Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania Employee Monitoring Laws (2026): Workplace Surveillance Rights
Independently fact-checked against primary sources (last audited August 17, 2026). · Reviewed by the RecordingLaw editorial team. · Law checked current as of August 9, 2026. · 7 primary sources cited on this page. How we verify our legal content
Pennsylvania is one of the strictest all-party consent states in the country for recording, but that consent rule is a separate question from whether an employer can monitor company communications. Pennsylvania has no dedicated employee electronic-monitoring notice statute and no social-media-password law. A 2012 bill that would have created the latter, the Social Media Privacy Protection Act, never made it out of committee, and no successor bill has advanced since.
This article provides general legal information about Pennsylvania employee monitoring law as of July 9, 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Consult a Pennsylvania-licensed attorney about your specific situation.
Scope: This article covers Pennsylvania law on an employer's authority to monitor employees, access personal social media, and conduct workplace video, GPS, and biometric monitoring. It does not re-derive Pennsylvania's all-party consent recording rules in full (see our Pennsylvania recording laws guide) or GPS law generally outside the employment context (see our Pennsylvania GPS tracking laws guide).
The Federal Baseline: the "Ordinary Course of Business" Exception
Pennsylvania's starting point for any workplace monitoring question is federal, not state, law. Title I of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act makes it unlawful to intentionally intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications without consent under 18 U.S.C. section 2511 (part of Title I's broader 18 U.S.C. sections 2510 to 2523), but the statute carves out a broad business-extension exemption for the owner of a communications system. Under 18 U.S.C. section 2510(5)(a), equipment an employer furnishes to staff for use in the ordinary course of business, such as its phone, email, and computer systems, is excluded from the Act's definition of a prohibited interception device, letting the employer intercept communications on that system in the ordinary course of business.
The leading case applying this exception is Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983): once a monitored call is identified as personal, the ordinary-course exception generally ends, and continued listening can create liability. Pennsylvania's own wiretap statute, WESCA, 18 Pa.C.S. section 5703, sits on top of that federal floor and is significantly stricter: it requires every party's consent. Pennsylvania's closest analog to the federal business-extension rule is not an exception at all but a definition: 18 Pa.C.S. section 5702 excludes from its definition of a prohibited interception device any telephone instrument, equipment or facility furnished to a subscriber or user and used in the ordinary course of business. That definitional carve-out, not a workplace-monitoring exception, is what Pennsylvania employers actually rely on when they monitor communications on their own phone systems.
Does Pennsylvania Require Notice Before Electronic Monitoring?
No. A small group of states, Connecticut, Delaware, New York, and (starting in 2026) Maine, require written or posted notice before monitoring phone, email, or internet use on the job. Pennsylvania has not enacted a comparable statute, and no clearly identifiable bill modeled on that approach appears pending in the General Assembly.
One related proposal is federal, not state: the Stop Spying Bosses Act, introduced by a group of senators that included Pennsylvania's then-Senator Bob Casey, whose term ended in January 2025, would require employers nationwide to disclose workplace surveillance. It is not Pennsylvania law and has not been enacted. Pennsylvania employers today rely on WESCA's ordinary-course-of-business device definition and the federal ordinary-course exception, not a dedicated state notice statute.
Social Media Privacy: Pennsylvania Has No Law (Yet)
Unlike Oklahoma and Oregon, both of which bar employers from demanding a personal social media password, Pennsylvania has never enacted such a law and is not among the roughly two dozen states that have.
The state came closer than some. House Bill 2332, the "Social Media Privacy Protection Act," was introduced by Representative Jesse White on June 18, 2012, with 29 co-sponsors. It would have barred employers from requiring an employee or applicant to disclose social media credentials, with exceptions preserving an employer's ability to maintain workplace technology policies, monitor company-owned devices, and view publicly available information. The bill was referred to the House Labor and Industry Committee the same day and never received a committee vote. It has had no further action since, and no comparable bill has advanced. Readers may recognize the pattern from Kentucky's House Bill 585, a similar unenacted proposal; Pennsylvania's bill follows the same trajectory.
Because no statute exists, a Pennsylvania employer that asks for a personal social media password is not violating a dedicated state law, though other legal theories, such as discrimination law or a common-law privacy claim, may still apply on the right facts.
Video and Audio Surveillance in Pennsylvania Workplaces
Pennsylvania's all-party consent rule is the sharpest trap in this cluster. Under WESCA, 18 Pa.C.S. section 5703, every participant must consent before anyone may record, a third-degree felony carrying up to 7 years in prison. This applies fully at work: an employer cannot secretly record a meeting, call, or conversation without every participant's consent, and an employee who is a party does not get to record unilaterally either. Section 5704(15) is much narrower than it is often described. It covers only personnel of a business engaged in telephone marketing or telephone customer service, the interception must be made for the sole purpose of training, quality control or monitoring, one party to the communication must have consented to it, the recordings may be used only for training or quality control, and they must be destroyed within one year of recording. It is a targeted telemarketing and customer-service carve-out, not a general employer-monitoring exception, and employee notice alone does not satisfy it. Our Pennsylvania workplace recording guide covers the consent question in more depth.
Pennsylvania has no employment-specific video-surveillance statute, but its voyeurism law limits where any camera can point. WESCA's audio-interception rule does not reach silent video, so a security camera capturing only video in a common work area is generally lawful. A separate statute, 18 Pa.C.S. section 7507.1, makes it a crime to knowingly record a person's intimate areas or nudity without consent in a place with a reasonable expectation of privacy, but only where the person acts for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of any person. A first offense is a misdemeanor of the third degree; multiple violations escalate to the second degree. That purpose element is a real limit: a camera an employer installs in those spaces for a stated security reason generally falls outside section 7507.1, though a civil invasion-of-privacy claim remains available to the employee and other criminal theories may reach it on the right facts. Adding audio activates WESCA's felony exposure on top of all of that.
Employers deploying workplace monitoring software should note the risk the Third Circuit identified in Popa v. Harriet Carter Gifts, Inc. (3d Cir. 2022): WESCA has no sweeping direct-party exception, so a party whose tracking code captures a user's browsing activity cannot avoid liability merely by showing that the user's browser communicated directly with that party's servers. The same statutory reasoning could reach employer-side bossware and keystroke loggers deployed without every affected party's consent, although Popa itself involved a marketing vendor tracking shoppers on a retail website, not employer monitoring. Employer no-recording policies are not automatically enforceable either: under NLRB Stericycle, Inc., 372 NLRB No. 113 (2023), a blanket ban is presumptively unlawful if it could chill wage or working-condition discussions, and GC Memorandum 25-07 (2025) treats undisclosed recording of bargaining sessions as a per se bad-faith bargaining violation.
GPS and Vehicle Tracking of Pennsylvania Employees
Pennsylvania is a genuine gap state on vehicle tracking. No statute specifically prohibits, or permits with conditions, installing a GPS tracker on a vehicle, private or company-owned. The one statute using the words "mobile tracking device," 18 Pa.C.S. section 5761, governs police applying to a court for authority to use one; it says nothing about private tracking, including by an employer.
In practice, an employer tracking a vehicle it owns faces essentially no legal obstacle, since ownership is the strongest available defense in a state with no tracking-specific statute. Tracking an employee's personal vehicle is murkier: nothing squarely prohibits it, but covert tracking that becomes part of a pattern of following or intimidating someone can be prosecuted as stalking under 18 Pa.C.S. section 2709.1, a first-degree misdemeanor escalating to a third-degree felony for a second offense. House Bill 407 would close this gap directly: it passed the House 201-2 on April 8, 2025 and remains pending in the Senate Judiciary Committee as of mid-2026. As passed by the House, it would fold nonconsensual tracking into the stalking statute while preserving tracking by law enforcement under court order, parents tracking minor children, caregivers, and employers tracking fleet vehicles they own. Until the Senate acts, none of that is codified law. See our Pennsylvania GPS tracking laws guide for the fuller picture.
Biometric Monitoring: Time Clocks in Pennsylvania
Employers increasingly use fingerprint or facial-recognition time clocks, and trucking fleets use driver-facing cameras that capture biometric identifiers. Illinois' Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14, is the strongest law of this kind nationally, requiring written consent and creating a private right of action; it does not apply outside Illinois. Pennsylvania has no standalone biometric privacy statute, and unlike Oklahoma and Oregon, it does not yet have a comprehensive consumer privacy law either.
House Bill 78, the proposed Consumer Data Privacy Act, passed the House 127 to 76 on October 1, 2025 and would classify biometric data as sensitive, requiring opt-in consent, following the model most states use. It cleared a Senate committee in February 2026 but had not received a full Senate vote as of mid-2026, and if enacted would likely, though not certainly, exempt employment-context data as Oklahoma's and Oregon's laws do. Until then, it is not in force.
Pennsylvania's breach-notification law leaves a genuine gap Oklahoma's and Oregon's do not. The Breach of Personal Information Notification Act (BPINA), amended by Act 33 of 2024, requires notice after a breach involving Social Security numbers, driver's license numbers, and financial account numbers, but does not list biometric identifiers among them. A Pennsylvania employer whose stored employee fingerprint data is exposed in a breach is not clearly required to notify anyone, unless that data is linked to another covered element. See our Pennsylvania biometric privacy guide for the pending bills.
What Pennsylvania Employees Can Do About Monitoring Concerns
An employee who believes an employer crossed a legal line has a few concrete options. A secret recording made without every participant's consent can support a criminal complaint and a civil suit under 18 Pa.C.S. section 5725. A camera in a restroom or locker room can support a law enforcement report under the video voyeurism statute. Covert tracking that fits a pattern of following can support a stalking complaint under 18 Pa.C.S. section 2709.1 or a Protection From Abuse petition where the tracker is a family or household member. Monitoring tied to a protected characteristic or concerted activity may fall under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission or the NLRB instead.
Because Pennsylvania genuinely lacks statutes several neighboring states have (a notice law, a social-media law, a GPS-tracking law), an employee with a specific fact pattern should keep records (dates, what was monitored, any written policy) and consult a Pennsylvania-licensed employment attorney rather than assume a single statute covers the situation. For the broader picture, see our Employee Monitoring Laws by State hub and our general US recording laws guide.
Disclaimer
This article provides general legal information about Pennsylvania employee monitoring law as of July 9, 2026. It is not a substitute for individualized legal advice. Employment monitoring disputes often involve overlapping statutes, employer policy, and federal law, and outcomes depend on specific facts. Readers should consult an attorney licensed in Pennsylvania for advice about a particular situation.
Related articles
- Employee Monitoring Laws by State
- Pennsylvania Recording Laws
- Pennsylvania Workplace Recording Laws
- Pennsylvania GPS Tracking Laws
- Pennsylvania Biometric Privacy Laws
- US Recording Laws by State
Last updated: July 9, 2026. Statutes cited reflect their in-force version as of that date.
More Pennsylvania Laws
- Pennsylvania AI Meeting Recording Laws
- Pennsylvania At-Will Employment Laws
- Pennsylvania Data Privacy Laws
- Pennsylvania GPS Tracking Laws
- Pennsylvania Recording Laws
- Pennsylvania Whistleblower Laws
Frequently Asked Questions
Does Pennsylvania law require my employer to tell me I'm being electronically monitored?
No. Pennsylvania has not enacted a notice statute like Connecticut, Delaware, New York, or Maine. Employers commonly rely on WESCA's ordinary-course-of-business device definition in 18 Pa.C.S. section 5702 and on the federal ordinary-course exception, neither of which requires that you be notified.
Can my employer ask for my Facebook or Instagram password in Pennsylvania?
There is no statute that prohibits it. A 2012 bill, House Bill 2332, would have banned the practice but stalled in committee, and no successor bill has passed since. Other legal theories may apply depending on how the employer uses the information.
Can my employer secretly record my conversations at work in Pennsylvania?
No. Pennsylvania's all-party consent law, 18 Pa.C.S. section 5703, requires every participant's consent before any recording, applying to employers the same as anyone else. Violating it is a third-degree felony carrying up to 7 years in prison.
Can my employer GPS track a company vehicle I drive in Pennsylvania?
Generally yes. Pennsylvania has no statute specifically regulating GPS tracking, so an employer tracking a vehicle it owns faces no clear legal obstacle. A pending bill, House Bill 407, would expressly preserve employer fleet tracking if enacted.
Can my employer put a camera in a Pennsylvania workplace restroom or locker room?
It is a serious risk, but the criminal analysis is narrower than it looks. The video voyeurism statute, 18 Pa.C.S. section 7507.1, reaches such a recording only when it is made for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire, so a camera installed for a stated security reason generally falls outside that statute. A civil invasion-of-privacy claim remains available, and any audio capture triggers WESCA's all-party consent felony.
Can my Pennsylvania employer require a fingerprint scan for the time clock?
There is no statute requiring consent before an employer collects biometric data for a time clock, and Pennsylvania's breach-notification law does not currently list biometric identifiers among the data that triggers a notice duty, unlike Oklahoma's and Oregon's laws.
Is there a bill that would make GPS tracking illegal in Pennsylvania?
Yes. House Bill 407 would fold nonconsensual tracking into the stalking statute while preserving law enforcement, parental, caregiver, and employer fleet-tracking exceptions. It passed the House 201-2 in April 2025 and remains pending in the Senate Judiciary Committee.
Can my employer monitor my computer activity with tracking software in Pennsylvania?
Employers commonly monitor company systems under WESCA's ordinary-course-of-business device definition and the federal ordinary-course exception. But in Popa v. Harriet Carter Gifts, Inc., a case about a marketing vendor tracking shoppers on a retail website, the Third Circuit concluded WESCA has no sweeping direct-party exception, so a party cannot avoid liability merely because the communication went directly to its own servers, a point worth weighing before deploying undisclosed keystroke-logging tools.
Updates
Corrected the description of Popa v. Harriet Carter Gifts, Inc. to what the Third Circuit actually decided: a consumer website-tracking case finding no sweeping direct-party exception under WESCA, not a ruling on workplace keystroke monitoring.
Corrected our description of 18 Pa.C.S. section 5704(15), which requires one-party consent and applies only to telephone marketing and customer service monitoring rather than imposing an employee-notice rule, restored the sexual-purpose element of the video voyeurism statute, and fixed the year of the Third Circuit's Popa decision to 2022.
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources
Governing law re-checked for recent changes
Corrected WESCA's business/quality-control monitoring exception from 18 Pa.C.S. 5704(4) (which is actually the all-party prior-consent clause) to the correct pinpoint, 5704(15), in both places it was cited, and corrected the federal 'ordinary course of business' employer-monitoring exception to its actual statutory source, 18 U.S.C. section 2510(5)(a) (not 2511(2)(a)(i)).
Governing law re-checked for recent changes
Reviewed and approved by an editor
The Law Behind This Article
This article rests on the statutory provisions below, held in our own legal record and retrieved from the official source. Tap a section to read the operative text.
Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes Title 18 (Crimes and Offenses)
§ 5703Interception, disclosure or use of wire, electronic or oral communicationsIn forcecited in 59 of our articles
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a person is guilty of a felony of the third degree if he: (1) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire, electronic or oral communication; (2) intentionally discloses or endeavors to disclose to any other person the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, electronic or oral communication; or (3) intentionally uses or endeavors to use the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, knowing or having reason to know, that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, electronic or oral communication.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-24 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at palegis.us
Cited in 121 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Commonwealth v. Brachbill (1989) held Section 5703(1) is not limited to interceptions made with an intercepting device, so an officer who listened on a telephone extension without the prior approval Section 5704(2)(ii) requires violated the section, and the testimony had to be suppressed.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Commonwealth v. Schaeffer (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 1987, 370 Pa. Super. 179)“…and other electronic interceptions of communications, see 18 Pa.C.S. § 5703, carved out limited exceptions to these…”
- Commonwealth v. Bennett (Superior Court of Pennsylvania 1976, 245 Pa. Super. 457)“…ode, Act of Dec. 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1 et seq. 18 Pa.C.S. § 5703, as amended Dec. 27, 1974, P.L. 1007, N…”
- Commonwealth v. Brachbill (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 1989, 520 Pa. 533)✓A state trooper listened on an extension phone to a call between a former inmate and a guard charged with abusing him; the court held section 5703 bars any willful interception, not only one using an intercepting device, so the trooper's testimony should have been suppressed.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Pennsylvania Smart Glasses Recording Laws (2026), Pennsylvania Voyeurism and Hidden Camera Laws: Penalties and Protections (2026), Pennsylvania Audio Recording Laws: All-Party Consent Rules and Felony Penalties (2026)
§ 5704Exceptions to prohibition of interception and disclosure of communicationsIn forcecited in 26 of our articles
It shall not be unlawful and no prior court approval shall be required under this chapter for: (1) An operator of a switchboard, or an officer, agent or employee of a provider of wire or electronic communication service, whose facilities are used in the transmission of a wire communication, to intercept, disclose or use that communication in the normal course of his employment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of wire or electronic communication service. However, no provider of wire or electronic communication service shall utilize service observing or random monitoring except for mechanical or service quality control checks. (2) Any investigative or law enforcement officer or any person acting at the direction or request of an investigative or law enforcement officer to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication involving suspected criminal activities, including, but not limited to, the crimes enumerated in section 5708 (relating to order authorizing interception of wire, electronic or oral communications), where: (i) (Deleted by amendment).
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at palegis.us
Cited in 126 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Commonwealth v. Schaeffer (1987) concluded Article I, Section 8 requires a warrant for one party consensual electronic eavesdropping, reading 5704(2) as only exempting that practice, not authorizing it. Commonwealth v. Baumhammers (2008) held 5704(14)(i)(C) permits disclosing a recorded inmate call in any criminal prosecution.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Commonwealth v. Baumhammers (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 2008, 599 Pa. 1)✓The Commonwealth used a recorded jail phone call between an inmate and his parents at his murder trial; the court held section 5704(14) was not violated because all three knew the call was being recorded, and the contents were properly divulged for a criminal prosecution.
- Commonwealth v. Arrington (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 2014, 624 Pa. 506)✓A murder defendant sought to suppress a call the victim recorded, on which he asked repeatedly whether he was being taped and said he did not care; the court addressed whether that amounted to prior consent under section 5704(4) but did not resolve it, finding any error harmless.
- Commonwealth v. Schaeffer (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 1987, 370 Pa. Super. 179)✓Police sent a wired informant into Schaeffer's home to record a marijuana buy without a warrant; the en banc court read section 5704(2) as only exempting participant monitoring from the Wiretap Act, not authorizing it, and held the state constitution still required a warrant.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Pennsylvania Phone Call Recording Laws: Consent Rules and Penalties (2026), Pennsylvania Recording Laws (2026): All-Party Consent Rules, Pennsylvania AI Meeting Recording Laws: All-Party Consent and Felony Penalties (2026)
§ 5725Civil action for unlawful interception, disclosure or use of wire, electronic or oral communicationIn forcecited in 16 of our articles
(a) Cause of action.--Any person whose wire, electronic or oral communication is intercepted, disclosed or used in violation of this chapter shall have a civil cause of action against any person who intercepts, discloses or uses or procures any other person to intercept, disclose or use, such communication; and shall be entitled to recover from any such person: (1) Actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages computed at the rate of $100 a day for each day of violation, or $1,000, whichever is higher. (2) Punitive damages. (3) A reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs reasonably incurred. (b) Waiver of sovereign immunity.--To the extent that the Commonwealth and any of its officers, officials or employees would be shielded from liability under this section by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, such immunity is hereby waived for the purposes of this section. (c) Defense.--It is a defense to an action brought pursuant to subsection (a) that the actor acted in good faith reliance on a court order or the provisions of this chapter.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at palegis.us
Cited in 54 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Agnew v. Dupler (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 1998, 553 Pa. 33)“…and shall be entitled to recover from any such person ... 18 Pa.C.S. § 5725(a). The Wiretap Act defines an “oral co…”
- McCulligan v. Pennsylvania State Police (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania 2015, 123 A.3d 1136)“…ust and proper pursuant to Section 5725 of the Wiretap Act, 18 Pa. C.S. § 5725. In April 2015, Responde…”
- Keppley v. School District of Twin Valley (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania 2005, 866 A.2d 1165)“…lectronic or oral communication. Section 5725 of the Act, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5725, authorizes a civil action by any perso…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Pennsylvania Ring Doorbell Laws: What You Need to Know in 2026
§ 7507.1Invasion of privacyIn forcecited in 23 of our articles
(a) Offense defined.--Except as set forth in subsection (d), a person commits the offense of invasion of privacy if he, for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of any person, knowingly does any of the following: (1) Views, photographs, videotapes, electronically depicts, films or otherwise records another person without that person's knowledge and consent while that person is in a state of full or partial nudity and is in a place where that person would have a reasonable expectation of privacy. (2) Photographs, videotapes, electronically depicts, films or otherwise records or personally views the intimate parts, whether or not covered by clothing, of another person without that person's knowledge and consent and which intimate parts that person does not intend to be visible by normal public observation. (3) Transfers or transmits an image obtained in violation of paragraph (1) or (2) by live or recorded telephone message, electronic mail or the Internet or by any other transfer of the medium on which the image is stored.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at palegis.us
Cited in 29 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):In Com. v. Dinell, Z. (2022), the Superior Court read section 7507.1(a)(1) as requiring four elements, including that the defendant acted for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire, and vacated a guilty plea where the defendant denied any sexual purpose and was told no such element existed.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Commonwealth v. Muniz, J., Aplt. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 2017, 164 A.3d 1189)“…18 Pa.C.S. §6312(d) (relating to sexual abuse of children); 18 Pa.C.S. §7507.1 (relating to invasion of privacy); 18 U…”
- Com. v. Dinell, Z. (Superior Court of Pennsylvania 2022, 270 A.3d 530)✓A care home worker pled guilty to 14 counts of invasion of privacy for phone photos of nude residents, but said nothing sexual was involved. The court held section 7507.1(a)(1) requires a sexual purpose as an element and let him withdraw the plea.
- Commonwealth, Aplt v. Kingston, S. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 2016, 636 Pa. 438)“…olations” of a particular criminal offense. See, e.g., 18 Pa.C.S. § 7507.1(a.1) (listing circumstances under which…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Pennsylvania Dashcam Laws: Mounting Rules, Audio Recording, and Evidence (2026), Pennsylvania Landlord-Tenant Recording and Surveillance Laws (2026), Pennsylvania Laws on Recording in Public: What Is Legal (2026)
§ 2709.1StalkingIn forcecited in 7 of our articles
(a) Offense defined.--A person commits the crime of stalking when the person either: (1) engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts toward another person, including following the person without proper authority, under circumstances which demonstrate either an intent to place such other person in reasonable fear of bodily injury or to cause substantial emotional distress to such other person; or (2) engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly communicates to another person under circumstances which demonstrate or communicate either an intent to place such other person in reasonable fear of bodily injury or to cause substantial emotional distress to such other person. (b) Venue.-- (1) An offense committed under this section may be deemed to have been committed at either the place at which the communication or communications were made or at the place where the communication or communications were received. (2) Acts indicating a course of conduct which occur in more than one jurisdiction may be used by any other jurisdiction in which an act occurred as evidence of a continuing pattern of conduct or a course of conduct.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-08-26 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at palegis.us
Cited in 92 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Commonwealth v. Bortz (2006) held a prior contempt conviction for violating a PFA order raises a first stalking conviction under 18 Pa.C.S. 2709.1 to a third-degree felony. Commonwealth v. Faison (2023) treated persistent messages sent after the victim asked to be left alone as evidence of the (a)(1) course of conduct.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Com. v. Faison, W. (Superior Court of Pennsylvania 2023, 297 A.3d 810)✓Faison had two prior convictions for threatening to kill the same woman he was convicted of stalking. The court held terroristic threats, though unlisted in 18 Pa.C.S. 2709.1(c)(2), qualify as a prior crime of violence, so third-degree felony grading was legal.
- Ake v. Bureau of Professional & Occupational Affairs, State Board of Accountancy (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania 2009, 974 A.2d 514)“…cted in Pennsylvania of the more serious crime of stalking, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709.1, a first offense under that section is…”
- Commonwealth v. Bortz (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 2006, 589 Pa. 431)✓Bortz kept phoning and visiting an ex-girlfriend and was convicted three times of contempt for violating her PFA order. The court held a prior contempt conviction for violating a PFA order grades a first stalking offense as a third-degree felony under 18 Pa.C.S. 2709.1.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Pennsylvania Surveillance Camera Laws (2026 Guide), Pennsylvania GPS Tracking Laws: Is It Legal to Put a Tracker on a Car? (2026), Pennsylvania Restraining Order Laws (2026): How to Get a PFA Order
§ 5761Mobile tracking devicesIn forcecited in 3 of our articles
(a) Authority to issue.--Orders for the installation and use of mobile tracking devices may be issued by a court of common pleas. (b) Jurisdiction.--Orders permitted by this section may authorize the use of mobile tracking devices if the device is installed and monitored within this Commonwealth. The court issuing the order must have jurisdiction over the offense under investigation. (c) Standard for issuance of order.--An order authorizing the use of one or more mobile tracking devices may be issued to an investigative or law enforcement officer by the court of common pleas upon written application. Each application shall be by written affidavit, signed and sworn to or affirmed before the court of common pleas.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at palegis.us
Cited in 6 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2024
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Commonwealth v. Burgos (Superior Court of Pennsylvania 2013, 2013 Pa. Super. 26)“…nd use of a mobile tracking device was entered, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 5761. The order authorized the attachment of…”
- Commonwealth v. Bart (Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Lycoming County 1991, 13 Pa. D. & C.4th 670)“…of the Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act, 18 Pa.C.S. §5761. Initially, we note that defendant ha…”
- Commonwealth v. Pacheco, D., Aplt. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 2021)“…United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012); see also 18 Pa.C.S. § 5761 (authorizing issuance of order by trial…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
United States Code Title 18
§ 2511Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications prohibitedIn forcecited in 441 of our articles
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who— intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication; intentionally uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to use or endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral communication when— such device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a signal through, a wire, cable, or other like connection used in wire communication; or such device transmits communications by radio, or interferes with the transmission of such communication; or such person knows, or has reason to know, that such device or any component thereof has been sent through the mail or transported in interstate or foreign commerce; or such use or endeavor to use (A) takes place on the premises of any business or other commercial establishment the operations of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or (B) obtains or is for the purpose of obtaining information relating to the operations of any business or other commercial establishment the operations of which affect interstate or foreign…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-17 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 2,045 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Griggs-Ryan v. Smith (1990) applied the Section 2511(2)(d) prior-consent exception, treating a tenant repeatedly told that all incoming calls were taped as having impliedly consented. United States v. United States District Court (1972) read the then-current Section 2511(3) as conferring no presidential surveillance power.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Mitchell v. Forsyth (Supreme Court of the United States 1985, 472 U.S. 511)✓The Attorney General authorized a warrantless 1970 national security wiretap that caught the plaintiff's calls; the Court held the since-repealed Section 2511(3) disclaimer left the tap lawful under Title III, and that Mitchell had qualified immunity.
- United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (Supreme Court of the United States 1972, 407 U.S. 297)✓The Attorney General approved warrantless wiretaps on members of a domestic group accused of bombing a CIA office; the Court read Section 2511(3) as a congressional disclaimer conferring no surveillance power, then held the Fourth Amendment required prior judicial approval.
- Forsyth v. Barr (Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 1994, 19 F.3d 1527)✓Dallas police used, in an internal affairs probe of an officer, calls private parties allegedly intercepted illegally; assuming that was unlawful, the Fifth Circuit held Section 2517(1) and (2) allowed the disclosure and use, defeating the Section 2511(1)(c) and (d) claims.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Connecticut Recording Laws (2026): Hybrid Consent Rules Explained, Oregon Recording Laws (2026): Hybrid One-Party and All-Party Rules, US Recording Laws by State (2026): All 50 States Explained
§ 2510DefinitionsIn forcecited in 137 of our articles
As used in this chapter— “wire communication” means any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception (including the use of such connection in a switching station) furnished or operated by any person engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications or communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce; “oral communication” means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation, but such term does not include any electronic communication; “State” means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States; “intercept” means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.1 So in original. The period probably should be a semicolon.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 2,382 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):United States v. New York Telephone Co. (1977) held that pen registers fall outside Title III because they do not acquire the contents of a communication as Section 2510(4) and (8) define interception. Forsyth v. Barr (1994) applied the same definitions, treating the defendant officers as law enforcement officers under Section 2510(7).
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Forsyth v. Barr (Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 1994, 19 F.3d 1527)✓Neighbors tapped an informant's home line and the overheard charges reached Dallas internal affairs; the Fifth Circuit saw no evidence the police defendants intercepted anything and held they were 2510(7) law enforcement officers, so 2517(1) and (2) allowed their use of it.
- Nixon v. Administrator of General Services (Supreme Court of the United States 1977, 433 U.S. 425)“…of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2510 et seq. 408 F. Supp., at 363 . We…”
- Gannett Co. v. DePasquale (Supreme Court of the United States 1979, 443 U.S. 368)“…of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. § 2510 et seq., be preserved prior to the d…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Surveillance Camera Laws by State (2026 Guide), Georgia Recording Laws (2026): One-Party Audio, All-Party Video, District of Columbia Recording Laws (2026): One-Party Consent Rules
Search our full record of US law — 2.1 million sections, every state + federal →
Sources and References
- 18 Pa.C.S. section 5703, Interception, disclosure or use of wire, electronic or oral communications(palegis.us).gov
- 18 U.S.C. section 2510(5)(a), business-extension exemption for equipment used in the ordinary course of business(law.cornell.edu).gov
- Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983)(law.resource.org)
- 18 Pa.C.S. section 7507.1, Invasion of privacy (video voyeurism)(palegis.us).gov
- House Bill 407, Regular Session 2025-2026, Pennsylvania General Assembly (tracking-device stalking bill)(palegis.us).gov
- House Bill 2332, Regular Session 2011-2012, Pennsylvania General Assembly, 'Social Media Privacy Protection Act' (never enacted)(palegis.us).gov
- Popa v. Harriet Carter Gifts, Inc., No. 21-2203 (3d Cir.)(courtlistener.com)
- House Bill 78, Regular Session 2025-2026, Pennsylvania General Assembly (Consumer Data Privacy Act, pending)(palegis.us).gov
- 18 U.S.C. section 2511, Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications prohibited(uscode.house.gov).gov
- 18 Pa.C.S. section 5704(15), exceptions to prohibition of interception (telephone marketing and customer service training and quality control)(palegis.us)
- 18 Pa.C.S. section 5702, definition of electronic, mechanical or other device (ordinary-course-of-business exclusion)(palegis.us)
- Popa v. Harriet Carter Gifts, Inc., No. 21-2203 (3d Cir. Aug. 16, 2022), precedential opinion(ca3.uscourts.gov)