New York
New York Self-Defense Laws: Duty to Retreat & Castle Doctrine (2026)
Independently fact-checked against primary sources (last audited August 17, 2026). · Reviewed by the RecordingLaw editorial team. · Law checked current as of August 17, 2026. How we verify our legal content
New York is NOT a stand-your-ground state. Under N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a), a person may not use deadly physical force if they know they can avoid the necessity of doing so by retreating with complete personal safety to themselves and others. New York imposes a clear duty to retreat in public; the dwelling exception is the only significant carve-out.
Information last verified on June 1, 2026.
Does New York Have a Duty to Retreat?
Yes. New York imposes a statutory duty to retreat before using deadly physical force in any location outside the actor's own dwelling. Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a) provides that a person is not justified in using deadly physical force if they know that, with complete personal safety to themselves and others, they can avoid the necessity of doing so by retreating.
The retreat obligation applies wherever the actor is outside their home: on a public street, in a park, in another person's residence, in a store, in a parking lot, or in any other location. If a safe path of retreat exists and the actor actually knows about it, they must take it before resorting to deadly force.
The standard is subjective as to the actor's knowledge: what matters is what the defendant actually knew at the moment, not what a hypothetical reasonable person might have perceived. New York courts have consistently held that the prosecution bears the burden of disproving a self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt once the defendant raises it. However, the prosecution can defeat a deadly-force claim by proving the defendant knew a safe retreat was available and chose not to take it.
New York is one of roughly a dozen states that still impose a duty to retreat, placing it firmly in contrast with stand-your-ground jurisdictions where a person lawfully present has no obligation to flee before defending themselves with deadly force.
Castle Doctrine in New York
New York law provides one significant exception to the duty to retreat: the castle doctrine. Under Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a)(i), a person is under no duty to retreat if they are in their own dwelling and were not the initial aggressor.
Both conditions must be satisfied for the castle-doctrine exception to apply:
- The person must be physically inside their own dwelling at the time they use deadly force.
- The person must not have been the initial aggressor in the confrontation.
If either condition is missing, the duty to retreat remains. A person who starts a confrontation in their own home cannot invoke the castle doctrine, and a person who is merely on the porch, in the driveway, or in the yard surrounding the home is not within the statutory protection.
Scope: Dwelling Only
New York's castle doctrine is intentionally narrow. Section 35.15 uses the term "dwelling" without defining it and without cross-referencing any definition of its own. Only § 35.20(4)(a) expressly prescribes that the meanings in Penal Law § 140.00 govern, and courts import that Article 140 definition when reading § 35.15. Under § 140.00(3), a dwelling is a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night, and § 140.00(2) defines "building" to include any structure, vehicle or watercraft used for overnight lodging of persons.
That definition marks the outer edge of the exception. The castle-doctrine exception in § 35.15(2)(a)(i) does not extend to:
- An ordinary passenger vehicle, which is not used for overnight lodging
- A place of employment or workplace
- A detached garage or outbuilding
- The curtilage surrounding the home
The vehicle line carries one caveat. Because § 140.00(2) sweeps in a vehicle used for overnight lodging of persons, a motorhome or camper that is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night can satisfy the definition of a dwelling. The exclusion is aimed at the ordinary car, not at every vehicle.
This scope is narrower than many other states. Connecticut, for instance, extends its no-retreat exception to the workplace; New York does not. A person confronted by an attacker while sitting in their parked car, or while at work, retains the duty to retreat in New York.
The "Own Dwelling" Requirement
The statute says "his or her dwelling," meaning the actor's own home. New York courts have interpreted this to apply to a person's regular place of abode. A person who is a lawful resident of the premises (including a tenant, a co-habitant, or a person with a regular bedroom there) falls within the protection. A person who is merely a guest at another person's home does not stand in their "own" dwelling and must retreat if they know they can do so safely.
Defense of Premises Against Burglary: Penal Law § 35.20
Separate from the personal self-defense provision of § 35.15, New York Penal Law § 35.20 governs the use of force in defense of premises. Subdivision 3 is the critical provision for castle-doctrine purposes:
"A person in possession or control of, or licensed or privileged to be in, a dwelling or an occupied building, who reasonably believes that another person is committing or attempting to commit a burglary of such dwelling or building, may use deadly physical force upon such other person when he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate the commission or attempted commission of such burglary." Source: N.Y. Penal Law § 35.20(3)
Section 35.20(3) is broader in one respect and narrower in another compared to § 35.15:
Broader: It covers any person in possession or control of, or licensed or privileged to be in, the dwelling or occupied building. This includes a tenant, a guest with permission to be there, and a building superintendent acting in their official capacity. It is not limited to the owner.
Narrower: The authority to use deadly force under § 35.20(3) is specifically tied to burglary, not trespass, not criminal mischief, not a general threat from an intruder. The actor must reasonably believe a burglary (as defined by Penal Law Article 140) is being committed or attempted. A person who simply sees an unauthorized person in their home must still assess whether the conduct meets the burglary threshold.
Subdivisions 1 and 2: Damage to Premises and Criminal Trespass
Penal Law § 35.20(1) permits any person to use physical force to prevent or terminate what they reasonably believe to be the commission or attempted commission of a crime involving damage to premises. That force must stop short of deadly physical force, with one exception written into the same subdivision: deadly physical force is permitted where the person reasonably believes it necessary to prevent or terminate arson.
Criminal trespass is governed by subdivision 2, not subdivision 1. Section 35.20(2) allows a person in possession or control of premises, or a person licensed or privileged to be there, to use non-deadly force to prevent or terminate a criminal trespass. It permits deadly physical force in order to prevent or terminate arson, as prescribed in subdivision 1, or in the course of a burglary or attempted burglary, as prescribed in subdivision 3.
Under § 35.20(4)(a), the terms "premises," "building," and "dwelling" carry the meanings prescribed in Penal Law § 140.00.
When Deadly Physical Force Is Justified Under § 35.15
Even when the duty-to-retreat analysis is resolved in the defender's favor (either because they are in their dwelling as a non-initial aggressor, or because they genuinely did not know a safe retreat was available), the use of deadly physical force is only authorized when the basic threshold of § 35.15(2) is met.
Penal Law § 35.15(1) permits the use of reasonable physical force whenever a person reasonably believes such force is necessary to defend themselves or a third person from what they reasonably believe to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by another. Deadly physical force requires one of these additional conditions under § 35.15(2):
- The actor reasonably believes the other person is using or about to use deadly physical force against them or a third person (subject to the retreat rule), OR
- The actor reasonably believes the other person is committing or attempting to commit a kidnapping, forcible rape, forcible aggravated sexual abuse, a crime formerly defined in section 130.50 of this chapter by force, or robbery against them or a third person (§ 35.15(2)(b)), OR
- The circumstances meet the burglary standard of § 35.20(3).
There is no statutory presumption of reasonable fear in New York. The actor must affirmatively demonstrate that a reasonable belief existed on the specific facts. Courts apply a subjective-objective standard: the actor must have subjectively held the belief, and that belief must have been objectively reasonable under the circumstances.
Defense of Property Limits
New York law does not permit the use of deadly force to protect property in the ordinary case. Penal Law § 35.20(1) allows reasonable non-deadly force against a crime involving damage to premises, and § 35.20(2) allows it against a criminal trespass. Larceny is not among the crimes either subdivision addresses. The statute reaches deadly force for a property crime only in the narrow situations it names: arson under subdivision 1, and arson or a burglary or attempted burglary under subdivision 2. Otherwise deadly force requires a simultaneous personal threat meeting the § 35.15(2) standard or the § 35.20(3) burglary standard.
In practice, this means that a person cannot shoot someone to protect a car, a wallet, livestock, or other property. If the same confrontation also involves a genuine threat of deadly force or great bodily harm to a person, the § 35.15 standard might separately authorize deadly force on personal-safety grounds, but the property interest alone never justifies it.
New York courts have consistently held that force must be proportionate to the threat. Using deadly force against a non-deadly threat, even inside the home, will not satisfy § 35.15(2)(a).
When the Justification Defense Fails
New York Penal Law § 35.15 identifies several circumstances that eliminate the justification defense entirely, even when other elements of a self-defense claim might otherwise be satisfied.
Initial aggressor. Under § 35.15(1)(b), a person who is the initial aggressor in a confrontation cannot claim justification. The right to reclaim self-defense may be re-established if the initial aggressor withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates that withdrawal, and the other party persists in threatening or using force. Simply backing away without a clear communication is generally insufficient.
Provocation. Under § 35.15(1)(a), a person who with intent to cause physical injury or death provokes the use of physical force by another cannot invoke § 35.15 to justify a response. The provocation must be intentional; accidental conduct that provokes a response does not strip the right.
Combat by agreement. Under § 35.15(1)(c), a person who engages in a fight with the other party's consent (a mutual agreement to fight) cannot claim justification unless one party escalates to deadly force beyond any agreed terms. New York courts have allowed a self-defense argument where a consenting participant in a fistfight suddenly faced a weapon or grossly disproportionate force they did not agree to.
Known safe retreat available. As discussed throughout, a person outside their own dwelling who knew a safe retreat was possible cannot claim justification for deadly force. This remains the most common ground on which New York juries are asked to reject a deadly-force defense.
Excessive force. Even inside the home, deadly force requires a reasonable belief that the threat rises to the level of deadly force or one of the enumerated crimes in § 35.15(2)(b). A disproportionate response to a non-deadly threat will not satisfy § 35.15.
Legal disclaimer: This article provides general legal information about New York self-defense law as of June 1, 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Use-of-force situations carry serious criminal and civil consequences that depend heavily on specific facts. Consult a licensed New York criminal-defense attorney before making any decisions based on information here.
For laws in other states, see self-defense laws by state.
For related New York property law, see New York squatters rights.
Last updated: June 1, 2026.
More New York Laws
Frequently Asked Questions
Is New York a stand your ground state?
No. New York is a duty-to-retreat state. Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a) bars the use of deadly physical force whenever the actor knows they can retreat with complete personal safety to themselves and others. New York has no stand-your-ground statute and no pending legislation to enact one as of June 1, 2026.
Do I have a duty to retreat in New York?
Yes, in any location outside your own dwelling. N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a) requires retreat when you know you can do so with complete personal safety before using deadly force. The only statutory exception is when you are inside your own dwelling and were not the initial aggressor. Outside the home, on the street, in a vehicle, at work, the duty to retreat applies.
Does New York have a castle doctrine?
Yes, but a narrow one. Under Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a)(i), a person in their own dwelling who was not the initial aggressor has no duty to retreat before using deadly force. The exception is limited to the dwelling: it does not extend to an ordinary vehicle, the yard, or the workplace. A separate provision, § 35.20(3), authorizes deadly force against a burglar of a dwelling or occupied building.
Can I use deadly force against a burglar in my home in New York?
Potentially yes, under two independent provisions. First, § 35.15(2)(a)(i) removes the duty to retreat for a non-initial-aggressor in their own dwelling when facing a deadly-force threat. Second, § 35.20(3) separately authorizes deadly force against a person reasonably believed to be committing or attempting burglary of a dwelling or occupied building, when necessary to prevent or stop that burglary. New York has no statutory presumption of reasonable fear, so the reasonableness of the belief must be demonstrated on the facts.
Does New York have civil immunity for self-defense?
No. New York has no statute granting civil immunity for use of force in self-defense. Even if criminal charges are not filed or result in acquittal, the person who used force may face a civil lawsuit for damages. The outcome of any criminal proceeding does not automatically determine the outcome of a civil case.
Can I use deadly force to protect my property in New York?
No. New York does not authorize deadly force to protect property alone. Penal Law § 35.20(1) permits reasonable non-deadly force against a crime involving damage to premises, and § 35.20(2) permits it against a criminal trespass. Deadly force to protect property requires either a concurrent personal threat meeting the § 35.15(2) standard or, specifically against a burglar, the § 35.20(3) burglary standard. You cannot use a firearm to stop a car theft or property crime absent a simultaneous threat to persons.
What happens if I was the initial aggressor in New York?
You lose the right to claim justification under § 35.15(1)(b). The initial aggressor cannot invoke self-defense. The right may be reclaimed only if you effectively withdraw from the encounter and clearly communicate that withdrawal, and the other party persists in threatening force. The bar is meaningful: New York courts require an effective communication of withdrawal, not merely backing away.
Updates
Corrected the description of Penal Law § 35.20: criminal trespass falls under subdivision 2 rather than subdivision 1, larceny is not covered by either, deadly force under subdivision 2 reaches burglary as well as arson, completed the § 35.15(2)(b) list of enumerated crimes, and clarified that a vehicle used for overnight lodging can qualify as a dwelling.
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources; governing law re-checked for recent changes
Governing law re-checked for recent changes
Reviewed and approved by an editor
The Law Behind This Article
This article rests on the statutory provisions below, held in our own legal record and retrieved from the official source. Tap a section to read the operative text.
New York Penal Law
§ 35.15Justification; use of physical force in defense of a personIn forcecited in 2 of our articles
Justification; use of physical force in defense of a person. 1. A person may, subject to the provisions of subdivision two, use physical force upon another person when and to the extent he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend himself, herself or a third person from what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by such other person, unless: (a) The latter's conduct was provoked by the actor with intent to cause physical injury to another person; or (b) The actor was the initial aggressor; except that in such case the use of physical force is nevertheless justifiable if the actor has withdrawn from the encounter and effectively communicated such withdrawal to such other person but the latter persists in continuing the incident by the use or threatened imminent use of unlawful physical force; or (c) The physical force involved is the product of a combat by agreement not specifically authorized by law. 2.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislation.nysenate.gov
Cited in 780 court opinionsMost recently applied by a court: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):People v. Goetz (1986) held that the reasonableness required by Penal Law 35.15 is objective, not simply what the defendant himself thought reasonable, though the jury weighs his circumstances and prior experiences. People v. McManus (1986) held justification is an ordinary defense the People must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt.
Leading cases:
- People v. Taylor (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York 2017, 2017 NY Slip Op 7649)“…s testimony that defendant was the initial aggressor ( see Penal Law § 35.15 [1] [b]; [2]; see generally People v W…”
- People v. Goetz (New York Court of Appeals 1986, 68 N.Y.2d 96)✓Goetz shot four youths on a subway train after one asked him for five dollars; the court held Penal Law 35.15's "reasonably believes" keeps an objective element, so the prosecutor's "reasonable man in the defendant's situation" charge was right, and reinstated the indictment.
- People v. McManus (New York Court of Appeals 1986, 67 N.Y.2d 541)✓McManus fired a rifle into a group he said was beating and robbing his companion and was convicted of depraved indifference murder after the court refused a justification charge on that count; the court held Penal Law 35.15 applies regardless of mens rea and ordered a new trial.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Self-Defense Laws by State: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)
§ 35.20Justification; use of physical force in defense of premises and in defense of a person in the course of burglaryIn force
Justification; use of physical force in defense of premises and in defense of a person in the course of burglary. 1. Any person may use physical force upon another person when he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate what he or she reasonably believes to be the commission or attempted commission by such other person of a crime involving damage to premises. Such person may use any degree of physical force, other than deadly physical force, which he or she reasonably believes to be necessary for such purpose, and may use deadly physical force if he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate the commission or attempted commission of arson. 2. A person in possession or control of any premises, or a person licensed or privileged to be thereon or therein, may use physical force upon another person when he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate what he or she reasonably believes to be the commission or attempted commission by such other person of a criminal trespass upon such premises.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislation.nysenate.gov
Cited in 76 court opinionsMost recently applied by a court: 2024
Leading cases:
- People v. Cox (New York Court of Appeals 1998, 92 N.Y.2d 1002)“…harge the defense of justification to terminate a burglary (Penal Law § 35.20 [3]), and defendant was convicted. The…”
- People v. White (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York 2010, 75 A.D.3d 109)“…ury on the defense of justification in defense of premises (Penal Law § 35.20 [3]) as it pertained to the count of ma…”
- People v. Hernandez (New York Court of Appeals 2002, 98 N.Y.2d 175)“…defined and used elsewhere in the Penal Law. Most notably, Penal Law § 35.20, which describes when a defendant may u…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
§ 140.00Criminal trespass and burglary; definitions of termsIn force
Criminal trespass and burglary; definitions of terms. The following definitions are applicable to this article: 1. "Premises" includes the term "building," as defined herein, and any real property. 2. "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any structure, vehicle or watercraft used for overnight lodging of persons, or used by persons for carrying on business therein, or used as an elementary or secondary school, or an inclosed motor truck, or an inclosed motor truck trailer. Where a building consists of two or more units separately secured or occupied, each unit shall be deemed both a separate building in itself and a part of the main building. 3. "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night. 4. "Night" means the period between thirty minutes after sunset and thirty minutes before sunrise. 5. "Enter or remain unlawfully." A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises when he is not licensed or privileged to do so.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislation.nysenate.gov
Cited in 318 court opinionsMost recently applied by a court: 2026
Leading cases:
- People v. Graves (New York Court of Appeals 1990, 76 N.Y.2d 16)“…n premises when he is not licensed or privileged to do so” (Penal Law § 140.00 [5]). In general, a person is "licensed…”
- People v. Barney (New York Court of Appeals 2003, 99 N.Y.2d 367)“…sue “lost its character as a dwelling within the meaning of Penal Law § 140.00 (3)” ( 294 AD2d at 813 ). One of the…”
- People v. Thompson (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York 1986, 116 A.D.2d 377)“…remains unlawfully” is defined in the Penal Law as follows (Penal Law § 140.00 [5]): "A person 'enters or remains unla…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
§ 35.00Justification; a defenseIn force
Justification; a defense. In any prosecution for an offense, justification, as defined in sections 35.05 through 35.30, is a defense.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at legislation.nysenate.gov
Cited in 24 court opinionsMost recently applied by a court: 2023
Leading cases:
- People v. McManus (New York Court of Appeals 1986, 67 N.Y.2d 541)“…an ordinary defense rather than an affirmative one (see, Penal Law § 35.00). As such, whenever justification is su…”
- People v. Hayes (New York Court of Appeals 2011, 17 N.Y.3d 46)“…ir burden of disproving the defense of justification (see Penal Law § 35.00; Matter of Y.K., 87 NY2d 430 , 433…”
- People v. Clark (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York 2015, 129 A.D.3d 1)“…secution for an offense, justification . . . is a defense" (Penal Law § 35.00). "When a defense,' other than an aff…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
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Sources and References
- N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15, Justification; use of physical force in defense of a person, New York State Senate(nysenate.gov)
- N.Y. Penal Law § 35.20, Justification; use of physical force in defense of premises and in defense of a person in the course of burglary, New York State Senate(nysenate.gov)
- N.Y. Penal Law § 35.00, Justification; a defense, New York State Senate(nysenate.gov)
- N.Y. Penal Law § 140.00, Criminal trespass and burglary; definitions of terms, New York State Senate(nysenate.gov)
- Cornell LII: Self-defense overview(law.cornell.edu)