Washington
Washington Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground Rules (2027)
Independently fact-checked against primary sources (last audited November 3, 2026). · Law checked current as of November 3, 2026. · 10 primary sources cited on this page. How we verify our legal content

Washington has no stand-your-ground statute, but its Supreme Court has long held that you do not have to retreat if you are attacked where you have a right to be. In State v. Redmond, 150 Wn.2d 489 (2003), the court put it this way: "The law is well settled that there is no duty to retreat when a person is assaulted in a place where he or she has a right to be."
That rule removes retreat, not the other limits. Force is lawful only when it is not more than necessary (RCW 9A.16.020(3)), and for a killing RCW 9A.16.050 sets the test: lawful defense against a reasonably apprehended design to commit a felony or do great personal injury, with imminent danger of it being carried out, or in actual resistance of an attempted felony upon you, in your presence, or upon or in the dwelling where you are. Washington has no statutory presumption that a home defender's fear was reasonable, and no statute granting immunity from prosecution. A prosecutor, judge or jury decides whether the facts meet these tests.
Jurisdiction scope: This page covers Washington State law: RCW chapter 9A.16 and Washington Supreme Court decisions. Federal property, federal buildings, military installations and tribal land can follow different rules, and federal prosecutions apply federal self-defense law. To compare Washington with other states, see our guide to self-defense laws in all 50 states.
Is Washington a Stand-Your-Ground State?
Yes, through court decisions rather than a statute. Washington is one of 7 states that reach a no-duty-to-retreat rule by case law instead of legislation (see the full list of stand-your-ground states). No section of RCW chapter 9A.16 mentions retreat.

The rule traces through three Washington Supreme Court decisions. In State v. Studd, 137 Wn.2d 533, 549 (1999), the court wrote: "We have previously held that '[n]o duty to retreat exists when one is feloniously assaulted in a place where [one] has a right to be,'" quoting State v. Allery, 101 Wn.2d 591, 598 (1984). Studd added that "A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction to this effect if sufficient evidence in the record supports it."
Redmond, citing Studd, restated the rule as "no duty to retreat when a person is assaulted in a place where he or she has a right to be" and said an instruction "should be given to this effect when sufficient evidence is presented to support" it. The court reversed Redmond's conviction because the jury was not given that instruction. Washington's pattern jury instructions also carry the rule. In Studd, one of the consolidated defendants, Cook, had requested a no-duty-to-retreat instruction "based upon WPIC 16.08," and in a 2025 assault case the Court of Appeals quoted WPIC 17.05, which tells jurors that "the law does not impose a duty to retreat" (State v. Clark, No. 39675-4-III).
Two conditions are built into the rule as the court states it:
- You were assaulted. The rule protects a person who "is assaulted." Allery's earlier wording, as Studd quotes it, was "feloniously assaulted."
- You had a right to be there. The rule applies "in a place where he or she has a right to be."
When Deadly Force Is Justified in Washington
Washington's statutes set the standard for force; the no-retreat rule only removes one question from the analysis.

RCW 9A.16.010 supplies the two definitions everything else depends on:
"(1) 'Necessary' means that no reasonably effective alternative to the use of force appeared to exist and that the amount of force used was reasonable to effect the lawful purpose intended. (2) 'Deadly force' means the intentional application of force through the use of firearms or any other means reasonably likely to cause death or serious physical injury."
RCW 9A.16.020(3) makes force lawful when used "by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary."
For a killing, RCW 9A.16.050 lists two situations:
"Homicide is also justifiable when committed either: (1) In the lawful defense of the slayer, or his or her husband, wife, parent, child, brother, or sister, or of any other person in his or her presence or company, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of the person slain to commit a felony or to do some great personal injury to the slayer or to any such person, and there is imminent danger of such design being accomplished; or (2) In the actual resistance of an attempt to commit a felony upon the slayer, in his or her presence, or upon or in a dwelling, or other place of abode, in which he or she is."
Subsection (1) has two parts that must both be present: reasonable ground to apprehend the design, and imminent danger that it will be accomplished. Subsection (2) requires an actual attempt to commit a felony, and it is written in the disjunctive: an attempted felony "upon the slayer, in his or her presence," or one "upon or in a dwelling, or other place of abode, in which he or she is." Not every felony counts: construing the same words in the predecessor statute, the Washington Supreme Court held that a felony that "is not a crime of violence" is "not the type of felony which will justify the taking of human life," and the felonies it named as qualifying include robbery, burglary and arson (State v. Nyland, 1955).
Whether a fear was reasonable, whether danger was imminent and whether the force was more than necessary are questions of fact. Redmond means retreat is not a legal requirement when you are assaulted where you have a right to be, but the jury still decides whether your force was necessary and reasonable.
Castle Doctrine in Washington
Washington's home-defense rule is the dwelling clause of RCW 9A.16.050(2): a killing is justifiable "in the actual resistance of an attempt to commit a felony ... upon or in a dwelling, or other place of abode, in which he or she is." The words require that you be in the dwelling or place of abode and that the attempted felony be actual. The attempted felony must also be a crime of violence, such as robbery, burglary or arson (State v. Nyland, 1955).
Washington has no statutory presumption of reasonable fear. Many states presume that a person who used force against someone unlawfully and forcibly entering a home acted out of reasonable fear (see our castle doctrine states guide). RCW chapter 9A.16 contains no such section, so a Washington jury weighs the reasonableness of a home defender's belief on the evidence like any other.
The dwelling clause names only a "dwelling, or other place of abode." The statute does not mention vehicles, businesses or yards, and our research found no Washington decision deciding whether the clause reaches them. Outside the home, RCW 9A.16.050(1) and the "upon the slayer, in his or her presence" clause of (2) are not tied to a dwelling. The case-law no-retreat rule applies only when you are assaulted in a place where you have a right to be, and that condition is a real limit. In a 2018 case, In re Personal Restraint of Harvey, 3 Wn. App. 2d 204, a defendant who shot two men in an apartment building's parking lot had neither express nor implied consent to be there, so the Court of Appeals held he was not entitled to a no-duty-to-retreat instruction.
RCW 9A.16.020(4) separately allows force "reasonably used by a person to detain someone who enters or remains unlawfully in a building or on real property lawfully in the possession of such person," so long as the detention "is reasonable in duration and manner to investigate the reason for the detained person's presence on the premises," and so long as the premises "did not reasonably appear to be intended to be open to members of the public." It is a detention rule, not a deadly-force rule.
Defending Another Person
Washington's statutes cover defense of others in three places:
- RCW 9A.16.050(1) justifies a killing in lawful defense of a spouse, parent, child, brother or sister, "or of any other person in his or her presence or company," on the same reasonable-ground and imminent-danger conditions that apply to self-defense.
- RCW 9A.16.020(3) covers force used "by another lawfully aiding" the person about to be injured, still limited to force "not more than is necessary."
- RCW 9A.16.110(1) names "coming to the aid of another who is in imminent danger of or the victim of assault, robbery, kidnapping, arson, burglary, rape, murder, or any other violent crime as defined in RCW 9.94A.030."
Deadly Force and Property
Washington's statutes do not authorize deadly force to protect property as such. RCW 9A.16.020(3) allows force against "a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession," but only force "not more than is necessary," and "necessary" requires that no reasonably effective alternative appeared to exist.
The only statutory path to a justifiable killing connected to property is RCW 9A.16.050(2), which requires actual resistance of an attempted felony "upon or in a dwelling, or other place of abode, in which he or she is." That clause turns on your presence in the dwelling and an attempted felony, not on the value of anything at stake. The felony must also be a crime of violence, such as robbery, burglary or arson; a felony that is not a crime of violence does not justify a killing (State v. Nyland, 1955).
If a dispute is really about who has the right to occupy a property, our guide to Washington squatters rights covers the civil process for removing an occupant.
When Self-Defense Is Not Available
A gender or sexual-orientation "panic" claim. RCW 9A.16.025, enacted in 2020, provides that "A person is not justified in using force against another based on the discovery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the victim's actual or perceived gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation, including under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted nonforcible romantic or sexual advance towards the defendant, or in which the defendant and victim dated or had a romantic or sexual relationship."
Force beyond what was necessary. Force that exceeds what is "necessary" under RCW 9A.16.010 is not lawful under 9A.16.020(3), even if some force was justified.
Starting or provoking the fight. Chapter 9A.16 contains no initial-aggressor section. Washington's limits on a person who started or provoked the confrontation come from court decisions and jury instructions, which this page does not summarize. The no-retreat rule as Redmond states it protects a person who "is assaulted."
Charges that commonly follow a disputed use of force are covered in our guides to Washington assault and battery laws and Washington manslaughter laws.
Immunity, Reimbursement and Burden of Proof
RCW 9A.16.110: reimbursement, not immunity
RCW 9A.16.110(1) opens with a broad sentence: "No person in the state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting by any reasonable means necessary, himself or herself, his or her family, or his or her real or personal property, or for coming to the aid of another who is in imminent danger of or the victim of" listed violent crimes.

Despite that wording, the section contains no procedure for dismissing a case before trial. What it provides is money after an acquittal:
- Reimbursement. When a person charged with a crime listed in subsection (1) "is found not guilty by reason of self-defense, the state of Washington shall reimburse the defendant for all reasonable costs, including loss of time, legal fees incurred, and other expenses involved in his or her defense" (9A.16.110(2)).
- A higher showing. "To award these reasonable costs the trier of fact must find that the defendant's claim of self-defense was sustained by a preponderance of the evidence." The judge then sets the amount.
- Not a lawsuit. "This reimbursement is not an independent cause of action."
- Reductions. If the trier of fact also finds the defendant "was engaged in criminal conduct substantially related to the events giving rise to the charges," the judge "may deny or reduce the amount of the award" (9A.16.110(3)).
- Special verdict. After a jury acquittal, the court must ask the jury whether the verdict was based on self-defense and, if so, whether the defendant was protecting self, family or property, or coming to the aid of another (9A.16.110(5)).
No criminal or civil immunity
Washington has no statute granting immunity from criminal prosecution for self-defense and no pretrial immunity hearing; self-defense is decided at trial. It also has no statute granting civil immunity, so the person you used force against, or that person's family, can still sue.
RCW 4.24.420(1) does supply a defense in that lawsuit. Except in an action arising out of law enforcement activities, "it is a complete defense to any action for damages for personal injury or wrongful death that the person injured or killed was engaged in the commission of a felony at the time of the occurrence causing the injury or death and the felony was a proximate cause of the injury or death." Both conditions must be met, and the civil court decides whether they are.
Who has to prove what
If there is some evidence tending to prove you acted in self-defense, the State has the burden of proving the absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt (State v. McCullum, 98 Wn.2d 484, 490 (1983)). The justifiable-homicide instruction quoted by the Washington Supreme Court in Studd told the jury: "The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide was not justifiable." The defendant's preponderance showing in 9A.16.110 matters only for reimbursement after an acquittal.
Practical Risks Even When You Acted Lawfully
A no-duty-to-retreat rule from case law does not stop an arrest or a charge. Police and prosecutors decide whether to charge, and a jury decides whether your fear was reasonable, whether the danger was imminent and whether your force was more than necessary.
Because Washington has no home-intruder presumption, a homeowner starts from the same place as anyone else: the evidence. Reimbursement under 9A.16.110 comes only after a not-guilty verdict, so the cost of a trial must be carried first.
Self-defense law also does not decide whether a weapon was lawful to carry. See our guides to Washington knife laws and Washington pepper spray and stun gun laws. An argument that never turns physical can still lead to a charge covered in our guide to Washington disorderly conduct laws, and ongoing threats are often better handled through Washington restraining orders.
If you have been involved in a use-of-force incident, speak with a licensed Washington criminal defense attorney before giving a detailed statement. This page is general legal information, not legal advice.
What Changes in Washington Self-Defense Law in 2027
As of November 2, 2026, no enacted bill amending RCW 9A.16.010, 9A.16.020, 9A.16.025, 9A.16.050 or 9A.16.110 takes effect in 2027. We queried the Washington Legislature's official web service for legislation affecting each of those sections in the 2025-26 biennium, which covers the 2025 and 2026 sessions, and it returned none. A control query on another RCW section returned bills, so the service was working. The official RCW pages for 9A.16.050 and 9A.16.110 show no amendment since 2011 and 1995.
That search covers bills that cite those RCW sections. The no-retreat rule itself is court-made, and our research did not identify a 2024 to 2026 Washington appellate decision changing it, so a future change could come from a new decision as easily as from a bill.
Related Washington Laws

More Washington Laws
Frequently Asked Questions
Is Washington a stand your ground state?
Yes, by case law rather than statute. The Washington Supreme Court holds there is no duty to retreat when a person is assaulted in a place where he or she has a right to be (State v. Redmond, 2003; State v. Studd, 1999). The force used must still be no more than necessary.
Do I have a duty to retreat in Washington?
Not if you are assaulted in a place where you have a right to be. If the evidence supports it, you are entitled to a jury instruction saying so. The jury still decides whether your force was necessary and reasonable.
Does Washington have a castle doctrine?
Yes, in a narrow statutory form. RCW 9A.16.050(2) makes a killing justifiable in actual resistance of an attempt to commit a felony upon or in a dwelling or other place of abode where you are. The felony must be a crime of violence, such as robbery or burglary (State v. Nyland, 1955). Washington has no statute presuming that a home defender's fear was reasonable.
Can I shoot an intruder in my home in Washington?
Washington law does not give a blanket rule. A killing is justifiable under RCW 9A.16.050 in actual resistance of an attempted felony in the dwelling where you are, or when there is reasonable ground to fear a felony or great personal injury and imminent danger. A prosecutor or jury decides whether the facts meet those conditions.
Does Washington's castle doctrine cover my car?
The dwelling clause of RCW 9A.16.050(2) names only a dwelling or other place of abode, and our research found no Washington decision extending it to a vehicle. In a car, you rely on the general rules: RCW 9A.16.050(1), the attempted-felony clause of 9A.16.050(2) (a felony attempted upon you or in your presence), and the no-retreat rule if you were assaulted where you had a right to be.
Can I use deadly force to protect property in Washington?
Not to protect property as such. RCW 9A.16.020(3) allows only force that is not more than necessary against a malicious trespass or interference with property. A killing is justifiable under 9A.16.050(2) only in actual resistance of an attempted felony upon you, in your presence, or upon or in a dwelling where you are, and the felony must be a crime of violence, such as robbery, burglary or arson (State v. Nyland, 1955).
Does Washington have self-defense immunity?
Not by statute. No Washington statute provides immunity from criminal prosecution, a pretrial immunity hearing or civil immunity for self-defense. RCW 4.24.420 does give a civil defense when the person injured was committing a felony that was a proximate cause of the injury or death. RCW 9A.16.110 instead requires the state to reimburse reasonable defense costs if you are found not guilty by reason of self-defense and the claim is found sustained by a preponderance of the evidence.
What is RCW 9A.16.110?
It is Washington's self-defense reimbursement statute. After a not-guilty verdict based on self-defense, the state must reimburse reasonable costs, including legal fees and lost time, if the trier of fact finds the claim sustained by a preponderance of the evidence. The judge sets the amount and may deny or reduce it for related criminal conduct.
Who has the burden of proof in a Washington self-defense case?
The prosecution, once there is some evidence that you acted in self-defense. The State then has the burden of proving the absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt (State v. McCullum, 1983). The justifiable-homicide instruction quoted by the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Studd told the jury the State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide was not justifiable.
Can I be sued after using force in self-defense in Washington?
Yes. Washington has no statute granting civil immunity for justified force, and RCW 9A.16.110 reimbursement is not a defense to a lawsuit. But RCW 4.24.420 makes it a complete defense to a damages claim for injury or death that the person injured or killed was committing a felony at the time and that the felony was a proximate cause of the injury or death. The civil court decides whether that defense applies.
Updates
Updated the retreat flowchart so its description of RCW 9A.16.050(2) includes a felony attempted in the person's presence.
Restored the 'in your presence' clause of RCW 9A.16.050(2) in two summaries of justifiable homicide and clarified that the WPIC 16.08 instruction request in State v. Studd was made by consolidated defendant Cook.
We added that a justifiable killing under RCW 9A.16.050(2) requires resisting a felony of violence, such as robbery, burglary or arson, as the Washington Supreme Court held in State v. Nyland (1955).
Clarified which Washington pattern jury instructions carry the no-duty-to-retreat rule (WPIC 16.08, as requested in State v. Studd, and WPIC 17.05, as quoted in State v. Clark, 2025).
Rewritten from current statute text and Supreme Court opinions: adds the burden of proof, the conditions of the no-retreat rule and RCW 9A.16.020(4), drops unsupported aggressor and NCSL claims, and adds a 2027 outlook.
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources; governing law re-checked for recent changes
Corrected the description of State v. Studd and State v. Redmond: both decisions state the no-duty-to-retreat rule on the authority of earlier Washington Supreme Court case law, not as an interpretation of RCW 9A.16.020.
Corrected the article's reading of RCW 9A.16.050 to reflect that subsection (1) and the first prong of subsection (2) carry no location limitation, so Washington's justifiable-homicide provisions are not confined to the home, and fixed a misattributed reference to the National Conference of State Legislatures.
The Law Behind This Article
This article rests on the statutory provisions below, held in our own legal record and retrieved from the official source. Tap a section to read the operative text.
Revised Code of Washington
§ 9A.16.020Use of force—When lawful.In force
The use, attempt, or offer to use force upon or toward the person of another is not unlawful in the following cases: (1) Whenever necessarily used by a public officer in the performance of a legal duty, or a person assisting the officer and acting under the officer's direction; (2) Whenever necessarily used by a person arresting one who has committed a felony and delivering him or her to a public officer competent to receive him or her into custody; (3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary; (4) Whenever reasonably used by a person to detain someone who enters or remains unlawfully in a building or on real property lawfully in the possession of such person, so long as such detention is reasonable in duration and manner to investigate the reason for the detained person's presence on the premises, and so long as the premises in question did not reasonably appear to be intended to be…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at app.leg.wa.gov
§ 9A.16.050Homicide—By other person—When justifiable.In forcecited in 5 of our articles
Homicide is also justifiable when committed either: (1) In the lawful defense of the slayer, or his or her husband, wife, parent, child, brother, or sister, or of any other person in his or her presence or company, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of the person slain to commit a felony or to do some great personal injury to the slayer or to any such person, and there is imminent danger of such design being accomplished; or (2) In the actual resistance of an attempt to commit a felony upon the slayer, in his or her presence, or upon or in a dwelling, or other place of abode, in which he or she is.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at app.leg.wa.gov
Cited in 85 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. McCullum (Washington Supreme Court 1983, 98 Wash. 2d 484)“…RCW 9A.16, entitled "Defenses". See RCW 9A.16.020(3) and RCW 9A.16.050(1) and (2). Thereafter, in State v.…”
- State v. Brightman (Washington Supreme Court 2005, 155 Wash. 2d 506)“…ied under RCW 9A. 16.050(2). Brightman correctly notes that RCW 9A.16.050(1) contemplates justifiable homicide wh…”
- State v. Dennison (Washington Supreme Court 1990, 115 Wash. 2d 609)“…was an issue the jury should have been able to consider. RCW 9A.16.050 specifically makes self-defense a statu…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Castle Doctrine States: All 50 States and DC (2027), Stand Your Ground States and Duty to Retreat States (2027)
§ 9A.16.010Definitions.In force
In this chapter, unless a different meaning is plainly required: (1) "Necessary" means that no reasonably effective alternative to the use of force appeared to exist and that the amount of force used was reasonable to effect the lawful purpose intended. (2) "Deadly force" means the intentional application of force through the use of firearms or any other means reasonably likely to cause death or serious physical injury.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at app.leg.wa.gov
Cited in 23 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. Brightman (Washington Supreme Court 2005, 155 Wash. 2d 506)“…used was reasonable to effect the lawful purpose intended." RCW 9A.16.010(1). ¶ 26 A defendant is entitled to a…”
- State v. Talley (Washington Supreme Court 2005, 122 Wash. 2d 192)“…w. In the defenses chapter of the Washington Criminal Code, RCW 9A.16.010, "necessary" is defined as meaning no "…”
- State v. Pottorff (Court of Appeals of Washington 2007, 138 Wash. App. 343)“…used was reasonable to affect the lawful purpose intended.” RCW 9A.16.010(1). The dictionary meaning of “necessar…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
§ 9A.16.110Defending against violent crime—Reimbursement.In force
(1) No person in the state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting by any reasonable means necessary, himself or herself, his or her family, or his or her real or personal property, or for coming to the aid of another who is in imminent danger of or the victim of assault, robbery, kidnapping, arson, burglary, rape, murder, or any other violent crime as defined in RCW 9.94A.030. (2) When a person charged with a crime listed in subsection (1) of this section is found not guilty by reason of self-defense, the state of Washington shall reimburse the defendant for all reasonable costs, including loss of time, legal fees incurred, and other expenses involved in his or her defense. This reimbursement is not an independent cause of action. To award these reasonable costs the trier of fact must find that the defendant's claim of self-defense was sustained by a preponderance of the evidence. If the trier of fact makes a determination of self-defense, the judge shall determine the amount of the award.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at app.leg.wa.gov
Cited in 27 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- City of Seattle v. Fontanilla (Washington Supreme Court 1996, 128 Wash. 2d 492)“…shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever,” RCW 9A.16.110 extends the reach of the statute to all…”
- Allstate Insurance v. Bauer (Court of Appeals of Washington 1999, 96 Wash. App. 11)“…ternatively, that the court should amend it to conform with RCW 9A.16.110, which provides that persons shall not…”
- State v. Joswick (Court of Appeals of Washington 1993, 71 Wash. App. 311)“…and expenses under RCW 9.01.200, recodified and amended as RCW 9A.16.110 (Laws of 1989, ch. 94). 1…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
§ 9A.16.025Use of force—When unjustified—Victim identity.In force
A person is not justified in using force against another based on the discovery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the victim's actual or perceived gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation, including under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted nonforcible romantic or sexual advance towards the defendant, or in which the defendant and victim dated or had a romantic or sexual relationship.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at app.leg.wa.gov
Florida Statutes
§ 776.012Use or threatened use of force in defense of person.In forcecited in 8 of our articles
(1) A person is justified in using or threatening to use force, except deadly force, against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other’s imminent use of unlawful force. A person who uses or threatens to use force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat before using or threatening to use such force. (2) A person is justified in using or threatening to use deadly force if he or she reasonably believes that using or threatening to use such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony. A person who uses or threatens to use deadly force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground if the person using or threatening to use the deadly force is not engaged in a criminal activity and is in a place where he or she has a right to be.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at leg.state.fl.us
Cited in 101 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Little v. State (2013) read section 776.012, as then numbered, as an independent basis for Stand Your Ground immunity, so a felon unlawfully armed could still claim it; the court certified conflict. Ivester v. State (1981) read section 776.012 with section 776.051 to allow self-defense against excessive force by an officer.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Smiley v. State (Supreme Court of Florida 2007, 966 So. 2d 330)“…reasoned that section 776.013 made a substantive change to section 776.012, Florida Statutes (2004), and it therefore would be a vio…”
- Hill v. State (Supreme Court of Florida 1996, 688 So. 2d 901)✓Hill shot and killed an abortion provider and an escort outside a Pensacola clinic, then sought to justify it under section 776.012; the court held legal abortion is not a cognizable harm under the statute and upheld barring that defense.
- Ivester v. State (District Court of Appeal of Florida 1981, 398 So. 2d 926)✓Ivester was convicted of resisting arrest with violence after a struggle with an officer witnesses said had kicked and threatened him; reading section 776.012 together with section 776.051, the court held self-defense against excessive force is relevant to that charge.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Stand Your Ground and Castle Doctrine Laws by State (2027), Florida Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground Rules (2027), Oregon Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground Rules (2027)
Sources and References
- State v. Redmond, 150 Wn.2d 489, 78 P.3d 1001 (2003) (no duty to retreat when assaulted where one has a right to be)(www.courtlistener.com)
- RCW 9A.16.020, Use of force, when lawful(app.leg.wa.gov).gov
- RCW 9A.16.050, Homicide by other person, when justifiable(app.leg.wa.gov).gov
- RCW 9A.16.110, Defending against violent crime, reimbursement(app.leg.wa.gov).gov
- State v. Studd, 137 Wn.2d 533, 973 P.2d 1049 (1999), quoting State v. Allery, 101 Wn.2d 591 (1984)(www.courtlistener.com)
- RCW 9A.16.010, Definitions ('necessary', 'deadly force')(app.leg.wa.gov).gov
- RCW 9A.16.025, Use of force, when unjustified (2020 c 3 s 2)(app.leg.wa.gov).gov
- Washington State Legislature web service, legislation affecting RCW 9A.16 sections, 2025-26 biennium(wslwebservices.leg.wa.gov).gov
- RCW 4.24.420, Action by person committing a felony, defense(app.leg.wa.gov).gov
- State v. Whitaker, No. 76128-5-I (Wash. Ct. App. June 11, 2018), quoting State v. McCullum, 98 Wn.2d 484, 490 (1983) on the State's burden(www.courts.wa.gov).gov
- State v. Alpert, No. 79147-8-I (Wash. Ct. App.), describing In re Personal Restraint of Harvey, 3 Wn. App. 2d 204 (2018) (no instruction without a right to be in the place)(www.courts.wa.gov).gov
- State v. Clark, No. 39675-4-III (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2025) (quoting WPIC 17.05)(www.courts.wa.gov).gov