AI Copyright Law in the United States (2026 Guide)
Two questions dominate AI and copyright in the United States: can you own what an AI creates, and can you be liable for what it reproduces? Federal law answers each more clearly than the headlines suggest. This hub maps both, and links to detailed guides.
Information last verified on 2026-06-25. This article presents general legal information about United States federal law, not legal advice. The law on AI and copyright is evolving, and several cases cited below are still on appeal.
Jurisdiction scope: This hub covers United States federal copyright law as it applies to artificial intelligence: the ownership of AI-generated works, infringement liability, open-source licensing, and the training-data cases. It does not address patent or trade-secret law in depth, and it does not cover other countries. For software specifically, see the code guide linked below; for other countries, see how AI and copyright differ worldwide.
Can you copyright what an AI makes?
Generally not, unless a human supplied the creative expression. United States copyright protects only works of human authorship, a requirement the courts and the Copyright Office have applied consistently to AI output. In Thaler v. Perlmutter, the D.C. Circuit affirmed in March 2025 that the Copyright Act requires a human author, and the Supreme Court declined to review that ruling in 2026. The principle reaches every kind of work, not just art: AI-generated code, images, music, and text all face the same bar.
This does not mean AI-assisted work is unprotectable. The Copyright Office's January 2025 report concluded that a work is protectable to the extent a human exercised creative control over its expressive elements, and that prompting alone usually does not supply that control. When registering, applicants must disclose and disclaim purely AI-generated material under the Office's guidance at 88 Fed. Reg. 16,190. The takeaway for creators and companies is that ownership tracks human contribution, so the portions a machine generated on its own may belong to no one.
When does AI use become copyright infringement?
Infringement happens when protected expression is reproduced, distributed, or adapted without authorization, and AI does not change that analysis. Under 17 U.S.C. § 106, the copyright owner alone may reproduce a work, prepare derivatives, or distribute it; under § 501, anyone who violates those rights is an infringer. Critically, infringement is a strict-liability wrong: there is no knowledge or intent requirement. The Supreme Court confirmed as early as 1931, in Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., that "intention to infringe is not essential under the act."
For AI users, the risk is that a model reproduces training material in its output and the user then publishes it. The user is the one distributing the result, so the user carries the exposure, even if they did not know the output traced back to a protected source. Innocence is not a defense to liability, and at most it can lower the damages award. Statutory damages run from $750 to $30,000 per work under § 504(c)(1). Under § 504(c)(2) a court "in its discretion may reduce" that award to as little as $200, but only where the infringer "sustains the burden of proving" that he "was not aware and had no reason to believe" his acts were infringing, and the same subsection lets a court raise the award to as much as $150,000 where the owner carries the burden of proving willfulness. The reduction is discretionary rather than automatic, and §§ 401(d) and 402(d) direct that no weight be given to an innocent-infringement plea in mitigation of damages where a proper copyright notice appeared on the copies the defendant had access to.
AI-generated code and open source
Software is where these rules bite first, because AI coding assistants are trained on vast amounts of open-source code and can reproduce recognizable pieces of it. Open source is not public domain; it is copyrighted code released under a license with conditions. Permissive licenses such as MIT and Apache 2.0 require attribution. Copyleft licenses such as GPL and AGPL require that derivative works stay open, and the AGPL extends that duty to software offered over a network. Courts enforce these terms through copyright (Jacobsen v. Katzer) and as contracts (Artifex v. Hancom), so shipping copyleft code inside a closed product without complying is both infringement and breach.
Because this is the most common real-world dispute, we cover it in depth in a dedicated guide: is AI-generated code copyright infringement?. It explains strict liability, the open-source license families, who is liable when a tool like Copilot suggests infringing code, and why purely AI-written code may not be copyrightable at all.
The training-data fight: is it fair use?
This is the most unsettled question, and the courts are split. Training a model requires copying enormous quantities of existing work, and whether that copying is fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 107 is being litigated case by case. In Thomson Reuters v. Ross Intelligence, a court rejected a fair-use defense where a non-generative AI was trained on a competitor's copyrighted material to build a directly competing product. In Bartz v. Anthropic and Kadrey v. Meta, courts found that training large language models on books was transformative and therefore fair use, although Anthropic still faced liability for sourcing pirated copies to begin with.
Several of these proceedings remain active, and Bartz v. Anthropic ended in a settlement, so none produced a final appellate ruling. Each turned heavily on its facts, especially on whether the AI's output competes with the original in the market. For now, the safest reading is that lawful acquisition of training data and genuinely transformative use help a fair-use defense, while building a market substitute from someone else's protected work undermines it.
Federal, not state: why there is no "AI copyright by state"
Copyright is one national system. Section 301 of Title 17 preempts any state-law right equivalent to copyright in a fixed work, so the same federal Copyright Act applies in every state. There is no California AI-copyright statute or Texas AI-copyright statute that changes who owns or infringes a work. What does vary by state are adjacent claims that often travel with a copyright dispute: trade-secret misappropriation under each state's Uniform Trade Secrets Act, and breach of a software license under state contract law. Those are separate from copyright, and they are the reason a single incident can produce claims in both federal and state court.
What is settled and what is still moving
| Question | Status in 2026 | Key authority |
|---|---|---|
| Can purely AI-generated work be copyrighted? | Settled: no, human authorship is required | Thaler v. Perlmutter (D.C. Cir. 2025); Copyright Office report (2025) |
| Is unknowing infringement still infringement? | Settled: yes, strict liability | 17 U.S.C. § 501; Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle (1931) |
| Must you comply with open-source licenses? | Settled: yes, by copyright and contract | Jacobsen v. Katzer; Artifex v. Hancom |
| Does an AI vendor share liability for infringing output? | Unsettled, on appeal | Doe v. GitHub (9th Cir.) |
| Is training AI on copyrighted works fair use? | Unsettled, courts split | Thomson Reuters v. Ross; Bartz v. Anthropic; Kadrey v. Meta |
Where to go next
For the detailed treatment of software, start with is AI-generated code copyright infringement?, the keystone guide in this hub. To compare how other countries handle AI and copyright, including Europe's stricter training-transparency duties, see how AI and copyright differ worldwide. For the separate question of licensing open-weight AI models inside a product, see AI model licensing and open-source attribution. For state-level AI regulation beyond copyright, such as disclosure and deepfake rules, see AI laws and regulation in the United States.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. It describes United States federal copyright law as of 2026-06-25 and does not address your specific facts. The law on AI-generated works is evolving, and several cited cases remain on appeal. Consult an attorney licensed in your jurisdiction before acting on AI-generated or open-source material.
Related articles
- Is AI-generated code copyright infringement?
- How AI and copyright differ worldwide
- AI model licensing and open-source attribution
- AI laws and regulation in the United States
Last updated: 2026-06-25. Statutes and cases cited reflect their status as of 2026-06-25; several AI-related decisions remain on appeal.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is AI-generated content protected by copyright in the United States?
Only to the extent a human authored it. Purely AI-generated output is not copyrightable, because United States law requires human authorship (Thaler v. Perlmutter; U.S. Copyright Office, 2025). AI-assisted work is protected only for the human-created portions.
Can I be sued for AI output that copied someone's work?
Yes. Copyright infringement is strict liability under 17 U.S.C. § 501, so you can be liable even if you did not know the output reproduced protected material. Innocent intent does not eliminate the claim. At most a court may reduce statutory damages under § 504(c)(2), and only if the infringer carries the burden of proving he was not aware and had no reason to believe his acts were infringing.
Is AI copyright law different in California than in other states?
No. Copyright is exclusively federal, and 17 U.S.C. § 301 preempts state copyright law, so the rule is the same in every state. State law applies only to related claims such as trade secrets or breach of a license contract.
Is it legal to train AI on copyrighted data?
It is unsettled and depends on the facts. Courts have split, rejecting fair use where the AI competed directly with the source (Thomson Reuters v. Ross) but allowing it where training was found transformative (Bartz v. Anthropic; Kadrey v. Meta). The law is still developing: Kadrey remains subject to further proceedings, and Bartz settled after its fair-use ruling.
Does the human-authorship rule apply to AI images and text, not just code?
Yes. The requirement of human authorship applies to all categories of works, so purely AI-generated images, music, and text face the same bar as AI-generated code (Thaler v. Perlmutter; Copyright Office, 2025).
Where can I read the detail on AI-generated code specifically?
See the keystone guide in this hub, is AI-generated code copyright infringement, which covers strict liability, open-source license compliance, the Copilot litigation, and whether AI-written code can be owned.
Updates
Clarified that the reduced $200 statutory-damages floor for an innocent infringer is discretionary and must be proven by the infringer, not automatic, and noted that a proper copyright notice forecloses the innocent-infringement plea.
Governing law re-checked for recent changes
Governing law re-checked for recent changes
The Law Behind This Article
This article rests on the statutory provisions below, held in our own legal record and retrieved from the official source. Tap a section to read the operative text.
United States Code Title 17
§ 501Infringement of copyrightIn forcecited in 2 of our articles
Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 122 or of the author as provided in section 106A(a), or who imports copies or phonorecords into the United States in violation of section 602, is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author, as the case may be. For purposes of this chapter (other than section 506), any reference to copyright shall be deemed to include the rights conferred by section 106A(a). As used in this subsection, the term “anyone” includes any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity. Any State, and any such instrumentality, officer, or employee, shall be subject to the provisions of this title in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity. The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled, subject to the requirements of section 411, to institute an action for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-16 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 1,883 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc. (Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 2003, 328 F.3d 1136)“…cular right committed while he or she is the owner of it.” 17 U.S.C. § 501 (b). MTM argues that the works Warren c…”
- Elektra Entertainment Group Inc. v. Crawford (District Court, C.D. California 2005, 226 F.R.D. 388)“…prevail on its claim for infringement of copyrights, under 17 U.S.C. § 501 , Plaintiffs must establish that the De…”
- Eden Toys, Inc., Cross-Appellee v. Florelee Undergarment Co., Inc., Cross-Appellant (Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 1982, 697 F.2d 27)“…exclusive licenses by owners of copyrights. 3 17 U.S.C. § 501 (b) (Supp. IV 1980); 3 M. Nimmer, Nimme…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Is AI-Generated Code Copyright Infringement? (2026)
§ 106Exclusive rights in copyrighted worksIn forcecited in 2 of our articles
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 2,792 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises (Supreme Court of the United States 1985, 471 U.S. 539)“…f exclusive rights “[sjubject to section 107 through 118.” 17 U. S. C. §106 . Section 107 states: “Notwithstanding…”
- Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (Supreme Court of the United States 1994, 510 U.S. 569)“…ts in "Oh, Pretty Woman," under the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U. S. C. § 106 (1988 ed. and Supp. IV), but for a fin…”
- Briarpatch Limited, L.P., Gerard F. Rubin v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., Michael Medavoy, Geisler Roberdeau, Inc., Terence Malick (Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 2004, 373 F.3d 296)“…exclusive rights already protected by copyright law under 17 U.S.C. § 106 . See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (a)…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
§ 107Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair useIn forcecited in 10 of our articles
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include— the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; the nature of the copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 883 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises (1985) applied the section 107 factors to reject fair use for prepublication quotation from an unpublished memoir, calling market effect the single most important element. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music (1994) held commercial character is only one element and rejected a presumption against parody.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises (Supreme Court of the United States 1985, 471 U.S. 539)✓The Nation, working from a purloined manuscript of Gerald Ford's memoirs, printed about 300 words verbatim and scooped Time's licensed excerpt. The Court held this was not fair use under section 107, weighing the work's unpublished nature and Time's cancellation as market harm.
- Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (Supreme Court of the United States 1984, 464 U.S. 417)✓Universal and Disney sued the maker of the Betamax over home taping of broadcast television. Weighing the section 107 factors, the Court held private noncommercial time-shifting is fair use because the studios showed no likelihood of harm to the market for their works.
- Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publishing (Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 2008)✓A karaoke maker sought a declaration that displaying and printing copyrighted lyrics was fair use. Applying the section 107 factors, the Ninth Circuit found the use commercial and not transformative, the lyrics creative and taken whole, and affirmed dismissal of the claim.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: How to File a DMCA Takedown on Xvideos (2026 Guide), What Is a DMCA Takedown? Complete Guide, How to File a DMCA Takedown on Etsy (2026 Guide)
§ 301Preemption with respect to other lawsIn forcecited in 2 of our articles
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date and whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 1,018 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Computer Associates International, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. Altai, Inc., Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant (Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 1992, 982 F.2d 693)“…ims had been preempted by the federal Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (a). We shall address each argument in…”
- The Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Industries, Ltd. (Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 1993, 9 F.3d 823)“…(1) the state law misappropriation claim is preempted by 17 U.S.C. § 301 , (2) the constants have no competitive…”
- Trandes Corporation v. Guy F. Atkinson Company, and Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 1993, 996 F.2d 655)“…propriation is preempted by § 301(a) of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (a) (1988); (2) Trandes failed to prove…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
§ 504Remedies for infringement: Damages and profitsIn forcecited in 5 of our articles
Except as otherwise provided by this title, an infringer of copyright is liable for either— the copyright owner’s actual damages and any additional profits of the infringer, as provided by subsection (b); or statutory damages, as provided by subsection (c). The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages. In establishing the infringer’s profits, the copyright owner is required to present proof only of the infringer’s gross revenue, and the infringer is required to prove his or her deductible expenses and the elements of profit attributable to factors other than the copyrighted work.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 2,114 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises (Supreme Court of the United States 1985, 471 U.S. 539)“…oldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U. S. 390, 406 (1940). Cf. 17 U. S. C. § 504 (b) (the infringer is required to prove…”
- Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc. (Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 2003, 346 F.3d 514)“…Bouchat sought damages from the Ravens and NFLP pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1), which renders an infringer liabl…”
- Anthony Dash v. Floyd Mayweather, Jr. (Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 2013, 731 F.3d 303)“…judgment on the issue of his entitlement to damages under 17 U.S.C. § 504 (b). For the reasons set forth below, w…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: How to File a DMCA Takedown on AWS (2026 Guide), How to File a DMCA Takedown on Discord (2026 Guide)
Search our full record of US law — 2.1 million sections, every state + federal →
Sources and References
- 17 U.S.C. § 301 (federal preemption of state copyright law)(law.cornell.edu)
- 17 U.S.C. § 106 (exclusive rights in copyrighted works)(law.cornell.edu)
- 17 U.S.C. § 501 (infringement of copyright)(law.cornell.edu)
- 17 U.S.C. § 504 (remedies; statutory damages, innocent and willful)(law.cornell.edu)
- Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931)(law.cornell.edu)
- Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)(law.cornell.edu)
- Thaler v. Perlmutter, No. 23-5233 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 18, 2025)(media.cadc.uscourts.gov).gov
- U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright and Artificial Intelligence, Part 2: Copyrightability (2025)(copyright.gov).gov
- Copyright Registration Guidance: Works Containing Material Generated by Artificial Intelligence, 88 Fed. Reg. 16,190 (Mar. 16, 2023)(federalregister.gov).gov
- Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008)(courtlistener.com)
- Artifex Software, Inc. v. Hancom, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2017) (GPL enforceable as a contract)(wsgr.com)
- Thomson Reuters Enterprise Centre GmbH v. Ross Intelligence Inc. (D. Del. Feb. 11, 2025)(dwt.com)
- Bartz v. Anthropic PBC, No. 3:24-cv-05417 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2025)(afslaw.com)
- Kadrey v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 23-cv-03417-VC (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2025)(goodwinlaw.com)
- The Open Source Definition, Open Source Initiative(opensource.org)
- 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (statutory damages; discretionary reduction to $200 for an innocent infringer, increase to $150,000 for willful infringement), U.S. Copyright Office(copyright.gov)
- 17 U.S.C. §§ 401(d), 402(d) (no weight given to an innocent-infringement defense where a proper copyright notice appeared on copies the defendant had access to), U.S. Copyright Office(copyright.gov)