Seventh Circuit Rules TCPA Text Messages Are Not Telephone Calls Under Do-Not-Call Law

Seventh Circuit Rules TCPA Text Messages Are Not Telephone Calls Under Do-Not-Call Law

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled on July 14, 2026, that text messages are not telephone calls under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act's Do-Not-Call private right of action, affirming dismissal of a class action against Blackstone Medical Services and creating a split with the Ninth Circuit.

Information last verified on July 19, 2026. This is a developing story; we update it as the record changes.

Jurisdiction scope: This ruling is binding federal law only within the Seventh Circuit, covering Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin. It directly conflicts with the Ninth Circuit's Howard v. Republican National Committee decision, which covers Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and other western jurisdictions. Courts outside these circuits are not bound by either ruling. This article is general legal information, not legal advice about your specific situation.

What Happened

On July 14, 2026, a unanimous three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided Steidinger v. Blackstone Medical Services, No. 25-2398. Judge Kirsch wrote the opinion, joined by Judges Pryor and Maldonado.

The case began as consolidated putative class action lawsuits filed in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois against Blackstone Medical Services, a Florida-based company that markets at-home sleep apnea tests. The plaintiffs, led by Seth Steidinger, alleged that Blackstone continued sending them marketing text messages after they replied STOP to opt out and after their phone numbers were registered on the National Do-Not-Call Registry. They sued under the TCPA's Do-Not-Call private right of action, 47 U.S.C. 227(c)(5), along with a Florida state telemarketing statute.

The district court dismissed the TCPA claim, holding that Section 227(c)(5) authorizes lawsuits only over unwanted telephone calls, not text messages, and it declined to keep the state-law claim in federal court once the federal claim was gone. The plaintiffs appealed.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The panel held that a text message is not a telephone call within the ordinary meaning Congress would have understood in 1991, when it enacted the TCPA and text messaging did not yet exist as consumer technology, looking to the statute's text and the surrounding structure of Section 227 rather than to any FCC interpretation. Because the DNC private right of action does not cover text messages, the court affirmed dismissal without reaching whether Blackstone's texting practices otherwise violated Do-Not-Call rules.

What the Law Actually Says

The TCPA, codified at 47 U.S.C. 227, contains several distinct provisions that consumers and businesses frequently conflate. Understanding which one applies matters, because Steidinger addresses only one of them.

Section 227(c) directs the FCC to maintain rules protecting residential telephone subscribers from unwanted telemarketing, which is the legal basis for the National Do-Not-Call Registry. Section 227(c)(5) is the private right of action that lets a person who received more than one call in a 12-month period, in violation of those Do-Not-Call rules, sue for statutory damages, generally $500 per violation and up to $1,500 for willful or knowing violations. That is the exact provision at issue in Steidinger, and the Seventh Circuit held its text, "telephone call," does not stretch to cover text messages.

Section 227(b) is a separate provision entirely. It restricts calls made using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, and it carries its own private right of action with the same statutory damages structure. Steidinger did not decide anything about Section 227(b), and readers researching their options under the TCPA generally should know that autodialer and prerecorded-voice text claims under 227(b) are a different legal question than the Do-Not-Call claim the Seventh Circuit rejected here.

The panel's reasoning tracks the U.S. Supreme Court's 2025 decision in McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates v. McKesson Corp., which instructed courts to interpret the TCPA based on its statutory text rather than deferring to FCC interpretive rules. Since McLaughlin, federal district courts had already split on whether "telephone call" in Section 227(c)(5) includes texts, and Steidinger is the first federal appeals court to resolve that question, ruling against text-message plaintiffs who relied on the DNC private right of action. Readers weighing whether a pattern of unwanted texts supports a claim can review the current damages framework on the site's TCPA lawsuit and damages page.

The Circuit Split

The Seventh Circuit's decision does not stand alone. On January 13, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided Howard v. Republican National Committee, and reached the opposite conclusion on a related question: it held that a text message can qualify as a call for purposes of Section 227(b), the autodialer and prerecorded-voice provision. In the same opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that because the recipient had to tap play before hearing the prerecorded voice in the embedded video file, the call was not made or initiated using that voice, so the plaintiff still lost on that particular claim.

The two decisions are not deciding the identical question. Howard addressed whether a text is a call under Section 227(b); Steidinger addressed whether a text is a call under Section 227(c)(5), the Do-Not-Call private right of action. But both courts had to answer the same underlying interpretive question, whether "call" in the TCPA's 1991 text extends to a communications technology that did not exist when Congress wrote the statute, and they answered it differently. The Ninth Circuit read "call" broadly enough to include texts; the Seventh Circuit read "telephone call" in Section 227(c)(5) narrowly enough to exclude them.

That divergence means a text-message practice that survives a Do-Not-Call claim in Illinois, Indiana, or Wisconsin could still face liability under Section 227(b) there, and could face liability under either provision in the Ninth Circuit's territory. Legal commentators tracking the TCPA docket describe this as a live circuit split on a question of real commercial significance for any business that texts consumers, and several have flagged it as a plausible candidate for U.S. Supreme Court review. This article does not predict how any future appeal would be decided.

Analysis: Why This Matters

The following is analysis from the Recording Law Editorial Team.

Steidinger matters less for what it says about Blackstone Medical Services and more for what it says about how quickly the TCPA's settled assumptions can move once the Supreme Court takes deference to regulators off the table. For years, litigants and lower courts largely treated the FCC's own guidance, which lumped texts in with calls across the statute, as settling the question. McLaughlin removed that assumption, and Steidinger shows one federal appeals court reading the DNC provision's actual words as narrower than the regulatory practice built up around it.

We think the more important story is the split itself, not the Seventh Circuit's answer in isolation. Two courts of appeals looked at closely related text in the same statute and reached opposite conclusions about whether "call" reaches texting. That is exactly the kind of conflict the Supreme Court exists to resolve, and until it does, or until Congress amends the statute, the practical rule depends on which circuit a business or consumer is in. We are not predicting which reading prevails; we are flagging that the uncertainty is real and, for now, geographic.

It is also worth being precise about scope. Steidinger closes one door, the Do-Not-Call private right of action under 227(c)(5), only within three states. It does not touch 227(b) autodialer or prerecorded-voice claims anywhere, it does not touch state telemarketing statutes, and it does not touch the FCC's own enforcement authority. A text-message marketer that stops respecting STOP replies has not necessarily found a safe harbor.

How This Affects You

This ruling is general information about a recent appellate decision, not advice about any individual's situation. A few points are worth understanding in general terms.

If you live in the Seventh Circuit (Illinois, Indiana, or Wisconsin), an unwanted marketing text alone is unlikely to support a claim under the Do-Not-Call private right of action, 227(c)(5), following Steidinger. That does not foreclose every text-message dispute there; claims under 227(b), covering autodialed or prerecorded-voice communications, may remain available depending on the facts, and state consumer-protection statutes are unaffected by this federal ruling.

If you live within the Ninth Circuit's territory, Howard v. Republican National Committee currently treats text messages as calls under 227(b), so that provision's protections may apply to unwanted texts there, subject to the facts of a given case. Outside both circuits, neither ruling is binding, and how a local federal court treats text messages under the TCPA may still be an open question. Anyone considering legal action over unwanted texts or calls should consult a licensed attorney in their jurisdiction who can evaluate the specific facts and applicable law.

This is general legal information, not legal advice. It describes a specific federal appellate ruling in the Seventh Circuit (Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin) and a conflicting Ninth Circuit ruling; it does not describe the law in any other jurisdiction and does not apply to every set of facts. Information verified as of July 19, 2026. This is a developing story and details may change as the record develops, including possible further appeals. Consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction before taking action based on this article.

Related articles:

• TCPA overview: telemarketing calls, texts, and your rights
• TCPA damages and how to sue for unwanted calls or texts
• Tracking open consumer class-action settlements

Last updated: 2026-07-19. This is a developing story; details verified as of 2026-07-19.

Frequently Asked Questions

Can I still sue over unwanted marketing texts after this ruling?

It depends on where you live and which TCPA provision applies. Within the Seventh Circuit (Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin), the Do-Not-Call private right of action under 227(c)(5) no longer covers text messages after Steidinger. Claims under a different provision, 227(b), which covers autodialed or prerecorded-voice communications, may still be available depending on the facts. Consult a licensed attorney to evaluate your specific situation.

Does the Steidinger ruling apply nationwide?

No. The Seventh Circuit's decision is binding only within its own territory, Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin. Courts in other federal circuits are not required to follow it, and the Ninth Circuit has already reached the opposite conclusion on a related question in Howard v. Republican National Committee.

What is the Do-Not-Call Registry private right of action?

It is the provision at 47 U.S.C. 227(c)(5) that lets a person who received more than one telemarketing call within a 12-month period, in violation of the FCC's Do-Not-Call rules, sue for statutory damages, generally $500 per violation and up to $1,500 for willful or knowing violations. Steidinger held this provision does not reach text messages.

Does this ruling apply to robocalls?

Not directly. Steidinger interpreted 227(c)(5), the Do-Not-Call private right of action. Robocalls and autodialed or prerecorded-voice text messages fall under a separate TCPA provision, 227(b), which this ruling did not address.

What is the difference between TCPA Section 227(b) and 227(c)?

Section 227(b) restricts calls made with an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice. Section 227(c) directs the FCC to maintain Do-Not-Call rules, and 227(c)(5) is the private right of action for violating those rules. Steidinger addressed only 227(c)(5).

What was the Ninth Circuit's Howard v. Republican National Committee decision?

Decided January 13, 2026, Howard held that a text message can qualify as a call under TCPA Section 227(b), the autodialer and prerecorded-voice provision, conflicting with Steidinger's reading of a related question under a different subsection.

Could the Supreme Court eventually resolve this circuit split?

The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have now reached conflicting conclusions on closely related TCPA text-messaging questions, which is the kind of conflict the Supreme Court can be asked to resolve. No petition has been decided on this question, and this article does not predict whether or how the Supreme Court would rule.