Wisconsin
Wisconsin Self-Defense Laws: Castle Doctrine & Duty to Retreat (2026)
Independently fact-checked against primary sources (last audited August 17, 2026). · Reviewed by the RecordingLaw editorial team. · Law checked current as of August 17, 2026. How we verify our legal content

Wisconsin is not a stand-your-ground state. The state legislature has never enacted a statutory stand-your-ground provision. In public spaces, whether a person had the opportunity to retreat is a factor a jury may weigh when deciding whether the use of force was reasonable. Inside a home, motor vehicle, or place of business, however, a separate statute, (1m), creates a castle-doctrine presumption: where an actor present in one of those locations used force intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm against a person who was unlawfully and forcibly entering, or was there after unlawfully and forcibly entering, and the actor knew or reasonably believed that, the actor is presumed to have reasonably believed force was necessary, and the court may not consider whether retreat was possible.
Wisconsin also pairs the criminal castle-doctrine presumption with a civil immunity statute, , enacted as part of 2011 Act 94.
Legal disclaimer: This article is general legal information about Wisconsin self-defense law. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Self-defense claims involve highly fact-specific circumstances with serious criminal and civil consequences. Consult a licensed Wisconsin criminal-defense attorney for advice about your situation.
Jurisdiction scope: This article covers Wisconsin state law. For a comparison of self-defense rules in all 50 states, see the national self-defense laws guide.
Is Wisconsin a Stand-Your-Ground State?
No. Wisconsin does not have a stand-your-ground law.
Stand-your-ground statutes, as enacted in states like Florida or Texas, remove any legal obligation or expectation to retreat before using force anywhere the person has a legal right to be. Wisconsin has never passed such a statute. The state's self-defense framework is built around , and that statute contains no provision eliminating the relevance of retreat in public spaces.
Under Wisconsin's general self-defense standard, the central question is whether the actor reasonably believed the force used was necessary. Courts and commentators have long recognized that whether a person had a clear and safe opportunity to walk away is one piece of evidence a jury can evaluate when deciding whether the belief in necessity was objectively reasonable. There is no absolute legal duty to retreat, meaning a prosecutor cannot secure a conviction solely because the defendant failed to flee. The point is more nuanced: if retreat was safe and obvious, that fact tends to undercut the claim that force was the only reasonable option.
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals addressed this relationship between retreat and reasonableness in State v. Wenger, confirming that failure to retreat is not a per se bar to self-defense, but it is a circumstance a jury may legitimately consider. Wisconsin therefore occupies a middle ground: no formal duty to retreat, but retreat as a relevant jury factor in public confrontations.
The Castle-Doctrine Presumption: Wis. Stat. 939.48(1m)
Wisconsin's most significant departure from the pure reasonable-belief framework is the castle-doctrine presumption added by 2011 Act 94 and codified at Wis. Stat. 939.48(1m).

The presumption applies when an actor uses force intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm and two conditions are met:
- The actor was present in their dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business.
- The person against whom force was used was unlawfully and forcibly entering, or had already unlawfully and forcibly entered, that location, and the actor knew of the unlawful entry.
When both conditions are satisfied, Wisconsin law provides two specific protections. First, the court shall presume that the actor reasonably believed force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm. Second, the court may not consider whether the actor had an opportunity to flee or retreat before using force.
The statute defines "place of business" as a business that the actor owns or operates. "Dwelling" is defined by reference to (1)(h), and that definition is broader than the building itself. It covers any premises or portion of a premises used as a home or place of residence, together with the part of the lot or site devoted to residential use, and it expressly includes other existing structures on the immediate residential premises such as driveways, sidewalks, swimming pools, terraces, patios, fences, porches, garages, and basements.
Exceptions to the Castle Presumption
The presumption does not apply in two circumstances:
- The actor was engaged in a criminal activity, or was using the dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business to further a criminal activity, at the time the force was used. Either prong defeats the presumption on its own, so the exception can apply even where the actor was not personally committing the crime at that moment.
- The person against whom force was used was a public safety worker (such as a law enforcement officer or firefighter) performing official duties, and either the officer had identified themselves or the actor reasonably should have known the person was a public safety worker.
When an exception applies, the case reverts to the ordinary reasonable-belief standard under Wis. Stat. 939.48(1), without the statutory presumption or the bar on considering retreat.
Civil Immunity Under Wis. Stat. 895.62
The same 2011 Act 94 that created the criminal presumption also created a companion civil immunity statute. Under , an actor who uses force under the same castle-doctrine conditions (unlawful, forcible entry into their dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business) is immune from civil liability arising from that use of force.
The civil immunity mirrors the criminal presumption: when the qualifying conditions are met, the actor is presumed to have reasonably believed force was necessary, and the finder of fact may not consider whether retreat was available. If a court grants civil immunity, it must also award the actor reasonable attorney fees, costs, compensation for lost income, and other litigation costs.
Wis. Stat. 895.62(4) carries the same two exceptions: the actor was engaged in a criminal activity or was using the dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business to further a criminal activity, or the person against whom force was used was a public safety worker performing official duties. What those exceptions defeat is narrower than it first appears. By its own terms, sub. (4) says the presumption in sub. (3) does not apply, and sub. (2) still grants immunity to an actor who actually held a reasonable belief that force was necessary, although sub. (2) is itself framed as applying "except as provided in sub. (4)." The practical effect is that an actor who falls into one of these exceptions should expect the reasonable-belief question to be litigated rather than presumed.
This civil immunity is limited to the castle-doctrine locations. It does not extend to uses of force in public spaces.
When Deadly Force Is Justified: The General Standard
Outside the castle-doctrine context, and as the baseline for all self-defense claims, Wis. Stat. 939.48(1) provides that a person may threaten or intentionally use force to prevent or terminate what they reasonably believe to be an unlawful interference with their person.
For non-deadly force, the standard is whether the actor reasonably believed the force used was necessary to prevent or terminate the interference.
For deadly force (force intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm), a higher threshold applies. The actor must reasonably believe that deadly force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to themselves.
Several practical points flow from this standard:
- The threat must be imminent. A fear of future harm, however genuine, does not satisfy the standard.
- The actor's belief must be reasonable, not merely subjective. A jury evaluates what a reasonable person in the same situation would have believed.
- The force used must be proportionate. Using deadly force in response to a shove is unlikely to meet the reasonable-necessity standard.
- In public, as discussed above, a safe opportunity to retreat is evidence the jury may weigh when assessing reasonableness.
Defense of Property
Under , a person may use non-deadly force to protect property from unlawful interference. The statute explicitly states that it is not reasonable to use deadly force for the sole purpose of defending property. Defense of property alone does not justify taking a life or inflicting great bodily harm.
Defense of Others
Wisconsin permits a person to defend a third party under the same conditions that would allow self-defense. Wis. Stat. 939.48(4) provides that a person is privileged to use force to protect another if they reasonably believe that the other person would be privileged to act in self-defense and that intervention is necessary to protect that person.

The standard is objective reasonableness from the defender's perspective at the moment of intervention. The defender need not be certain the third party would prevail on a self-defense claim; the question is whether a reasonable person in the defender's position would have believed the intervention was justified.
Defense of others covers family members, bystanders, and anyone else. The defender steps into the shoes of the person being protected: if that person had provoked the confrontation and forfeited the self-defense privilege, the intervening defender's privilege is similarly limited.
When Self-Defense Fails: Aggressor, Provocation, and Excessive Force
Wis. Stat. 939.48(2) sets out the circumstances in which the self-defense privilege is lost or reduced.
The Initial Aggressor Rule
A person who provokes an attack or initiates the use of unlawful force generally cannot claim self-defense against the person they provoked. But Wis. Stat. 939.48(2)(a) gives a provoker two distinct paths back to the privilege. First, if the ensuing attack escalates to a level that gives the provoker a reasonable belief of imminent death or great bodily harm, the provoker is privileged to act in self-defense even without withdrawing, though deadly force is available only if the provoker reasonably believes every other reasonable means of escape has been exhausted.
Second, under 939.48(2)(b), the privilege may be regained if the initial aggressor withdraws from the fight in good faith and gives adequate notice of that withdrawal to the other person. If the victim then continues the attack after a genuine withdrawal, the original aggressor regains the right to use reasonable force in self-defense.
One category of provoker gets neither path. Under Wis. Stat. 939.48(2)(c), a person who provokes an attack, whether by lawful or unlawful conduct, with the intent to use that attack as an excuse to cause death or great bodily harm to the assailant is not entitled to claim the privilege of self-defense at all. That is a categorical bar: no escalation route, no withdrawal route. It also reaches conduct that was itself perfectly legal, so long as the provocation was engineered as a pretext for killing or seriously injuring the other person.
Excessive Force
Even when a person was not the aggressor and faced a genuine threat, self-defense can fail if the force used was disproportionate to the threat. If an actor responds to a fistfight by drawing a firearm and shooting, a jury must determine whether that escalation was reasonable. Excessive force may result in a partial or complete loss of the self-defense claim.
Retreat as a Jury Factor (Outside Castle Locations)
As noted throughout this article, the ability to retreat safely is not a legal prerequisite to claiming self-defense in Wisconsin. A person is not legally required to flee before responding to an attack. But in public confrontations, a jury evaluating the reasonableness of the actor's belief that force was necessary may take into account that a clear and safe path of retreat existed and was not taken. This is not a standalone ground for conviction; it is one factor in the overall reasonableness calculus.
Inside the castle locations (dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business), Wis. Stat. 939.48(1m) removes this consideration entirely, but only on the statute's own terms. The actor must have used force intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm, and the person against whom that force was used must have been unlawfully and forcibly entering, or present after unlawfully and forcibly entering, with the actor knowing or reasonably believing that. Simply being at home, in a vehicle, or at one's own business does not by itself take retreat off the table, so a confrontation with an invited guest or someone who entered without force is still judged under the ordinary reasonableness standard.
Related Wisconsin Laws
- Wisconsin Squatters Rights, which covers defense of property and adverse possession under Wisconsin law.
- Wisconsin Recording Laws, covering one-party consent rules for recording conversations in Wisconsin.

For self-defense laws in other states, see the national self-defense laws guide.
Legal disclaimer: This article is general legal information about Wisconsin self-defense law. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Self-defense claims turn on specific facts, witness credibility, and case law interpretations that can vary. Contact a licensed Wisconsin criminal-defense attorney before making any decisions based on this information.
Content last reviewed: June 2026.
More Wisconsin Laws
Frequently Asked Questions
Is Wisconsin a stand your ground state?
No. Wisconsin has not enacted a stand-your-ground law. There is no statute that removes the relevance of retreat in public spaces. In public confrontations, whether a safe retreat was available is a factor a jury may consider when deciding if the actor's use of force was reasonable.
Do I have a duty to retreat in Wisconsin?
There is no absolute legal duty to retreat in Wisconsin, meaning a prosecutor cannot convict someone simply because they failed to flee. However, outside the castle-doctrine locations (home, vehicle, business), the availability of a safe retreat is a factor a jury can weigh when evaluating whether force was necessary. Inside those locations, Wis. Stat. 939.48(1m) bars the court from considering retreat, but only where the actor used force intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm against a person who was unlawfully and forcibly entering, or was present after unlawfully and forcibly entering, and the actor knew or reasonably believed that. Being in your own home, vehicle, or business is not by itself enough to trigger the bar.
Does Wisconsin have a castle doctrine?
Yes. Under Wis. Stat. 939.48(1m), when a person is present in their dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business and an intruder unlawfully and forcibly enters, the court must presume the actor reasonably believed force was necessary and may not consider whether retreat was possible. A companion civil immunity statute, Wis. Stat. 895.62, protects the actor from lawsuits under the same conditions.
What locations does Wisconsin's castle doctrine cover?
The castle-doctrine presumption under Wis. Stat. 939.48(1m) applies to a dwelling, a motor vehicle, and a place of business that the actor owns or operates. 'Dwelling' takes its meaning from Wis. Stat. 895.07(1)(h) and is broader than the house itself: it covers premises used as a home or place of residence plus the part of the lot devoted to residential use, expressly including driveways, sidewalks, swimming pools, terraces, patios, fences, porches, garages, and basements. It does not extend to other locations such as a public street, a park, or another person's property.
Does Wisconsin have civil immunity for self-defense?
Yes, within the castle-doctrine locations. Wis. Stat. 895.62, enacted by 2011 Act 94, provides civil liability immunity when an actor uses force against an unlawful, forcible intruder in their dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business. If immunity is granted, the court must award attorney fees and litigation costs to the actor. There is no civil immunity for uses of force in public spaces.
Can I use deadly force to protect property in Wisconsin?
No. Wis. Stat. 939.49 explicitly states that deadly force may not be used for the sole purpose of defending property. You may use non-deadly force to stop someone from unlawfully interfering with property. Deadly force is only justified when you reasonably believe it is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to a person.
What happens if I started the fight but then needed to defend myself?
Under Wis. Stat. 939.48(2), an initial aggressor loses the self-defense privilege, but the statute gives back two paths. If the ensuing attack escalates to a reasonable belief of imminent death or great bodily harm, the aggressor is privileged to act in self-defense right away, though deadly force is available only if the aggressor reasonably believes they have exhausted every other reasonable means to escape. Separately, the privilege can be regained if the aggressor withdraws from the fight in good faith and gives adequate notice of the withdrawal to the other person; if the other person continues the attack after a genuine withdrawal, the original aggressor may then use reasonable force in self-defense. One situation has no way back at all: under Wis. Stat. 939.48(2)(c), a person who provokes an attack, whether by lawful or unlawful conduct, intending to use that attack as an excuse to cause death or great bodily harm, is not entitled to claim self-defense.
Updates
Corrected the castle-doctrine section to state the statutory conditions that actually trigger the presumption and the bar on considering retreat, expanded the definition of "dwelling" to match Wis. Stat. 895.07(1)(h), added the categorical provocation bar in Wis. Stat. 939.48(2)(c), and restored the full text of the criminal-activity exception.
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources; governing law re-checked for recent changes
Governing law re-checked for recent changes
Added the second, escalation-based path back to the self-defense privilege for an initial aggressor under Wis. Stat. 939.48(2)(a) (reasonable belief of imminent death or great bodily harm, with an exhaustion-of-retreat condition on deadly force), which the article previously omitted, describing withdraw-with-notice as the only path. Fixed in the Initial Aggressor Rule section, KeyTakeaways, and the FAQ.
Governing law re-checked for recent changes
Reviewed and approved by an editor
The Law Behind This Article
This article rests on the statutory provisions below, held in our own legal record and retrieved from the official source. Tap a section to read the operative text.
Wisconsin Statutes, Chapter 939: Crimes
§ 939.48Self-defense and defense of others.In forcecited in 2 of our articles
(1) A person is privileged to threaten or intentionally use force against another for the purpose of preventing or terminating what the person reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference with his or her person by such other person. The actor may intentionally use only such force or threat thereof as the actor reasonably believes is necessary to prevent or terminate the interference. The actor may not intentionally use force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm unless the actor reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself. (1m) (a) In this subsection: 1. “Dwelling” has the meaning given in s. 895.07 (1) (h). 2. “Place of business” means a business that the actor owns or operates.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-01 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at docs.legis.wisconsin.gov
Cited in 39 court opinionsMost recently applied by a court: 2025
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):State v. Head (2002) held Wis. Stat. 939.48(1) sets a reasonable objective threshold for perfect self-defense: a reasonable belief in unlawful interference and that the force used was necessary. State v. Hamdan (2003) applied it to hold that generalized high-crime fear is not the actual unlawful interference the statute requires.
Leading cases:
- State v. Head (Wisconsin Supreme Court 2002, 255 Wis. 2d 194)✓Head shot her husband after he threatened her during an argument about their daughter. The court held section 939.48(1) requires objectively reasonable beliefs for perfect self-defense, while imperfect self-defense needs only actual beliefs, and ordered a new trial.
- State v. Payano (Wisconsin Supreme Court 2009, 2009 WI 86)“…tat. § 904.01 ; Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772 ; see also Wis. Stat. § 939.48 (1) and (4). ¶ 73 In terms of contex…”
- State v. Hamdan (Wisconsin Supreme Court 2003, 264 Wis. 2d 433)✓Hamdan, a grocer in a high-crime area, was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon in his store. The court rejected his self-defense privilege because section 939.48 requires an actual unlawful interference, absent that night, but reversed his conviction on other grounds.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Self-Defense Laws by State: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)
§ 939.49Defense of property and protection against retail theft.In force
(1) A person is privileged to threaten or intentionally use force against another for the purpose of preventing or terminating what the person reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference with the person’s property. Only such degree of force or threat thereof may intentionally be used as the actor reasonably believes is necessary to prevent or terminate the interference. It is not reasonable to intentionally use force intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm for the sole purpose of defense of one’s property.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at docs.legis.wisconsin.gov
Cited in 2 court opinionsMost recently applied by a court: 2015
Leading cases:
- State v. Dundon (Wisconsin Supreme Court 1999, 226 Wis. 2d 654)“…or self-defense or defense of others, 9 while Wis. Stat. § 939.49 provides a privilege for the defense o…”
- Kelly v. Berg (Court of Appeals of Wisconsin 2015, 365 Wis. 2d 83)“…rgency doctrine instruction was appropriate because, under Wis. Stat. § 939.49 (1), a person is "privileged to threate…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
§ 939.45Privilege.In force
The fact that the actor’s conduct is privileged, although otherwise criminal, is a defense to prosecution for any crime based on that conduct. The defense of privilege can be claimed under any of the following circumstances: (1) When the actor’s conduct occurs under circumstances of coercion or necessity so as to be privileged under s. 939.46 or 939.47; or (2) When the actor’s conduct is in defense of persons or property under any of the circumstances described in s. 939.48 or 939.49; or (3) When the actor’s conduct is in good faith and is an apparently authorized and reasonable fulfillment of any duties of a public office; or (4) When the actor’s conduct is a reasonable accomplishment of a lawful arrest; or (5) (a) In this subsection: 1. “Child” has the meaning specified in s. 948.01 (1). 3. “Person responsible for the child’s welfare” includes the child’s parent, stepparent or guardian; an employee of a public or private residential home, institution or agency in which the child resides or is confined or that provides services to the child; or any other person legally responsible for the child’s welfare in a residential setting.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at docs.legis.wisconsin.gov
Cited in 18 court opinionsMost recently applied by a court: 2022
Leading cases:
- State v. Head (Wisconsin Supreme Court 2002, 255 Wis. 2d 194)“…106. Perfect self-defense is a privilege recognized in Wis. Stat. § 939.45 (2). Before a privilege may be consider…”
- State v. Coleman (Wisconsin Supreme Court 1996, 206 Wis. 2d 199)“…nse to a prosecution for any crime based on that conduct." Wis. Stat. § 939.45 (emphasis added). There is no indicati…”
- State v. Hamdan (Wisconsin Supreme Court 2003, 264 Wis. 2d 433)“…rivilege, as a matter of law, under the privilege statute ( Wis. Stat. § 939.45 ) in these circumstances. Hamdan argued…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Wisconsin Statutes, Chapter 895: Damages, Liability, And Miscellaneous Provisions Regarding Actions In Courts
§ 895.62Use of force in response to unlawful and forcible entry into a dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business; civil liability immunity.In force
(1) In this section: (a) “Actor” means a person who uses force that is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm to another person. (b) “Dwelling” has the meaning given in s. 895.07 (1) (h). (c) “Place of business” means a business that the actor owns or operates. (2) Except as provided in sub. (4), an actor is immune from civil liability arising out of his or her use of force that is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm if the actor reasonably believed that the force was necessary to prevent imminent death or bodily harm to himself or herself or to another person and either of the following applies: (a) The person against whom the force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcibly entering the actor’s dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business, the actor was on his or her property or present in the dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business, and the actor knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry was occurring.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at docs.legis.wisconsin.gov
Cited in 2 court opinionsMost recently applied by a court: 2025
Leading cases:
- Brandon Velez, Plaintiff v. Rachael Eutzy, Erik Slocum, Casey Seigle, and The City of Manchester, N.H., Defendants (District Court, D. New Hampshire 2025, 2025 DNH 061)“…and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8340.2; Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-622; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 895.62(5); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-204(c). Yet,…”
- Velez v. Eutzy (District Court, D. New Hampshire 2025)“…at. Ann. § 8340.2; Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-622; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 895.62(5); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-2…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
§ 895.07Claims against contractors and suppliers.In forcecited in 2 of our articles
(1) Definitions. In this section: (a) “Action” means a civil action or an arbitration under ch. 788. (b) “Association” means a homeowner’s association, condominium association under s. 703.02 (1m), unit owner’s association, or a nonprofit corporation created to own and operate portions of a planned community that may assess unit owners for the costs incurred in the performance of the association’s obligations. (c) “Claim” means a request or demand to remedy a construction defect caused by a contractor or supplier related to the construction or remodeling of a dwelling. (d) “Claimant” means the owner, tenant, or lessee of a dwelling, or an association, who has standing to sue a contractor or supplier regarding a construction defect. (e) “Construction defect,” in those cases when the contractor or supplier has provided a warranty to a consumer, means the definition of “defect” in the warranty. In all other cases, “construction defect” means a deficiency in the construction or remodeling of a dwelling that results from any of the following: 1. Defective material. 2. Violation of applicable codes. 3. Failure to follow accepted trade standards for workmanlike construction.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at docs.legis.wisconsin.gov
Cited in 4 court opinionsMost recently applied by a court: 2016
Leading cases:
- State v. Chew (Court of Appeals of Wisconsin 2014, 358 Wis. 2d 368)“…ing" in subdivision 2. and the definition of dwelling from Wis. Stat. § 895.07 (l)(h), which is incorporated into the…”
- Solowicz v. Forward Geneva National, LLC (Wisconsin Supreme Court 2010, 323 Wis. 2d 556)“…the Wisconsin Statutes only once, and only in passing, in Wis. Stat. § 895.07 (1)(b). [2] ¶ 79 The court's use of…”
- Cheryl M. Sorenson v. Richard A. Batchelder (Wisconsin Supreme Court 2016, 368 Wis. 2d 140)“…38(4)(b); Wis. Stat. § 766.588(4)(b); and Wis. Stat. § 895.07(1)(j). ¶39 Furthermore,…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Wisconsin Voyeurism and Hidden Camera Laws: Privacy Crimes and Penalties (2026)
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Sources and References
- Wis. Stat. 939.48: Self-Defense and Defense of Others(docs.legis.wisconsin.gov)
- Wis. Stat. 939.49: Defense of Property(docs.legis.wisconsin.gov)
- Wis. Stat. 895.62: Civil Liability Immunity for Use of Force(docs.legis.wisconsin.gov)
- Wis. Stat. 939.45: Privilege(docs.legis.wisconsin.gov)
- 2011 Wisconsin Act 94: Castle Doctrine and Civil Immunity(docs.legis.wisconsin.gov)
- Wis. Stat. 895.07(1)(h): Definition of "Dwelling"(docs.legis.wisconsin.gov)