District of Columbia
DC Squatters Rights: Washington D.C. Adverse Possession Laws (2026)
Independently fact-checked against primary sources (last audited August 18, 2026). · Reviewed by the RecordingLaw editorial team. · Law checked current as of August 18, 2026. How we verify our legal content
Squatters in the District of Columbia must occupy property openly and continuously for 15 years before they can claim ownership through adverse possession under D.C. Code § 12-301(a)(1). Property owners can remove unlawful occupants through an action for possession of real property under D.C. Code § 16-1501 et seq.
Information last verified on May 27, 2026. This article provides general legal information, not legal advice.
Jurisdiction scope: This page covers squatters rights law in the District of Columbia only. For a 50-state comparison, see the national squatters rights guide.
Adverse Possession in the District of Columbia: Period and Elements
The 15-Year Rule
D.C. Code § 12-301(a)(1) sets a 15-year statute of limitations on actions to recover land, tenements, or hereditaments. In practice, this provision is the source of the District's adverse possession period: once 15 years pass without the record owner bringing a recovery action, the occupant's possession ripens into a potential ownership claim.
The District of Columbia does not recognize a shorter period for claimants holding color of title (a defective deed or other document that appears to convey ownership). Unlike many states that reward color-of-title claimants with a reduced period of five to ten years, D.C. applies the same 15-year clock regardless of whether the occupant holds any paper claim to the property.
D.C. law does not make paying property taxes a mandatory element. Some states condition adverse possession on the occupant paying property taxes throughout the claim period; the District of Columbia does not impose that condition on a claimant who can otherwise show actual possession.
Taxes are not irrelevant, however. For a vacant and unimproved lot, D.C. Code § 16-1113 gives a claimant an alternative way to satisfy the possession element. If the lot was assessed for taxation to the claimant, the claimant paid those taxes, and the claimant had sole control of the lot for the 15 years before the suit was brought, the statute treats those facts as the equivalent of possession by actual enclosure. That is an optional route to proving possession on unimproved land, not a tax requirement imposed on every claim.
Elements a Claimant Must Prove
To prevail on an adverse possession claim in D.C., a claimant must prove that possession was:
Actual. The occupant must physically use the land in a manner consistent with its nature. For a residential lot, that typically means living on the property, maintaining it, and making repairs.
Open and notorious. The occupation must be visible and obvious so that a reasonable owner inspecting the property would notice someone else is in possession. Concealed or secretive use does not qualify.
Exclusive. The occupant must possess the property to the exclusion of the record owner and the general public. Shared use with the owner defeats the exclusivity element.
Hostile. Hostility in the legal sense does not require bad intent. It means the occupant possesses the land without the owner's permission. A licensee or tenant who has the owner's consent cannot satisfy the hostile element.
Continuous for 15 years. The occupant must maintain uninterrupted possession for the full 15-year period. Seasonal or periodic absences may be acceptable if consistent with how the property is ordinarily used, but significant gaps in possession restart the clock.
The claimant bears the burden of proving each element by clear and convincing evidence. Courts apply that standard strictly because adverse possession results in the involuntary loss of another person's property.
Tacking
A claimant may add together ("tack") the possession periods of successive occupants, provided there is privity between them (for example, a transfer of possession through a deed, even a defective one, or a direct handoff). Tacking allows a current occupant to combine their years of possession with a predecessor's years to reach the 15-year threshold.
Perfecting Title Through Quiet Title
Completing 15 years of qualifying possession does not automatically transfer record title. The occupant must take an additional legal step to formalize ownership. D.C. Code § 16-3301 provides the procedure: the claimant files a complaint in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia alleging that title has vested by adverse possession. The decree, once entered, may be recorded with the Recorder of Deeds to give public notice of the ownership change. Where a defendant cannot be located, the court allows service by publication under the standards applicable to nonresident defendants.
D.C. Code § 16-3301(c) saves the rights of infants and others under legal disability for two years after their disabilities are removed, but the entire period preserved may not exceed 22 years from the time the rights accrued.
That savings clause governs the quiet title action. A record owner's own deadline to sue is set separately. Under D.C. Code § 12-302, a person who was under 18 years of age, non compos mentis, or imprisoned when the right of action accrued may bring an action for the recovery of lands within five years after the disability is removed, and not thereafter. An owner in that position should work from the five-year figure in § 12-302 rather than the two-year savings clause in the quiet title statute.
How to Remove a Squatter in the District of Columbia
Identify Whether the Occupant Is a Squatter or a Tenant
Before filing any court action, property owners must determine whether the person on the property is a true squatter (someone who entered without permission and has no rental agreement) or a tenant whose right to possession has ended. This distinction matters enormously in the District of Columbia.
D.C. has some of the strongest tenant-protection laws in the country. Tenants under an expired or month-to-month lease, tenants in a building subject to the Rental Housing Act, and certain other occupants have procedural rights and potential defenses that a property owner cannot bypass. Filing the wrong type of action wastes time and may subject the owner to liability. An attorney familiar with D.C. landlord-tenant law can help classify the occupant correctly before proceeding.
A true squatter who entered without any agreement, invitation, or permission is not a tenant and does not hold any of the rights that attach to a tenancy. That person is subject to removal through the action for possession described below.
Action for Possession of Real Property (D.C. Code § 16-1501 et seq.)
The primary legal mechanism for removing an unlawful occupant in the District of Columbia is an action for possession of real property, sometimes called an unlawful detainer or forcible entry and detainer action. The action is filed in the Landlord and Tenant Branch of D.C. Superior Court.
Step 1: File a Verified Complaint. The property owner files a verified complaint under D.C. Code § 16-1501 alleging that the occupant detains possession without right. The complaint must include sufficient facts to establish the owner's right to possession. Owners who are landlords must also show current rental registration and licensing. D.C. Code 16-1501(c) does not carve out an exemption for true squatters; the only stated exemptions apply to complaints involving subtenants and, under subsection (e), commercial tenants.
Step 2: Service of the Summons. Under D.C. Code § 16-1502, the summons must be served at least 14 days before the initial hearing date. Service may be made by direct delivery to the occupant, by leaving a copy with someone at least 16 years old who resides on the premises, or by posting the summons in a conspicuous place on the property. If service is by posting, the owner must also mail a copy to the premises within three calendar days and must submit a timestamped photograph of the posted summons to the court.
Step 3: Initial Hearing. The court holds an initial hearing. If the occupant does not appear, the owner may request a default judgment. If the occupant appears and contests possession, the case proceeds to a merits hearing.
Step 4: Judgment and Writ of Restitution. Under D.C. Code § 16-1503, if the court rules for the property owner, it enters a judgment for possession and may issue a writ of restitution directing the U.S. Marshals Service to remove the occupant and restore possession to the owner.
A judgment in this proceeding settles possession, not ownership. D.C. Code § 16-1505 provides that a judgment in a proceeding under this chapter is not a bar to any afteraction brought by either party, and does not conclude any question of title between them where title is not pleaded by the defendants. That distinction matters here: winning possession does not by itself extinguish an occupant's adverse possession claim, because adverse possession is a claim of title. An owner who wants ownership settled must have title litigated, and an occupant who believes title has vested must still bring the quiet title action described above.
No Self-Help Removal
Property owners in the District of Columbia cannot remove a squatter through self-help. Changing locks, removing belongings, shutting off utilities, or physically removing an occupant without a court order is unlawful. Violations can expose the owner to civil liability. All removals must go through the court process described above.
2024-2025 Legislative Developments
Several U.S. states enacted expedited squatter-removal statutes in 2024 and 2025 that allow law enforcement to remove squatters quickly through an administrative rather than judicial process. As of May 2026, the District of Columbia has not enacted a comparable law. D.C. Code § 16-1501 et seq. remains the controlling removal procedure, and it requires a court filing and hearing before any removal can take place.
Legal Disclaimer: This article provides general legal information about Washington D.C. squatters rights and adverse possession law. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Laws can change and individual circumstances vary. Consult a lawyer licensed in the District of Columbia before taking any action related to squatters, adverse possession, or property disputes.
For a comparison of squatters rights laws across all 50 states, see the national squatters rights guide.
RecordingLaw.com provides general legal information, not legal advice. No attorney-client relationship is formed by reading this page.
Frequently Asked Questions
How long does it take for a squatter to claim rights in Washington D.C.?
A squatter in the District of Columbia must possess property for 15 continuous years before they can assert an adverse possession claim. This 15-year period is set by D.C. Code § 12-301(a)(1). There is no shorter period for claimants with color of title. Paying property taxes is not a required element, but under D.C. Code § 16-1113 a claimant on a vacant, unimproved lot may prove possession by showing that the lot was assessed to them, that they paid those taxes, and that they had sole control for the 15 years before suit.
Does D.C. have a color-of-title exception that shortens the adverse possession period?
No. Unlike many states, the District of Columbia does not recognize a reduced adverse possession period for claimants who hold color of title. The same 15-year clock under D.C. Code § 12-301(a)(1) applies to all adverse possession claims regardless of whether the occupant holds a defective deed or other document.
How do I remove a squatter from my property in Washington D.C.?
You must file an action for possession of real property in the Landlord and Tenant Branch of D.C. Superior Court under D.C. Code § 16-1501. File a verified complaint, serve the summons at least 14 days before the initial hearing under D.C. Code § 16-1502, and obtain a judgment and writ of restitution executed by the U.S. Marshals Service. Self-help removal is not permitted.
Can a squatter ever legally own property in D.C.?
Yes, but only after satisfying every element of adverse possession for 15 years and then filing a quiet title action in Superior Court under D.C. Code § 16-3301. The court decree, once recorded with the Recorder of Deeds, formalizes the ownership transfer.
What is the difference between a squatter and a tenant in D.C.?
A squatter entered the property without the owner's permission and has no rental agreement. A tenant entered with the owner's consent under a lease or rental arrangement. D.C.'s strong tenant-protection laws apply to tenants, not to true squatters. However, if an owner previously invited someone onto the property, that person may have tenant rights even without a written lease, so legal advice is important before filing any action.
Did D.C. pass an anti-squatter or expedited removal law in 2024 or 2025?
As of May 2026, the District of Columbia has not enacted a dedicated expedited squatter-removal law. Several other states passed such laws in 2024 and 2025, but D.C. has not followed. Property owners in the District must still proceed through the standard court-based action for possession under D.C. Code § 16-1501 et seq.
What must a squatter prove to win an adverse possession claim in D.C.?
The squatter must prove by clear and convincing evidence that possession was actual, open and notorious, exclusive, hostile (without the owner's permission), and continuous for 15 years. Failing to satisfy any single element defeats the claim.
Updates
Corrected our description of D.C. Code § 16-1505, which does not make a possession judgment conclusive, added the § 16-1113 tax-and-sole-control route to proving possession of a vacant unimproved lot, and added the five-year deadline § 12-302 gives an owner who was under a legal disability.
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources; governing law re-checked for recent changes
Corrected a claim that DC's rental-registration/licensing proof requirement for summary possession filings does not apply when removing a true squatter; the statute contains no such carve-out.
Governing law re-checked for recent changes
Reviewed and approved by an editor
The Law Behind This Article
This article rests on the statutory provisions below, held in our own legal record and retrieved from the official source. Tap a section to read the operative text.
Code of the District of Columbia, Title 16: Particular Actions, Proceedings and Matters. - Chapter 33: Quieting Title Obtained by Adverse Possession.
§ 16-3301Complaint; allegations; parties; service; decree.In force
(a) When title to real property in the District of Columbia has become vested in a person by adverse possession, the holder thereof may file a complaint in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to have the title perfected. In the complaint, it is sufficient to allege that the plaintiff holds the title to the property, and that it has vested in him, or in himself and in those under whom he claims, by adverse possession. In the action, it is not necessary to make any person a party defendant except those persons who appear to have a claim or title adverse to that of the plaintiff. Upon the trial of the cause, proof of the facts showing title in the plaintiff by adverse possession entitles him to decree of the court declaring his title by adverse possession, and a copy of the decree may be entered of record in the office of the Recorder of Deeds for the District. (b) In an action pursuant to this section, if process is returned not to be found, notice by publication may be substituted as in the case of nonresident defendants.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-30 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at github.com
Code of the District of Columbia, Title 12: Right to Remedy. - Chapter 3: Limitation of Actions.
§ 12-301Limitation of time for bringing actions.In forcecited in 13 of our articles
[(a)] Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, actions for the following purposes may not be brought after the expiration of the period specified below from the time the right to maintain the action accrues: (1) for the recovery of lands, tenements, or hereditaments— 15 years; (2) for the recovery of personal property or damages for its unlawful detention— 3 years; (3) for the recovery of damages for an injury to real or personal property— 3 years; (4) for libel, slander, assault, battery, mayhem, wounding, malicious prosecution, false arrest or false imprisonment— 1 year; (5) for a statutory penalty or forfeiture— 1 year; (6) on an executor’s or administrator’s bond— 5 years; on any other bond or single bill, covenant, or other instrument under seal— 12 years; (7) on a simple contract, express or implied— 3 years; (8) for which a limitation is not otherwise specially prescribed— 3 years; (9) for a violation of § 7-1201.01(11)— 1 year; (10) for the recovery of damages for an injury to real property from toxic substances including products containing asbestos— 5 years from the date the injury is discovered or with reasonable diligence should have been…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-08 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at github.com
Cited in 492 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Bussineau v. President of Georgetown College (1986) held that under 12-301 a discovery-rule claim accrues only when plaintiff knows or should know of the injury, its cause in fact, and some evidence of wrongdoing. Greenpeace, Inc. v. The Dow Chemical Company (2014) applied 12-301(4)'s one-year period to intrusion upon seclusion.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Bussineau v. President of Georgetown College (District of Columbia Court of Appeals 1986, 518 A.2d 423)✓A dental patient, reassured her treatment was proper, sued years later. Reversing summary judgment, the court held that where the discovery rule applies, a D.C. Code 12-301(8) claim accrues only on knowledge of the injury, its cause in fact, and some evidence of wrongdoing.
- District of Columbia v. OWENS-CORNING FIBERGLAS CORPORATION (District of Columbia Court of Appeals 1990, 572 A.2d 394)✓The District sued asbestos makers over removal costs in roughly 2,400 public buildings, and most claims were held time barred. The court held the District is immune from D.C. Code 12-301 when it sues to vindicate public rights in performing a public function, and reversed.
- Greenpeace, Inc. v. The Dow Chemical Company (District of Columbia Court of Appeals 2014, 97 A.3d 1053)✓Greenpeace alleged corporate espionage, including rummaging through its trash for confidential documents. The court held an intrusion upon seclusion claim is governed by the one-year period in D.C. Code 12-301(4), not a three-year period, so the claim was time barred.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: District of Columbia Recording Laws (2026): One-Party Consent Rules, District of Columbia Hit and Run Laws: Penalties & Guide, DC Defamation Laws: Libel, Slander & Suing (2026)
§ 12-302Disability of plaintiff.In forcecited in 3 of our articles
(a) Except as provided by subsection (b) of this section, when a person entitled to maintain an action is, at the time the right of action accrues: (1) under 18 years of age; or (2) non compos mentis; or (3) imprisoned — he or his proper representative may bring action within the time limited after the disability is removed. (b) When a person entitled to maintain an action for the recovery of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or upon an instrument under seal, is under any of the disabilities specified by subsection (a) of this section at the time the right of action accrues, he or his proper representative, except where otherwise specified herein, may bring the action within 5 years after the disability is removed, and not thereafter.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-30 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at github.com
Cited in 47 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Brown v. Jonz (District of Columbia Court of Appeals 1990, 572 A.2d 455)“…Brown’s claim for legal malpractice was tolled pursuant to D.C.Code § 12-302(a)(3) (1989 Repl.) due to his imprisonm…”
- Interdonato v. Interdonato (District of Columbia Court of Appeals 1987, 521 A.2d 1124)“…hteenth birthday, which was in June 1970. See D.C. Code § 12-302 (a)(l) (1981). Since more than three ye…”
- Bond v. Serano (District of Columbia Court of Appeals 1989, 566 A.2d 47)“…the statute of limitations in particular situations. See D.C.Code § 12-302 (1981) (limitations period tolled due t…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: District Of Columbia Statute of Limitations: Filing Deadlines by Case Type, Medical Malpractice Laws in Washington DC (2026): Deadlines
Code of the District of Columbia, Title 16: Particular Actions, Proceedings and Matters. - Chapter 11: Ejectment and Other Real Property Actions. - Subchapter I: Ejectment.
§ 16-1113Defense of adverse possession; enclosure.In force
In an action to recover vacant and unimproved lots of ground it is not necessary, in order to maintain the defense of adversary possession, to show that the premises in controversy had been enclosed; but if it appears that the property had been assessed for taxation to the defendant, or those under whom he claims, and that he or they had regularly paid the taxes on the property and were the only persons who had exercised control over the property for a period of fifteen years before the bringing of the action, the facts shall be the equivalent of possession by actual enclosure.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-30 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at github.com
Cited in 3 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Tyroshi Investments, LLC v. U.S. Bank, NA, Successor Trustee to LaSalle Bank NA (District of Columbia Court of Appeals 2025)“…cese of Washington, 5 A.3d 653, 658 (D.C. 2010)); see also D.C. Code § 16-1113 (adverse possession defense arises whe…”
- Asnake v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. (Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 2018, 313 F. Supp. 3d 84)“…pett , 569 A.2d 1186 , 1190 (D.C. 1990) ; see also D.C. Code § 16-1113 . If successful, the adverse possessor…”
- Asnake v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (District Court, District of Columbia 2018)“…mith v. Tippett, 569 A.2d 1186, 1190 (D.C. 1990); see also D.C. Code § 16-1113. If successful, the adverse possessor…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Code of the District of Columbia, Title 16: Particular Actions, Proceedings and Matters. - Chapter 15: Forcible Entry and Detainer.
§ 16-1501Definition; summons.In force
(a) When a person detains possession of real property without right, or after his right to possession has ceased, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, on complaint under oath verified by the person aggrieved by the detention, or by his agent or attorney having knowledge of the facts, may issue a summons in English and Spanish to the party complained of to appear and show cause why judgment should not be given against him for the restitution of possession. (b) A person aggrieved shall not file a complaint seeking restitution of possession pursuant to this section for nonpayment of rent in an amount less than $600. Nothing in this subsection shall prevent the person aggrieved from filing a complaint to recover the amount owed. (1) A person aggrieved shall not file a complaint seeking restitution of possession pursuant to this section without a valid rental registration or claim of exemption pursuant to § 42-3502.05, and a current license for rental housing issued pursuant to § 47-2828(c)(1), as certified at the time of filing and documented at the initial hearing.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-30 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at github.com
Cited in 11 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Shannon & Luchs Co. v. Jeter (District of Columbia Court of Appeals 1983, 469 A.2d 812)“…ludes the summary proceeding of a suit for possession under D.C.Code § 16-1501 (1981). D.C.Code § 16-1501 (1981…”
- District of Columbia v. Towers (District of Columbia Court of Appeals 2021)“…filing actions for possession of real property pursuant to D.C. Code § 16-1501 (2012 Repl.) during the public health…”
- April J. Ward and James L. Scales v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and James L. Scales and April J. Ward v. Wachovia Mortgage Prentice Hall Corporation System (District of Columbia Court of Appeals 2014)“…or after [their] right to possession has ceased . . . .” D.C. Code § 16-1501 (2012 Repl.). This court does not appea…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
§ 16-1502Service of summons.In force
(a) The summons provided for by section 16-1501 shall be served at least 14 days before the day fixed for the initial hearing of the action. If the defendant has left the District, or cannot be found, the summons may be served by delivering a copy of the summons to the tenant, or by leaving a copy with some person above the age of 16 years residing on or in possession of the premises, or by posting a copy of the summons on the premises where it may be conveniently read. (1) If the summons is posted on the premises, a copy of the summons shall be mailed first class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the premises sought to be recovered, addressed in the name of the person known to be in possession of the premises, or, if unknown, addressed in the name of the person occupying the premises, within 3 calendar days of the date of posting. (2) If a summons is served by posting a copy on the premises, a photograph of the posted summons must be submitted to the court. The photograph must have a readable timestamp that indicates the date and time when the summons was posted.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-30 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at github.com
Cited in 5 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2023
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Alexander v. Polinger Co. (District of Columbia Court of Appeals 1985, 496 A.2d 267)“…rt can determine that process was served in compliance with D.C. Code Section 16-1502 (1973 ed.) 3 and SCR L & T…”
- Frank Emmet Real Estate, Inc. v. Monroe (District of Columbia Court of Appeals 1989, 562 A.2d 134)“…s to the address of the leased premises, as provided for by D.C.Code § 16-1502 (1981). Landlord did not testify at the…”
- Southern Hills Limited Partnership v. Charles Anderson (District of Columbia Court of Appeals 2018)“…lord and Tenant Branch requires service in compliance with D.C. Code § 16-1502 (2012 Repl.). The statute reads in rel…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
§ 16-1503Judgment and execution for possession.In force
When, upon a trial in a proceeding pursuant to this chapter, it appears that the plaintiff is entitled to the possession of the premises, judgment and execution for the possession shall be awarded in his favor, with costs; and if the plaintiff becomes nonsuit or fails to prove his right to the possession, the defendant shall have judgment and execution for his costs.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-30 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at github.com
Cited in 5 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2023
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Shannon & Luchs Co. v. Jeter (District of Columbia Court of Appeals 1983, 469 A.2d 812)“…ding to sue under this statutory provision. Further, D.C.Code § 16-1503 (1981) provides: When, upon a tr…”
- Johnson v. Edgewood Management Corp. (District of Columbia Court of Appeals 1986, 512 A.2d 287)“…ver, Judge Walton vacated his original order and held that D.C. Code § 16-1503 (1981), which authorizes “judgment and…”
- Weatherly v. Second Northwest Coop. Homes Assoc., Inc. (District of Columbia Court of Appeals 2023)“…ember of Second Northwest, she cannot occupy the unit. See D.C. Code § 16-1503 (“When, upon a trial in a proceeding pu…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
§ 16-1505Conclusiveness of judgment.In force
A judgment of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia in a proceeding pursuant to this chapter is not a bar to any afteraction brought by either party, and does not conclude any question of title between them, where title is not pleaded by the defendants.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-30 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at github.com
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Sources and References
- D.C. Code § 12-301(a)(1) - Limitations of actions: recovery of land(code.dccouncil.gov)
- D.C. Code § 16-1501 - Action for possession of real property: definition and summons(code.dccouncil.gov)
- D.C. Code § 16-1502 - Action for possession of real property: service of summons(code.dccouncil.gov)
- D.C. Code § 16-1503 - Action for possession of real property: judgment and execution(code.dccouncil.gov)
- D.C. Code § 16-3301 - Quiet title obtained by adverse possession: complaint, allegations, parties, service, decree(code.dccouncil.gov)
- D.C. Code § 16-1113 - Defense of adverse possession; enclosure(code.dccouncil.gov)
- D.C. Code § 16-1505 - Action for possession of real property: conclusiveness of judgment(code.dccouncil.gov)
- D.C. Code § 12-302 - Limitations of actions: disability of plaintiff(code.dccouncil.gov)