Massachusetts
Massachusetts Deepfake Laws: AI Images, Voice Cloning & Penalties (2026)
Independently fact-checked against primary sources (last audited August 16, 2026). · Reviewed by the RecordingLaw editorial team. · Law checked current as of August 16, 2026. · 7 primary sources cited on this page. How we verify our legal content
Massachusetts criminalizes sexual deepfakes under M.G.L. ch. 265, § 43A, enacted as part of the 2024 Act to Prevent Abuse and Exploitation (Ch. 118 of the Acts of 2024, effective September 18, 2024). The law explicitly covers AI-generated and computer-altered images through a broad "digitization" definition. Massachusetts has no election deepfake law in force, and its right of publicity statute (M.G.L. ch. 214, § 3A) does not cover voice cloning.
Is It Illegal to Make a Deepfake of Someone in Massachusetts?
Massachusetts law targets three distinct deepfake buckets with uneven coverage. The sexual and intimate bucket is the strongest: distributing a nonconsensual intimate deepfake is a criminal offense under M.G.L. ch. 265, § 43A. The election and political bucket has no active law, only pending legislation. The voice cloning and digital likeness bucket is unaddressed by statute, leaving victims to rely on federal rules and limited common law.
Notably, Massachusetts was among the last states in the country to enact an intimate deepfake law. Before September 2024 the state had no criminal statute covering nonconsensual intimate images at all. The 2024 Act to Prevent Abuse and Exploitation (Ch. 118) filled that gap and went further than many earlier state laws by expressly reaching AI-generated content through the digitization definition.
Creating a deepfake for private purposes (without distributing it) is not addressed by current state criminal law. Distribution with reckless disregard for the subject's lack of consent is the triggering conduct under § 43A.
Sexual and Intimate Deepfakes
The core prohibition lives in M.G.L. ch. 265, § 43A. It is unlawful to distribute visual material depicting an identifiable person who is nude, partially nude, or engaged in sexual conduct when the distribution is done intentionally or with reckless disregard for the person's lack of consent and causes emotional distress or other injury.
"Visual material" expressly includes material produced by digitization. "Digitization" means the creation or alteration of visual material, including through the use of computer-generated images, in a manner that would falsely appear to a reasonable person to be an authentic representation of the person depicted. That definition squarely covers AI-generated deepfakes: a synthetic nude image of a real person is prohibited even if no actual photograph of the person undressed ever existed.
The statute also makes clear that consent to the creation of visual material does not constitute consent to its distribution. So an image generated with the subject's knowledge can still give rise to criminal liability if later shared without fresh consent.
For minors, M.G.L. ch. 272, § 29D (added by the same 2024 Act) creates a juvenile-track adjudication for minors who distribute intimate images of other minors. Young people adjudicated under § 29D are not required to register as sex offenders and are eligible for record expungement, reflecting a rehabilitative rather than punitive approach for peer-to-peer teen cases.
The existing child sexual abuse material statute, M.G.L. ch. 272, § 29C, uses the phrase "depiction by computer" but predates generative AI and lacks language specific to AI-created CSAM. Pending bills S.1174 and H.1593 would strengthen that coverage, but neither had passed as of June 2026. Federal law fills the gap: 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B), enacted through the PROTECT Act of 2003, covers computer-generated images that are indistinguishable from those of a real minor. That prong is not absolute: 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) gives a defendant an affirmative defense that the material was not produced using any actual minor, and that defense is withheld only for morphed images of an identifiable minor under § 2256(8)(C).
Election and Political Deepfakes
Massachusetts has no operative election deepfake law as of June 2026. The state's 2024 temporary election deepfake provision expired before any statewide election was held.
In February 2026 the Massachusetts House passed two separate bills. H.5093 ("An Act to Protect Against Election Misinformation") would prohibit distributing materially deceptive AI-generated media depicting a candidate within 90 days of an election. H.5094 would require political advertisements containing AI-generated content to carry a disclosure stating the ad "contains content generated by AI," with violations subject to fines up to $1,000. As of June 2026 both bills were in the Senate Committee on Ways and Means and had not been signed into law.
First Amendment caution applies here. A California election deepfake law (AB 2839) was enjoined in August 2025 on First Amendment grounds, illustrating the constitutional tension in laws that restrict political speech. Any Massachusetts election deepfake law, once enacted, may face similar litigation.
AI Voice Cloning and Digital Likeness
Massachusetts has a statutory right of publicity, M.G.L. ch. 214, § 3A, which allows a person to sue over unauthorized use of their name, portrait, or picture for advertising or trade purposes. The statute does not mention voice, and it does not extend to the breadth of voice and likeness claims that modern AI simulations raise. There is no Massachusetts equivalent of the Tennessee ELVIS Act (Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-25-1101 et seq., eff. July 1, 2024), which was the first state law to extend publicity rights to AI voice simulations and remains the national reference point for this type of legislation.
Practically, this means a Massachusetts-based victim of AI voice cloning has no clear state criminal remedy. Civil claims would need to fit within M.G.L. ch. 214, § 3A, which requires commercial use of a name, portrait, or picture and says nothing about voice, leaving many AI voice-cloning harms without a clear state remedy. The FTC Impersonation Rule (16 CFR Part 461) and the FCC's 2024 ruling on AI robocalls provide some federal coverage for commercial misuse, but neither addresses the full range of voice-cloning harms. Outside commercial settings, a cloned voice can also be used to pose as a relative in trouble on the phone; our guide to family emergency and grandparent scams explains what to do in the first hour and where to report it.
For victims whose voice or likeness is used in sexually explicit deepfakes, the § 43A intimate-image law would apply if the material is distributed without consent.
Federal Law That Applies in Massachusetts
The TAKE IT DOWN Act (Public Law 119-12) was signed into law on May 19, 2025, as the first federal law directly targeting intimate deepfakes. It makes it a federal crime to knowingly publish nonconsensual intimate visual depictions of adults or minors, and expressly covers AI-generated "digital forgeries." Penalties reach two years in federal prison, three years if the victim is a minor. Platforms must remove flagged content within 48 hours of receiving a victim notice, an obligation in effect since May 19, 2026. The Federal Trade Commission enforces the platform-removal obligation.
The DEFIANCE Act, which would create a federal civil cause of action for sexual deepfake victims with liquidated damages up to $150,000 ($250,000 if the conduct involved actual or attempted sexual assault, stalking, or harassment), passed the Senate by unanimous consent on January 13, 2026 (S.1837, 119th Congress) and remains pending in the House (H.R.3562). The 118th-Congress version also passed the Senate in July 2024 but died in the House. The DEFIANCE Act is proposed legislation, not current law.
The NO FAKES Act (S.4591/H.R.8915, 119th Congress), which would create a federal right of publicity against unauthorized AI digital replicas of voice and likeness, is also proposed only and has not passed either chamber.
The FCC's February 2024 ruling (FCC 24-17) under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act treats AI-generated voices in robocalls as "artificial" voices, making unsolicited AI voice-clone calls illegal without prior express consent. The FTC's Impersonation Rule (16 CFR Part 461) prohibits deceptive impersonation of government entities and businesses using AI-generated voice or media.
For AI-generated CSAM, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) under the PROTECT Act covers computer-generated images indistinguishable from those of a real minor, subject to the affirmative defense in 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) that no actual minor was used to produce the material.
What Victims Can Do
Victims of sexual deepfakes in Massachusetts have three main avenues. First, report to law enforcement: M.G.L. ch. 265, § 43A is a criminal offense. Police and district attorneys can pursue charges; the state Attorney General's office has also publicly urged tech companies to remove deepfake NCII content.
Second, use the federal TAKE IT DOWN Act's platform-removal mechanism. Since May 2025, victims can submit a notice to any covered platform and the platform must remove the content within 48 hours. This applies regardless of whether the content is hosted on a Massachusetts server.
Third, pursue civil remedies. The 2024 Act also amended Chapter 209A (the domestic abuse prevention statute) to define "abuse" to include nonconsensual intimate image sharing, enabling victims to seek civil protective orders. Section 43A itself creates criminal penalties only, although it expressly preserves other remedies available at law or in equity. Common law tort claims (intentional infliction of emotional distress, false light invasion of privacy) may also apply depending on the facts.
For election deepfakes, because no Massachusetts law is currently in force, victims are limited to platform reporting and federal remedies. The TAKE IT DOWN Act does not cover election deepfakes; it is limited to intimate images.
Penalties at a Glance
| Conduct | Law | Penalty |
|---|---|---|
| Distributing nonconsensual intimate images or deepfakes (first offense) | M.G.L. ch. 265, § 43A | Up to 2.5 years in house of correction; fine up to $10,000; or both |
| Distributing nonconsensual intimate images or deepfakes (subsequent offense) | M.G.L. ch. 265, § 43A | Up to 10 years in state prison; fine up to $15,000; or both |
| Minor distributing intimate images of another minor | M.G.L. ch. 272, § 29D | Juvenile adjudication (no sex-offender registration; expungement eligible) |
| Publishing intimate deepfakes federally (TAKE IT DOWN Act) | Public Law 119-12 | Up to 2 years federal prison (3 years if victim is a minor) |
| AI voices in robocalls without consent | FCC 24-17 / TCPA | FTC/FCC enforcement; civil private right of action under TCPA |
| AI-generated CSAM (indistinguishable from real minor) | 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) | Federal felony; mandatory minimum sentences apply |
Disclaimer: This page provides general legal information about Massachusetts deepfake laws as of June 2026. It is not legal advice. Laws in this area change rapidly; consult a licensed Massachusetts attorney for guidance on your specific situation.
More Massachusetts Laws
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Frequently Asked Questions
Is it illegal to make a deepfake of someone in Massachusetts?
Creating a deepfake privately is not specifically criminalized under current Massachusetts law. However, distributing a sexual or intimate deepfake without the person's consent is a crime under M.G.L. ch. 265, § 43A, effective September 18, 2024. The law covers AI-generated images through its digitization definition.
Is deepfake porn a crime in Massachusetts?
Yes. Distributing nonconsensual intimate images, including AI-generated deepfakes depicting a real identifiable person, is a criminal offense under M.G.L. ch. 265, § 43A. A first offense carries up to 2.5 years in jail and fines up to $10,000. Repeat offenders face up to 10 years in state prison.
Can I sue someone for a deepfake in Massachusetts?
Not under the deepfake statute itself. M.G.L. ch. 265, § 43A is a criminal statute and does not create a direct civil damages action, though it expressly preserves other remedies at law or in equity. Victims may seek civil protective orders under Chapter 209A, sue under the right of publicity statute (M.G.L. ch. 214, § 3A) for commercial misuse of a name or image, and bring common law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress or invasion of privacy depending on the circumstances.
Are AI voice clones illegal in Massachusetts?
Massachusetts has no state law specifically targeting AI voice cloning. The federal FCC ruling (FCC 24-17) makes AI voice-clone robocalls illegal under the TCPA. The FTC Impersonation Rule prohibits AI-voice impersonation of businesses and government entities. Tennessee's ELVIS Act is the national model for voice-cloning legislation, but Massachusetts has not enacted a comparable law.
Does Massachusetts have an election deepfake law?
No, not as of June 2026. Massachusetts enacted a temporary 2024 election deepfake provision that expired before any statewide election. In February 2026 the House passed two bills (H.5093 and H.5094) addressing AI in political ads, but both remained in the Senate and had not been signed into law.
Does the federal TAKE IT DOWN Act apply in Massachusetts?
Yes. The TAKE IT DOWN Act (Public Law 119-12), signed May 19, 2025, applies nationwide, including Massachusetts. It independently criminalizes publishing nonconsensual intimate deepfakes and requires platforms to remove flagged content within 48 hours of a victim notice.
What if someone creates a deepfake of a minor in Massachusetts?
AI-generated CSAM is covered federally under 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) regardless of Massachusetts state law gaps. Massachusetts M.G.L. ch. 272, § 29C uses 'depiction by computer' language that may apply, but lacks specific generative AI language; pending bills S.1174 and H.1593 would strengthen it. Minors who share intimate images of other minors are addressed by M.G.L. ch. 272, § 29D under a juvenile track.
How is Massachusetts' deepfake law different from its recording law?
Massachusetts is a two-party (all-party) consent state for audio recording under M.G.L. ch. 272, § 99, meaning all parties to a conversation must consent to being recorded. That wiretapping law is separate from the 2024 intimate deepfake statute under ch. 265, § 43A. The recording law governs capturing conversations; the deepfake law governs distributing synthetic intimate images. Both reflect Massachusetts' strong privacy tradition, but they operate independently.
Updates
Corrected the federal AI-generated CSAM discussion: 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) does provide an affirmative defense that no actual minor was used in producing material charged under § 2256(8)(B), and that defense is withheld only for morphed images under § 2256(8)(C).
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources; governing law re-checked for recent changes
Updated NO FAKES Act federal bill citation to S.4591 (119th Congress, "NO FAKES Act of 2026") and current Senate Judiciary Committee status.
Governing law re-checked for recent changes
Governing law re-checked for recent changes
Reviewed and approved by an editor
The Law Behind This Article
This article rests on the statutory provisions below, held in our own legal record and retrieved from the official source. Tap a section to read the operative text.
Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 265
§ 43ACriminal harassment; punishmentIn forcecited in 7 of our articles
Section 43A. (a) Whoever willfully and maliciously engages in a knowing pattern of conduct or series of acts over a period of time directed at a specific person, which seriously alarms that person and would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, shall be guilty of the crime of criminal harassment and shall be punished by imprisonment in a house of correction for not more than 21/2 years or by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment. The conduct or acts described in this paragraph shall include, but not be limited to, conduct or acts conducted by mail or by use of a telephonic or telecommunication device or electronic communication device including, but not limited to, any device that transfers signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photo-electronic or photo-optical system, including, but not limited to, electronic mail, internet communications, instant messages or facsimile communications.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-08-30 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at malegislature.gov
Cited in 55 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Commonwealth v. Welch (2005) held a conviction under G. L. c. 265, section 43A requires three or more incidents targeted at a specific person, and read the statute to reach only unprotected speech. Commonwealth v. Johnson (2014) rejected facial and as-applied First Amendment challenges in a cyberharassment case.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- O'BRIEN v. Borowski (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 2012, 461 Mass. 415)✓Reviewing a civil harassment order a police officer obtained over repeated middle-finger gestures, the court construed Chapter 258E and, departing from Welch, stated that Section 43A reaches both fighting words and true threats.
- Commonwealth v. Welch (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 2005, 444 Mass. 80)✓A woman was convicted under the criminal harassment statute for homophobic remarks made over more than a year and a half; the court read Section 43A to require at least three incidents, refused to count acts predating the statute, and reversed for insufficient evidence.
- Commonwealth v. Walters (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 2015, 472 Mass. 680)✓After a breakup, a man targeted his former fiancee at their jointly owned home by shutting off the water, fouling the toilets, and planting a sign that blocked her access; the court affirmed his conviction under Section 43A and rejected his free-speech defense.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Massachusetts GPS Tracking Laws: Is It Legal to Put a Tracker on a Car? (2026), Massachusetts Drone Laws (2026): Privacy, Trespass, and Warrant Rules, Massachusetts Employee Monitoring Laws (2026): What Employers Can Track
Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 214
§ 3AUnauthorized use of name, portrait or picture of a person; injunctive relief; damages; exceptionsIn force
Section 3A. Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within the commonwealth for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without his written consent may bring a civil action in the superior court against the person so using his name, portrait or picture, to prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may recover damages for any injuries sustained by reason of such use. If the defendant shall have knowingly used such person's name, portrait or picture in such manner as is prohibited or unlawful, the court, in its discretion, may award the plaintiff treble the amount of the damages sustained by him.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at malegislature.gov
Cited in 42 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Tropeano v. Atlantic Monthly Co. (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 1980, 379 Mass. 745)“…r consent for advertising or trade purposes in violation of G. L. c. 214, § 3A; and (2) that the de *746…”
- Kelley v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc. (Massachusetts Superior Court 2007, 23 Mass. L. Rptr. 87)“…olesterol Letter. Effectively, Kelley claims a violation of G.L.c. 214, §3A, which permits “(a)ny person whose name…”
- Haney v. City of Boston (Massachusetts Superior Court 2012, 30 Mass. L. Rptr. 199)“…poses of trade without her written consent” in violation of G.L.c. 214, §3A. In response to the original complain…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 272
§ 29DPossession, purchase or dissemination by minor of visual material of child in state of nudity or depicted in sexual conduct; punishmentIn forcecited in 3 of our articles
Section 29D. (a) Whoever, while under the age of criminal majority, possesses, purchases or disseminates, including by uploading to an internet website, any visual material, as defined in section 31, in violation of section 29B or 29C may be punished in accordance with section 58 of chapter 119. (b) For the purposes of this section, knowingly disseminating visual material by: (i) reporting the matter to a law enforcement agency, to the department of elementary and secondary education or to a parent, foster parent, guardian, teacher, principal or other relevant school personnel; or (ii) affording a law enforcement agency, the department of elementary and secondary education or a parent, foster parent, guardian, teacher, principal or other relevant school personnel access to the visual material for purposes within the agency's, department's or person's position, authority or capacity shall not constitute dissemination in violation of this section.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-08-31 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at malegislature.gov
Also relied on in: Massachusetts Sexting Laws: Legal Consequences and Penalties, Massachusetts Pornography Laws (2026): No Age-Verification Law Yet
§ 29CKnowing purchase or possession of visual material of child depicted in sexual conduct; punishmentIn forcecited in 3 of our articles
Section 29C. Whoever knowingly purchases or possesses a negative, slide, book, magazine, film, videotape, photograph or other similar visual reproduction, or depiction by computer, of any child whom the person knows or reasonably should know to be under the age of 18 years of age and such child is: (i) actually or by simulation engaged in any act of sexual intercourse with any person or animal; (ii) actually or by simulation engaged in any act of sexual contact involving the sex organs of the child and the mouth, anus or sex organs of the child and the sex organs of another person or animal; (iii) actually or by simulation engaged in any act of masturbation; (iv) actually or by simulation portrayed as being the object of, or otherwise engaged in, any act of lewd fondling, touching, or caressing involving another person or animal; (v) actually or by simulation engaged in any act of excretion or urination within a sexual context; (vi) actually or by simulation portrayed or depicted as bound, fettered, or subject to sadistic, masochistic, or sadomasochistic abuse in any sexual context; or (vii) depicted or portrayed in any pose, posture or setting…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at malegislature.gov
Cited in 64 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Commonwealth v. Kenney (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 2007, 449 Mass. 840)“…t charging possession of child pornography, in violation of G. L. c. 272, § 29C. 1 Prior to trial, the defendant moved…”
- Commonwealth v. Anthony (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 2008, 451 Mass. 59)“…tments with possession of child pornography in violation of G. L. c. 272, § 29C. 1 He filed a consolidated motion to s…”
- Commonwealth v. Sullivan (Massachusetts Appeals Court 2012, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 293)“…convicted of one count of possession of child pornography, G. L. c. 272, § 29C(vii), and possession of child pornograp…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
United States Code Title 18
§ 2256Definitions for chapterIn forcecited in 56 of our articles
For the purposes of this chapter, the term— “minor” means any person under the age of eighteen years; Except as provided in subparagraph (B), “sexually explicit conduct” means actual or simulated— sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex; bestiality; masturbation; sadistic or masochistic abuse; or lascivious exhibition of the anus, genitals, or pubic area of any person; For purposes of subsection 8(B) 1 So in original. Probably should be “(8)(B)”.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 1,142 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002) held the child pornography definitions in 2256(8)(B) and (8)(D), reaching virtual and pandered images, overbroad under the First Amendment. United States v. Williams (2008) construed sexually explicit conduct in 2256(2)(A), reading simulated to require explicit portrayal of the act.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- United States v. Williams (Supreme Court of the United States 2008, 553 U.S. 285)✓Williams posted a chat-room link to photos of real children and was convicted of pandering. Upholding that ban, the Court read section 2256(2)(A)'s definition of sexually explicit conduct as tracking the one approved in Ferber, and said material must in fact meet it.
- Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (Supreme Court of the United States 2002, 535 U.S. 234)✓An adult-entertainment trade group, a nudist-lifestyle publisher, a painter and a photographer challenged the CPPA. The Court held sections 2256(8)(B) and 2256(8)(D), reaching images that only appear to be of minors or are pandered that way, overbroad and unconstitutional.
- United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc. (Supreme Court of the United States 1994, 513 U.S. 64)✓A distributor sold tapes of an actress filmed before she turned 18. Besides reading 'knowingly' in section 2252 to reach the performer's age, the Court rejected as insubstantial the claim that section 2256 is vague and overbroad for setting majority at 18 and using 'lascivious.'
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Deepfake & AI Voice Cloning Laws by State (2026), Alaska Deepfake Laws: AI Images, Voice Cloning & Penalties (2026), Arizona Deepfake Laws: AI Images, Voice Cloning & Penalties (2026)
§ 2252ACertain activities relating to material constituting or containing child pornographyIn forcecited in 16 of our articles
Any person who— knowingly mails, or transports or ships using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, any child pornography; knowingly receives or distributes— any child pornography using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or that has been mailed, or has been shipped or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer; or any material that contains child pornography using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or that has been mailed, or has been shipped or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer; knowingly— reproduces any child pornography for distribution through the mails, or using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer; or advertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or solicits through the mails, or using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-16 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 3,530 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):United States v. Williams (2008) held that Section 2252A(a)(3)(B), the pandering and solicitation provision, is neither overbroad under the First Amendment nor unconstitutionally vague. United States v. Pugh (2008) applied the section at sentencing, holding a probation-only sentence for possession unreasonable.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- United States v. Williams (Supreme Court of the United States 2008, 553 U.S. 285)✓Williams posted in a chat room offering 'good' pictures of his toddler daughter for swaps and linked to images of real children; the Supreme Court held 2252A(a)(3)(B), which bans offers to provide or requests to obtain child pornography, is neither overbroad nor vague.
- United States v. Pugh (Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 2008, 515 F.3d 1179)✓Pugh pleaded guilty under 2252A(a)(5)(B) to possessing 68 images and two videos of child pornography he obtained by posing as a girl in chat rooms; the Eleventh Circuit held the five-year probation sentence, with no prison and no supervised release, substantively unreasonable.
- Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (Supreme Court of the United States 2002, 535 U.S. 234)✓Adult entertainment producers, a nudist publisher and artists challenged the CPPA definitions reaching images that 'appear to be' or 'convey the impression' of minors; the Supreme Court held both definitions, which widened what 2252A reaches, facially overbroad.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Federal Sexting Laws: Legal Consequences and Penalties, Hawaii Sexting Laws: Legal Consequences and Penalties, Minnesota Sexting Laws: Legal Consequences and Penalties
Tennessee Code Annotated, Title 47, Chapter 25, Part 11: Protection of Personal Rights (Ensuring Likeness, Voice, and Image Security Act of 2024)
§ 47-25-1101Short titleIn forcecited in 54 of our articles
This part shall be known and may be cited as the “Ensuring Likeness, Voice, and Image Security Act of 2024.” History Acts 1984, ch. 945, § 1; 2024, ch. 588, § 1.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2021-05-21 · Read the full text in our law library
Cited in 5 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2011
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Courts cite 47-25-1101 et seq. as the Personal Rights Protection Act of 1984. Gibbons v. Schwartz-Nobel (1996) applied a one-year limitations period because the Act supplies none, and STATE EX REL. ELVIS PRESLEY INTL. MEMORIAL FOUNDATION v. Crowell (1987) said nothing in the Act limits publicity rights vested before its effective date.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Gracey v. Maddin (Court of Appeals of Tennessee 1989, 769 S.W.2d 497)✓A widow sued her late husband's law firm under the Personal Rights Protection Act to stop its use of his surname; the Court of Appeals affirmed an injunction on partnership and name-assignment grounds, and the majority opinion never applied the Act's own provisions.
- STATE EX REL. ELVIS PRESLEY INTL. MEMORIAL FOUNDATION v. Crowell (Court of Appeals of Tennessee 1987, 733 S.W.2d 89)✓Two nonprofits fought over using Elvis Presley's name in their corporate names; the court rested his descendible right of publicity on Tennessee common law rather than the Personal Rights Protection Act, and said nothing in the Act limits rights vested before its effective date.
- Gibbons v. Schwartz-Nobel (Court of Appeals of Tennessee 1996, 928 S.W.2d 922)✓A woman sued over a book that named her and printed her childhood photo, and over a related TV film; the Court of Appeals held the Personal Rights Protection Act sets no limitations period of its own, applied the one year period, and affirmed summary judgment.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Tennessee Laws on Recording in Public: What You Can and Cannot Film, Tennessee Video Recording Laws: What Is Legal and What Is Not, Tennessee Workplace Recording Laws: Employee and Employer Rights
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Sources and References
- M.G.L. ch. 265, § 43A (as amended by Ch. 118 of the Acts of 2024): Massachusetts nonconsensual intimate image and deepfake statute(malegislature.gov).gov
- Massachusetts Acts of 2024, Chapter 118: An Act to Prevent Abuse and Exploitation(malegislature.gov).gov
- Massachusetts House Press Release: House Passes Bills Regulating AI Use in Elections (Feb. 2026)(malegislature.gov).gov
- TAKE IT DOWN Act, Public Law 119-12 (S.146, 119th Congress, signed May 19, 2025)(congress.gov).gov
- 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B): Federal CSAM statute covering computer-generated images (PROTECT Act 2003)(law.cornell.edu)
- FCC 24-17: FCC ruling making AI-generated voices in robocalls illegal under TCPA (Feb. 2024)(fcc.gov).gov
- FTC Impersonation Rule, 16 CFR Part 461 (eff. April 1, 2024)(ftc.gov).gov
- M.G.L. ch. 214, § 3A, the Massachusetts statutory right of publicity (name, portrait or picture)(malegislature.gov).gov
- 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c): affirmative defense that no actual minor was used, unavailable only for § 2256(8)(C) morphed material(law.cornell.edu)