Federal Circuit: VA Flight Training Benefits Still Require a Degree

Federal Circuit: VA Flight Training Benefits Still Require a Degree

The Federal Circuit held on September 3, 2026 that FAA approval of a flight course does not by itself unlock VA educational assistance. In Loomis v. Collins, the panel affirmed that the course must still be given by a college for degree credit.

Information last verified on September 5, 2026.

Status: Decided. Loomis v. Collins, No. 2026-1063 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 3, 2026), is a precedential opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirming a decision of a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. The panel resolved one question: how 38 U.S.C. § 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) and 38 U.S.C. § 3680A(b) fit together. It expressly did not decide whether an institution of higher learning that contracts flight training out to a private pilot school satisfies § 3680A(b) (slip op. at 10 n.4). It also did not decide whether the VA regulations the appellant attacked are valid, holding instead that a claimant who is ineligible by statute suffers no injury from them, and it did not reach the Secretary's jurisdictional argument under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a) (slip op. at 12 and n.5).

Jurisdiction and scope: This is a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the one court with appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. As a precedential opinion it governs VA educational assistance adjudications nationwide. It construes federal education benefit provisions in Title 38 of the U.S. Code. It does not address VA disability compensation, state tuition assistance programs, or FAA pilot certification standards themselves.

What Happened

Charles Glen Loomis served in the United States Air Force from 1995 to 2015, retiring in February 2015 after 20 years (slip op. at 2). He then joined General Atomics as a field service representative. He wanted to move into a sensor operator role, but the company required him to earn a pilot certification first (slip op. at 2).

To pay for that certification, Loomis applied for VA educational assistance benefits covering a training course at MidCoast Aviation Services, LLC. In support, he submitted a certificate from the Federal Aviation Administration authorizing MidCoast to operate a provisional pilot school with a private pilot course (slip op. at 2, 3).

The VA denied the application, and the Board of Veterans' Appeals affirmed the denial. The Board accepted that Loomis had a basic entitlement to educational assistance benefits. It denied this course anyway, because MidCoast was not recognized as an educational institution of higher learning and Loomis was not taking the course in pursuit of a college degree (slip op. at 3).

A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed in No. 23-4348. The caption identifies that panel as Judges Joseph L. Falvey, Jr., Joseph L. Toth and Scott Laurer (slip op. at 1). The majority relied on 38 U.S.C. § 3680A(b). Judge Laurer dissented, reading a different statute, 38 U.S.C. § 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii), to allow benefits for FAA-approved flight training courses regardless of any college affiliation (slip op. at 3).

Loomis appealed pro se. The Federal Circuit appointed Claire A. Fundakowski as amicus curiae to argue in support of his interpretation of the law, and the panel thanked her in a footnote (slip op. at 4 n.2). The Secretary was represented by the Commercial Litigation Branch of the Justice Department's Civil Division together with the VA Office of General Counsel. The panel was Chief Judge Moore, Circuit Judge Cunningham, and District Judge Arun Subramanian of the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation, who wrote the opinion.

What the Law Actually Says

The case turns on two provisions and the relationship between them.

38 U.S.C. § 3672, "Approval of courses," sets the precondition. In the circumstances of this case, a veteran or eligible person receives benefits while enrolled in a course offered by an educational institution "only if" that course is approved as provided in the chapter by the State approving agency for the State where the institution is located, or by the Secretary. That approval can be constructive rather than express. Section 3672(b)(2)(A) says that, subject to several other sections including § 3680A, a program of education "is deemed to be approved" if a State approving agency, or the Secretary acting in that role, determines the program is one of a short list. Clause (ii) of that list is "[a] flight training course approved by the Federal Aviation Administration that is offered by a certified pilot school that possesses a valid Federal Aviation Administration pilot school certificate."

38 U.S.C. § 3680A, "Disapproval of enrollment in certain courses," is the limit. Subsection (a) blocks whole categories of study: bartending and personality development courses, sales and sales management courses without specialized vocational content, avocational or recreational courses, and, with exceptions, independent study programs. Subsection (b) is the flight training rule, and it reads in full: "Except to the extent otherwise specifically provided in this title or chapter 106 of title 10, the Secretary shall not approve the enrollment of an eligible veteran in any course of flight training other than one given by an educational institution of higher learning for credit toward a standard college degree the eligible veteran is seeking."

Loomis argued that the deeming provision in § 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) is exactly what the "[e]xcept to the extent otherwise specifically provided" clause of § 3680A(b) contemplates. On that reading, an FAA-approved course at a certified pilot school qualifies whether or not any college is involved, and the "subject to" proviso in § 3672(b)(2)(A) picks up the rest of § 3680A but not subsection (b) (slip op. at 5, 6).

The panel answered no, in three textual moves.

No exception language. Section 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) does not expressly set aside the college requirement, and it does not use the phrasing one would expect of an exception, such as "In addition to," "As an exception to," or "Notwithstanding" (slip op. at 7).

"Subject to" means subordinate. Relying on Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990), the court read being "subject to" a statute as being "subordinate" to, or "governed or affected by," its provisions. So when § 3672(b)(2)(A) says its provisions are subject to § 3680A, that confirms § 3680A supplies additional eligibility requirements rather than being displaced (slip op. at 7, 8).

Section 3034(d) would become a nullity. 38 U.S.C. § 3034(d), which sits in the All-Volunteer Force Educational Assistance Program chapter of Title 38, permits the Secretary to approve flight training "in addition to a course of flight training that may be approved under section 3680A(b)" for an individual entitled to basic educational assistance under that chapter, where the veteran already possesses a valid private pilot certificate, meets the medical requirements for a commercial pilot certificate on the day training begins, pursues training generally accepted as necessary for a recognized vocational objective in aviation, and takes courses that are FAA-approved at a certified pilot school. That last condition matches the text of § 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii). If the deeming provision alone authorized payment regardless of an existing pilot certificate, § 3034(d) would do no work (slip op. at 8, 10).

The panel then addressed two surplusage arguments raised by Loomis and by Judge Laurer's dissent below, and rejected both.

The first was that reading the college requirement into flight training makes § 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) superfluous. The court said that objection rests on an incorrect assumption that FAA-approved pilot schools are never themselves institutions of higher learning. The FAA licenses Part 141 pilot schools that are part of colleges, and the opinion points to the FAA's own facility dashboard and names the University of Oklahoma and The Ohio State University (slip op. at 9). The opinion adds that even where a course is not offered directly by a college, § 3680A(b) might still be satisfied where a college contracts with a private pilot school, an arrangement the VA permits by regulation at 38 C.F.R. § 21.4233(e), which allows all or part of a school's program to be provided by another school or entity under contract and requires FAA approval for contracted flight training. Footnote 4 is important here: the court expressly did not decide whether such a contract arrangement would satisfy the requirement that the course be "given by" a college, because Loomis did not contend the regulation was satisfied in his case (slip op. at 9, 10 n.4).

The second was that the government's reading makes the "[e]xcept" clause of § 3680A(b) superfluous. The court answered that § 3034(d) is the provision that "specifically provides" an exception, so the clause has work to do. Loomis pointed to legislative history: the 1990 predecessor of § 3034(d), then 38 U.S.C. § 1434(d)(1), already contained "in addition to" language, while the 1990 predecessor of § 3680A(b), then § 1673(b), contained no "[e]xcept" clause. Why add an exception clause for an exception that already existed? The panel answered that Congress may amend a statute simply to clarify existing law, citing Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077, 1082 (9th Cir. 1994), and that the clause plausibly resolved a conflict between the two predecessors (slip op. at 10, 11).

Finally, Loomis separately challenged several VA regulations as conflicting with these statutes. The Veterans Claims majority had said he "may have a point" and "might be right" about the regulations' invalidity, but treated the issue as irrelevant because the statute foreclosed his application. The Federal Circuit agreed: because Loomis is ineligible by statute, any irregularity in the regulations caused him no injury and warranted no relief. In footnote 5 the panel noted it therefore did not need to consider the Secretary's separate argument that the court lacked jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a) to hear the regulatory challenge (slip op. at 12 and n.5). The judgment was affirmed, with no costs.

Analysis: Why This Matters

The following is analysis from the Recording Law Editorial Team.

The opinion is a compact demonstration of structure-first statutory reading. The deeming language in § 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii) is the kind of provision that reads, in isolation, like a grant of eligibility. The panel's answer is that a provision opening with "[s]ubject to" another section has already told you where to look for the rest of the rule. Cross-reference clauses of that sort appear throughout Title 38, and this opinion treats one as load-bearing rather than as boilerplate.

The second signal is about how narrow the flight training carve-outs actually are. Read together as the panel reads them, the provisions at issue in this case leave two routes to VA-funded flight training: a course given by a college for credit toward a degree the veteran is seeking, or the § 3034(d) route, which is conditioned on the veteran already holding a private pilot certificate and meeting commercial-certificate medical requirements. The precise problem Loomis faced, needing an initial certification to qualify for a job, falls between them, because the § 3034(d) route assumes a certificated pilot upgrading toward a vocational objective.

The unresolved question is worth flagging precisely because the court flagged it. Footnote 4 leaves open whether a college that contracts training out to a private pilot school under 38 C.F.R. § 21.4233(e) satisfies § 3680A(b)'s "given by" language. The panel raised the contract structure to defeat a surplusage argument, then declined to bless it, because the argument was not before it. Nothing in this opinion resolves how that arrangement is treated.

The regulatory ruling is also narrower than it may look. The Veterans Claims majority's remark that Loomis "might be right" about the regulations was not adopted or rejected on the merits. It was set aside on injury grounds, and footnote 5 leaves the § 7292(a) jurisdictional question untouched as well. Those questions remain available to a claimant who is statutorily eligible and can show the regulations harmed them.

One procedural detail deserves note. Loomis argued his own appeal, and the court appointed amicus counsel to present his statutory reading. That is how a court tests a question fully when one side is unrepresented, and it fits a question that had already split the panel below.

How This Affects You

If you are a veteran weighing flight training against your Title 38 education benefits, this decision settles what the paperwork has to show. An FAA-approved course at a school holding a valid Part 141 pilot school certificate clears the course-approval step, and under this ruling it does not by itself establish eligibility. Under § 3680A(b) as construed here, the course generally also has to be given by an institution of higher learning for credit toward a degree you are actually pursuing.

The opinion also points at where the college-linked path is real: some Part 141 pilot schools are operated by universities, and it names two by way of example. There is also a non-degree route this opinion had no occasion to address. Under 38 C.F.R. § 21.4235(a), a veteran eligible under 38 U.S.C. chapter 30, 32 or 33, or a reservist eligible under 10 U.S.C. chapter 1606 or 1607, may use benefits for flight training outside a degree program if they already hold a valid private pilot certificate or higher and hold a second-class medical certificate on the first day of training, or a first-class certificate for an Airline Transport Pilot course. Loomis held no private pilot certificate, which is why that route was not open to him. Whether the degree path, the § 3034(d) path, or the § 21.4235(a) path fits a particular situation is a question for VA and, if needed, for an accredited representative or attorney.

On process, the road this case traveled is the standard one: VA decision, then the Board of Veterans' Appeals, then the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, then the Federal Circuit. If you want to see how those steps connect, our walkthrough of the review lanes and the appeal path from the Board up through the courts covers the same court structure, though it is written around disability rating decisions rather than education claims.

That distinction is worth stating plainly rather than blurring. This case is about educational assistance, a benefit governed by its own chapters of Title 38. Our veterans benefits coverage centers on disability compensation, which turns on service connection and rating percentages and follows a different statutory scheme entirely. A decision about flight school eligibility does not affect a disability rating, an effective date, or a compensation award.

The representation point does carry over. Loomis appealed without a lawyer, and it took a court-appointed amicus to develop his statutory argument. Anyone considering paid help with a VA matter should understand who is accredited to represent claimants and what may lawfully be charged, which is the subject of our guide to unaccredited claim consultants and VA fee rules.

This article is legal information, not legal advice. It summarizes a published federal appellate opinion and the statutes it construes as of September 5, 2026. It does not create an attorney-client relationship, and it does not evaluate any individual claim. Eligibility for VA education benefits depends on facts specific to your service, your program, and your school. For advice about your own claim, consult a VA-accredited representative or an attorney.

Related articles

• How VA decisions move from the Board to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
• Our main coverage of VA disability benefits, a separate benefit from education assistance
• Unaccredited claim consultants and the fee rules that govern VA representation

Last updated: 2026-09-05. Details verified as of 2026-09-05.