Sixth Circuit Revives NetChoice Challenge to Tennessee Law

Sixth Circuit Vacates Injunction Denial in NetChoice Challenge to Tennessee Age-Verification Law, Sends Case Back Without Ruling on Free Speech Claims

A divided Sixth Circuit panel vacated a district court's denial of a preliminary injunction against Tennessee's social-media age-verification law and sent the case back for further review. The court decided only whether NetChoice showed irreparable harm; it did not rule on the First Amendment merits.

Information last verified on September 2, 2026.

Status: Decided and filed August 28, 2026. Published (precedential) opinion. Disposition: vacated and remanded, 2-1, with a dissent. The panel resolved only the irreparable-harm factor of the preliminary-injunction test. The First Amendment merits of Tennessee's law remain undecided and now go back to the district court.

Jurisdiction: This ruling binds the Sixth Circuit (Tennessee, Kentucky, Michigan, and Ohio) and directly concerns Tennessee's Protecting Children from Social Media Act. It does not resolve the constitutionality of that law or of similar age-verification statutes in other states.

What Happened

On August 28, 2026, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued a published opinion in NetChoice, LLC v. Skrmetti, No. 25-5660. NetChoice, a trade association representing internet companies including Meta, Snap, X, and Google's YouTube, had sued Tennessee Attorney General Jonathan Skrmetti on October 3, 2024, to block enforcement of the state's Protecting Children from Social Media Act before it took effect. The dissent notes that on appeal NetChoice listed three additional covered members (Automattic's Tumblr, Discord, and Reddit), having named them in an amended complaint filed August 13, 2025.

The district court in Nashville denied NetChoice's request for a preliminary injunction in June 2025, holding that NetChoice had not shown its members faced irreparable harm imminent enough to justify blocking the law while the case proceeded. Because the district court found that factor missing, it did not go on to weigh the other three factors courts use to decide whether to grant a preliminary injunction: likelihood of success on the merits, the balance of equities, and the public interest.

NetChoice appealed. The Sixth Circuit panel, in an opinion authored by Judge Alice Batchelder and joined by Judge Kevin Ritz, held that the district court's assessment of irreparable harm "was an abuse of discretion." The court found that NetChoice had adequately alleged two forms of harm: unrecoverable compliance costs to at least two member platforms (Nextdoor and Dreamwidth), and the chilling of protected speech while the law hangs over the companies' operations. The panel was careful to frame this narrowly. As the majority put it near the close of its opinion, "Assuming NetChoice's First Amendment claims are correct on the merits (on which we express no opinion and which we leave to the district court for consideration), we hold that its members have demonstrated irreparable harm on that basis, at least sufficient to overcome our threshold irreparable-harm hurdle." Slip op. at 21.

Judge Eric Clay dissented. He would have affirmed the denial of the injunction, writing that NetChoice "failed to carry its burden of demonstrating an imminent threat of irreparable harm" (Dissent, slip op. at 22) and that, in his view, "there is no need to remand to have the district court further consider the preliminary injunction factors, as the majority is determined to do" (Dissent, slip op. at 31).

The panel vacated the district court's order and remanded "for further consideration of that motion consistent with this decision." Slip op. at 21.

What the Law Actually Says

Tennessee's Protecting Children from Social Media Act was enacted in 2024 as Public Chapter 899 and is codified at Tenn. Code Ann. Sections 47-18-5701 through 47-18-5706. It took effect January 1, 2025. According to the enacted text on the Tennessee Secretary of State's publications site, and as the Sixth Circuit's opinion recounts, the law does the following:

• Requires a "social media company," defined as an interactive computer service providing an account-based platform where users post text, image, or video content, to verify the age of anyone attempting to open an account (Section 47-18-5703(a)(1)).
• If the prospective account holder is a minor, defined as an unemancipated Tennessee resident known or reasonably believed by the platform to be under 18 (Section 47-18-5702(4)), the company must verify express parental consent before allowing the account, and must prohibit the minor from becoming an account holder without it (Section 47-18-5703(a)(2)).
• Requires the company to allow a parent to revoke consent for a minor to become or continue as an account holder (Section 47-18-5703(b)).
• Bars social media companies and third parties from retaining the personally identifying information used to verify age or parental consent (Section 47-18-5703(c)).
• Requires companies to give a minor's parent tools to supervise the account, including at minimum the ability to view privacy settings, set daily time limits, and schedule breaks during which the minor cannot access the account (Section 47-18-5704).
• Voids any contract clause or choice-of-law provision that waives the Act's protections (Section 47-18-5706).
• Gives the Tennessee Attorney General enforcement authority modeled on the state's Consumer Protection Act, including the power to investigate, sue, seek civil penalties of up to $1,000 per violation (up to $2,000 for a knowing repeat violation of an existing injunction), and recover the state's costs and attorney's fees (Section 47-18-5705, incorporating Sections 47-18-106 and 47-18-108).

NetChoice's suit raises two constitutional theories: that the Act's verification and consent mandates abridge the free-speech rights of the platforms and their users under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and that its coverage definitions are unconstitutionally vague under due process principles. Neither claim was resolved by this decision. The Sixth Circuit's ruling turned entirely on the four-factor preliminary-injunction standard the Supreme Court set out in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council (irreparable harm, likelihood of success on the merits, balance of equities, and the public interest), and specifically on how the Sixth Circuit applies the irreparable-harm factor at this early stage of a case. For background on how age-verification mandates fit into the broader landscape of state and federal rules aimed at minors online, see our overview of federal age-verification proposals under KOSA and COPPA, and our summary of how states regulate children's online privacy.

What Happens Next

The case returns to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The panel's mandate directs that court to reconsider NetChoice's motion for a preliminary injunction "consistent with" the Sixth Circuit's opinion, meaning it must now treat NetChoice as having cleared the irreparable-harm threshold and move on to weigh the other three preliminary-injunction factors it never reached the first time, including whether NetChoice is likely to succeed on the First Amendment and vagueness claims. The Sixth Circuit did not tell the district court how to resolve those remaining factors, and it explicitly declined to signal a view on the merits.

The Protecting Children from Social Media Act remains on the books and in effect in Tennessee. This ruling does not enjoin it. Attorney General Skrmetti retains statutory enforcement authority under the Act while the case proceeds on remand, subject to whatever preliminary injunction the district court may or may not issue after the further proceedings this ruling requires.

Because the opinion is published and precedential, it also addresses a dispute the district court had flagged over whether the four preliminary-injunction factors are strict prerequisites or factors to be balanced against one another. The panel declined to say which reading of Winter is correct. It held instead that binding circuit precedent treats the four as factors to balance rather than a list of prerequisites, and that only the Supreme Court or the Sixth Circuit sitting en banc could change that rule. The panel added one limit: a court may still deny an injunction without reaching the other factors when a movant utterly fails on likelihood of success or on irreparable harm.

Beyond the district court proceedings, either party could seek further review, including rehearing en banc or a petition to the U.S. Supreme Court, though nothing in the record reviewed for this article indicates either side has done so as of publication. The opinion itself notes that Tennessee's law is one of several state minor-and-social-media statutes facing industry challenges around the country, citing pending or decided cases involving Mississippi, Ohio, California, Texas, Utah, Arkansas, Georgia, Colorado, Maryland, Louisiana, Virginia, Nebraska, and Florida. Most of those were brought by NetChoice; the Florida and Texas cases in that footnote were brought by the Computer and Communications Industry Association. This article did not independently review the substance of those other rulings, so no comparison of how they came out, or whether they conflict with this one, is made here.

Analysis: Why This Matters

The following is analysis from the Recording Law Editorial Team.

It is worth being precise about what changed and what did not. Before this ruling, NetChoice's challenge to Tennessee's law was effectively stalled at the courthouse door: the district court had decided NetChoice could not even clear the first hurdle needed to ask for interim relief, so the substantive First Amendment and vagueness arguments were never reached. After this ruling, that procedural block is removed and the case can move forward on its merits arguments in the district court, but those arguments have not been evaluated by any court yet in this case.

The panel's reasoning is a fairly technical exercise in preliminary-injunction doctrine, not a statement about how strong or weak Tennessee's justification for the law is. Much of the opinion works through prior Sixth Circuit cases on what counts as "irreparable" harm, particularly whether costs a company incurs complying with a law that might later be struck down can support an injunction even when those costs are, in the panel's words, "common and small." The majority concluded they can, consistent with the circuit's earlier decision in Commonwealth v. Biden. That is a rule about when courts can act before a final judgment, not a ruling on whether the underlying regulation survives constitutional scrutiny.

The dissent is a reminder that this was not unanimous, and that the underlying legal question, how imminent and certain a company's alleged injury must be before a court will step in early, is one on which reasonable judges on the same panel actively disagreed. Readers should treat any characterization of this decision as "Tennessee's law survives" or "Tennessee's law is in trouble" with real skepticism; the panel took no position on the law's ultimate validity, and said so directly.

How This Affects You

For a Tennessee parent or teen, nothing about the day-to-day operation of the Protecting Children from Social Media Act changes as a direct result of this decision. The Act remains in effect, and covered social media platforms remain subject to its age-verification and parental-consent requirements unless and until a court enjoins it. This ruling did not strike down the law, and it did not uphold it either.

What has changed is procedural: the litigation challenging the law is no longer stalled, and the district court will now have to work through the remaining questions, including whether NetChoice is likely to win on the merits, before deciding whether to block enforcement while the case continues. That process will take time, and its outcome is not something this article predicts. Anyone with questions about how the Act applies to a specific platform or account, or about a specific enforcement notice, should consult a licensed Tennessee attorney or the Tennessee Attorney General's office directly rather than relying on general summaries of ongoing litigation. For a broader look at how state privacy and data-handling rules intersect with platform obligations, see our guide to state data privacy laws.

This article summarizes a recent, published federal appellate decision for general informational purposes. It is not legal advice and does not address any specific person's or company's situation. Court proceedings on remand may change the practical effect of this ruling. Consult a licensed attorney for advice about a specific matter.

Related articles

• Federal age-verification proposals: KOSA and COPPA 2.0
• Children's online privacy rules by state
• Arkansas Teen Privacy Act: what it requires
• Ninth Circuit narrows a Section 230 defense
• X Corp. v. James: platform transparency ruling explained
• State data privacy laws overview

Last updated: 2026-09-02. This is a developing story; details verified as of 2026-09-02.