California Court: Wealth Alone Doesn't Bar a Divorce Fee Award

California Court of Appeal: Wealth Alone Doesn't Bar a Divorce Fee Award

On September 4, 2026, California's First District Court of Appeal reversed a San Francisco family court's denial of postjudgment attorney fees in a high-asset divorce, holding the court never made the express findings Family Code section 2030 requires before turning down the wife's fee request.

Information last verified on September 8, 2026.

Status: Decided and certified for publication on September 4, 2026. The Court of Appeal reversed the family court's denial of attorney fees and remanded the case for the family court to make the express findings Family Code section 2030 requires. This is a slip opinion filed four days before this article's verification date; it says nothing about any petition for rehearing or petition for review, since none would yet appear in the filed opinion itself.

Jurisdiction scope: This article covers California state family law, specifically the postjudgment attorney fee standard under Family Code section 2030 as construed by California's First District Court of Appeal. A published opinion from a California Court of Appeal binds California trial courts statewide on the legal questions it decides, but this article does not address attorney fee standards in other states. For a broader look at spousal support nationwide, see how spousal support works state by state.

What Happened

Tony Trousset and Erin Kelley divorced in 2023 after 16 years of marriage, dividing tens of millions of dollars in real property and other assets under a marital settlement agreement incorporated into a June 21, 2023 judgment that closed out the dissolution case under California procedure. Trousset, an investment banker, agreed to pay Kelley a $1 million spousal support buyout and a $2.6 million equalizing payment.

On May 4, 2023, Kelley requested postjudgment attorney fees under Family Code sections 2030 and 3557, seeking $95,000 in fees already incurred since signing the settlement agreement and $80,000 in anticipated future fees tied to disputes over child support and custody that followed that agreement. Family Code section 2030, subdivision (a)(1), reaches "any proceeding subsequent to entry of a related judgment," and the opinion treats the request as a postjudgment one throughout, though it was filed weeks before the judgment was entered. Following a long-cause hearing before a different judicial officer, the San Francisco County Superior Court denied the request in a November 7, 2024 order. The court found Trousset had more liquid assets than Kelley but concluded she "does not demonstrate need" because she held substantial liquid assets of her own. It also weighed the spousal-support factors in Family Code section 4320, noting that Kelley had already received substantial payments from Trousset to resolve spousal support and that a family court had earlier found she committed domestic violence against him, and it found the postjudgment litigation had been "overlitigated." Kelley appealed.

"The Court has reviewed each party's Income and Expense Declaration. Tony clearly has more liquid assets than Erin. However, while there is a disparity in assets, Erin does not demonstrate need. Indeed, she has substantial liquid assets (over $10 million)." In re Marriage of Trousset and Kelley, No. A172398, slip op. at 5 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist. Sept. 4, 2026)

What Family Code Section 2030 Actually Requires

In a California divorce, either spouse may ask the court to order the other to pay attorney fees. Family Code section 2030, subdivision (a)(1), directs the family court to "ensure that each party has access to legal representation ... by ordering, if necessary based on the income and needs assessments, one party ... to pay to the other party ... whatever amount is reasonably necessary for attorney's fees and for the cost of maintaining or defending the proceeding during the pendency of the proceeding."

Subdivision (a)(2) is the part the Court of Appeal focused on. When a party requests fees under section 2030, the statute requires the trial court to make findings on three separate questions: whether a fee award is appropriate at all, whether there is a disparity in access to funds to retain counsel, and whether one party is able to pay for legal representation of both parties. The statute is direct about the consequence: "If the findings demonstrate disparity in access and ability to pay, the court shall make an order awarding attorney's fees and costs."

The opinion also draws on Family Code section 2032, which sets the standard for both whether to make an award and how much it should be: subdivision (a) asks whether "the making of the award, and the amount of the award," are "just and reasonable under the relative circumstances of the respective parties," considering the spousal-support factors listed in Family Code section 4320. Section 2032 states plainly that a requesting spouse's own resources are "not itself a bar" to an award against a wealthier spouse; financial resources are "only one factor" in dividing the overall cost of litigation equitably.

Citing Morton, a published decision of the Fifth District, the panel explained that the required findings must be express, meaning "stated in words, either in writing or orally on the record." It read Ciprari, from the Second District, the other way on this point: there the trial court's order was construed as impliedly making the findings, which is why this panel later observed that "[u]nlike Ciprari, there was no statement by the family court from which we can clearly discern a finding of disparity in access to funds." A court need not use particular magic words, but when its intent cannot be clearly discerned from the record, a reviewing court will not step in and supply the missing finding itself.

For background on how ongoing spousal support is calculated in California, a related but legally distinct question from a postjudgment fee award, see California's spousal support laws.

Why Having Assets Did Not Settle the Question

The family court's order found that Trousset "clearly has more liquid assets" than Kelley, language Kelley argued on appeal was itself an implicit finding of a "disparity in access to funds to retain counsel" under section 2030. The Court of Appeal was not convinced the finding was that clear. It held that "a disparity in assets is not always tantamount to a disparity in access to funds to retain legal counsel," and that the trial court's further statement, that Kelley "does not demonstrate need" because she held "substantial liquid assets (over $10 million)," could just as reasonably be read as a finding of no disparity in access at all. Because the order was ambiguous on that point, and said nothing about whether Trousset could pay for both parties' lawyers, the panel held the trial court committed legal error.

An error alone does not win a reversal. Under the California constitutional harmless-error standard, Kelley had to show a reasonable probability that the family court would have reached a different result had it not erred. On the ability-to-pay question, the panel found that showing straightforward: the record put Trousset's net worth at $22.5 million, so it was reasonably probable the trial court would have found him able to pay for both parties' representation had it made an express finding. On the closer question of disparity in access to funds, the panel weighed the record against two published precedents, Ciprari and Morton, both involving spouses who each held substantial assets but where one spouse also had ongoing income the other lacked. Kelley, unemployed since the parties' children were born, and Trousset, an investment banker drawing continuing income from his firm, presented a similar asymmetry, and the panel concluded there was a reasonable probability the trial court would have found a disparity in access to funds as well.

The panel drew a firm line here. It did not hold that a fee award is mandatory, and it distinguished this record from Ciprari and Morton as closer on the facts than either of those cases. The remand instructs the family court to make the express findings itself, not to award any particular amount. If the family court finds a disparity and an ability to pay, it must then determine what amount is "appropriate" under the "just and reasonable" standard, engaging in what the panel called a "nuanced and granular inquiry" rather than treating all of the fees Kelley sought as unreasonable.

Analysis: Why This Matters

The following is analysis from the Recording Law Editorial Team.

This opinion turns on a distinction that is easy to blur in a fee dispute: a party's overall wealth is a different legal question from whether that party has access to funds to litigate a specific proceeding. Family Code section 2030 asks about access to funds and ability to pay, not about net worth in the abstract, and section 2032 states directly that a requesting spouse's own resources are not by themselves a reason to deny an award. A family court that reasons from a bank balance alone, without separately asking whether one spouse can more readily draw on income or assets than the other, skips a step the statute requires.

The opinion also illustrates why "express findings" is a recurring phrase in California family law appeals. Section 2030 does not require particular words, but it requires enough clarity that a reviewing court can tell what the trial court actually decided. Here, a single sentence, that Kelley "does not demonstrate need" despite holding substantial liquid assets, was read two different ways by the two sides of the same case, which is the kind of ambiguity the express-findings requirement exists to prevent.

The opinion is also a reminder that a reversal for missing findings is not a decision on the merits. The Court of Appeal was explicit that it did not view Ciprari and Morton as compelling a mandatory fee award on this record. The family court retains the discretion to reach the same result, a denial, so long as it explains that result with the findings the statute requires.

How This Affects You

A spouse in a California divorce who is asked to pay, or who is seeking, postjudgment attorney fees should expect the family court to address, on the record, whether a fee award is appropriate, whether there is a disparity in access to funds between the parties, and whether one party can pay for both sides' representation. Under Family Code section 2030, an order denying or granting fees should reflect findings on each of these questions, not only a description of each party's overall assets.

Holding significant savings or investments does not, by itself, disqualify a spouse from receiving a fee award under California law, just as an overall disparity in wealth does not, by itself, guarantee one. Courts have generally treated financial resources as one factor among several, alongside the spousal-support considerations in Family Code section 4320 and whether the underlying litigation was reasonably conducted. Anyone navigating a fee request in an active California family law matter should raise the specific facts of their case with a licensed family law attorney, since the outcome turns on findings the trial court makes on the individual record before it. For general background, see how California courts weigh spousal support factors.

This is general legal information, not legal advice. It covers California family law and reflects sources verified on September 8, 2026. Laws change and this story is developing; consult a lawyer licensed in your jurisdiction about your specific situation.

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Last updated: 2026-09-08. This is a developing story; details verified as of 2026-09-08.