Court Reverses Anti-SLAPP Denial in Coppola Libel Case

California Appeals Court Reverses Anti-SLAPP Denial in Coppola v. Variety Media (Unpublished)

A California Court of Appeal panel reversed a Los Angeles trial court order and directed it to grant the defendants' anti-SLAPP motion and strike Francis Ford Coppola's libel complaint in full. The September 4, 2026 opinion is not certified for publication.

Information last verified on September 6, 2026.

Status: Decided at the Court of Appeal. On September 4, 2026, the Second Appellate District, Division Five, issued its opinion in Coppola v. Variety Media, LLC, No. B345022, an appeal from Los Angeles County Superior Court No. 24STCV23459 (Judge Christopher K. Lui). The court reversed the order denying the defendants' special motion to strike and directed the trial court "to enter a new and different order granting the motion and striking the complaint in its entirety" (typed opn. at 29). The opinion is expressly marked "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS," and its own header states that "California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b)" (typed opn. at 1).

Jurisdiction scope: California only. Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 is a California statute, and this decision comes from one district of the California Court of Appeal. Other states have their own anti-SLAPP statutes, written differently, and some have none. Federal courts apply their own rules on when a state anti-SLAPP motion is available to them.

What Happened

In July 2024, Variety published an article under the headline "Video of Francis Ford Coppola Kissing 'Megalopolis' Extras Surfaces as Crew Members Detail Unprofessional Behavior on Set (EXCLUSIVE)," bylined to Variety reporters Brent Lang and Tatiana Siegel, whom Coppola named as defendants alongside Variety Media, LLC (typed opn. at 2). The opinion recites that the article embedded two videos taken by a crew member during the filming of a nightclub scene, and that it stated the videos "would appear to corroborate a bombshell report in the Guardian" describing conduct toward extras on the set (typed opn. at 2-3). The panel, which reviewed the videos in the appellate record, described one clip as about six seconds long and the other as about 32 seconds long, and noted that none of the women Coppola visibly interacts with in the videos are topless (typed opn. at 3).

Coppola filed a libel complaint in September 2024. As the opinion summarizes it, the complaint identified three categories of allegedly defamatory statements: statements suggesting he inadvertently ruined shots, statements concerning his kissing of extras, and statements concerning the lack of a human resources department on the production (typed opn. at 6). The complaint sought general and special damages of "not less than fifteen million dollars," plus punitive and exemplary damages (typed opn. at 6).

The defendants responded with a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. They argued the article was protected speech on an issue of public interest and that Coppola could not show a probability of prevailing, both because the challenged statements were not actionable and because he had not adequately pleaded actual malice (typed opn. at 8-9).

A procedural wrinkle shaped the record. Coppola moved to lift the automatic discovery stay so he could depose the defendants and identify their anonymous sources. At the hearing, defense counsel said they were arguing Coppola had not pleaded facts showing actual malice but were "not challenging any evidentiary burden," and the trial court denied the motion to lift the stay as moot (typed opn. at 10). Coppola later argued that concession also conceded falsity. The Court of Appeal rejected that reading, explaining in a footnote that the defendants "conceded only that if Coppola made a sufficient showing of falsity" and pleaded actual malice adequately, "he would not have to make a prima facie evidentiary showing of actual malice" (typed opn. at 21 n.6).

The trial court denied the motion. It sustained the defendants' objection to a declaration from UCLA English professor Eric Jager about how an average reader would understand the article, reasoning that whether statements are capable of defamatory meaning is a question for the court (typed opn. at 13). It then found prong one satisfied and concluded at prong two that several statements in the article were "susceptible to a defamatory meaning" (typed opn. at 14). Notably, the trial court found that the HR and checks-and-balances material was not defamatory or false, yet still denied the motion, which had asked to strike the complaint in its entirety (typed opn. at 15 n.3).

On de novo review, the Court of Appeal disagreed. "The trial court's anti-SLAPP analysis is flawed and requires reversal," the panel wrote, because "Coppola did not carry his burden to establish his libel allegations possess the requisite minimal merit; some of the statements he attacks do not include a provably false assertion of fact, and for those that do, he did not make an adequate prima facie showing of falsity" (typed opn. at 16).

On the kissing statements, the panel emphasized the article's hedged construction. "The words 'would appear' signal that an interpretation or opinion follows," it wrote (typed opn. at 22), and the framing that the videos appear "to corroborate" the Guardian's reporting "also signals the videos do not independently prove" the underlying claim (typed opn. at 23). Coppola did not deny kissing extras during the scene; the only proposition he alleged to be false was that the women were topless, and the panel observed that the Variety article did not itself state that they were (typed opn. at 22). A footnote added that characterizing conduct as "unprofessional" is likewise "non-actionable opinion," because "professional norms are highly subjective" (typed opn. at 24 n.9).

On the "ruining shots" language, the panel separated a factual assertion from a subjective one. "Whether Coppola often inadvertently walked into shots is a matter of fact. But Coppola has failed to make a prima facie showing that it is false," the court wrote, reasoning that evidence he sometimes appeared in shots intentionally or unavoidably does not show he never walked into them inadvertently (typed opn. at 26). The claim that he was "ruining" shots, by contrast, "suffers from the opposite problem: it is not, in context, provably false," a conclusion the panel drew in part from Coppola's own declaration about how directors judge which takes work (typed opn. at 26).

On the HR and checks-and-balances statements, the panel first noted the complaint had misquoted the article, which said there was no outside studio or streamer with its own HR department involved with the production (typed opn. at 27 n.11). It then held that "[t]he thrust of defendants' statement, which Coppola does not dispute, is that Coppola's financing of the project meant he did not answer to anyone else," and that this remained accurate whether or not extras had a channel for complaints (typed opn. at 28).

Because the falsity analysis disposed of the appeal, the panel expressly declined to reach the remaining issues, stating in a footnote that it "need not consider any of defendants' other arguments for reversal, including the argument that actual malice was insufficiently alleged" (typed opn. at 16 n.4). The disposition reversed the order and directed entry of an order granting the motion and striking the complaint in its entirety, with costs on appeal to the defendants (typed opn. at 29).

What the Law Actually Says

California's anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, lets a defendant move to strike a claim that arises from acts in furtherance of the rights of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue, "unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim."

Courts apply that language as a two-step process. At step one, the moving defendant must show the challenged claim arises from protected activity. At step two, the plaintiff must show the claim has at least minimal merit, which means stating a legally sufficient claim and making a prima facie factual showing that would sustain a favorable judgment. The court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims at that stage. An order denying an anti-SLAPP motion is reviewed de novo (typed opn. at 17-18).

This appeal is a clean illustration of how lopsided those two steps can be. Step one was uncontested: the panel stated at the outset that "There is no question that Coppola's complaint arises from anti-SLAPP protected activity" (typed opn. at 2). Everything the appeal decided happened at step two, and specifically on whether the challenged statements were false statements of fact. Readers who want the broader statutory picture can start with our overview of California defamation law, which covers the state's limitations period, retraction rules, and the anti-SLAPP procedure in more depth.

Two substantive doctrines carried the outcome.

The first is the fact and opinion distinction. Under California Civil Code section 45, libel is a false and unprivileged written publication that exposes a person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or that tends to injure the person in an occupation. Because a falsehood is required, pure opinion is generally not actionable, but the opinion here restates the standard caveat: statements of opinion that imply a false assertion of fact can be actionable. Courts decide, as a question of law, whether a statement is reasonably susceptible to a defamatory interpretation, looking to the totality of the circumstances. That inquiry asks whether the statement discloses the facts it rests on, whether it implies undisclosed facts, and whether it was "cautiously phrased in terms of the author's impression" (typed opn. at 19-20). Hedged framing is not a magic phrase, but it is evidence a reader would take the sentence as an interpretation rather than a verified fact, and that is how the panel read "would appear to corroborate." If you are new to how courts sort written from spoken claims, our explainer on the difference between libel and slander covers the basic categories.

The second is substantial truth. A plaintiff bears the burden of proving the challenged statement false, and, as the panel put it, "The plaintiff cannot be said to have carried this burden so long as the statement appears substantially true" (typed opn. at 21). Minor inaccuracies do not create falsity as long as the gist of the charge is justified. That principle is why the qualified word "traditional" mattered in the checks-and-balances discussion, and it sits alongside the other standard defenses in a defamation case.

The opinion also recites the constitutional overlay without applying it: a public figure plaintiff must prove the defendant published a false statement of fact with actual malice, meaning with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of whether it was false, under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-280 (1964) (typed opn. at 18). The trial court had found Coppola to be a public figure. The Court of Appeal did not decide any actual malice question, because falsity resolved the case first. Our page on defamation claims brought by public figures explains why that standard so often decides these disputes when a court does reach it.

One more legal point deserves its own paragraph, because it governs how this decision can be used at all. California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115, provides that an opinion of a California Court of Appeal that is not certified for publication or ordered published "must not be cited or relied on by a court or a party in any other action," except in the narrow situations subdivision (b) identifies, such as where the opinion is relevant under law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel, or where it concerns the same person in another criminal or disciplinary action. An unpublished opinion resolves the appeal for the parties in front of the court. It is not precedent, it does not change California law, and outside those narrow exceptions a lawyer cannot cite it to a different judge in a different case. The California courts post unpublished opinions online for public information and keep them reachable afterward through the courts' case information search, but public availability is not citability.

Analysis: Why This Matters

The following is analysis from the Recording Law Editorial Team.

The most useful thing about this opinion is not the outcome but the sentence-level method, and that method is worth understanding even though the decision itself cannot be cited.

Look at what the panel did with a single clause. The article said Coppola was "often inadvertently inserting himself into the shot and ruining it." The trial court treated that as one defamatory unit implying incompetence. The Court of Appeal took it apart. "Inadvertently inserting himself into the shot" states something checkable about what happened on a set, so it is factual, and a plaintiff at step two has to come forward with a prima facie showing that it is false. "Ruining it" is an aesthetic verdict about whether a take is usable, and the panel found nothing provably false in it, drawing on Coppola's own account of how a director's judgment works across shooting and editing. Two clauses in one sentence, two different legal answers, and neither one favored the plaintiff.

The falsity half of that analysis is the part plaintiffs tend to underestimate. Coppola submitted a declaration saying his appearance in the scene was intentional and that some crew appearances were unavoidable given four cameras running simultaneously, three of them hand-held and moving around the action. That is a real evidentiary showing. It just does not negate the assertion actually made, which was about what happened "often," not always. A denial has to line up with the words the defendant published. When it answers an adjacent claim instead, a court reviewing the record de novo can find the prima facie showing missing even while accepting the plaintiff's evidence as true.

The same mismatch appears in the kissing category. Coppola's declaration denied kissing an actress who was topless. The article, as the panel read it, did not assert that the women in the videos were topless; it offered a hedged view that the videos lend support to reporting published elsewhere. So the denial answered a sentence that was not on the page. Whatever one thinks of that reading, it shows why the exact published wording, qualifiers included, does more work in these motions than the impression a reader carries away.

There is also a lesson in the expert declaration. Coppola offered a professor of English to explain that an average reader would miss the conditional phrasing. The trial court excluded it, and the Court of Appeal noted that expert testimony may help a jury understand how an average reader would construe a statement, but that courts do not defer to experts on the threshold legal question of whether a statement is reasonably susceptible to a defamatory interpretation. That threshold call belongs to the judge.

Finally, note the procedural asymmetry the case illustrates. The defendants obtained, on a motion decided before any discovery into anonymous sources, an appellate ruling directing that the complaint be stricken in its entirety, with costs on appeal. Anti-SLAPP statutes are built to produce that early exit when a claim lacks minimal merit, and the automatic discovery stay is part of the design. Whether that design strikes the right balance is a live policy debate in many states. This decision does not resolve it, and, being unpublished, it does not even add a citable data point to it.

How This Affects You

Nothing in this decision changes California law, because an unpublished opinion is not precedent. It is still a clear window into how California courts run the second step of an anti-SLAPP motion in a defamation case, and a few general points follow from that.

Qualifiers in published writing are legally meaningful. Phrases like "would appear to," "sources say," and "seems to" are read in context, and courts examine whether the surrounding article discloses the facts the characterization rests on. That cuts both ways. Hedging around a fully disclosed factual basis is treated differently from hedging that implies undisclosed damaging facts.

Falsity is the plaintiff's burden, and it is claim-specific. A general denial does not substitute for evidence contradicting the specific assertion that was published. Substantial truth means the gist controls, so minor inaccuracies rarely create liability on their own.

If you are researching a potential defamation dispute in any state, start with the actual published words, the date of publication, and your state's statute of limitations and anti-SLAPP rules, which vary widely. Our defamation law library collects the state-by-state material. Nothing here tells you how any of it applies to your own facts, and only a licensed attorney in your state can do that.

This article is legal information, not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Defamation and anti-SLAPP rules differ by state and turn on specific facts and deadlines. Consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction about your own situation.

Related articles

• California Defamation Laws
• Public Figure Defamation
• Defenses to Defamation
• Libel vs. Slander
• Defamation Laws by State

Last updated: 2026-09-06. This is a developing story; details verified as of 2026-09-06.