Massachusetts
Massachusetts At-Will Employment Laws: Exceptions and Your Rights
Independently fact-checked against primary sources (last audited August 20, 2026). · Reviewed by the RecordingLaw editorial team. · Law checked current as of August 20, 2026. · 7 primary sources cited on this page. How we verify our legal content

Massachusetts is an at-will employment state, meaning an employer can terminate an employee at any time, for any reason or no reason at all, and an employee can likewise quit at any time. The at-will default is long established under Massachusetts common law, though the Supreme Judicial Court has recognized three significant exceptions that limit an employer's power to fire.
Is Massachusetts an at-will employment state?
Yes. Massachusetts follows the at-will employment doctrine under common law. An employer does not need to give a reason, provide notice, or show cause before ending the employment relationship. Similarly, employees may resign at will without legal liability. This default rule has governed Massachusetts employment relationships for well over a century, and it remains the baseline unless one of the three recognized exceptions applies or the parties have contracted for something different.
Exceptions to at-will employment in Massachusetts
Massachusetts recognizes all three major common-law exceptions to at-will employment, though the good-faith covenant operates more narrowly here than in most states that recognize it.

Public-policy exception (recognized). The Supreme Judicial Court established this exception across two decisions. Smith-Pfeffer v. Superintendent of the Walter E. Fernald State School, 404 Mass. 145 (1989), confirmed that an employer may not discharge an employee for: (1) asserting a legally guaranteed right, (2) doing what the law requires, or (3) refusing to do what the law forbids. Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp., 410 Mass. 805 (1991), added a fourth category: (4) performing important public deeds that the law encourages even if it does not absolutely require them. This exception protects workers who, for example, report a safety violation, cooperate with a government investigation, or refuse to commit fraud on a customer. The exception is narrow: it does not require just cause for a firing, and internal matters, such as an employee's disagreement with the employer's internal policy decisions, cannot be the basis of a public-policy claim. Retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim is governed by a specific statute rather than by this common-law exception, as explained below.
Implied-contract exception (recognized). Massachusetts courts have held that language in an employee handbook, written policy, or oral assurances can create implied contractual terms if the language is sufficiently definite. An employee handbook that promises progressive discipline or "termination only for cause" may give rise to an implied-contract claim. However, a clear and prominent disclaimer stating that the handbook is not a contract and employment remains at-will will generally defeat such a claim. Employers who want to preserve at-will status must include an unambiguous disclaimer in their handbooks and offer-letter language.
Covenant of good faith and fair dealing (recognized, narrow). Massachusetts recognized this covenant in Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96 (1977), where the court upheld a jury verdict that the employer's termination of a salesman with twenty-five years of employment, the next business day after it obtained a $5,000,000 order from a customer, was motivated by a desire to pay him as little of the bonus credit as it could. The court explained that this bad-faith rule has been applied to prevent the forfeiture by employees of benefits almost earned by the rendering of substantial services. In Gram v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 384 Mass. 659 (1981), the Supreme Judicial Court declined to treat a discharge without good cause as, by itself, a breach of the covenant, explaining that termination in the absence of good cause does not establish bad faith. In Massachusetts, the covenant reaches a termination designed to deprive an employee of compensation almost earned (Fortune) and, under Gram, a discharge without good cause that costs the employee identifiable future compensation clearly related to past service, even without proof the employer meant to take it. It is NOT a general "just cause" requirement: a firing without good cause does not, by itself, breach the covenant.
Is Massachusetts a right-to-work state?
No. Massachusetts does not have a right-to-work statute. Under federal labor law (the National Labor Relations Act), states may enact right-to-work laws that prohibit mandatory union membership or fees as a condition of employment. Massachusetts has not done so, which means union-security agreements, requiring employees to join a union or pay agency fees as a condition of continued employment in a unionized workplace, are permitted here.
It is important not to confuse right-to-work with at-will employment. Right-to-work laws address whether workers can be compelled to support a union financially; at-will employment is about whether an employer needs a reason to fire someone. The two concepts are legally and practically distinct. As of 2026, 26 states have right-to-work laws, after Michigan repealed its statute effective February 13, 2024. Massachusetts is not among them.
What at-will employment does not allow in Massachusetts
Even in an at-will state, certain terminations are illegal. The federal floor applies across all 50 states: an employer may not fire an employee because of a protected characteristic covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (race, color, religion, sex, national origin), the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, or the Equal Pay Act.

Retaliation is also prohibited. Federal statutes forbid firing an employee for reporting workplace safety violations (OSHA), taking qualifying family or medical leave (FMLA), engaging in concerted activity with co-workers (NLRA), blowing the whistle on financial fraud (Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank), exercising wage-and-hour rights (FLSA), or seeking veterans' reemployment rights (USERRA).
Massachusetts adds its own layer through M.G.L. c. 151B, the Massachusetts Fair Employment Practices Act, which prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religious creed, national origin, sex, gender identity, sexual orientation, disability, ancestry, age (40+), and several other characteristics. The Massachusetts Wage Act (M.G.L. c. 149, ss. 148-150) provides additional protections for wage claims. Terminating an employee in retaliation for asserting rights under these statutes violates both the public-policy exception and specific statutory anti-retaliation provisions.
Workers' compensation retaliation has its own statute. M.G.L. c. 152, s. 75B(2) provides that no employer "shall discharge, refuse to hire or in any other manner discriminate against an employee because the employee has exercised a right afforded by this chapter," or because the employee testified or cooperated with an inquiry or proceeding under it, unless the employee knowingly participated in a fraudulent proceeding.
The statute also names the forum and the remedies. A person claiming to be aggrieved may initiate proceedings in the Superior Court department of the trial court for the county in which the violation occurred, and an employer found to have violated the paragraph must pay the employee lost wages, grant the employee suitable employment, and reimburse reasonable attorney fees as determined by the court, which may add whatever equitable relief it deems necessary. Because this provision supplies its own forum and remedy scheme, a worker fired over a comp claim should ask an employment attorney which claim to bring rather than assuming the common-law public-policy count is the route.
For broader protections available to workers who report illegal activity, see the whistleblower protections hub.
If you were fired in Massachusetts
If you were terminated in Massachusetts, it is natural to wonder whether the discharge was lawful. At-will employment means your employer did not have to give you a reason, and a reason they give may simply be false or pretextual. But the absence of a stated reason, or even an obviously unfair one, does not by itself make a firing illegal.

Start by documenting everything: the date of termination, what was said, any written communication, whether the termination came shortly after you filed a workers' comp claim, complained about discrimination, or earned a large commission. Timing and context matter. Consider whether the facts fit one of Massachusetts's three exceptions or whether your situation implicates the federal floor or c. 151B.
Deadlines are strict. Discrimination claims under c. 151B must be filed with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) within 300 days of the discriminatory act. Federal EEOC charge deadlines are also 300 days in Massachusetts. Filing deadlines for wage claims and other matters differ. To keep an MCAD or wage claim alive, get a free case evaluation from a Massachusetts employment lawyer on these deadlines soon after termination (attorney advertising).
This article is general legal information, not legal advice. Employment law varies by state and changes frequently, and it is not a substitute for advice about a specific termination. For guidance on your situation, consult a licensed employment attorney in Massachusetts.
Related: At-Will Employment by State | Whistleblower Protections
More Massachusetts Laws
- Massachusetts Employee Monitoring Laws
- Massachusetts Final Paycheck Laws
- Massachusetts Whistleblower Laws
- Massachusetts Workers Compensation Laws
Frequently Asked Questions
Is Massachusetts an at-will state?
Yes. Massachusetts is an at-will employment state under common law, meaning employers may terminate employees at any time for any reason unless a public-policy, implied-contract, or good-faith-covenant exception applies, or a specific statute prohibits the termination.
Can I be fired for no reason in Massachusetts?
Yes, in most cases. At-will employment means an employer does not need to provide a reason. However, if the real reason is illegal, such as discrimination, retaliation, or a bad-faith attempt to deny earned wages, the termination may be actionable despite no stated reason.
Is Massachusetts a right-to-work state?
No. Massachusetts has no right-to-work law, so union-security agreements requiring union membership or dues as a condition of employment are permitted under state law. Right-to-work is separate from at-will employment: it governs union obligations, not whether an employer can fire you.
Can my employer fire me for filing a workers' compensation claim in Massachusetts?
No. M.G.L. c. 152, s. 75B(2) specifically bars an employer from discharging, refusing to hire, or otherwise discriminating against an employee because the employee exercised a right afforded by the workers' compensation chapter or testified or cooperated in a proceeding under it, unless the employee knowingly participated in a fraudulent proceeding. A person aggrieved may bring proceedings in the Superior Court for the county where the violation occurred, and an employer found to have violated the paragraph must pay lost wages, grant suitable employment, and reimburse reasonable attorney fees. Because this statute supplies its own forum and remedies, ask an employment attorney whether to proceed under it rather than relying on the common-law public-policy exception.
Does an employee handbook protect me in Massachusetts?
It can, if the language is definite enough to create an implied contract. However, a clear and prominent disclaimer stating that employment remains at-will and the handbook is not a contract will generally override any implied-contract claim in Massachusetts.
Can my employer fire me right before I earn a big commission in Massachusetts?
Possibly not. Under Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96 (1977), Massachusetts recognizes a narrow good-faith-and-fair-dealing covenant that bars a discharge timed specifically to prevent an employee from receiving compensation already earned or nearly earned. The covenant is narrow and does not require good cause for a firing, although Gram v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 384 Mass. 659 (1981), also allows recovery of identifiable future compensation tied to past service that is lost through a discharge without good cause.
What should I do if I think I was wrongfully fired in Massachusetts?
Document everything immediately, note the timing relative to any protected activity, and consult an employment attorney. Deadlines for c. 151B discrimination claims at the MCAD are 300 days from the act; missing the deadline can bar your claim.
Updates
Corrected the descriptions of Smith-Pfeffer, Fortune v. National Cash Register, and Gram v. Liberty Mutual to what the Supreme Judicial Court actually held, including Gram's allowance of recovery for compensation tied to past service.
Added Massachusetts's workers' compensation anti-retaliation statute (M.G.L. c. 152, s. 75B(2)), including the court where a claim is filed and the remedies it provides, which the page previously omitted in favor of the common-law public-policy exception alone.
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources; governing law re-checked for recent changes
Reviewed and approved by an editor
The Law Behind This Article
This article rests on the statutory provisions below, held in our own legal record and retrieved from the official source. Tap a section to read the operative text.
Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 151B
§ 4Unlawful practicesIn forcecited in 4 of our articles
Section 4. It shall be an unlawful practice: 1. For an employer, by himself or his agent, because of the race, color, religious creed, national origin, sex, gender identity, sexual orientation, which shall not include persons whose sexual orientation involves minor children as the sex object, genetic information, pregnancy or a condition related to said pregnancy including, but not limited to, lactation or the need to express breast milk for a nursing child, ancestry or status as a veteran of any individual to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification. 1A.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-06 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at malegislature.gov
Cited in 878 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Madsen v. Erwin (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 1985, 395 Mass. 715)“…Against Discrimination, 379 Mass. 279, 281-282 (1979) (G.L.c. 151B, § 4, [1], which proscribes employment discr…”
- Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Institute (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 2005, 443 Mass. 367)“…the plaintiff; and (3) unlawful retaliation in violation of G. L. c. 151B, § 4. The jury also returned a verdict in fa…”
- College-Town, Division of Interco, Inc. v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 1987, 400 Mass. 156)“…Loretta Rizzi, on the basis of *158 sex, in violation of G.L.c. 151B, § 4 (1) and (4). The commission, affirming…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Massachusetts Background Check Laws (2026 Guide), Massachusetts Whistleblower Laws: Protections and How to Report, Wrongful Termination in Massachusetts (2026): Laws, Deadlines, How to File
§ 5Complaints; procedure; limitations; bar to proceeding; award of damagesIn forcecited in 2 of our articles
Section 5. Any person claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged unlawful practice or alleged violation of clause (e) of section thirty-two of chapter one hundred and twenty-one B or sections ninety-two A, ninety-eight and ninety-eight A of chapter two hundred and seventy-two may, by himself or his attorney, make, sign and file with the commission a verified complaint in writing which shall state the name and address of the person, employer, labor organization or employment agency alleged to have committed the unlawful practice complained of or the violation of said clause (e) of said section thirty-two or said sections ninety-two A, ninety-eight and ninety-eight A which shall set forth the particulars thereof and contain such other information as may be required by the commission. The attorney general may, in like manner, make, sign and file such complaint. The commission, whenever it has reason to believe that any person has been or is engaging in an unlawful practice or violation of said clause (e) of said section thirty-two or said sections ninety-two A, ninety-eight and ninety-eight A, may issue such a complaint.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at malegislature.gov
Cited in 310 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- College-Town, Division of Interco, Inc. v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 1987, 400 Mass. 156)“…he commission is not bound by the strict rules of evidence. G.L.c. 151B, § 5. G.L.c. 30A, § 11 (2). Furthermore, the…”
- Cuddyer v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 2001, 434 Mass. 521)“…barred by the six-month statute of limitations set forth in G. L. c. 151B, § 5, for complaints filed with the Massachu…”
- Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc. v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 2004, 441 Mass. 632)“…od. At the time Rapoza filed his charge of discrimination, G. L. c. 151B, § 5, as amended through St. 1989, c. 722, §…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 149
§ 148Payment of wages; commissions; exemption by contract; persons deemed employers; provision for cashing check or draft; violation of statuteIn forcecited in 2 of our articles
Section 148. Every person having employees in his service shall pay weekly or bi-weekly each such employee the wages earned by him to within six days of the termination of the pay period during which the wages were earned if employed for five or six days in a calendar week, or to within seven days of the termination of the pay period during which the wages were earned if such employee is employed seven days in a calendar week, or in the case of an employee who has worked for a period of less than five days, hereinafter called a casual employee, shall, within seven days after the termination of such period, pay the wages earned by such casual employee during such period, but any employee leaving his employment shall be paid in full on the following regular pay day, and, in the absence of a regular pay day, on the following Saturday; and any employee discharged from such employment shall be paid in full on the day of his discharge, or in Boston as soon as the laws requiring pay rolls, bills and accounts to be certified shall have been complied with; and the commonwealth, its departments, officers, boards and commissions shall so pay every mechanic, workman and laborer employed by it…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-03 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at malegislature.gov
Cited in 468 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Wiedmann v. Bradford Group, Inc. (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 2005, 444 Mass. 698)“…mber, 2001, asserting claims *700 under the common law and G. L. c. 149, § 148, the weekly payment of wages law (weekl…”
- Somers v. Converged Access, Inc. (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 2009, 454 Mass. 582)“…its enjoyed by CAI employees to which he was entitled under G. L. c. 149, § 148, as amended through St. 1998, c. 236, §…”
- Melia v. Zenhire, Inc. (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 2012, 462 Mass. 164)“…antum meruit, and violations of the Massachusetts Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, §§ 148, 150 (Wage Act). With respect to the la…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Massachusetts Final Paycheck Laws: Same-Day Pay, Triple Damages
Search our full record of US law — 2.1 million sections, every state + federal →
Sources and References
- Smith-Pfeffer v. Superintendent of the Walter E. Fernald State School, 404 Mass. 145 (1989) (public-policy exception to at-will employment)(malegislature.gov).gov
- Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96 (1977) (covenant of good faith and fair dealing)(malegislature.gov).gov
- Gram v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 384 Mass. 659 (1981) (narrowing Fortune to earned/nearly-earned compensation)(malegislature.gov).gov
- M.G.L. c. 151B — Massachusetts Fair Employment Practices Act(malegislature.gov).gov
- M.G.L. c. 149, ss. 148-150 — Massachusetts Wage Act(malegislature.gov).gov
- Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) — agency overview and filing deadlines(mass.gov).gov
- Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp., 410 Mass. 805 (1991) (public-policy exception, fourth prong — performing important public deeds that law encourages even if not required)(malegislature.gov).gov
- M.G.L. c. 152, s. 75B - workers' compensation anti-retaliation provision (discharge, refusal to hire, or discrimination for exercising rights under the chapter; Superior Court forum; lost wages, suitable employment, attorney fees)(malegislature.gov)
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