Squatters Rights by State: Adverse Possession Laws (2026)
Independently fact-checked against primary sources (last audited October 7, 2026). · Reviewed by the RecordingLaw editorial team. · Law checked current as of August 18, 2026. · 29 primary sources cited on this page. How we verify our legal content
"Squatters' rights" is the informal name for adverse possession: a person who occupies someone else's land can gain legal title to it, but only after possessing it openly, continuously, exclusively, and without the owner's permission for the state's full statutory period. Those periods generally run from 5 years (California, Montana, Nevada) to 30 years (Louisiana, New Jersey). Some states shorten the period for a claimant holding color of title (a deed or similar document that looks valid but is legally defective), to 3 years in Texas and Arizona, for example, and some also require property-tax payments.
Until that period has run, a squatter does not own the property, but the owner usually still cannot simply lock them out. Removal generally goes through the state's eviction or unlawful-detainer process, and several states, including Florida, Georgia, and Tennessee, have passed fast-track squatter-removal laws since 2024.
The exact elements, periods, and proof rules vary by state, so this hub keeps the complete 50-state-plus-DC comparison and links to every jurisdiction guide.
Information last verified on May 27, 2026. This article provides general legal information, not legal advice.
Jurisdiction scope: This hub provides a 50-state-plus-DC comparison and links every existing state guide. Requirements vary by jurisdiction. For doctrine, proof, and bounded case examples, see how adverse possession works. For a specific property, confirm the current primary authority in that jurisdiction.
Squatter vs. Trespasser: What Is the Legal Difference?
A trespasser enters property without permission and without any claim of ownership. A squatter also enters without permission, but the squatter's conduct is directed toward the land as if the squatter owns it. That behavioral distinction is legally significant: a trespasser acquires no property rights no matter how long the trespass continues, while a squatter who satisfies each element of adverse possession for the full statutory period can petition a court to quiet title in the squatter's name. Under the objective hostility test articulated in Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304, 309-310 (Alaska 1990), hostility does not require bad intent or knowledge that the land belongs to someone else. The claimant must simply have acted toward the land as an owner would act, without the true owner's permission. Good faith or bad faith is irrelevant to that inquiry. The practical boundary between a squatter and a trespasser therefore turns on whether the occupant's behavior, viewed objectively, resembles ownership rather than mere unauthorized presence.
The distinction also matters for removal strategy. A trespasser who entered within the past few days can typically be removed by police on criminal trespass grounds. A person who has lived on the property for months, paid utilities, and maintained the lawn presents a residency claim that most states require courts to adjudicate through a formal eviction or quiet title proceeding before removal. Property owners who skip that process and attempt self-help removal face civil and, in some states, criminal liability.
The Five Elements of Adverse Possession
Most states describe adverse possession through five familiar elements. The labels are shared, but each state defines them in its own statutes and case law, and some add conditions, such as tax payment or an honest or reasonable belief of ownership.
Actual possession: the claimant physically uses the land the way an owner would, for example by living on it, fencing it, building on it, or farming it.
Continuous possession: the use lasts the full statutory period without a meaningful break. Courts generally measure this against how a typical owner would use that kind of land, so seasonal use of remote land can qualify (Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304, 309 (Alaska 1990)).
Open and notorious possession: the use is visible enough to put a reasonably attentive owner on notice. Hidden or secretive occupation does not count.
Exclusive possession: the claimant generally does not share possession with the owner or the general public.
Hostile possession: the claimant possesses without the owner's permission. Someone the owner allowed in, such as a tenant or a guest, generally is not a hostile possessor while that permission lasts.
States differ on how these elements are defined and proved. Oregon, for example, adds an objectively reasonable honest belief of ownership and requires clear-and-convincing proof (ORS 105.620), while New York requires a "claim of right" (N.Y. RPAPL § 501). See how adverse possession works for the statutes and court decisions, then use the state table below and the guide for the jurisdiction where the property is located.
Statutory Periods by State: How Long Until Squatters Rights Vest?
Statutory periods across the 51 US jurisdictions range from 5 years (California, Montana, and Nevada) to 30 years (Louisiana and New Jersey). New York requires 10 years under N.Y. CPLR § 212(a) combined with N.Y. RPAPL §§ 501 and 511. Florida sets 7 years on both of its tracks, but the conditions differ. Under color of title, Fla. Stat. § 95.16 requires 7 years of continued possession founded on a written instrument, decree, or judgment, and (for possession commencing after December 31, 1945) recording of that instrument with the clerk of the circuit court; it imposes no tax-payment and no property-appraiser return requirement. Without color of title, Fla. Stat. § 95.18 requires 7 years of possession plus payment of all outstanding taxes and matured installments of special improvement liens within 1 year of entering possession, filing of a uniform return with the county property appraiser within 30 days after that payment, and payment of all subsequent annual taxes and liens for the rest of the period. California compresses the period to 5 years but requires payment of all property taxes for all 5 years, supported by certified records, under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 325. Texas uses a tiered scheme: 3 years under a recorded instrument (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.024), 5 years under a deed plus tax payments (§ 16.025), and 10 years by actual peaceable possession with cultivation, use, or enjoyment (§ 16.026); the 10-year track limits claims without a title instrument to 160 acres. Montana requires 5 years plus tax payment under Mont. Code Ann. § 70-19-411.
The table below lists every jurisdiction. Where a "Shorter Period (Color of Title / Recorded Deed)" is shown, that reduced period applies only when the claimant holds a facially valid but defective instrument of title and, in some states, also pays taxes. A dash indicates the state does not provide a statutory reduction for color of title. The "Property Taxes Required" column reflects only the general adverse possession track; some states impose an additional tax requirement on the shorter color-of-title track even when the general track does not require taxes.
Select a state below for a full guide to its adverse possession rules and squatter-removal process.
The table below covers 9 states in the Northeast.
| State | Statutory Period | Shorter Period (Color of Title / Recorded Deed) | Property Taxes Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Connecticut | 15 years | None | No |
| Maine | 20 years | None | No |
| Massachusetts | 20 years | None | No |
| New Hampshire | 20 years | None | No |
| New Jersey | 30 years | None | No |
| New York | 10 years | None | No |
| Pennsylvania | 21 years | 10 years | No |
| Rhode Island | 10 years | None | No |
| Vermont | 15 years | None | No |
The table below covers 12 states in the Midwest.
| State | Statutory Period | Shorter Period (Color of Title / Recorded Deed) | Property Taxes Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Illinois | 20 years | 7 years | With color of title (vacant land) |
| Indiana | 10 years | None | Yes |
| Iowa | 10 years | None | No |
| Kansas | 15 years | None | No |
| Michigan | 15 years | None | No |
| Minnesota | 15 years | None | 5 consecutive yrs on separately assessed parcels |
| Missouri | 10 years | None | No |
| Nebraska | 10 years | None | No |
| North Dakota | 20 years | None | No |
| Ohio | 21 years | None | No |
| South Dakota | 20 years | None | No |
| Wisconsin | 20 years | 10 years | Yes for the 7-yr track (S. 893.27) |
The table below covers 16 states in the South, plus the District of Columbia.
| State | Statutory Period | Shorter Period (Color of Title / Recorded Deed) | Property Taxes Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alabama | 10 years | None | Conditional (recorded color of title for 10 yrs OR annual tax listing for 10 yrs) |
| Arkansas | 7 years | None | No |
| Delaware | 20 years | None | No |
| Florida | 7 years | 7 years | Yes |
| Georgia | 20 years | 7 years | No |
| Kentucky | 15 years | 7 years | No |
| Louisiana | 30 years | 10 years | No |
| Maryland | 20 years | None | No |
| Mississippi | 10 years | None | No |
| North Carolina | 20 years | 7 years | No |
| Oklahoma | 15 years | None | No |
| South Carolina | 10 years | None | No |
| Tennessee | 7 years | None | No |
| Texas | 10 years | 3 years | With recorded instrument or color of title (3-yr track, S. 16.024); deed plus tax payments (5-yr track, S. 16.025) |
| Virginia | 15 years | None | No |
| West Virginia | 10 years | None | No |
| District of Columbia | 15 years | None | No |
The table below covers 13 states in the West.
| State | Statutory Period | Shorter Period (Color of Title / Recorded Deed) | Property Taxes Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alaska | 10 years | 7 years (color of title, AS 09.45.052(a)) | No |
| Arizona | 10 years | 3 years | With deed/color of title (5-yr tracks) |
| California | 5 years | None | Yes |
| Colorado | 18 years | 7 years | With color of title |
| Hawaii | 20 years | None | No |
| Idaho | 20 years | None | Yes |
| Montana | 5 years | None | Yes |
| Nevada | 5 years | None | Yes |
| New Mexico | 10 years | None | Yes (color of title + taxes both required) |
| Oregon | 10 years | None | No |
| Utah | 7 years | None | Yes |
| Washington | 10 years | 7 years | With color of title (7-yr track, RCW 7.28.070) |
| Wyoming | 10 years | None | No |
Sources for table: Ala. Code § 6-5-200; Alaska Stat. §§ 09.10.030, 09.45.052; Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 12-523 to 12-527; Ark. Code Ann. § 18-61-101; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 322, 325; Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 38-41-101, 38-41-108; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-575; Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 7901; Fla. Stat. §§ 95.16, 95.18; O.C.G.A. §§ 44-5-163, 44-5-164; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 657-31; Idaho Code § 5-210; 735 ILCS 5/13-101, 5/13-110; Ind. Code §§ 34-11-2-11, 32-21-7-1; Iowa Code § 614.1(5); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-503; Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 413.010, 413.060; La. Civ. Code arts. 3486, 3473; Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 801; Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-103; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 21; Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5801; Minn. Stat. § 541.02; Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-13; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.010; Mont. Code Ann. § 70-19-411; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-202; Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 11.070, 11.110, 11.150; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:2; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-30; NMSA 1978, § 37-1-22; N.Y. CPLR § 212(a); N.Y. RPAPL §§ 501, 511, 521; N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-40, 1-38; N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01-04; Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.04; Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 93; tit. 60, § 333; Or. Rev. Stat. § 105.620; 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 5530, 5527.1; R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-7-1; S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-67-210 to 15-67-260; S.D. Codified Laws § 15-3-1; Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-103; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 16.024, 16.025, 16.026; Utah Code §§ 78B-2-208 to 78B-2-214; 12 V.S.A. § 501; Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-236; RCW 4.16.020, 7.28.050, 7.28.070; W. Va. Code § 55-2-1; Wis. Stat. §§ 893.25, 893.26, 893.27; Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-103; D.C. Code § 12-301(a)(1).
Note on medium-confidence rows: The statutory periods for Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Mississippi, New Jersey, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming reflect the well-established standard period confirmed across multiple secondary sources. Those states' official legislature websites were inaccessible via direct fetch during research (JavaScript-rendered or SSL-blocked). A final spot-check against each official .gov source is recommended before relying on these figures in a state-specific spoke article.
Color of Title and Tax Payment Vary by State
Color of title and property-tax payments may matter differently depending on the state and statutory track. The adverse possession doctrine guide explains the distinctions through Oregon and Minnesota statutes. Use the linked state guide for the complete rule that applies to the property.
The 2024-2025 Anti-Squatting Legislation Wave
A wave of states enacted statutes in 2024 and 2025 that sharply accelerated the removal of unauthorized occupants and, in several cases, criminalized the act of squatting itself. These laws create sheriff-administered or law-enforcement removal tracks that bypass the traditional court-supervised eviction timeline.
Florida led the wave with HB 621 (Ch. 2024-44), signed March 27, 2024, effective July 1, 2024. The law created Fla. Stat. § 82.036, which allows a residential property owner to file a verified complaint directly with the sheriff attesting that: the dwelling is residential; entry was unlawful; the occupant is not a current or former tenant, immediate family member, or co-owner; and no litigation regarding possession is pending. After the sheriff verifies ownership, the sheriff must without delay serve notice to immediately vacate and restore possession to the owner. Fla. Stat. § 82.036 (2024). Wrongful removal under this process entitles the displaced occupant to actual damages, triple the fair market rent, court costs, and attorney fees. Fla. Stat. § 82.036 (2024).
Georgia enacted HB 1017 (the Georgia Squatter Reform Act, effective April 24, 2024). The act amended O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21 to make entering land or premises for the purpose of residing there criminal trespass (unlawful squatting), amended Title 44, Chapter 11, Article 2 to provide a magistrate-court property-affidavit process, and authorizes a sheriff, deputy, or constable to turn out the occupant within three days of the owner's affidavit unless the occupant files a counter-affidavit. Ga. HB 1017 (2024); O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21; O.C.G.A. tit. 44, ch. 11, art. 2.
Alabama enacted HB 182 (effective June 1, 2024), which defines a squatter as a person who is not a lease party and not authorized by a tenant; squatters are excluded from Title 35, Chapters 9 and 9A eviction procedures and may be removed without a formal eviction action. The Alabama Governor's office confirmed the signing. 2024 Ala. Acts (HB 182); Alabama Governor's Office signing announcement (2024). The law also imposes criminal penalties for falsifying real-estate documents used to manufacture color of title.
West Virginia enacted the Stop Squatters Act (HB 4940, effective June 4, 2024), codified at W. Va. Code §§ 55-3C-1 and 55-3C-2. The act classifies squatting as criminal trespass; courts may not require a formal eviction to remove a squatter, and arrest is the primary removal mechanism. W. Va. Code §§ 55-3C-1, 55-3C-2 (2024).
Tennessee enacted Public Chapter 1009 (HB 1259/SB 795, effective July 1, 2024). A property owner files a verified complaint with the sheriff; the sheriff serves notice to immediately vacate and restores possession; arrest for trespass is authorized. Wrongful removal triggers triple fair market rent, actual damages, costs, and fees. Tenn. Pub. Ch. 1009 (2024); Tenn. General Assembly, HB 1259.
North Carolina enacted Session Law 2025-88 (effective December 1, 2025), creating an expedited removal track for unauthorized residential occupants: after the owner files an affidavit, the sheriff serves the occupant, a magistrate holds a hearing within roughly 48 hours, and a vacate order can follow shortly after. The fast track reaches true squatters, not holdover tenants. N.C. Sess. Law 2025-88 (2025).
Idaho enacted Idaho Code section 6-310A (HB 321, effective July 1, 2025), a sheriff-administered remedy under which a residential owner files a verified complaint under penalty of perjury and the sheriff serves a notice to vacate and may remove the occupants. The same law created new criminal offenses for fraudulently detaining or leasing real property. Idaho Code section 6-310A (2025).
Louisiana enacted Act 2024 No. 466 (effective August 1, 2024), which makes remaining on property more than five days after a valid notice to vacate a criminal trespass and authorizes an ex parte temporary restraining order for an owner who is denied use of the property by a person with no legal interest in it. 2024 La. Acts No. 466.
Maryland enacted Senate Bill 46 (Chapter 188, Acts of 2025, effective October 1, 2025), which requires a court to hold a wrongful detainer hearing within 10 business days of filing, accelerating the removal of unauthorized occupants. 2025 Md. Laws ch. 188.
The trend has continued into 2025 and 2026, with more states adopting or proposing similar measures, and several other states, including Nevada, Utah, and Virginia, offer separate criminal or expedited civil pathways. Because these procedures change quickly and reach only genuine unlawful occupants, an owner should confirm the current statute and process in the specific state before acting.
Jurisdiction reminder: The statutes above apply only in their respective states, and even a fast-track law reaches only genuine unlawful occupants, never a current or former tenant. Property owners in every other state must use the traditional court eviction process described in the next section.
How to Legally Remove a Squatter: No Self-Help Allowed
Self-help removal (changing locks, shutting off utilities, removing a squatter's belongings, or physically barring entry) is prohibited in every US state. California Courts Self-Help Center makes this explicit for California: property owners must use the unlawful detainer process in Superior Court; self-help measures including lockouts, utility shutoffs, or removal of belongings are prohibited. California Courts Self-Help Center, "Evictions."
Ejectment is the common-law action brought by a party with the right to possess property (but not currently in possession) against the party in actual possession; it requires proof of paramount or superior title. Cornell LII Wex, "Ejectment." Unlawful detainer is the modern statutory equivalent in most states, typically faster and cheaper than ejectment.
The removal process varies by jurisdiction:
California: The owner must file an unlawful detainer action in Superior Court. California Courts Self-Help Center, "Evictions."
Florida (with a 2024 sheriff track): For residential properties, the owner files a verified complaint directly with the sheriff under Fla. Stat. § 82.036 (not with the court), attesting to the four statutory conditions. The sheriff then verifies ownership and serves a notice to immediately vacate. Fla. Stat. § 82.036 (2024). For situations that do not meet the § 82.036 criteria (for example, the occupant is a former tenant), the standard court eviction process applies.
Texas: Property owners must use the eviction process in Justice Court. Police may remove a person present less than approximately one week on criminal trespass grounds, but anyone with a residency claim requires a formal eviction; hearings are typically set 10 to 21 days out, and the constable gives 24-hour notice before removal. Texas Law Help (approved by the Supreme Court of Texas), "Evicting a Squatter." Texas also allows an accelerated Motion for Summary Disposition specifically for squatters who entered unlawfully; the occupant must respond within four days or the owner receives a Writ of Possession without a hearing. Texas Law Help (approved by the Supreme Court of Texas), "Eviction."
New York: Property owners use the holdover proceeding in Housing Court (New York City) or the unlawful detainer process in local court. N.Y. RPAPL §§ 501 and 521 govern the substantive rights at issue.
Jurisdiction reminder: Removal procedures are entirely state-specific. The sheriff-complaint process available in Florida (Fla. Stat. § 82.036), Georgia, Alabama, West Virginia, and Tennessee does not exist in other states. Owners in all other states must proceed through the court eviction process.
Why Do Squatters Have Rights? The Legal History Behind Adverse Possession
Adverse possession is not a modern legal invention designed to reward trespassers. The doctrine traces to medieval English land law and was formalized in statutes of limitation as early as the Statute of Limitations 1623 and the Real Property Limitation Act 1833. American states adopted similar statutes of limitation on real property actions in the colonial and early post-independence period, and every state in the union has maintained one since. The doctrine serves three distinct legal and economic purposes.
First, adverse possession resolves title disputes that would otherwise be unresolvable. Before comprehensive recording systems, land boundaries were imprecise and competing grants from colonial governments often overlapped. A statute of limitations on ejectment and trespass actions gave courts a mechanism to quiet those disputes by recognizing the party in actual possession as the owner after a substantial period.
Second, the doctrine penalizes owners who abandon or fail to monitor their property. Property law across the common-law world reflects a background principle that land should be used productively. An owner who takes no interest in property for 10, 15, or 20 years has effectively forfeited the interest that statutes of limitation protect.
Third, adverse possession vindicates the reliance interests of occupants who have invested in improving and using land. Cornell LII Wex's treatment of color of title notes that a claimant with a facially valid instrument has a reasonable basis to believe ownership was transferred; the law ultimately protects that reliance when it is accompanied by open, continuous occupation for the statutory period. Cornell LII Wex, "Color of Title."
The hostile element as articulated in Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304, 309 (Alaska 1990), captures this rationale precisely: the test is not moral wrongdoing but whether the occupant treated the land as an owner would. That framing means hostility turns on the occupant's outward conduct toward the land, not on the occupant's state of mind.
Understanding the doctrine's purpose also explains why legislatures in 2024 drew a sharp distinction between traditional adverse possession (which requires years of uninterrupted occupation and court adjudication) and the modern squatter problem (someone who moves into a vacant property opportunistically for days or weeks). The 2024 statutes in Florida, Georgia, Alabama, West Virginia, and Tennessee target the latter. They do not eliminate adverse possession claims built up over years; they create a fast track for removing recent unauthorized occupants before any adverse possession clock can start.
This page provides general legal information about squatters rights and adverse possession law in the United States. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Property law is governed by state statute and varies significantly by jurisdiction; the rules summarized here may not reflect the most current version of the law in your state or the specific facts of your situation. If you are a property owner dealing with an unlawful occupant, or if you believe you may have an adverse possession claim, consult a licensed real estate attorney in the state where the property is located. Information last verified May 2026.
Sources
The primary legal authorities cited in this article are listed below. Each authority was drawn from the research dossier verified May 27, 2026; the page template renders the full citation list with links.
Last updated: May 27, 2026.
Statutes cited reflect their in-force version as of May 27, 2026.
Frequently Asked Questions
What are squatters rights?
Squatters rights refer to the legal doctrine of adverse possession, under which a person who occupies land openly, continuously, exclusively, and hostilely for the state's statutory period can petition a court to transfer title to the occupant. Every US state recognizes this doctrine; the five elements and burden of proof standard are articulated in Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304, 309 (Alaska 1990).
Why do squatters have rights?
Adverse possession has existed in Anglo-American law since at least the Statute of Limitations 1623 and serves three purposes: quieting ancient title disputes, penalizing owners who abandon property, and protecting reliance interests of long-term occupants who treat land as their own. Cornell LII Wex describes color of title as a companion doctrine that further protects claimants who hold a facially valid but legally defective ownership document.
What are the 5 requirements for adverse possession?
The five requirements are: (1) actual possession, (2) continuous possession for the full statutory period, (3) open and notorious possession that puts the owner on constructive notice, (4) exclusive possession not shared with the general public or the true owner, and (5) hostile possession, meaning the claimant acted toward the land as an owner without the true owner's permission. Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304, 309 (Alaska 1990) holds that all five must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
How long does it take to get squatters rights?
The statutory period ranges from 5 years in California (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 325), Montana (Mont. Code Ann. § 70-19-411), and Nevada (Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 11.070, 11.110, 11.150) to 30 years in Louisiana (La. Civ. Code art. 3486) and New Jersey (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-30). Florida requires 7 years under Fla. Stat. § 95.18 and New York requires 10 years under N.Y. CPLR § 212(a).
Does Texas have squatters rights?
Yes. Texas recognizes adverse possession under a tiered scheme: 10 years of peaceable possession with cultivation, use, or enjoyment under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.026 (limited to 160 acres without a title instrument), 5 years with a recorded deed plus tax payments under § 16.025, and 3 years under a recorded instrument under § 16.024. Texas Law Help (approved by the Supreme Court of Texas) notes that police may remove a person present less than approximately one week on trespass grounds, but anyone with a residency claim requires a formal Justice Court eviction.
Does Florida have squatters rights?
Yes, Florida recognizes adverse possession on two 7-year tracks. Fla. Stat. § 95.16 covers possession under color of title and requires 7 years of continued possession plus recording of the written instrument, decree, or judgment the claim is founded on; it has no tax-payment or return-filing condition. Fla. Stat. § 95.18 covers possession without color of title and is the track that requires payment of all outstanding taxes and matured lien installments within 1 year of entering possession, filing of a uniform return with the county property appraiser within 30 days after that payment, and payment of taxes for the rest of the 7 years. However, Florida HB 621 (Ch. 2024-44, effective July 1, 2024) created Fla. Stat. § 82.036, which allows residential owners to request swift sheriff removal of recent unauthorized occupants before any adverse possession clock becomes relevant.
What states have squatters rights?
All 50 states and the District of Columbia recognize adverse possession. Statutory periods and specific requirements vary; for example, California requires 5 years plus tax payment (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 325), New York requires 10 years (N.Y. CPLR § 212(a); N.Y. RPAPL §§ 501, 511), and Florida requires 7 years, with tax payment and a uniform return required only on the no-color-of-title track (Fla. Stat. § 95.18) and recording of the instrument required on the color-of-title track (Fla. Stat. § 95.16). The full 51-jurisdiction comparison appears in the table above.
Can you call the police to remove a squatter?
Police can remove a recent entrant on criminal trespass grounds in most states, but a person who has been living on the property for an extended period typically requires a formal court eviction or, in Florida, Georgia, Alabama, West Virginia, and Tennessee, the 2024 sheriff-complaint process. California Courts Self-Help Center confirms that self-help removal is prohibited in California and owners must use the unlawful detainer process. Alabama HB 182 (2024 Ala. Acts) and the West Virginia Stop Squatters Act (W. Va. Code §§ 55-3C-1, 55-3C-2) allow law enforcement to arrest and remove squatters directly.
What is the difference between a squatter and a trespasser?
A trespasser is someone present on land without permission and without a claim of ownership; the trespasser acquires no property rights regardless of duration. A squatter also enters without permission but occupies the land in a manner consistent with ownership, which can ripen into an adverse possession claim after the statutory period. Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304, 309-310 (Alaska 1990) holds that the hostile element of adverse possession is satisfied when the claimant acts toward the land as an owner, not by the mere fact of unauthorized presence.
What is color of title?
Color of title is a document that appears on its face to convey ownership of real property but is legally defective, such as a forged deed, a deed from a grantor without authority to convey, or an instrument with a fatal technical defect. Cornell LII Wex, 'Color of Title.' Many states reduce the adverse possession statutory period for a claimant who holds color of title; Georgia, for example, cuts 20 years (O.C.G.A. § 44-5-163) to 7 years under written evidence of title (O.C.G.A. § 44-5-164). New York does not shorten its period: N.Y. RPAPL § 511 recognizes a color-of-title claim after 10 years of continued occupation, the same 10 years N.Y. CPLR § 212(a) requires when there is no instrument.
Updates
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources
Corrected the description of Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom to what the court actually held: hostility turns on the occupant’s outward conduct toward the land, not the occupant’s state of mind.
Added the adverse-possession guide and clarified that elements, periods and conditions vary by state. Preserved the comparison and all 51 jurisdiction links.
Corrected Oklahoma's adverse possession period to the 15 years set by Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 93(4) and removed an unsupported 2023 amendment claim, separated Florida's tax-payment and county-return conditions so they are attributed only to the no-color-of-title track under Fla. Stat. § 95.18, and replaced New York with Georgia as the example of color of title shortening the statutory period, since both New York tracks run 10 years.
Corrected the Alaska row of the 51-jurisdiction comparison table to reflect its 7-year color-of-title adverse possession track (AS 09.45.052(a)) and fixed the table's Alaska source citation, which had pointed to an unrelated condominium statute.
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources; governing law re-checked for recent changes
Fixed Florida's 95.18 uniform-return deadline (30 days after paying taxes, not 30 days of entry), Alabama's 6-5-200 conditional 10-year period (color of title or tax listing required), and a wrong Tennessee citation (28-2-101 to 28-2-103) for the plain 7-year track.
Governing law re-checked for recent changes
Corrected the Texas row in the 51-jurisdiction table: the shorter color-of-title track is 3 years under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 16.024 (the table previously listed 5 years and omitted the 3-year track), with the 5-year deed-plus-tax track under 16.024 noted separately.
Aligned the Texas table row's conditions with the 3-year track under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 16.024 and the 5-year deed-and-tax track under 16.025.
Governing law re-checked for recent changes
Reviewed and approved by an editor
State-by-state comparison
Each state guide below is paired with the governing statute our editors adjudicated for it, held in our own legal record and verified against the official source.
Each statute shown is the same adjudicated anchor its state guide renders, independently verified against primary sources. A dash means not yet adjudicated in our record — never that no law exists.
The Law Behind This Article
This article rests on the statutory provisions below, held in our own legal record and retrieved from the official source. Tap a section to read the operative text.
California Code of Civil Procedure
§ 325In forcecited in 3 of our articles
(a) For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by a person claiming title, not founded upon a written instrument, judgment, or decree, land is deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases only: (1) Where it has been protected by a substantial enclosure. (2) Where it has been usually cultivated or improved. (b) In no case shall adverse possession be considered established under the provision of any section of this code, unless it shall be shown that the land has been occupied and claimed for the period of five years continuously, and the party or persons, their predecessors and grantors, have timely paid all state, county, or municipal taxes that have been levied and assessed upon the land for the period of five years during which the land has been occupied and claimed. Payment of those taxes by the party or persons, their predecessors and grantors shall be established by certified records of the county tax collector.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-08 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at leginfo.legislature.ca.gov
Cited in 72 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2024
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Hagman held no tax payment was due under § 325 where none was levied or assessed, and the mosquito assessment was not a tax for that purpose. Abar upheld the private fee beneath a fenced street. West held taxes and a recorded deed alone did not establish possession.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Alcaraz v. Vece (California Supreme Court 1997, 14 Cal. 4th 1149)“…ust have paid all taxes levied or assessed on the property (Code Civ. Proc., § 325; 4 Witkin, supra, Real Property, § 11…”
- Hagman v. Meher Mount Corp. (California Court of Appeal 2013, 215 Cal. App. 4th 82)✓Hagman fenced and improved 0.44 acres owned by a tax-exempt religious nonprofit. The court held § 325 required no property-tax payment because none was levied or assessed, and the mosquito assessment was not a tax; it affirmed title.
- Abar v. Rogers (California Court of Appeal 1972, 23 Cal. App. 3d 506)✓The Rogers fenced an unused street and used it for wrecked cars and supplies for more than five years. The court found substantial evidence met § 325 and held they acquired the private underlying fee, subject to any public easement.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: How to Charge Someone With Trespassing, California Squatters Rights and Adverse Possession Laws (2026)
§ 322In forcecited in 2 of our articles
When it appears that the occupant, or those under whom he claims, entered into the possession of the property under claim of title, exclusive of other right, founding such claim upon a written instrument, as being a conveyance of the property in question, or upon the decree or judgment of a competent Court, and that there has been a continued occupation and possession of the property included in such instrument, decree, or judgment, or of some part of the property, under such claim, for five years, the property so included is deemed to have been held adversely, except that when it consists of a tract divided into lots, the possession of one lot is not deemed a possession of any other lot of the same tract.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at leginfo.legislature.ca.gov
Cited in 22 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2015
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Thomson v. Dypvik (California Court of Appeal 1985, 174 Cal. App. 3d 329)“…This color of title concept is provided for in California Code of Civil Procedure sections 322 and 323. 6 *340…”
- Nielsen v. Gibson (California Court of Appeal 2009, 178 Cal. App. 4th 318)“…[following West]; see also Civ. Code, § 1007; Code Civ. Proc., § 322.) A landowner can interrupt the…”
- Gerhard v. Stephens (California Supreme Court 1968, 68 Cal. 2d 864)“…a 1940 quiet title decree against Carroll, an oil lessee. (Code Civ. Proc., § 322.) These instruments describe the proper…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
New York Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law
§ 511Adverse possession under written instrument or judgmentIn forcecited in 2 of our articles
Adverse possession under written instrument or judgment. Where the occupant or those under whom the occupant claims entered into the possession of the premises under claim of right, exclusive of any other right, founding the claim upon a written instrument, as being a conveyance of the premises in question, or upon the decree or judgment of a competent court, and there has been a continued occupation and possession of the premises included in the instrument, decree or judgment, or of some part thereof, for ten years, under the same claim, the premises so included are deemed to have been held adversely; except that when they consist of a tract divided into lots, the possession of one lot is not deemed a possession of any other lot.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislation.nysenate.gov
Also relied on in: New York Squatters Rights and Adverse Possession Laws (2026)
§ 501Adverse possession; definedIn forcecited in 4 of our articles
Adverse possession; defined. For the purposes of this article: 1. Adverse possessor. A person or entity is an "adverse possessor" of real property when the person or entity occupies real property of another person or entity with or without knowledge of the other's superior ownership rights, in a manner that would give the owner a cause of action for ejectment. 2. Acquisition of title. An adverse possessor gains title to the occupied real property upon the expiration of the statute of limitations for an action to recover real property pursuant to subdivision (a) of section two hundred twelve of the civil practice law and rules, provided that the occupancy, as described in sections five hundred twelve and five hundred twenty-two of this article, has been adverse, under claim of right, open and notorious, continuous, exclusive, and actual. 3. Claim of right. A claim of right means a reasonable basis for the belief that the property belongs to the adverse possessor or property owner, as the case may be.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-08 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislation.nysenate.gov
Also relied on in: Adverse Possession: Elements and State Law Differences
§ 521Adverse possession not under written instrument or judgmentIn forcecited in 2 of our articles
Adverse possession not under written instrument or judgment. Where there has been an actual continued occupation of premises under a claim of right, exclusive of any other right, but not founded upon a written instrument or a judgment or decree, the premises so actually occupied, and no others, are deemed to have been held adversely.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislation.nysenate.gov
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules
§ 212Actions to be commenced within ten or fifteen yearsIn forcecited in 3 of our articles
Actions to be commenced within ten or fifteen years. (a) Possession necessary to recover real property. An action to recover real property or its possession cannot be commenced unless the plaintiff, or his predecessor in interest, was seized or possessed of the premises within ten years before the commencement of the action. (b) Annulment of letters patent. Where letters patent or a grant of real property, issued or made by the state, are declared void on the ground of fraudulent suggestion or concealment, forfeiture, mistake or ignorance of a material fact, wrongful detaining or defective title, an action to recover the premises may be commenced by the state or by a subsequent patentee or grantee, or his successor in interest, within ten years after the determination is made. (c) To redeem from a mortgage.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislation.nysenate.gov
Also relied on in: New York Statute of Limitations: Filing Deadlines by Case Type
Florida Statutes
§ 95.18Real property actions; adverse possession without color of title.In forcecited in 3 of our articles
(1) When the possessor has been in actual continued possession of real property for 7 years under a claim of title exclusive of any other right, but not founded on a written instrument, judgment, or decree, or when those under whom the possessor claims meet these criteria, the property actually possessed is held adversely if the person claiming adverse possession:(a) Paid, subject to s. 197.3335, all outstanding taxes and matured installments of special improvement liens levied against the property by the state, county, and municipality within 1 year after entering into possession; (b) Made a return, as required under subsection (3), of the property by proper legal description to the property appraiser of the county where it is located within 30 days after complying with paragraph (a); and (c) Has subsequently paid, subject to s. 197.3335, all taxes and matured installments of special improvement liens levied against the property by the state, county, and municipality for all remaining years necessary to establish a claim of adverse possession.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-08 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at leg.state.fl.us
Cited in 21 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2018
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Herron reversed summary judgment because ownership and tax-assessment disputes remained. Meyer held color of title did not extend beyond recorded boundaries, requiring the no-color statutory route. Pasekoff left dismissal of a § 95.18 count unchallenged for lack of a tax return.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Herron v. Dastic (District Court of Appeal of Florida 2000, 754 So. 2d 185)✓Claimants paid taxes for seven years, but neighbors paid first in the last year. Ownership and assessment disputes required trial, and the court expressed no view on the other § 95.18 elements.
- Meyer v. Law (Supreme Court of Florida 1973, 287 So. 2d 37)✓Neighbors built across a mistakenly surveyed line. Their deed gave no color of title beyond its recorded boundaries, so they had to satisfy the tax-return, tax-payment, and possession rules for claims without color.
- Pasekoff v. Kaufman (District Court of Appeal of Florida 1981, 392 So. 2d 971)✓The trial court dismissed the estate’s § 95.18 count for lack of evidence that the property was returned for taxes. That ruling was conceded and not challenged on appeal.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Florida Squatters Rights and Adverse Possession Laws (2026), New Jersey Squatters Rights and Adverse Possession Laws (2026)
§ 82.036Limited alternative remedy to remove unauthorized persons from residential real property.In forcecited in 3 of our articles
(1) The Legislature finds that the right to exclude others from entering, and the right to direct others to immediately vacate, residential real property are the most important real property rights. The Legislature further finds that existing remedies regarding unauthorized persons who unlawfully remain on residential real property fail to adequately protect the rights of the property owner and fail to adequately discourage theft and vandalism. The intent of this section is to quickly restore possession of residential real property to the lawful owner of the property when the property is being unlawfully occupied and to thereby preserve property rights while limiting the opportunity for criminal activity. (2) A property owner or his or her authorized agent may request from the sheriff of the county in which the property is located the immediate removal of a person or persons unlawfully occupying a residential dwelling pursuant to this section if all of the following conditions are met:(a) The requesting person is the property owner or authorized agent of the property owner. (b) The real property that is being occupied includes a residential dwelling.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at leg.state.fl.us
§ 95.16Real property actions; adverse possession under color of title.In forcecited in 2 of our articles
(1) When the occupant, or those under whom the occupant claims, entered into possession of real property under a claim of title exclusive of any other right, founding the claim on a written instrument as being a conveyance of the property, or on a decree or judgment, and has for 7 years been in continued possession of the property included in the instrument, decree, or judgment, the property is held adversely. If the property is divided into lots, the possession of one lot shall not be deemed a possession of any other lot of the same tract. Adverse possession commencing after December 31, 1945, shall not be deemed adverse possession under color of title until the instrument upon which the claim of title is founded is recorded in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of the county where the property is located. (2) For the purpose of this section, property is deemed possessed in any of the following cases:(a) When it has been usually cultivated or improved. (b) When it has been protected by a substantial enclosure. All land protected by the enclosure must be included within the description of the property in the written instrument, judgment, or decree.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at leg.state.fl.us
Cited in 28 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2024
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Seddon v. Harpster (Supreme Court of Florida 1981, 403 So. 2d 409)“…s, the court noted that: Under the present day reading of Section 95.16, Florida Statutes, there can be no doubt that the Defenda…”
- Meyer v. Law (Supreme Court of Florida 1973, 287 So. 2d 37)“…nt, judgment, or decree, within the purview of § 95.16." Fla. Stat. § 95.16 , F.S.A., deals with adverse possession…”
- Bush v. Grasswick (District Court of Appeal of Florida 2002, 830 So. 2d 963)“…considered a title claim based on adverse possession under section 95.16, Florida Statutes (1991) and (1975). The Setons' adverse…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
§ 16.024ADVERSE POSSESSION: THREE-YEAR LIMITATIONS PERIODIn forcecited in 2 of our articles
A person must bring suit to recover real property held by another in peaceable and adverse possession under title or color of title not later than three years after the day the cause of action accrues.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at statutes.capitol.texas.gov
Cited in 33 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Mid Pac Portfolio, LLC v. Paula Welch, Clyde Alan Ashworth and Wells Fargo Bank, Minnesota, NA Formerly Known as Norwest Bank, Minnesota, NA, as Trustee for Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII, Inc. Floating Rate Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 1999-LBI (Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) 2015)“…3 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §16.024 .......................................…”
- Aransas County Navigation District No. 1 v. John William Johnson (Texas Court of Appeals, 13th District 2008)“…quired element under both statutes of limitations. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 16.024 , 16.025. We therefore conclude that…”
- BP America Production Co. v. Marshall (Texas Supreme Court 2011, 54 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 978)“…han three years after the day the cause of action accrues.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.024. The five-year statute requires the own…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Texas Squatters Rights and Adverse Possession Laws (2026)
§ 16.025ADVERSE POSSESSION: FIVE-YEAR LIMITATIONS PERIODIn forcecited in 2 of our articles
(a) A person must bring suit not later than five years after the day the cause of action accrues to recover real property held in peaceable and adverse possession by another who: (1) cultivates, uses, or enjoys the property; (2) pays applicable taxes on the property; and (3) claims the property under a duly registered deed. (b) This section does not apply to a claim based on a quitclaim deed, a forged deed, or a deed executed under a forged power of attorney.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at statutes.capitol.texas.gov
Cited in 49 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Mid Pac Portfolio, LLC v. Paula Welch, Clyde Alan Ashworth and Wells Fargo Bank, Minnesota, NA Formerly Known as Norwest Bank, Minnesota, NA, as Trustee for Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities VII, Inc. Floating Rate Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 1999-LBI (Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) 2015)“…3 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §16.025…………………………………………...3,7 Tex. Civ. Prac. &…”
- Juana Mendez Valdez, Et Vir Juan Valdez v. Melody Mueller Moerbe (Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) 2015)“…3 Code Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 16.025 and 16.026.............................…”
- NJ Williams Family Partnership, Ltd. v. James Buchanan Winn, III (Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin) 2010)“…the 5-, 10-, and 25-year adverse possession statutes. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 16.025-.028 (West 2002). Afte…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
§ 16.026ADVERSE POSSESSION: 10-YEAR LIMITATIONS PERIODIn forcecited in 2 of our articles
(a) A person must bring suit not later than 10 years after the day the cause of action accrues to recover real property held in peaceable and adverse possession by another who cultivates, uses, or enjoys the property. (b) Without a title instrument, peaceable and adverse possession is limited in this section to 160 acres, including improvements, unless the number of acres actually enclosed exceeds 160. If the number of enclosed acres exceeds 160 acres, peaceable and adverse possession extends to the real property actually enclosed. (c) Peaceable possession of real property held under a duly registered deed or other memorandum of title that fixes the boundaries of the possessor's claim extends to the boundaries specified in the instrument.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-08 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at statutes.capitol.texas.gov
Cited in 86 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):On remand, Cahill upheld rejection of a ten-year claim on factual-sufficiency review. Roberts held disputed fencing, grazing, pond use and signs raised fact issues under § 16.026 but did not conclusively establish title; it reversed summary judgment and remanded.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Cahill v. Lyda (Court of Appeals of Texas 1991, 814 S.W.2d 390)✓Cahill claimed 15.332 acres inside an old fence based on grazing, taxes and clearing. On remand, the court upheld the trial court’s rejection of her ten-year claim on factual-sufficiency review. The later Supreme Court reversal concerned attorney fees only.
- James Daniel Roberts and Sheryl A. Gross v. Linda Ratliff, Robert Ratliff, and Leonard Ratliff (Texas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth) 2018)✓The Ratliffs claimed a 6.54-acre strip based on fencing, grazing, a pond and signs, but the owners disputed exclusive use. The court held the evidence raised fact issues under § 16.026 without conclusively proving title, reversed summary judgment and remanded.
- Anna Maria Salinas Saenz v. Thorp Petroleum Corp. (Texas Court of Appeals, 4th District (San Antonio) 2015)“…16.021(1) (West 2002) ................................ 32 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.026(a) (West 2002) ........................…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Code of Alabama 1975, Title 6: Civil Practice.
§ 6-5-200When Title to Land Conferred or Defeated; When Claim May Be Defended or Prosecuted; Construction of Section.In forcecited in 2 of our articles
(a) Adverse possession cannot confer or defeat title to land unless: (1) The party setting it up shall show that a deed or other color of title purporting to convey title to him has been duly recorded in the office of the judge of probate of the county in which the land lies for 10 years before the commencement of the action; (2) He and those through whom he claims shall have annually listed the land for taxation in the proper county for 10 years prior to the commencement of the action if the land is subject to taxation; or (3) He derives title by descent cast or devise from a predecessor in the title who was in possession of the land.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-07 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at alison.legislature.state.al.us
Cited in 23 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Bearden applied the 10-year boundary-dispute rule between adjoining owners without § 6-5-200’s three alternative prerequisites, while requiring open, notorious, hostile, continuous and exclusive possession. Hand upheld title based on a recorded tax deed, tax payments and owner-like use of a vacant lot.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Whittemore v. Varner (Supreme Court of Alabama 1992, 607 So. 2d 142)✓The plaintiffs claimed parcel 12 through a predecessor. His 1983 consent judgment waived claims based on his earlier possession. The court found § 6-5-200’s 10-year requirement unmet and reversed the judgment awarding title.
- Bearden v. Ellison (Supreme Court of Alabama 1990, 560 So. 2d 1042)✓Neighbors treated a fence as their boundary for decades, and the claimants gardened, cut timber and grazed cattle to it. The court affirmed adverse-possession title because the evidence supported 10 years of open, hostile, notorious, continuous and exclusive use.
- Hand v. Stanard (Supreme Court of Alabama 1980, 392 So. 2d 1157)✓A tax-deed holder paid taxes and treated an undeveloped beach lot as an owner would by surveying it, marking corners, posting signs and visiting it. The court held he satisfied § 6-5-200 and affirmed his ownership.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Alabama Squatters Rights and Adverse Possession Laws (2026)
Official Code of Georgia Annotated
§ 16-7-21Criminal trespass.In forcecited in 4 of our articles
(a) A person commits the offense of criminal trespass when he or she intentionally damages any property of another without consent of that other person and the damage thereto is $500.00 or less or knowingly and maliciously interferes with the possession or use of the property of another person…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2021-08-17 · Read the full text in our law library
Cited in 314 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Williams v. State (Court of Appeals of Georgia 1986, 180 Ga. App. 854)“…nsent and the damage thereto exceeds $500.00 . . . .” Under OCGA § 16-7-21 (a), “[a] person commits the offense of…”
- Waugh v. State (Supreme Court of Georgia 1993, 263 Ga. 692)“…lesser included offense is also enumerated as error. OCGA § 16-7-21 (a) provides, in relevant part, that th…”
- Achor Center, Inc. v. Holmes (Court of Appeals of Georgia 1995, 219 Ga. App. 399)“…or the arrest of Reverend Holmes for criminal trespass. See OCGA § 16-7-21 (b) (2) and (3). Although there is proo…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Georgia Laws on Recording Police: Your First Amendment Rights (2026), Georgia Laws on Recording in Public: What Is Legal (2026), Georgia Squatters Rights and Adverse Possession Laws (2026)
§ 44-5-163When adverse possession for 20 years confers title.In forcecited in 2 of our articles
Possession of real property in conformance with the requirements of Code Section 44-5-161 for a period of 20 years shall confer good title by prescription to the property against everyone except the state and those persons laboring under the disabilities stated in Code Section 44-5-170. (Laws…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2021-08-17 · Read the full text in our law library
Cited in 42 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Georgia Power affirmed prescriptive title supported by qualifying possession of 6.5 acres. McCloud-Pue held that the 20-year clock could not run while railway land remained under federal regulatory jurisdiction and affirmed dismissal of the quiet-title claim.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Georgia Power Co. v. Irvin (Supreme Court of Georgia 1997, 267 Ga. 760)✓Families occupied and used 6.5 acres at Tallulah Gorge while Georgia Power retained generation rights; the court affirmed the jury's prescriptive-title verdict.
- Shearin v. Wayne Davis & Co., PC (Supreme Court of Georgia 2006, 281 Ga. 385)✓Landowners sought to compel county maintenance of a road; the court held the 20-year prescription route was separate from the seven-year public-use route and affirmed mandamus.
- LESLIE MCCLOUD-PUE, OF THE ESTATE OF ANNETTE CAVANAUGH-MCCLOUD v. ATLANTA BELTLINE INC. (Court of Appeals of Georgia 2022)✓An estate claimed a parking strip along a former railway; the court held the 20-year period could not run while federal rail jurisdiction continued and affirmed dismissal.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
§ 44-5-164When adverse possession for seven years confers title.In forcecited in 2 of our articles
Possession of real property under written evidence of title in conformance with the requirements of Code Section 44-5-161 for a period of seven years shall confer good title by prescription to the property against everyone except the state and those persons laboring under the disabilities stated in…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2021-08-17 · Read the full text in our law library
Cited in 39 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Georgia Power Co. v. Irvin (Supreme Court of Georgia 1997, 267 Ga. 760)“…hes a key for description, and fulfills the requirements of OCGA § 44-5-164. 4 See also McCrea v. Ga. Power Co.,…”
- Rector of Christ Church v. Bishop of Episcopal Diocese of Georgia, Inc. (Supreme Court of Georgia 2011, 290 Ga. 95)“…n perfect title under Georgia's adverse possession statute, OCGA § 44-5-164. In addition to describing neutral pr…”
- Smart v. Miller (Supreme Court of Georgia 1990, 260 Ga. 88)“…roperty against everyone except the state. . . . (b) OCGA § 44-5-164 provides: Possession of real pro…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
West Virginia Code
§ 55-3C-2Squatters defined: squatters not tenants; squatting constitutes criminal trespass; petition and eviction not appropriate remedies for squatters; remedy is arrest for trespass.In forcecited in 3 of our articles
(a) “Squatter” means a person unlawfully occupying a dwelling unit or other structure who is not entitled under a rental or lease agreement or who is not authorized by the tenant or owner to occupy that dwelling unit or structure. “Squatter” does not include a tenant who holds over in a periodic tenancy as described in §37-6-5 of this code, or an owner. (b) “Squatting” means the act of being a squatter. Squatting is synonymous with trespass, and is a criminal act under §61-3B-2 or §61-3B-3 of this Code. (c) Squatters are not considered tenants for purposes of this code and are not entitled to eviction proceedings afforded to lawful tenants. A Court of this state shall not require the use of eviction, or a similar procedure such as those found under §55-3A-1, et seq. or §55-3B-1, et seq. of this Code, by an owner in any instance involving the removal of a squatter from possession of a property.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-30 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at code.wvlegislature.gov
Also relied on in: West Virginia Squatters Rights and Adverse Possession Laws (2026)
§ 55-2-1Entry upon or recovery of lands.In forcecited in 5 of our articles
No person shall make an entry on, or bring an action to recover, any land, but within ten years next after the time at which the right to make such entry or to bring such action shall have first accrued to himself or to some person through whom he claims.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-08 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at code.wvlegislature.gov
Cited in 1 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 1975
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Payne v. Weirton Steel Company (District Court, N.D. West Virginia 1975, 397 F. Supp. 192)“…ch default.” (parentheses added). Plaintiff suggests W.Va.Code § 55-2-1 et seq. as being more anal…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: West Virginia Statute of Limitations: Filing Deadlines by Case Type
Tennessee Code Annotated
§ 28-2-103Seven-year period runs from time right accrued — Extent of possession.In forcecited in 2 of our articles
(a) No person or anyone claiming under such person shall have any action, either at law or in equity, for the recovery of any lands, tenements or hereditaments, but within seven (7) years after the right of action accrued. (b) No possession of lands, tenements or hereditaments shall be deemed to…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2021-05-21 · Read the full text in our law library
Cited in 39 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Hightower v. Pendergrass (Tennessee Supreme Court 1983, 662 S.W.2d 932)“…of the seven year statute of limitations *934 provided by T.C.A. § 28-2-103 [1] . The Court of Appeals and the chan…”
- Cross v. McCurry (Court of Appeals of Tennessee 1993, 859 S.W.2d 349)“…not agree and hold the applicable statute of limitations is T.C.A. § 28-2-103 which applies in cases of adverse posse…”
- Shearer v. Vandergriff (Tennessee Supreme Court 1983, 661 S.W.2d 680)“…BYERS, Special Justice. The issue in this case is whether T.C.A. § 28-2-103 1 bars the action of the appel *681 la…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Tennessee Squatters Rights and Adverse Possession Laws (2026)
Revised Code of Washington
§ 7.28.070Adverse possession under claim and color of title—Payment of taxes.In forcecited in 2 of our articles
Every person in actual, open and notorious possession of lands or tenements under claim and color of title, made in good faith, and who shall for seven successive years continue in possession, and shall also during said time pay all taxes legally assessed on such lands or tenements, shall be held and adjudged to be the legal owner of said lands or tenements, to the extent and according to the purport of his or her paper title. All persons holding under such possession, by purchase, devise or descent, before said seven years shall have expired, and who shall continue such possession and continue to pay the taxes as aforesaid, so as to complete the possession and payment of taxes for the term aforesaid, shall be entitled to the benefit of this section.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at app.leg.wa.gov
Cited in 42 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2024
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Harris v. Urell (Court of Appeals of Washington 2006, 133 Wash. App. 130)“…rough adverse possession under "good faith color of title," RCW 7.28.070; and (2) the statute of limitations and…”
- Peeples v. Port of Bellingham (Washington Supreme Court 1980, 93 Wash. 2d 766)“…adverse possession action at the end of the 7-year period. RCW 7.28.070. *773 The burden of p…”
- McCoy v. Lowrie (Washington Supreme Court 1953, 42 Wash. 2d 24)“…forth therein. Sections 3 and 4 of the act are codified in RCW 7.28.070 and 7.28.080. The latter section of the…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Washington Squatters Rights and Adverse Possession Laws (2026)
§ 4.16.020Actions to be commenced within ten years—Exception.In forcecited in 3 of our articles
The period prescribed for the commencement of actions shall be as follows: Within ten years: (1) For actions for the recovery of real property, or for the recovery of the possession thereof; and no action shall be maintained for such recovery unless it appears that the plaintiff, his or her ancestor, predecessor or grantor was seized or possessed of the premises in question within ten years before the commencement of the action. (2) For an action upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States, or of any state or territory within the United States, or of any territory or possession of the United States outside the boundaries thereof, or of any extraterritorial court of the United States, unless the period is extended under RCW 6.17.020 or a similar provision in another jurisdiction. (3) Of the eighteenth birthday of the youngest child named in the order for whom support is ordered for an action to collect past due child support that has accrued under an order entered after July 23, 1989, by any of the above-named courts or that has accrued under an administrative order as defined in RCW 74.20A.020(6), which is issued after July 23, 1989.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-08 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at app.leg.wa.gov
Cited in 142 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Highline applied the 10-year period to airport-noise inverse condemnation and remanded disputed damages. Roy allowed tacking through physical transfer despite the deed’s omission. Viewing evidence favorably to the Nickells, Nickell found possession complete before the greenbelt law and reversed summary judgment.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Highline School District No. 401 v. Port of Seattle (Washington Supreme Court 1976, 87 Wash. 2d 6)✓A school district alleged worsening airport noise damaged nearby schools. Applying RCW 4.16.020's 10-year prescriptive period, the court held evidence of increased operations and noisier aircraft created a fact issue about a new taking, and reversed dismissal of that claim.
- Roy v. Cunningham (Court of Appeals of Washington 1986, 46 Wash. App. 409)✓The Roys and predecessors treated land to an old fence as their own. The court held subjective boundary uncertainty did not defeat hostility and physical transfer permitted tacking despite the deed's omission, affirming adverse-possession title while remanding damages.
- Nickell v. SOUTHVIEW HOMEOWNERS ASS'N (Court of Appeals of Washington 2012, 167 Wash. App. 42)✓Viewing the Nickells’ landscaping evidence favorably on summary judgment, the court found adverse possession complete by June 1995. The 1997 greenbelt law and alleged silence did not defeat their claim; it reversed the association’s judgment and remanded.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Washington Statute of Limitations: Filing Deadlines by Case Type
Minnesota Statutes, Chapter 541: LIMITATION OF TIME, COMMENCING ACTIONS
§ 541.02RECOVERY OF REAL ESTATE, 15 YEARSIn forcecited in 4 of our articles
No action for the recovery of real estate or the possession thereof shall be maintained unless it appears that the plaintiff, the plaintiff's ancestor, predecessor, or grantor was seized or possessed of the premises in question within 15 years before the beginning of the action. Such limitations shall not be a bar to an action for the recovery of real estate assessed as tracts or parcels separate from other real estate, unless it appears that the party claiming title by adverse possession or the party's ancestor, predecessor, or grantor, or all of them together, shall have paid taxes on the real estate in question at least five consecutive years of the time during which the party claims these lands to have been occupied adversely. The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply to actions relating to the boundary line of lands, which boundary lines are established by adverse possession, or to actions concerning lands included between the government or platted line and the line established by such adverse possession, or to lands not assessed for taxation.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-08 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at revisor.mn.gov
Cited in 47 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Grubb affirmed the possession elements but ordered judgment for the record owner because the claimants had not paid the required taxes on the substantially claimed assessed parcel. Searles declined to decide whether § 541.02 barred a post-divorce land claim.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Ganje v. Schuler (Court of Appeals of Minnesota 2003, 659 N.W.2d 261)“…y. After setting out the 15 year adverse-possession period, Minn.Stat. § 541.02 (2002), states: Such limitations…”
- Grubb v. State (Court of Appeals of Minnesota 1988, 433 N.W.2d 915)✓Farmers proved the possession elements for more than 15 years but paid no property taxes. The court held the boundary exception inapplicable and remanded for judgment vesting title in the record owner.
- Searles v. Searles (Court of Appeals of Minnesota 1987, 412 N.W.2d 11)✓A former spouse sued nearly 15 years after divorce for Minnesota land; the court declined to decide whether § 541.02 applied and held the pleaded real-property claim could proceed.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Minnesota Squatters Rights and Adverse Possession Laws (2026)
Wisconsin Statutes, Chapter 893: Limitations Of Commencement Of Actions And Proceedings; Procedure For Claims Against Governmental Units
§ 893.27Adverse possession; founded on recorded title claim and payment of taxes.In forcecited in 3 of our articles
(1) An action for the recovery or the possession of real estate and a defense or counterclaim based upon title to real estate are barred by uninterrupted adverse possession of 7 years, except as provided by s. 893.14 or 893.29. A person who in connection with his or her predecessors in interest is in uninterrupted adverse possession of real estate for 7 years, except as provided by s. 893.29, may commence an action to establish title under ch. 841. (2) Real estate is possessed adversely under this section as provided by s. 893.26 (2) to (5) and only if: (a) Any conveyance of the interest evidenced by the written instrument or judgment under which the original entry was made is recorded with the register of deeds of the county in which the real estate lies within 30 days after execution; and (b) The person possessing it or his or her predecessor in interest pays all real estate taxes, or other taxes levied, or payments required, in lieu of real estate taxes for the 7-year period after the original entry. Judicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section is new.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at docs.legis.wisconsin.gov
Also relied on in: Wisconsin Squatters Rights and Adverse Possession Laws (2026), Wisconsin Statute of Limitations: Filing Deadlines by Case Type
New Mexico Statutes Annotated 1978, Chapter 37
§ 37-1-22Title in fee simple by adverse possession; action after ten years barred; definition; payment of taxes.In forcecited in 5 of our articles
In all cases where any person or persons, their children, heirs or assigns, shall have had adverse possession continuously and in good faith under color of title for ten years of any lands, tenements or hereditaments and no claim by suit in law or equity effectually prosecuted shall have been set up or made to the said lands, tenements or hereditaments, within the aforesaid time of ten years, then and in that case, the person or persons, their children, heirs or assigns, so holding adverse possession as aforesaid, shall be entitled to keep and hold in possession such quantity of lands as shall be specified and described in some writing purporting to give color of title to such adverse occupant, in preference to all, and against all, and all manner of person or persons whatsoever; and any person or persons, their children or their heirs or assigns, who shall neglect or who have neglected for the said term of ten years, to avail themselves of the benefit of any title, legal or equitable, which he, she or they may have to any lands, tenements or hereditaments, within this state, by suit of law or equity effectually prosecuted against the person or persons so as aforesaid…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-08 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at nmonesource.com
Cited in 22 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2018
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Deaton excluded possession before federal land was patented. Rio Rancho held that a drainage-easement plat was not color of fee title. Lopez limited adverse title to the portion exclusively and continuously possessed.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Deaton v. Gutierrez (New Mexico Court of Appeals 2003, 135 N.M. 423)✓Adverse possession of federal public land could not begin before the patent issued, and strangers to the patent claimant could not use relation back to count earlier possession.
- City of Rio Rancho v. AMREP SOUTHWEST INC. (New Mexico Supreme Court 2011, 150 N.M. 428)✓A recorded drainage-easement plat did not purport to convey fee title, so it was not color of title and the City's adverse-possession claim failed.
- Lopez v. Adams (New Mexico Court of Appeals 1993, 116 N.M. 757)✓A 1964 deed and tax payments supported color of title and taxes, but competing use defeated exclusive, uninterrupted possession on the eastern portion, limiting title to the western portion.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: New Mexico Squatters Rights and Adverse Possession Laws (2026), New Mexico Statute of Limitations: Filing Deadlines by Case Type
Kansas Statutes Annotated, Chapter 60: PROCEDURE, CIVIL
§ 60-503Adverse possession.In forcecited in 3 of our articles
No action shall be maintained against any person for the recovery of real property who has been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of such real property, either under a claim knowingly adverse or under a belief of ownership, for a period of fifteen (15) years. This section shall not apply to any action commenced within one (1) year after the effective date of this act.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-08 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ksrevisor.gov
Cited in 54 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Stith rejected adverse possession where sporadic storage and shared dumping were neither exclusive nor continuous. Armstrong upheld prescriptive utility easements acquired through open, exclusive and continuous use under a good-faith belief of ownership.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Stith v. Williams (Supreme Court of Kansas 1980, 227 Kan. 32)✓Neighbors occasionally stored items on a disputed strip also used as a dump; the court held their possession was neither exclusive nor continuous and affirmed record title.
- Armstrong v. Cities Service Gas Co. (Supreme Court of Kansas 1972, 210 Kan. 298)✓Utilities maintained pipelines and power lines across the land for decades under a belief of ownership; the court upheld their prescriptive easements under § 60-503.
- Chesbro v. Board of County Commissioners (Court of Appeals of Kansas 2008, 39 Kan. App. 2d 954)✓A county used and maintained the strip beside a road under a belief of ownership for 15 years; the court affirmed summary judgment establishing adverse possession.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Kansas Squatters Rights and Adverse Possession Laws (2026), Kansas Statute of Limitations: Filing Deadlines by Case Type
Code of Virginia, Title 8.01: Civil Remedies and Procedure
§ 8.01-236Limitation of entry on or action for landIn forcecited in 2 of our articles
No person shall make an entry on, or bring an action to recover, any land unless within fifteen years next after the time at which the right to make such entry or bring such action shall have first accrued to such person or to some other person through whom he claims; provided that an action for unlawful entry or detainer under § 8.01-124 shall be brought within three years after such entry or detainer.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-08 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at law.lis.virginia.gov
Cited in 10 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2007
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Hunt v. Section 1, Oyster Bay Community Ass'n (Virginia Circuit Court 2003, 61 Va. Cir. 103)“…v. Chincoteague Vol. Fire Co., 220 Va. 553 (1979); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-236 ). The Complainants must prove the el…”
- Willner v. Frey (District Court, E.D. Virginia 2006, 421 F. Supp. 2d 913)“…that the Commonwealth of Virginia, through the operation of Va.Code § 8.01-236, had taken the Willners’ property for p…”
- United States v. Tobias (Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 1990, 899 F.2d 1375)“…Va. 967, 976 , 103 S.E.2d 227, 234 (1958)); see also Va.Code Ann. § 8.01-236 (1984) (establishing 15-year statutory…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Virginia Squatters Rights and Adverse Possession Laws (2026)
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Sources and References
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