS 503.050(1). Prior to the adoption of the pena…”
- Rodgers v. Commonwealth (Kentucky Supreme Court 2009, 285 S.W.3d 740)“…vent the commission of a felony involving the use of force. KRS 503.050(2). The bill expressly provided that th…”
- Elliott v. Commonwealth (Kentucky Supreme Court 1998, 976 S.W.2d 416)“…2d 959 (1931). The penal code takes a different approach. KRS 503.050 provides as follows: (1) The use…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Official Code of Georgia Annotated
§ 16-3-21Use of force in defense of self or others; evidence of belief that force was necessary in murder or manslaughter prosecution.In forcecited in 2 of our articles
(a) A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that such threat or force is necessary to defend himself or herself or a third person against such other's imminent use of unlawful force; however, except as provided in
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legis.ga.gov
Cited in 503 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Woodard v. State (2015) overruled Heard and held OCGA 16-3-21(b)(2) applies by its terms, so a person committing a felony is not justified in using force in self-defense. Neal v. State (2012) applied the section, holding a charge tracking its aggressor exception harmless even assuming no evidence showed Neal was the aggressor.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Neal v. State (Supreme Court of Georgia 2012, 290 Ga. 563)✓Neal held his fiancee in a chokehold until she died and claimed self-defense; he attacked the added charge from OCGA 16-3-21(b)(3) on aggressors and mutual combat. The court held an instruction closely tracking the statute is not harmful even if that exception does not apply.
- Woodard v. State (Supreme Court of Georgia 2015)✓Woodard, a convicted felon carrying a gun, shot and killed two off-duty officers working security during a pat-down and claimed self-defense; the court overruled Heard v. State and held OCGA 16-3-21(b)(2) applies by its terms to any felony, so that charge was not error.
- State v. Collins (Supreme Court of Georgia 1998, 270 Ga. 42)“…wing the defendant to present a justification defense under OCGA § 16-3-21 (a).…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Georgia Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)
§ 16-3-23Use of force in defense of habitation.In forcecited in 6 of our articles
A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that such threat or force is necessary to prevent or terminate such other's unlawful entry into or attack upon a habitation;…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2021-08-17 · Read the full text in our law library
Cited in 104 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Coleman v. State (Supreme Court of Georgia 2009, 286 Ga. 291)“…tion on the use of force in defense of habitation, found in OCGA § 16-3-23. 2 “Unlike the defense of…”
- Fair v. State (Supreme Court of Georgia 2008, 284 Ga. 165)“…16-3-24 shall be immune from criminal prosecution...." OCGA § 16-3-23 governs the use of force in defense of…”
- Benham v. State (Supreme Court of Georgia 2004, 277 Ga. 516)“…on the use of force in defense of habitation as provided in OCGA § 16-3-23. To the extent that the Court of Appeal…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
California Penal Code
§ 198.5In forcecited in 6 of our articles
Any person using force intended or likely to cause death or great bodily injury within his or her residence shall be presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily injury to self, family, or a member of the household when that force is used against another person, not a member of the family or household, who unlawfully and forcibly enters or has unlawfully and forcibly entered the residence and the person using the force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred. As used in this section, great bodily injury means a significant or substantial physical injury.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at leginfo.legislature.ca.gov
Cited in 14 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2023
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- People v. Brown (California Court of Appeal 1992, 6 Cal. App. 4th 1489)“…front porch may be “forcibly entered” within the meaning of Penal Code section 198.5. It arises out of an altercation in whi…”
- People v. Gleghorn (California Court of Appeal 1987, 193 Cal. App. 3d 196)“…He asserts that CALJIC No. 5.42 is inconsistent with Penal Code section 198.5 which states: “Any person using force i…”
- People v. Silvey (California Court of Appeal 1997, 58 Cal. App. 4th 1320)“…easonable." He contends such an instruction is supported by Penal Code section 198.5, and should have been given even though…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
New Mexico Statutes Annotated 1978, Chapter 30
§ 30-2-7Justifiable homicide by citizenIn forcecited in 3 of our articles
Homicide is justifiable when committed by any person in any of the following cases: A. when committed in the necessary defense of his life, his family or his property, or in necessarily defending against any unlawful action directed against himself, his wife or family; B. when committed in the lawful defense of himself or of another and when there is a reasonable ground to believe a design exists to commit a felony or to do some great personal injury against such person or another, and there is imminent danger that the design will be accomplished; or C. when necessarily committed in attempting, by lawful ways and means, to apprehend any person for any felony committed in his presence, or in lawfully suppressing any riot, or in necessarily and lawfully keeping and preserving the peace.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at nmonesource.com
Cited in 11 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):New Mexico reads Section 30-2-7 as the justification that negates the unlawfulness element of homicide. State v. Parish (1994) held once self-defense is raised the State must disprove it; State v. Cunningham (2000) held omitting unlawfulness from the murder elements was not fundamental error where a self-defense instruction was given.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. Cunningham (New Mexico Supreme Court 2000, 128 N.M. 711)✓Cunningham killed a man in a shootout and claimed self-defense. Citing Section 30-2-7(A) as the justification that makes a killing lawful, the court held omitting unlawfulness from the murder elements instruction was not fundamental error given a separate self-defense charge.
- State v. Parish (New Mexico Supreme Court 1994, 118 N.M. 39)✓Parish, chased and beaten by a group in Taos, shot and killed one attacker. Reading the justifiable homicide statute with Section 30-2-8, the court held its unstated premise is that the State must rebut a claim of lawfulness, and reversed his voluntary manslaughter conviction.
- State v. Candelaria (New Mexico Supreme Court 2018, 434 P.3d 297)“…of self-defense and defense of another as set forth in 15 NMSA 1978, Section 30-2-7(A)-(B) (1963)); State v. Ellis, 2008-NM…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Utah Code, Title 76: Criminal Offenses
§ 76-2-402Force in defense of person -- Forcible felony defined.In forcecited in 4 of our articles
(1) As used in this section: (a) "Forcible felony" means aggravated assault, mayhem, aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping and aggravated kidnapping, rape, forcible sodomy, rape of a child, object rape, object rape of a child, sexual abuse of a child, aggravated sexual abuse of a child, and aggravated sexual assault as defined in Chapter 5, Offenses Against the Individual, and arson, robbery, and burglary as defined in Chapter 6, Offenses Against Property. (b) "Forcible felony" includes any other felony offense that involves the use of force or violence against an individual that poses a substantial danger of death or serious bodily injury. (c) "Forcible felony" does not include burglary of a vehicle, as defined in Section 76-6-204, unless the vehicle is occupied at the time unlawful entry is made or attempted. (2) (a) An individual is justified in threatening or using force against another individual when and to the extent that the individual reasonably believes that force or a threat of force is necessary to defend the individual or another individual against the imminent use of unlawful force.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at le.utah.gov
Cited in 68 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Utah courts have applied the exclusions in Utah Code 76-2-402. State v. Gonzalez (2015) held that evidence of the defendant's words and conduct was enough for a jury to find he was the aggressor and not justified. State v. Silva (2019) addressed whether the felony in progress bar foreclosed self-defense but affirmed on lack of prejudice.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. Gonzalez (Utah Supreme Court 2015, 779 Utah Adv. Rep. 124)✓Gonzalez followed a rival gang member into a store restroom, blocked the exit and stabbed him; the court held the evidence let a jury find he was the aggressor, so the section 76-2-402 self-defense justification was unavailable and the directed verdict was properly denied.
- State v. Lee (Court of Appeals of Utah 2014, 751 Utah Adv. Rep. 16)“…son against such other's imminent use of unlawful force. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (1) (LexisNexis 2003). But this general…”
- State v. Silva (Utah Supreme Court 2019, 456 P.3d 718)✓The trial court barred Silva from arguing perfect self-defense under section 76-2-402(2)(a)(ii) because he was committing felonies when he shot an unarmed man in the back of the head; the court assumed that ruling was error but held it harmless and affirmed.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Utah Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)
Minnesota Statutes, Chapter 609: CRIMINAL CODE
§ 609.065JUSTIFIABLE TAKING OF LIFEIn forcecited in 6 of our articles
The intentional taking of the life of another is not authorized by section 609.06, except when necessary in resisting or preventing an offense which the actor reasonably believes exposes the actor or another to great bodily harm or death, or preventing the commission of a felony in the actor's place of abode.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at revisor.mn.gov
Cited in 30 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Minnesota courts have applied Minn. Stat. 609.065 to self-defense and defense of dwelling. State v. Pendleton (1997) held fear of great bodily harm or death is not an element of the defense-of-dwelling clause; State v. Dodis (1982) held improper an instruction allowing deadly force against a non-life-threatening felony.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. Dodis (Supreme Court of Minnesota 1982, 314 N.W.2d 233)✓Dodis shot a drinking companion twice in the head and said the man had forced him into a sex act; the court held the instruction he wanted, approving deadly force to prevent a felony that was not life-threatening, misstated Minn. Stat. 609.065 and was properly refused.
- State v. Pendleton (Supreme Court of Minnesota 1997, 567 N.W.2d 265)✓Pendleton shot a guest who refused to leave his apartment and rushed him; the court held that under Minn. Stat. 609.065 a defendant preventing a felony in his own home need not fear death or great bodily harm, so the standard instruction adding that element required a new trial.
- State v. Hare (Supreme Court of Minnesota 1998, 575 N.W.2d 828)✓Hare stabbed his niece's boyfriend, with whom he shared an apartment, during a fight; the court held the defense-of-dwelling clause of Minn. Stat. 609.065 presupposes an intruder, so one resident cannot invoke it against a co-resident, making the instruction error harmless.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Minnesota Self-Defense Laws: Duty to Retreat & Castle Doctrine (2026)
Michigan Compiled Laws
§ 780.972Use of deadly force by individual not engaged in commission of crime; conditionsIn forcecited in 7 of our articles
(1) An individual who has not or is not engaged in the commission of a crime at the time he or she uses deadly force may use deadly force against another individual anywhere he or she has the legal right to be with no duty to retreat if either of the following applies: (a) The individual honestly and reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is necessary to prevent the imminent death of or imminent great bodily harm to himself or herself or to another individual. (b) The individual honestly and reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is necessary to prevent the imminent sexual assault of himself or herself or of another individual. (2) An individual who has not or is not engaged in the commission of a crime at the time he or she uses force other than deadly force may use force other than deadly force against another individual anywhere he or she has the legal right to be with no duty to retreat if he or she honestly and reasonably believes that the use of that force is necessary to defend himself or herself or another individual from the imminent unlawful use of force by another individual.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislature.mi.gov
Cited in 263 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):People v. Guajardo (2013) held that a felon unlawfully possessing a firearm is not barred from raising self-defense under MCL 780.972, because the Self-Defense Act preserves common-law defenses. People v. Stevens (2014) applied section 780.972(1) to a defendant who entered a home uninvited and attacked the occupant.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- People v. Stevens (Michigan Court of Appeals 2014, 306 Mich. App. 620)✓Stevens went to a man's house with a knife, entered uninvited, started a fight and stabbed him four times; the court held the evidence excluded self-defense under MCL 780.972(1) because he had no legal right to be in the home and was committing a crime when he used force.
- People v. Guajardo (Michigan Court of Appeals 2013, 300 Mich. App. 26)✓Guajardo, a felon barred from guns, retrieved a rifle, waited minutes, then shot a tenant who had retreated into his room; the court held the Self-Defense Act does not bar a felon in possession from claiming self-defense, but that no evidence supported the instruction here.
- People v. Moreno (Michigan Supreme Court 2012, 491 Mich. 38)“…islature changed the common-law duty to retreat by enacting MCL 780.972, which specifically explains that there…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Michigan Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)
§ 780.951Individual using deadly force or force other than deadly force; presumption; definitionsIn forcecited in 8 of our articles
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), it is a rebuttable presumption in a civil or criminal case that an individual who uses deadly force or force other than deadly force under section 2 of the self-defense act has an honest and reasonable belief that imminent death of, sexual assault of, or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another individual will occur if both of the following apply: (a) The individual against whom deadly force or force other than deadly force is used is in the process of breaking and entering a dwelling or business premises or committing home invasion or has broken and entered a dwelling or business premises or committed home invasion and is still present in the dwelling or business premises, or is unlawfully attempting to remove another individual from a dwelling, business premises, or occupied vehicle against his or her will. (b) The individual using deadly force or force other than deadly force honestly and reasonably believes that the individual is engaging in conduct described in subdivision (a).
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-30 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislature.mi.gov
Cited in 16 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- People of Michigan v. Michael Anthony Thigpen (Michigan Court of Appeals 2023)“…n October 1, 2006, id., and with it the Legislature enacted MCL 780.951(1), see 2006 PA 311, which forms the ba…”
- People of Michigan v. Theodore Paul Wafer (Michigan Supreme Court 2018)“…asonable belief of imminent death or great bodily harm. See MCL 780.951(1). The trial court reasoned that CJI2d…”
- People v. Conyer (Michigan Court of Appeals 2008, 281 Mich. App. 526)“…3 These acts were codified at MCL 780.961, MCL 780.951, MCL 600.2922c, MCL 768.21c, and MCL 60…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Kansas Statutes Annotated, Chapter 21: CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS
§ 21-5222Defense of a person; no duty to retreat.In forcecited in 6 of our articles
(a) A person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent it appears to such person and such person reasonably believes that such use of force is necessary to defend such person or a third person against such other's imminent use of unlawful force. (b) A person is justified in the use of deadly force under circumstances described in subsection (a) if such person reasonably believes that such use of deadly force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to such person or a third person. (c) Nothing in this section shall require a person to retreat if such person is using force to protect such person or a third person.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ksrevisor.gov
Cited in 37 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):State v. Macomber (2019) applied the subjective and objective prongs of KSA 21-5222 and upheld a probable cause finding that the defendant's deadly force was not statutorily justified. State v. Fisher (2016) described imperfect self-defense as an honest but objectively unreasonable belief that 21-5222 justified force.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. Fisher (Supreme Court of Kansas 2016, 304 Kan. 242)✓Fisher gravely injured a housemate in a fight and testified he feared she would kill him. The court held an imperfect self-defense instruction, resting on an honest but unreasonable belief that 21-5222 justified force, was appropriate but its omission not clear error.
- State v. Macomber (Supreme Court of Kansas 2019)✓Macomber shot and killed an unarmed man during a confrontation in the man's driveway. The court upheld denial of self-defense immunity because the State showed probable cause the force was not justified under 21-5222, and held the omitted presumption instruction harmless.
- State v. Montgomery (Supreme Court of Kansas 2026)✓Montgomery crossed a street and shot an unarmed man five times after the man raised his hands. The court held a 21-5222 self-defense instruction was not factually appropriate because no reasonable person could have perceived an imminent threat of death.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Kansas Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)
Maine Revised Statutes, Title 17-A: MAINE CRIMINAL CODE, Part 1: GENERAL PRINCIPLES, Chapter 5: DEFENSES AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES; JUSTIFICATION
§ 108Physical force in defense of a personIn forcecited in 6 of our articles
1. A person is justified in using a reasonable degree of nondeadly force upon another person in order to defend the person or a 3rd person from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful, nondeadly force by such other person, and the person may use a degree of such force that the person reasonably believes to be necessary for such purpose. However, such force is not justifiable if: A. With a purpose to cause physical harm to another person, the person provoked the use of unlawful, nondeadly force by such other person; or [PL 2007, c. 173, §24 (AMD).] B. The person was the initial aggressor, unless after such aggression the person withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to such other person the intent to do so, but the other person notwithstanding continues the use or threat of unlawful, nondeadly force; or [PL 2007, c. 173, §24 (AMD).] C. The force involved was the product of a combat by agreement not authorized by law. [PL 1975, c. 499, §1 (NEW).] 1-A.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislature.maine.gov
Cited in 93 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):State v. Ouellette (2012) held a section 108 self-defense instruction is available for any charge with an intentional, knowing, or reckless element. State v. Pabon (2011) held omitting section 108's dwelling-place exception to the duty to retreat was not obvious error where the defendant was the initial aggressor.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. Pabon (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine 2011, 28 A.3d 1147)✓Pabon stabbed his girlfriend and housemate in their apartment; the trial court left section 108's dwelling-place exception to the duty to retreat out of the self-defense instruction, and the court held that omission was not obvious error given the evidence he was the aggressor.
- State v. Ouellette (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine 2012, 37 A.3d 921)✓Ouellette left his vehicle with a baseball bat and hit a man who had threatened and tailed him; the court held a section 108 self-defense justification is available for any charge carrying a reckless state of mind, and vacated his reckless conduct conviction.
- State v. Philbrick (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine 1984, 481 A.2d 488)✓Philbrick shot and killed a man in Saco and asked for instructions on self-defense and sexual self-defense under section 108(2)(A); the court held his own contradictory accounts generated neither justification, and affirmed the refusal to instruct.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Maine Self-Defense Laws: Duty to Retreat & Castle Doctrine (2026)
West Virginia Code
§ 55-7-22Civil relief for persons resisting certain criminal activities.In forcecited in 7 of our articles
(a) A lawful occupant within a home or other place of residence is justified in using reasonable and proportionate force, including deadly force, against an intruder or attacker to prevent a forcible entry into the home or residence or to terminate the intruder's or attacker's unlawful entry if the occupant reasonably apprehends that the intruder or attacker may kill or inflict serious bodily harm upon the occupant or others in the home or residence or if the occupant reasonably believes that the intruder or attacker intends to commit a felony in the home or residence and the occupant reasonably believes deadly force is necessary. (b) A lawful occupant within a home or other place of residence does not have a duty to retreat from an intruder or attacker in the circumstances described in subsection (a) of this section.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at code.wvlegislature.gov
Also relied on in: West Virginia Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)
Delaware Code, Title 11 (Crimes and Criminal Procedure), Chapter 004 (DEFENSES TO CRIMINAL LIABILITY)
§ 464Justification — Use of force in self-protection.In forcecited in 6 of our articles
(a) The use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the defendant reasonably believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting the defendant against the use of unlawful force by the other person on the present occasion. (b) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (d) and (e) of this section, a person employing protective force may estimate the necessity thereof under the circumstances as the person reasonably believes them to be when the force is used, without retreating, surrendering possession, doing any other act which the person has no legal duty to do or abstaining from any lawful action. (c) The use of deadly force is justifiable under this section if the defendant reasonably believes that such force is necessary to protect the defendant against death, serious physical injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat. (d) The use of force is not justifiable under this section to resist an arrest which the defendant knows or should know is being made by a peace officer, whether or not the arrest is lawful.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at delcode.delaware.gov
Cited in 49 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):State v. Taylor (2021) held that the June 2021 amendment to 11 Del. C. § 464, which requires a defendant's belief in the need for force to be reasonable, is substantive and does not reach earlier conduct. Spence v. State (2015) applied section 464(e)(2) where the defendant's own testimony showed he could have retreated in complete safety.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Probst v. State (Supreme Court of Delaware 1988, 547 A.2d 114)“…direction of Walla in self-defense or in defense of others. 11 Del.C. §§ 464-465. In essence, Probst’s attorney argu…”
- Spence v. State (Supreme Court of Delaware 2015, 129 A.3d 212)✓Spence approached two men with a shotgun at a Wilmington party and killed one; applying 11 Del. C. 464(e)(2), the court found his own testimony showed safe chances to retreat, so his justification defense failed and improper closing slides were not reversible.
- Moor v. Licciardello (Supreme Court of Delaware 1983, 463 A.2d 268)✓A saloon owner shot an unarmed musician in the leg after a scuffle and pleaded self-defense in a civil suit; the court held the subjective test of 11 Del. C. 464 governs any self-defense claim, so the reasonable man charge was error and the verdict was reversed.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Delaware Self-Defense Laws: Duty to Retreat & Castle Doctrine (2026)
Ohio Revised Code
§ 2901.09No duty to retreat in residence or vehicleIn forcecited in 6 of our articles
(A) As used in this section, "residence" has the same meaning as in section 2901.05 of the Revised Code. (B) For purposes of any section of the Revised Code that sets forth a criminal offense, a person has no duty to retreat before using force in self-defense, defense of another, or defense of…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-31 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at codes.ohio.gov
Cited in 198 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. Knuff (Ohio Supreme Court 2024, 175 Ohio St. 3d 82)“…January Term, 2024 {¶ 192} Former R.C. 2901.09, Ohio’s “castle doctrine” statute, enac…”
- State v. Shine-Johnson (Ohio Court of Appeals 2018, 117 N.E.3d 986)“…force in self-defense. Hubbard at ¶ 51 ; R.C. 2901.09(B) ("a person who lawfully is in that p…”
- State v. Bundy (Ohio Court of Appeals 2012, 2012 Ohio 3934)“…350, 2012-Ohio-1952, ¶43 (construing complementary statute, R.C. 2901.09(B), the no-duty-to-retreat statute); S…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Ohio Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)
§ 2901.05Burden of proof - reasonable doubt - self-defenseIn forcecited in 6 of our articles
(A) Every person accused of an offense is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the burden of proof for all elements of the offense is upon the prosecution.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-31 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at codes.ohio.gov
Cited in 1,424 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):State v. Messenger (2022) held H.B. 228's amendment to R.C. 2901.05 left the defendant a burden of producing evidence of self-defense, after which the state must disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt, reviewed for manifest weight, not sufficiency. State v. Jenkins (1984) applied the section's reasonable-doubt standard in a capital case.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. Maurer (Ohio Supreme Court 1984, 15 Ohio St. 3d 239)✓Maurer, sentenced to death for the kidnapping and murder of a child, argued the state's burden in a capital case should be proof beyond all doubt; the court held the standard is proof beyond a reasonable doubt as defined in R.C. 2901.05 and reaffirmed that definition.
- State v. Jenkins (Ohio Supreme Court 1984, 15 Ohio St. 3d 164)✓Jenkins, sentenced to death for killing a police officer while fleeing a robbery, argued a capital jury must be told the state's burden is proof beyond all doubt; the court held the standard is proof beyond a reasonable doubt as defined in R.C. 2901.05 and upheld that definition.
- State v. Jones (Ohio Supreme Court 2001, 91 Ohio St. 3d 335)✓Jones, convicted of aggravated murder for shooting an Ashtabula police officer, argued the reasonable-doubt charge recited verbatim from R.C. 2901.05(D) let juries convict on less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt; the court rejected that and reaffirmed the definition.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated, TITLE LXII CRIMINAL CODE, CHAPTER 627 JUSTIFICATION
§ 627:4Physical Force in Defense of a Person.In forcecited in 6 of our articles
I. A person is justified in using non-deadly force upon another person in order to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful, non-deadly force by such other person, and he may use a degree of such force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for such purpose. However, such force is not justifiable if: (a) With a purpose to cause physical harm to another person, he provoked the use of unlawful, non-deadly force by such other person; or (b) He was the initial aggressor, unless after such aggression he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to such other person his intent to do so, but the latter notwithstanding continues the use or threat of unlawful, non-deadly force; or (c) The force involved was the product of a combat by agreement not authorized by law. II.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at gc.nh.gov
Cited in 57 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):New Hampshire courts read RSA 627:4 against the common law. State v. Pugliese (1980) held the dwelling exception to the retreat duty reaches the curtilage, so a person need not retreat outside the house but on its grounds. State v. Etienne (2011) held the deadly force provision implicitly requires the force to be reasonably necessary.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. Pugliese (Supreme Court of New Hampshire 1980, 120 N.H. 728)✓Pugliese killed a man in a struggle on his beach some distance from his cottage; the court read dwelling in RSA 627:4, III(a) to reach the curtilage, so he was entitled to a no retreat instruction for his home's grounds, leaving to retrial whether the beach was within them.
- State v. Etienne (Supreme Court of New Hampshire 2011, 163 N.H. 57)✓Etienne shot a man in the head on his porch and claimed defense of himself and a friend; the court held RSA 627:4, II implicitly requires that deadly force be reasonably necessary, so instructing the jury on a necessity requirement was not error.
- State v. Ayer (Supreme Court of New Hampshire 2006, 154 N.H. 500)✓Ayer shot a family counselor who refused to leave his property, arguing RSA 627:4 justified deadly force to stop DCYF from kidnapping his son; the court upheld refusing that instruction because no evidence showed an intent to kidnap or that he believed one existed.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: New Hampshire Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)
Arizona Revised Statutes, Title 13 (Criminal Code), Chapter 4 (JUSTIFICATION)
§ 13-405Justification; use of deadly physical forceIn forcecited in 6 of our articles
A. A person is justified in threatening or using deadly physical force against another: 1. If such person would be justified in threatening or using physical force against the other under section 13-404, and 2. When and to the degree a reasonable person would believe that deadly physical force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly physical force. B. A person has no duty to retreat before threatening or using deadly physical force pursuant to this section if the person is in a place where the person may legally be and is not engaged in an unlawful act.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at azleg.gov
Cited in 37 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):State v. Jessen (1981) held ARS 13-405 does not make retreat a legal predicate to self-defense, though a known unused chance to retreat bears on whether deadly force was immediately necessary. State v. Grannis (1995) held an instruction implying only actual deadly force can justify a deadly response misstated the standard.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. Jessen (Arizona Supreme Court 1981, 130 Ariz. 1)✓Jessen shot his branch manager dead during a pay dispute and claimed self-defense. The court held section 13-405 does not make retreat a legal predicate to self-defense, though a known and unused chance to retreat bears on whether deadly force was immediately necessary.
- State of Arizona v. Ronald Vassell (Court of Appeals of Arizona 2015, 238 Ariz. 281)“…s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly physical force.” A.R.S. § 13-405(A)(2). But the threat or use of physica…”
- State v. Grannis (Arizona Supreme Court 1995, 183 Ariz. 52)✓Webster was convicted of murdering a man who picked him and his co-defendant up hitchhiking; he claimed a reasonable belief in the need for deadly force. The court held the deadly-force instruction was error: section 13-405 turns on reasonably apparent, not actual, deadly force.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Arizona Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)
§ 13-419Presumptions; defense of a residential structure or occupied vehicle; exceptions; definitionsIn forcecited in 6 of our articles
A. A person is presumed to reasonably believe that the threat or use of physical force or deadly force is immediately necessary for the purposes of sections 13-404 through 13-408, section 13-418 and section 13-421 if the person knows or has reason to believe that the person against whom physical force or deadly force is threatened or used is unlawfully or forcefully entering or has unlawfully or forcefully entered and is present in the person's residential structure or occupied vehicle. B. For the purposes of sections 13-404 through 13-408, section 13-418 and section 13-421, a person who is unlawfully or forcefully entering or who has unlawfully or forcefully entered and is present in a residential structure or occupied vehicle is presumed to pose an imminent threat of unlawful deadly harm to any person who is in the residential structure or occupied vehicle. C. The presumptions in subsections A and B of this section do not apply if: 1.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-08-04 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at azleg.gov
Cited in 6 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. Castleberry (Court of Appeals of Arizona 2026)“…able, and Joe was presumed to pose an imminent threat under A.R.S. § 13-419 because he had forced his way into her…”
- State v. Abdi (Court of Appeals of Arizona 2011, 226 Ariz. 361)“…nclude the court erred in instructing the jury, pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-419, to presume the victim had acted reason…”
- State of Arizona v. John Logan Brown (Arizona Supreme Court 2025)“…13-407; and the presumption that applies to these defenses, A.R.S. § 13-419. ¶2 In this case, we deter…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Vermont Statutes Annotated, Title 13: Crimes and Criminal Procedure, Chapter 53: Homicide
§ 2305Justifiable homicideIn forcecited in 7 of our articles
(a) If a person kills or wounds another under any of the circumstances enumerated below, the person shall be guiltless: (1) in the just and necessary defense of the person’s own life or the life of any other person; (2) if the person reasonably believed that the person, or any other person, was in imminent peril and that it was necessary to repel that peril with deadly force in the forceful or violent suppression of a person attempting to commit murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, burglary, or robbery; or (3) in the case of a law enforcement officer as defined in 20 V.S.A. § 2351(a) using force in compliance with 20 V.S.A. § 2368(b)(1)–(2) and (5) or deadly force in compliance with 20 V.S.A. § 2368(c)(1)–(4) and (6). (b) This section shall not be construed to limit or infringe upon defenses granted at common law. (Amended 1983, No. 23, § 2; 2019, No. 165 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, eff. July 1, 2021; 2021, No. 27, § 4, eff. Oct. 1, 2021; 2021, No. 95 (Adj. Sess.), § 1, eff. April 21, 2022.)
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislature.vermont.gov
Cited in 8 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2014
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Vermont treats 13 V.S.A. Section 2305(1) as the self-defense justification in homicide. Under State v. Wheelock (1992), a killing is just and necessary only if the defendant's belief of imminent peril was reasonable, judged with his individual attributes; Wheelock held voluntary intoxication is not one of them.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. Ovitt (Supreme Court of Vermont 2005, 178 Vt. 605)✓Ovitt shot his mother's ex-husband in the head and buried the body, claiming self-defense. Addressing that claim under Section 2305(1), the court restated that a defendant must reasonably believe he faced imminent peril, and upheld excluding a violent act seven to nine years old.
- State v. Wheelock (Supreme Court of Vermont 1992, 158 Vt. 302)✓Wheelock shot a man at close range during a drug and alcohol binge, believing the victim had a knife. Applying Section 2305(1)'s just and necessary defense standard, the court held a jury may weigh the defendant's traits but must disregard voluntary intoxication, and affirmed.
- State v. Camley (Supreme Court of Vermont 1981, 140 Vt. 483)“…f Manosh had been done in self-defense, and was thus, under 13 V.S.A. § 2305, justifiable homicide for which he shou…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: How Long Is a Life Sentence in Vermont? (2026 Guide), Vermont Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground by Case Law & Castle Doctrine (2026)
Nebraska Revised Statutes, Chapter 28: CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS
§ 28-1409Use of force in self-protectionIn forcecited in 6 of our articles
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section and of section 28-1414, the use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion. (2) The use of such force is not justifiable under this section to resist an arrest which the actor knows is being made by a peace officer, although the arrest is unlawful.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at nebraskalegislature.gov
Cited in 82 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):State v. Iromuanya (2006) applied section 28-1409's deadly force limits and held no self-defense instruction was required absent evidence of a reasonable, good faith belief in the need for deadly force. State v. Harris (2016) held the section 28-1409(4)(b)(i) privilege of nonretreat exists only in one's dwelling or place of work.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. Iromuanya (Nebraska Supreme Court 2006, 272 Neb. 178)✓Iromuanya fired a derringer at a Lincoln party minutes after a brief scuffle, wounding one guest and killing another; the court held nothing in the record supported a good faith belief in the need for deadly force under section 28-1409, so no instruction was owed.
- State v. Harris (Nebraska Supreme Court 2016, 294 Neb. 766)“…s addressed in § 28-1409(4)(b)(i). 9. Self-Defense. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1409(4)(b)(i) (Reissue 2008), the privi…”
- State v. Bedford (Nebraska Court of Appeals 2022, 31 Neb. Ct. App. 339)“…rrect statement of the law,” as it was “drawn directly from Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1409 (2016) and NJI2d Crim. 7.1.” Brief for…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Nebraska Self-Defense Laws: Duty to Retreat & Castle Doctrine (2026)
Idaho Code
§ 18-4009Justifiable homicide by any personIn forcecited in 4 of our articles
18-4009. Justifiable homicide by any person. (1) Homicide is justifiable when committed by any person in any of the following cases: (a) When resisting any attempt to murder any person, or to commit a felony, or to do some great bodily injury upon any person; (b) When committed in defense of…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-08-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislature.idaho.gov
Cited in 12 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. Carter (Idaho Supreme Court 1982, 103 Idaho 917)“…en quarrel or heat of passion. 2. Involuntary — ....’ “Idaho Code § 18-4009 provides that a homicide is ‘justifiabl…”
- State v. Bodenbach (Idaho Supreme Court 2019, 165 Idaho 577)“…18 Idaho Sess. Laws 500. The language formerly contained in Idaho Code section 18-4009.3 is now contained in Idaho Code sectio…”
- State v. Robert Dean Hall (Idaho Supreme Court 2016, 161 Idaho 413)“…tion 18-4009 and section 18-4010 are as follows: Idaho Code section 18-4009: Homicide is also ju…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Idaho Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)
Revised Statutes of Missouri, Title XXXVIII (CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT; PEACE OFFICERS AND PUBLIC DEFENDERS), Chapter 563
§ 563.031Use of force in defense of persons.In forcecited in 8 of our articles
1. A person may, subject to the provisions of subsection 2 of this section, use physical force upon another person when and to the extent he or she reasonably believes such force to be necessary to defend himself or herself or a third person from what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful force by such other person, unless: (1) The actor was the initial aggressor; except that in such case his or her use of force is nevertheless justifiable provided: (a) He or she has withdrawn from the encounter and effectively communicated such withdrawal to such other person but the latter persists in continuing the incident by the use or threatened use of unlawful force; or (b) He or she is a law enforcement officer and as such is an aggressor pursuant to section 563.046; or (c) The aggressor is justified under some other provision of this chapter or other provision of law; (2) Under the circumstances as the actor reasonably believes them to be, the person whom he or she seeks to protect would not be justified in using such protective force; (3) The actor was attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the commission of a forcible felony.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at revisor.mo.gov
Cited in 49 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Missouri courts treat section 563.031 as the governing self-defense test. State v. Bruner (2018) held the statutory elements, not the older common law formulation, control whether a defendant has injected the defense. State v. Clinch (2011) held the 2007 amendment did not remove the imminence requirement.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. Bruner (Supreme Court of Missouri 2018, 541 S.W.3d 529)✓Bruner shot his wife's companion six times outside a movie theater after the man threatened him verbally; the court held he did not inject self-defense under section 563.031, since fear of being grabbed or punched cannot justify deadly force.
- State v. Clinch (Missouri Court of Appeals 2011, 335 S.W.3d 579)✓Clinch waited in a parking lot and shot the father of his nieces and nephew, saying he was defending the children from abuse; the court held section 563.031, as amended in 2007, still requires a reasonable belief that unlawful force is occurring or imminent.
- State of Missouri v. Richard John Whipple (Missouri Court of Appeals 2016, 501 S.W.3d 507)“…defense still must meet the reasonableness requirements of section 563.031 RSMo Supp. 2011 4 in order for him to be en…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Missouri Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026), Missouri Knife Laws (2026): Restricted Areas and the Switchblade Trap, Missouri Pepper Spray and Stun Gun Laws (2026)
Iowa Code, Chapter 704: FORCE
§ 704.1Reasonable force.In forcecited in 6 of our articles
1. “Reasonable force” means that force and no more which a reasonable person, in like circumstances, would judge to be necessary to prevent an injury or loss and can include deadly force if it is reasonable to believe that such force is necessary to avoid injury or risk to one’s life or safety or the life or safety of another, or it is reasonable to believe that such force is necessary to resist a like force or threat. 2. A person may be wrong in the estimation of the danger or the force necessary to repel the danger as long as there is a reasonable basis for the belief of the person and the person acts reasonably in the response to that belief. 3. A person who is not engaged in illegal activity has no duty to retreat from any place where the person is lawfully present before using force as specified in this chapter.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legis.iowa.gov
Cited in 52 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State of Iowa v. Antoine Tyree Williams (Supreme Court of Iowa 2019)“…argues the district court erred when it held that amended Iowa Code section 704.1, which became effective on July 1, 2017…”
- State of Iowa v. Shane Michael Teslik (Court of Appeals of Iowa 2025)“…orce is necessary to resist a like force or threat. Iowa Code § 704.1(1). Importantly, section 704.1(3)…”
- State of Iowa v. Lasondra A. Johnson (Supreme Court of Iowa 2024)“…retreat, if possible, before resorting to the use of force. Iowa Code § 704.1(3) (2020). Under this law, people need…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Iowa Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)
§ 704.2AJustifiable use of deadly force.In forcecited in 6 of our articles
1. For purposes of this chapter, a person is presumed to reasonably believe that deadly force is necessary to avoid injury or risk to one’s life or safety or the life or safety of another in either of the following circumstances: a. The person against whom force is used, at the time the force is used, is doing any of the following: (1) Unlawfully entering by force or stealth the dwelling, place of business or employment, or occupied vehicle of the person using force, or has unlawfully entered by force or stealth and remains within the dwelling, place of business or employment, or occupied vehicle of the person using force. (2) Unlawfully removing or is attempting to unlawfully remove another person against the other person’s will from the dwelling, place of business or employment, or occupied vehicle of the person using force. b. The person using force knows or has reason to believe that any of the conditions set forth in paragraph “a” are occurring. 2. The presumption set forth in subsection 1 does not apply if, at the time force is used, any of the following circumstances are present: a.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legis.iowa.gov
Cited in 4 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2024
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State of Iowa v. Lasondra A. Johnson (Supreme Court of Iowa 2024)“…Turning to Instruction 58, the first paragraph restates Iowa Code § 704.2A(1)(a)(1), which provides that “a person…”
- State of Iowa v. Michael Lang (Court of Appeals of Iowa 2024)“…sider.” At a pretrial hearing, the State pointed to Iowa Code section 704.2A, the “stand your ground” statute enact…”
- State of Iowa v. Quarzone Erikey Martin (Court of Appeals of Iowa 2020)“…against the person against whom the force is used. Iowa Code § 704.2A. Martin elected not to assert a…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Montana Code Annotated, Title 45
§ 45-3-103Use Of Force In Defense Of Occupied StructureIn forcecited in 6 of our articles
45-3-103. Use of force in defense of occupied structure. (1) A person is justified in the use of force or threat to use force against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that the use of force is necessary to prevent or terminate the other person's unlawful entry into or attack upon an occupied structure. (2) A person justified in the use of force pursuant to subsection (1) is justified in the use of force likely to cause death or serious bodily harm only if: (a) the entry is made or attempted and the person reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent an assault upon the person or another then in the occupied structure; or (b) the person reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent the commission of a forcible felony in the occupied structure.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at mca.legmt.gov
Cited in 13 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. Daniels (Montana Supreme Court 2011, 362 Mont. 426)“…tion concerning the defense of an occupied structure under § 45-3-103, MCA (2009). Daniels argues that this refus…”
- State v. Barrack (Montana Supreme Court 1994, 267 Mont. 154)“…in defense of an occupied structure, which is set forth at § 45-3-103, MCA. That statute provides that: A person…”
- State v. Hagen (Montana Supreme Court 1995, 273 Mont. 432)“…efense of an occupied structure is set forth at s 45-3-103, MCA, which states: A person is justif…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Montana Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)
§ 45-3-110No Duty To Summon Help Or FleeIn forcecited in 6 of our articles
45-3-110. No duty to summon help or flee. Except as provided in 45-3-105, a person who is lawfully in a place or location and who is threatened with bodily injury or loss of life has no duty to retreat from a threat or summon law enforcement assistance prior to using force. The provisions of this section apply to a person offering evidence of justifiable use of force under 45-3-102, 45-3-103, or 45-3-104.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at mca.legmt.gov
Cited in 3 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2020
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. S. Trujillo (Montana Supreme Court 2020, 400 Mont. 124)“…strict Court committed plain error in violation of § 45-3-110, MCA, by allowing the State’s closing argume…”
- State v. Bobby Cooksey (Montana Supreme Court 2012, 366 Mont. 346)“…elf-defense,” the officer may have a duty 2 Section 45-3-110, MCA, concerns the duty to retreat or summon…”
- State v. King (Montana Supreme Court 2016, 385 Mont. 483)“…of force. The former instruction reflects the language of § 45-3-110, MCA, and addresses a person’s duty to retre…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
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Sources and References
- Alabama: Ala. Code Section 13A-3-23(b) (effective until Oct. 1, 2026); Ala. Code Section 13A-3-23(a)(4)-(5) (effective until Oct. 1, 2026) (retreat and fear-presumption classifications)(alison.legislature.state.al.us)
- Alaska: Alaska Stat. Section 11.81.335(b)(5); Alaska Stat. Section 11.81.335(b)(1), (3), (5) (retreat and fear-presumption classifications)(akleg.gov).gov
- Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Sections 13-405(B), 13-411(B), 13-418(B) (retreat classification)(azleg.gov).gov
- Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Sections 13-411(C)-(D), 13-419(A)-(D) (fear-presumption classification)(azleg.gov).gov
- Arkansas: Ark. Code Ann. Sections 5-2-606(c), 5-2-607(b), as amended by 2021 Ark. Acts 250 (retreat classification)(arkleg.state.ar.us)
- Arkansas: Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-620 (fear-presumption classification)(arkleg.state.ar.us)
- California: Judicial Council of California, CALCRIM2026, Nos.505 and3470 (retreat classification)(courts.ca.gov).gov
- California: Cal. Penal Code Section 198.5 (fear-presumption classification)(leginfo.legislature.ca.gov).gov
- Colorado: Colorado Judicial Branch, COLJI-Crim 2025, H:12 (applying Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-704) (retreat classification)(coloradojudicial.gov).gov
- Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. Section 18-1-704.5(2) (fear-presumption classification)(olls.info)
- Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. Section 53a-19(b) (retreat classification)(cga.ct.gov).gov
- Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. Sections 53a-19(b)(1), 53a-20 (fear-presumption classification)(cga.ct.gov).gov
- Delaware: 11 Del. C. Section 464(e)(2); 11 Del. C. Sections 464(e)(2), 466(c), 469 (retreat and fear-presumption classifications)(delcode.delaware.gov).gov
- District of Columbia: In re Robertson, D.C. Ct. App. Nos. 00-FM-925 & 04-FM-1269, slip op. at 24-25 (Jan. 24, 2008), quoting Gillis v. United States, 400 A.2d 311, 313 (D.C. 1979); In re Robertson, D.C. Ct. App. Nos. 00-FM-925 & 04-FM-1269, slip op. at 24-25 (Jan. 24, 2008) (retreat and fear-presumption classifications)(www.dccourts.gov).gov
- Florida: Fla. Stat. Section 776.012(1)-(2) (2026) (retreat classification)(leg.state.fl.us)
- Florida: Fla. Stat. Section 776.013(2)-(3) (2026) (fear-presumption classification)(leg.state.fl.us)
- Georgia: Ga. Code Section 16-3-23.1 (no duty to retreat prior to use of force in self-defense), enacted by 2006 Ga. Laws Act 599 (SB 396) (retreat classification)(law.justia.com)
- Georgia: Medina v. State, S26A0362 (Ga. Mar. 3, 2026) (applying OCGA §§ 16-3-23 and 16-3-24.1) (fear-presumption classification)(gasupreme.us)
- Hawaii: Haw. Rev. Stat. Section 703-304(5)(b); Haw. Rev. Stat. Section 703-304(5)(b)(i) (retreat and fear-presumption classifications)(data.capitol.hawaii.gov).gov
- Idaho: Idaho Code Section 19-202A(3); Idaho Code§§19-202A(5),18-4009(2)-(3) (retreat and fear-presumption classifications)(legislature.idaho.gov).gov
- Illinois: Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions-Criminal 24-25.09X, Committee Note (citing People v. Hughes and People v. Miller) (retreat classification)(ilcourtsaudio.blob.core.windows.net)
- Illinois: 720 ILCS5/7-2(a),2-6(a) (fear-presumption classification)(ftp.ilga.gov).gov
- Indiana: Ind. Code Section 35-41-3-2(c) (official 2021 code volume; current-body verification pending); Ind. Code Section 35-41-3-2(d) (official 2021 code volume; current-body verification pending) (retreat and fear-presumption classifications)(iga.in.gov).gov
- Iowa: Iowa Code Section 704.1(3) (retreat classification)(legis.iowa.gov).gov
- Iowa: Iowa Code Section 704.2A (fear-presumption classification)(legis.iowa.gov).gov
- Kansas: Kan. Stat. Ann. Sections 21-5222(c), 21-5230 (retreat classification)(kslegislature.gov).gov
- Kansas: Kan. Stat. Ann. Sections 21-5223, 21-5224 (fear-presumption classification)(kslegislature.gov).gov
- Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. Sections 503.050(4), 503.055(3) (retreat classification)(apps.legislature.ky.gov).gov
- Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. Section 503.055 (fear-presumption classification)(apps.legislature.ky.gov).gov
- Louisiana: La. Rev. Stat. Sections 14:19(C)-(D), 14:20(C)-(D); La. Rev. Stat. Sections 14:19(B), 14:20(B) (retreat and fear-presumption classifications)(legis.la.gov).gov
- Maine: 17-A Me. Rev. Stat. Section 108(2)(C)(3)(a); 17-A Me. Rev. Stat. Section 108(2)(B) (retreat and fear-presumption classifications)(legislature.maine.gov).gov
- Maryland: Shae-Von Edwards v. State, No. 0799, Sept. Term 2023 (Md. App. Ct. Oct. 31, 2025) (retreat classification)(mdcourts.gov).gov
- Maryland: Joiner v. State, No. 1949, Sept. Term 2023 (Md. App. Ct. May 30, 2025) (fear-presumption classification)(mdcourts.gov).gov
- Massachusetts: Massachusetts Model Jury Instructions on Homicide III, notes 81-84 (discussing G.L. c. 278, Section 8A) (retreat classification)(mass.gov).gov
- Massachusetts: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, Section 8A (fear-presumption classification)(malegislature.gov).gov
- Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws Section 780.972 (retreat classification)(legislature.mi.gov).gov
- Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws Section 780.951 (fear-presumption classification)(legislature.mi.gov).gov
- Minnesota: State v. Blevins, 10 N.W.3d 29, 35-40 (Minn. 2024) (discussing State v. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d 392, 402 (Minn. 2001)) (retreat classification)(mncourts.gov).gov
- Minnesota: Minn. Stat. Section 609.065 (fear-presumption classification)(revisor.mn.gov).gov
- Mississippi: Miss. Code Section 97-3-15(4); Miss. Code Section 97-3-15(2)(c), (3) (retreat and fear-presumption classifications)(billstatus.ls.state.ms.us)
- Missouri: Mo. Rev. Stat. § 563.031.3 (retreat classification); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 563.031.5 shifts the burden to the state to disprove the defendant's reasonable belief for the dwelling, residence, and vehicle entries described in subsection 2(2), rather than creating a presumption (fear-presumption classification)(revisor.mo.gov).gov
- Montana: Mont. Code Ann. § 45-3-110 (retreat classification)(mca.legmt.gov).gov
- Montana: Mont. Code Ann. §§ 45-3-103, 45-2-101(47) require an individualized reasonable belief and establish no presumption (fear-presumption classification)(mca.legmt.gov).gov
- Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1409(4)(b); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1409(4)(b)(i) (retreat and fear-presumption classifications)(nebraskalegislature.gov).gov
- Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.120(2); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 200.120-.130 (retreat and fear-presumption classifications)(leg.state.nv.us)
- New Hampshire: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 627:4 III(a); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 627:4 II (retreat and fear-presumption classifications)(gc.nh.gov).gov
- New Jersey: N.J. Model Criminal Jury Charge, Justification - Self Defense (N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4); N.J. Model Criminal Jury Charge, Justification - Self Defense (retreat and fear-presumption classifications)(njcourts.gov).gov
- New Mexico: UJI 14-5190 NMRA (retreat classification)(supremecourt.nmcourts.gov).gov
- New Mexico: UJI 14-5170 NMRA (fear-presumption classification)(supremecourt.nmcourts.gov).gov
- New York: N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15(2) (retreat classification)(nysenate.gov).gov
- New York: N.Y. Penal Law §§ 35.15(2)(a)(i), 35.20(3) (fear-presumption classification)(nysenate.gov).gov
- North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.3(a) (retreat classification)(ncleg.gov).gov
- North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2 (fear-presumption classification)(ncleg.gov).gov
- North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-05-07(2)(b)(2); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 12.1-05-07(2)(c), 12.1-05-07.1 (retreat and fear-presumption classifications)(ndlegis.gov).gov
- Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.09(B)-(C) (retreat classification)(codes.ohio.gov).gov
- Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.05(B)(2)-(4) (fear-presumption classification)(codes.ohio.gov).gov
- Oklahoma: Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1289.25(D); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1289.25(B)-(C) (retreat and fear-presumption classifications)(oklegislature.gov).gov
- Oregon: State v. James, 350 Or. App. 71, 80 (2026) (retreat classification)(ojd.contentdm.oclc.org)
- Oregon: Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 161.219, 161.225 (fear-presumption classification)(oregonlegislature.gov).gov
- Pennsylvania: 18 Pa.C.S. § 505(b)(2.3)-(2.4); 18 Pa.C.S. § 505(b)(2)-(2.5) (retreat and fear-presumption classifications)(palegis.us)
- Rhode Island: State v. Urena, No. 2004-199-C.A., slip op. at 8-9 & n.4 (R.I. June 16, 2006) (quoting State v. Quarles) (retreat classification)(courts.ri.gov).gov
- Rhode Island: R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-8-8 (fear-presumption classification)(webserver.rilegislature.gov).gov
- South Carolina: S.C. Code § 16-11-440(C); S.C. Code § 16-11-440(A)-(B) (retreat and fear-presumption classifications)(scstatehouse.gov).gov
- South Dakota: S.D. Codified Laws § 22-18-4.1; S.D. Codified Laws §§ 22-18-4.3 to -4.4 (retreat and fear-presumption classifications)(sdlegislature.gov).gov
- Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-611(b), enacted by 2007 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 210 (retreat classification)(capitol.tn.gov).gov
- Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-611(c)-(d); 2008 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 1012; 2026 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 886 (fear-presumption classification)(capitol.tn.gov).gov
- Texas: Tex. Penal Code §§ 9.31(e)-(f), 9.32(c)-(d); Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(b) (retreat and fear-presumption classifications)(statutes.capitol.texas.gov).gov
- Utah: Utah Code § 76-2-402(4); Utah Code §§ 76-2-405(3), 76-2-407(3) (retreat and fear-presumption classifications)(le.utah.gov).gov
- Vermont: Vermont Office of Legislative Counsel, Meaning of ‘Necessary’ When Using Force in Self-Defense (Mar. 23, 2022) (discussing State v. Tubbs and State v. Hatcher) (retreat classification)(legislature.vermont.gov).gov
- Vermont: 13 V.S.A. § 2305(a) (fear-presumption classification)(legislature.vermont.gov).gov
- Virginia: Taylor v. Commonwealth, No. 0753-09-3, slip op. at 4 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2010) (retreat classification)(courts.state.va.us)
- Virginia: Horne v. Commonwealth, No. 1267-22-1, slip op. at 10-11 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2023) (fear-presumption classification)(courts.state.va.us)
- Washington: State v. Courtney, No. 76108-1-I, slip op. at 22-25 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2018) (unpublished) (quoting WPIC 16.08) (retreat classification)(courts.wa.gov).gov
- Washington: Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.16.050 (fear-presumption classification)(app.leg.wa.gov).gov
- West Virginia: W. Va. Code § 55-7-22(b)-(c) (retreat classification); W. Va. Code § 55-7-22(a)-(b) requires the occupant's reasonable apprehension or belief and establishes no presumption (fear-presumption classification)(code.wvlegislature.gov).gov
- Wisconsin: State v. Wenger, No. 98-1739-CR, slip op. at 7 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 1999) (retreat classification)(wicourts.gov).gov
- Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1m) (fear-presumption classification)(docs.legis.wisconsin.gov).gov
- Wyoming: Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-602(e); Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-602(b)-(c) (retreat and fear-presumption classifications)(wyoleg.gov).gov
- Florida: Fla. Stat. Section 776.032(1)-(2), (4) (2026) (criminal immunity and arrest limits); Fla. Stat. Section 776.032(1), (3) (2026) (civil immunity)(leg.state.fl.us).gov
- Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. § 895.62(2)-(5) (limited civil immunity)(docs.legis.wisconsin.gov).gov