North Carolina
North Carolina Employee Monitoring Laws: Workplace Surveillance and Social Media (2026)
Independently fact-checked against primary sources (last audited August 17, 2026). · Reviewed by the RecordingLaw editorial team. · Law checked current as of August 17, 2026. · 10 primary sources cited on this page. How we verify our legal content
North Carolina employers can monitor work email, phone lines, and company computer systems under the federal wiretap law's business-use exception, and the state's rules on employee privacy are thinner than many online compliance checklists claim. A 2013 bill would have barred North Carolina employers from demanding an employee's social media password, but it died in the state Senate and never became law, so North Carolina has no social-media-password statute today. This guide separates what North Carolina actually regulates, GPS and fleet-vehicle tracking, hidden cameras, and biometric time clocks, from what a proposed law almost did but didn't.
This article provides general legal information about North Carolina employee monitoring law as of July 9, 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Consult a North Carolina-licensed attorney about your specific situation.
Scope: This article covers North Carolina law on an employer's authority to monitor employees, access personal social media, and conduct video, GPS, and biometric monitoring. It does not re-derive North Carolina's one-party consent rules (see our North Carolina recording laws guide) or GPS law outside employment (see our North Carolina GPS tracking laws guide).
The "Ordinary Course of Business" Exception in Federal and North Carolina Law
Workplace monitoring in North Carolina runs through two statutes that draw the same line: the federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act and North Carolina's own Electronic Surveillance Act. Title I of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act makes it unlawful to intentionally intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications without consent under 18 U.S.C. section 2511 (part of Title I's broader 18 U.S.C. sections 2510-2523), but it carves out a broad exception for the owner of a communications system. Under the business-extension exemption in 18 U.S.C. section 2510(5)(a), equipment furnished by a communications provider that is "being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its business" falls outside the Act's definition of a covered device, a definitional carve-out courts extend to employers who own the phone, email, and computer systems staff use, letting them intercept communications on that system in the ordinary course of business.
The leading case applying this exception is Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983), where an employer monitored a sales line as part of a standing training program. The court held that once a call is determined personal rather than business-related, the ordinary-course exception generally ends, and continued listening can create liability.
North Carolina's Electronic Surveillance Act reaches the same conduct on its own terms. N.C. Gen. Stat. section 15A-287(a) makes it a Class H felony to willfully intercept any wire, oral, or electronic communication without the consent of at least one party, so an employer that taps employee phone or email traffic answers to state law and not only to the federal statute. But the state Act carries a business-extension carve-out that mirrors the federal one. Section 15A-286(7)a.1 excludes from the definition of an intercepting device any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment, or facility furnished by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its business and "being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its business." Section 15A-287(b)(3) separately makes it lawful to intercept a communication "in a manner otherwise allowed by Chapter 119 of the United States Code," the federal wiretap chapter.
The practical upshot is that employer monitoring of company phone and email systems rests on a parallel state exclusion as well as the federal one, and the two point the same way. North Carolina adds no notice or consent step on top of that baseline for routine review of its own systems; where state law does more work is in the specific areas below.
Does North Carolina Require Notice Before Electronic Monitoring?
No. A small group of states, Connecticut, Delaware, New York, and (starting in 2026) Maine, require employers to give employees written or posted notice before monitoring phone, email, or internet use on the job. North Carolina has not enacted a comparable statute, so an employer can generally monitor company email, internet use, and phone lines on employer-owned systems under the federal ordinary-course exception and its North Carolina counterpart, without a state-mandated notice step. A written monitoring policy is still good practice: it documents that surveillance occurred in the ordinary course of business rather than as a targeted intrusion, and it matters if an employee later brings a common-law invasion-of-privacy claim.
Does North Carolina Have a Social Media Password Law? (No, Despite What Some Compliance Lists Claim)
Several 50-state compliance checklists list North Carolina among the states that bar employers from demanding a social media password. That is incorrect. Roughly half the states, including neighbors Virginia and Tennessee, have enacted a law along those lines. North Carolina is not one of them, and it never has been.
The confusion traces to a specific bill. In 2013, the NC House considered House Bill 846, the Job and Education Privacy Act. As drafted, it would have barred an employer from requiring an employee or applicant to disclose a social media or personal email password, or to log in in the employer's presence, and would have protected anyone disciplined for refusing. The House passed a committee substitute in May 2013, but after crossing over, the Senate referred it to the Rules and Operations of the Senate Committee on May 20, 2013, and it never got a floor vote. The bill died there when the 2013-2014 session ended. Because it was never enacted, there is no Chapter 99F in the North Carolina General Statutes; the chapter sequence runs directly from Chapter 99E to Chapter 100.
That gap has practical consequences. A North Carolina employer that asks for a personal social media password is not violating a specific state statute by asking. What changes the analysis is acting on the answer: logging into the account without the employee's genuine authorization can trigger the federal Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. section 2701, which criminalizes intentionally accessing a stored electronic communications facility without authorization. A coerced disclosure followed by the employer reviewing genuinely private content may also support a common-law invasion-of-privacy claim. Neither theory reaches as far as the statute HB 846 would have created.
Video and Audio Surveillance in North Carolina Workplaces
North Carolina has no employment-specific video-surveillance statute, but general law limits where a camera, employer-owned or not, can point. North Carolina's hidden-camera and voyeurism statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. section 14-202, makes it a graduated offense, up to a Class I felony for installing a device to capture images for sexual gratification and a Class H felony for disseminating those images, to secretly record someone in a place with a reasonable expectation of privacy, such as a restroom, locker room, or changing area. An employer that installs a camera in those spaces faces both criminal liability and a civil invasion-of-privacy claim, regardless of a posted policy.
Cameras in common work areas, sales floors, and entrances are generally permissible without a state-specific notice requirement. Audio recording of employees falls under the one-party consent rule, section 15A-287: an employer recording a conversation, rather than reviewing stored communications, needs at least one participant's consent, which the employer itself can supply if it's a party to the call. See our North Carolina workplace recording laws guide for depth.
GPS and Vehicle Tracking of North Carolina Employees
North Carolina has no dedicated employer vehicle-tracking notice statute comparable to New Jersey's N.J. Stat. section 34:6B-22. Instead, it folds tracking-device rules into its cyberstalking statute, N.C.G.S. 14-196.3(b)(5), which makes it unlawful to knowingly install, place, or use an electronic tracking device, GPS unit, OBD-II plugin, or AirTag-style tracker to track a person without consent.
The statute lists eleven exceptions, and two apply squarely to the workplace: owners of fleet vehicles, including businesses that provide vehicles for employees to operate, and employers providing a work communications device. Tracking a company van or a location-enabled work phone is lawful under these exceptions, with no statutory duty to give advance notice.
Neither the fleet-vehicle exception nor the employer-communications-device exception carries a domestic-violence-protective-order limit. That limit lives elsewhere in the statute, attached to three other exceptions. Two of them fail when the person doing the tracking is subject to a Chapter 50B protective order: the vehicle-owner-or-lessee exception in subdivision (b)(5)b and the parent-or-legal-guardian-of-a-minor exception in (b)(5)h. The third, the exception in (b)(5)k for a private detective or private investigator licensed under Chapter 74C, is commercial rather than personal and is framed the other way around: it applies only if the person being tracked "is not under the protection of a domestic violence protective order under Chapter 50B of the General Statutes or any other court order that protects against assault, threat, harassment, following, or contact." What the fleet and employer-device exceptions do not cover is a personally owned vehicle; hiding a tracker there without consent risks a Class 2 misdemeanor. See our North Carolina GPS tracking laws guide for the full exception list.
Biometric Monitoring: Time Clocks and North Carolina's Breach Notification Law
Employers increasingly use fingerprint or facial-recognition time clocks, and in trucking, driver-facing cameras that capture biometric identifiers. Illinois' Biometric Information Privacy Act is the strongest law of this kind nationally, requiring written consent before collection and creating a private right of action, but it does not apply outside Illinois. North Carolina has no comparable statute, and no state law requires consent before enrolling employees in a biometric time clock.
What North Carolina does have is indirect protection through its breach-notification framework. The Identity Theft Protection Act's definitions section, N.C. Gen. Stat. section 75-61, defines protected "personal information" by reference to section 14-113.20(b), which lists biometric data and fingerprints among the covered categories. If a breach exposes biometric time-clock data alongside an employee's name, the Act's notice-of-breach-duty section, N.C. Gen. Stat. section 75-65, requires notifying affected individuals and the Attorney General. Because a breach-notification violation is automatically a UDTPA violation, an injured employee can recover treble damages and attorney fees, sharper than most no-biometric-statute states offer, though it applies only after a breach, not at collection.
House Bill 462, the proposed NC Personal Data Privacy Act, would classify biometric data used for identification as sensitive data requiring opt-in consent. As of July 2026 it remains pending in committee, alongside companion Senate Bill 757, and is not current law.
What North Carolina Employees Can Do About Monitoring Concerns
An employee who believes an employer crossed a legal line has a few concrete options. A bare demand for a social media password does not by itself support a state-law claim, since North Carolina has none, but unauthorized access to the account afterward can support a federal Stored Communications Act claim. A camera in a restroom or locker room can support both a police report and a civil invasion-of-privacy claim. A hidden tracker on a personal vehicle, or tracking under the vehicle-owner, parent-guardian, or licensed-private-detective exception once a protective order is in play, can support a report under N.C.G.S. 14-196.3. Monitoring tied to a protected characteristic or workers' compensation retaliation may instead fall under the NC Department of Labor or the NLRB. Because these rules span several distinct sources, an employee should keep records and consult a North Carolina-licensed employment attorney rather than assume a single statute covers the situation. See our Employee Monitoring Laws by State hub and US Recording Laws by State.
Disclaimer
This article provides general legal information about North Carolina employee monitoring law as of July 9, 2026. It is not a substitute for individualized legal advice. Employment monitoring disputes often involve overlapping statutes, employer policy, and federal law, and outcomes depend on specific facts. Readers should consult an attorney licensed in North Carolina for advice about a particular situation.
Related articles
- Employee Monitoring Laws by State
- North Carolina Recording Laws
- North Carolina Workplace Recording Laws
- North Carolina GPS Tracking Laws
- North Carolina Data Privacy Laws
- US Recording Laws by State
Last updated: July 9, 2026. Statutes cited reflect their in-force version as of that date.
More North Carolina Laws
- North Carolina AI Meeting Recording Laws
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- North Carolina Data Privacy Laws
- North Carolina GPS Tracking Laws
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- North Carolina Whistleblower Laws
Frequently Asked Questions
Can my employer ask for my Facebook or Instagram password in North Carolina?
Legally, yes. North Carolina has no statute banning the request; a 2013 bill, House Bill 846, would have prohibited it but died in the Senate and was never enacted, so there is no Chapter 99F. You can still decline, and an employer that logs into your account without authorization, rather than merely asking, can violate the federal Stored Communications Act.
Can my employer GPS track a company vehicle I drive in North Carolina?
Yes. N.C.G.S. 14-196.3(b)(5) exempts fleet-vehicle owners and employers tracking work-issued communications devices. Unlike the statute's vehicle-owner, parent-or-guardian, and licensed-private-detective exceptions, the fleet and employer-device exceptions carry no domestic-violence-protective-order limit.
Can my employer track my personal car in North Carolina?
Not without your consent. The statutory exceptions cover employer-owned fleet vehicles and employer-issued communications devices, not a personally owned car. Hiding a tracker there without consent can be charged as a Class 2 misdemeanor.
Can my employer put a camera in a North Carolina workplace restroom or locker room?
No. North Carolina's voyeurism statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. section 14-202, prohibits recording someone without consent in a place with a reasonable expectation of privacy, and this applies to employer-installed cameras like anyone else.
Can my North Carolina employer require a fingerprint scan for the time clock?
Under current state law, yes. North Carolina has no biometric consent statute, so employers can generally require biometric time clocks without specific consent. If that data is later breached, the employer must notify affected employees, and an injury claim can carry treble damages under the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
Is North Carolina one of the states with a social media privacy law for employees?
No. About half of US states, including neighbors Virginia and Tennessee, restrict employers from demanding social media passwords, but North Carolina is not one of them despite a 2013 attempt, House Bill 846, that died in the Senate. If an employer accesses your account without authorization rather than just asking for the password, consult an attorney about a claim under the federal Stored Communications Act or North Carolina's invasion-of-privacy tort.
Updates
Corrected the North Carolina tracking-exception discussion to note that the domestic-violence-protective-order limit in G.S. 14-196.3(b)(5) applies to three exceptions, including the licensed private-investigator exception, and added North Carolina's own business-extension carve-out under the state Electronic Surveillance Act alongside the federal one.
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources; governing law re-checked for recent changes
Governing law re-checked for recent changes
Corrected the federal statutory basis for employer 'ordinary course of business' monitoring: it rests on the business-extension exemption in 18 U.S.C. section 2510(5)(a), not the service-provider exception in section 2511(2)(a)(i).
Governing law re-checked for recent changes
Reviewed and approved by an editor
The Law Behind This Article
This article rests on the statutory provisions below, held in our own legal record and retrieved from the official source. Tap a section to read the operative text.
North Carolina General Statutes, Chapter 14: Criminal Law.
§ 14-196.3CyberstalkingIn forcecited in 2 of our articles
(a) The following definitions apply in this section: (1) Electronic communication. - Any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature, transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, computer, electromagnetic, photoelectric, or photo-optical system. (2) Email. - The transmission of information or communication by the use of the internet, a computer, a facsimile machine, a pager, a cellular telephone, a video recorder, or other electronic means sent to a person identified by a unique address or address number and received by that person. (3) Electronic tracking device. - An electronic or mechanical device that permits a person to remotely determine or track the position and movement of another person. (4) Fleet vehicle. - Any of the following: (i) one or more motor vehicles owned by a single entity and operated by employees or agents of the entity for business or government purposes, (ii) motor vehicles held for lease or rental to the general public, or (iii) motor vehicles held for sale, or used as demonstrators, test vehicles, or loaner vehicles, by motor vehicle dealers.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ncleg.gov
Cited in 6 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Courts have addressed section 14-196.3 only at its edges. State v. Murray (2025), unpublished and where the statute was not charged, said its (b)(5)(h) exception suggests the legislature meant to punish a parent under a DVPO who uses an AirTag. A federal court in Brister v. Shanks (2025) found no civil claim under it.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. Packingham (Court of Appeals of North Carolina 2013, 229 N.C. App. 293)“…or other electronic device to commit an unlawful sex act; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-196.3 (2011) prohibits cyber-stalking; and A…”
- State v. Bernard (Court of Appeals of North Carolina 2014, 236 N.C. App. 134)✓A woman sent a false email from a university employee's account; using the definition of "electronic communication" that Section 14-196.3(a) supplies to the computer-crime venue statute, the court held the offense was committed on campus, letting campus police search her home.
- State v. Murray (Court of Appeals of North Carolina 2025)✓A father under a domestic violence protective order hid an AirTag in his child's diaper bag; though not charged with cyberstalking, the court read Section 14-196.3(b)(5)(h), which withholds the parent exception from such parents, as showing that tracking is punishable.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
§ 14-202Secretly peeping into room occupied by another personIn forcecited in 13 of our articles
(a) Any person who shall peep secretly into any room occupied by another person shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. (a1) Unless covered by another provision of law providing greater punishment, any person who secretly or surreptitiously peeps underneath or through the clothing being worn by another person, through the use of a mirror or other device, for the purpose of viewing the body of, or the undergarments worn by, that other person without their consent shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. (b) The following definitions apply in this section: (1) Photographic image. - Any photograph or photographic reproduction, still or moving, or any videotape, motion picture, or live television transmission, or any digital image of any individual. (2) Private area of an individual. - The naked or undergarment clad genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or female breast of that individual. (3) Room. - Includes, but is not limited to, a bedroom, a rest room, a bathroom, a shower, a dressing room, a dressing stall, a cubicle, or other similar area designed to provide privacy. (4) Under circumstances in which that individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ncleg.gov
Cited in 17 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):In Matter of Banks (1978) the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld G.S. 14-202 against vagueness and overbreadth challenges, reading secret peeping to require spying intended to invade the occupant's privacy. State v. Pell (2011) applied its sex offender registration provision and reversed an order unsupported by evidence.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Matter of Banks (Supreme Court of North Carolina 1978, 295 N.C. 236)✓A trial judge held the secret peeping statute unconstitutional. The court reversed, construing the statute to reach only spying done with the wrongful purpose of invading the occupant's privacy, and held it was neither impermissibly vague nor overbroad on that reading.
- State v. Breathette (Court of Appeals of North Carolina 2010, 202 N.C. App. 697)“…any child of either sex under the age of 16 years. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202 .l(a)(l)-(2). The statute is unambiguou…”
- State v. Pell (Court of Appeals of North Carolina 2011, 211 N.C. App. 376)✓A man pleaded guilty to eight counts of felony secret peeping and was ordered onto the sex-offender registry. The court held the danger-to-the-community standard in this section is not vague, but reversed the registration order because the risk evidence did not support it.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
§ 14-113.20Identity theftIn forcecited in 5 of our articles
(a) A person who knowingly obtains, possesses, or uses identifying information of another person, living or dead, with the intent to fraudulently represent that the person is the other person for the purposes of making financial or credit transactions in the other person's name, to obtain anything of value, benefit, or advantage, or for the purpose of avoiding legal consequences is guilty of a felony punishable as provided in G.S. 14-113.22(a). (b) The term "identifying information" as used in this Article includes the following: (1) Social security or employer taxpayer identification numbers. (2) Drivers license, State identification card, or passport numbers. (3) Checking account numbers. (4) Savings account numbers. (5) Credit card numbers. (6) Debit card numbers. (7) Personal Identification (PIN) Code as defined in G.S. 14-113.8(6). (8) Electronic identification numbers, email names or addresses, internet account numbers, or internet identification names. (9) Digital signatures. (10) Any other numbers or information that can be used to access a person's financial resources. (11) Biometric data. (12) Fingerprints. (13) Passwords.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ncleg.gov
Cited in 19 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):State v. Jones (2014) held that signing a name different from the cardholder's does not escape Section 14-113.20, since possession of others' credit card numbers supported an inference of fraudulent intent. State v. Barron (2010) held that confirming another's social security digits to police was a use of identifying information.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. Jones (Supreme Court of North Carolina 2014, 367 N.C. 299)✓A man possessed four people's credit card numbers and had used other victims' numbers under false names at two businesses; the court held that evidence supported the fraudulent intent element of section 14-113.20(a), and that signing a different name does not defeat it.
- State v. Barron (Court of Appeals of North Carolina 2010, 202 N.C. App. 686)✓Stopped by police, a man gave his brother's name and birth date and confirmed the last four digits of his brother's Social Security number; the court held that confirmation was itself a use of another person's identifying information under section 14-113.20(a).
- State v. Crook (Court of Appeals of North Carolina 2016, 247 N.C. App. 784)✓A man carried another man's driver license, accepted arrest warrants in that name, and used it on a bond application; the court found no plain error in instructing that the license was identifying information, since the license carries the number named in section 14-113.20(b)(2).
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
North Carolina General Statutes, Chapter 15A: Criminal Procedure Act.
§ 15A-287Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications prohibitedIn forcecited in 18 of our articles
(a) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this Article, a person is guilty of a Class H felony if, without the consent of at least one party to the communication, the person: (1) Willfully intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication. (2) Willfully uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to use or endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral communication when: a. The device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a signal through, a wire, cable, or other like connection used in wire communications; or b. The device transmits communications by radio, or interferes with the transmission of such communications.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ncleg.gov
Cited in 12 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):North Carolina courts apply Section 15A-287 to private recording. Kroh v. Kroh (2002) held it reaches one spouse's nonconsensual audio recording of the other in the family home, not video without sound, and adopted vicarious consent by a custodial parent. State v. McGriff (2002) held interception is not willful absent a bad purpose.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. McGriff (Court of Appeals of North Carolina 2002, 151 N.C. App. 631)✓A neighbor's cordless phone picked up a call in which a girl said McGriff had tried to force oral sex on her, and she listened about an hour; the court held listening out of concern for a minor was not willful interception under Section 15A-287(a)(1), so the evidence came in.
- Wright v. TOWN OF ZEBULON (Court of Appeals of North Carolina 2010, 202 N.C. App. 540)✓A police chief hid a transmitter under a sergeant's patrol car seat to test whether he tipped off drug dealers; the court affirmed summary judgment on his Section 15A-287(a)(1) claim, finding the public safety purpose meant the interception was not willful.
- Kroh v. Kroh (Court of Appeals of North Carolina 2002, 152 N.C. App. 347)“…rs to intercept, . . . any . . . oral . . . communication.” G.S. § 15A-287(a)(l). An “oral communication” includes…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
§ 15A-286DefinitionsIn forcecited in 6 of our articles
As used in this Article, unless the context requires otherwise: (1) "Aggrieved person" means a person who was a party to any intercepted wire, oral, or electronic communication or a person against whom the interception was directed. (2) "Attorney General" means the Attorney General of the State of North Carolina, unless otherwise specified. (3) "Aural transfer" means a transfer containing the human voice at any point between and including the point of origin and the point of reception. (4) "Chapter 119 of the United States Code" means Chapter 119 of Part I of Title 18, United States Code, being Public Law 90-351, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986. (5) "Communications common carrier" shall have the same meaning which is given the term "common carrier" by section 153(h) of Title 47 of the United States Code. (6) "Contents" when used with respect to any wire, oral, or electronic communication means and includes any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ncleg.gov
Cited in 9 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Wright v. TOWN OF ZEBULON (Court of Appeals of North Carolina 2010, 202 N.C. App. 540)“…ts violated the North Carolina Electronic Surveillance Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-286 to -298 (2009) (“NCESA”), by willfully…”
- Kroh v. Kroh (Court of Appeals of North Carolina 2002, 152 N.C. App. 347)“…llance Act, Art. 16 of Chapter 15A of the General Statutes (N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-286 et seq. (2001)), and (4) i…”
- State v. McGriff (Court of Appeals of North Carolina 2002, 151 N.C. App. 631)“…he use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-286(13) (2001). The key to our analy…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
United States Code Title 18
§ 2511Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications prohibitedIn forcecited in 441 of our articles
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who— intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication; intentionally uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to use or endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral communication when— such device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a signal through, a wire, cable, or other like connection used in wire communication; or such device transmits communications by radio, or interferes with the transmission of such communication; or such person knows, or has reason to know, that such device or any component thereof has been sent through the mail or transported in interstate or foreign commerce; or such use or endeavor to use (A) takes place on the premises of any business or other commercial establishment the operations of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or (B) obtains or is for the purpose of obtaining information relating to the operations of any business or other commercial establishment the operations of which affect interstate or foreign…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-17 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 2,045 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Griggs-Ryan v. Smith (1990) applied the Section 2511(2)(d) prior-consent exception, treating a tenant repeatedly told that all incoming calls were taped as having impliedly consented. United States v. United States District Court (1972) read the then-current Section 2511(3) as conferring no presidential surveillance power.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Mitchell v. Forsyth (Supreme Court of the United States 1985, 472 U.S. 511)✓The Attorney General authorized a warrantless 1970 national security wiretap that caught the plaintiff's calls; the Court held the since-repealed Section 2511(3) disclaimer left the tap lawful under Title III, and that Mitchell had qualified immunity.
- United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (Supreme Court of the United States 1972, 407 U.S. 297)✓The Attorney General approved warrantless wiretaps on members of a domestic group accused of bombing a CIA office; the Court read Section 2511(3) as a congressional disclaimer conferring no surveillance power, then held the Fourth Amendment required prior judicial approval.
- Forsyth v. Barr (Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 1994, 19 F.3d 1527)✓Dallas police used, in an internal affairs probe of an officer, calls private parties allegedly intercepted illegally; assuming that was unlawful, the Fifth Circuit held Section 2517(1) and (2) allowed the disclosure and use, defeating the Section 2511(1)(c) and (d) claims.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
§ 2510DefinitionsIn forcecited in 137 of our articles
As used in this chapter— “wire communication” means any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception (including the use of such connection in a switching station) furnished or operated by any person engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications or communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce; “oral communication” means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation, but such term does not include any electronic communication; “State” means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States; “intercept” means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.1 So in original. The period probably should be a semicolon.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 2,382 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):United States v. New York Telephone Co. (1977) held that pen registers fall outside Title III because they do not acquire the contents of a communication as Section 2510(4) and (8) define interception. Forsyth v. Barr (1994) applied the same definitions, treating the defendant officers as law enforcement officers under Section 2510(7).
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Forsyth v. Barr (Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 1994, 19 F.3d 1527)✓Neighbors tapped an informant's home line and the overheard charges reached Dallas internal affairs; the Fifth Circuit saw no evidence the police defendants intercepted anything and held they were 2510(7) law enforcement officers, so 2517(1) and (2) allowed their use of it.
- Nixon v. Administrator of General Services (Supreme Court of the United States 1977, 433 U.S. 425)“…of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2510 et seq. 408 F. Supp., at 363 . We…”
- Gannett Co. v. DePasquale (Supreme Court of the United States 1979, 443 U.S. 368)“…of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. § 2510 et seq., be preserved prior to the d…”
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§ 2701Unlawful access to stored communicationsIn forcecited in 19 of our articles
Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section whoever— intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided; or intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility; and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such system shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section. The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) of this section is— if the offense is committed for purposes of commercial advantage, malicious destruction or damage, or private commercial gain, or in furtherance of any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or any State— a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both, in the case of a first offense under this subparagraph; and a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both, for any subsequent offense under this subparagraph; and in any other case— a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 1 year or both, in the case of a first offense under this paragraph;…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-16 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 724 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- United States v. Warshak (Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 2010, 631 F.3d 266)“…ied in good faith on the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq., a statute that allows the gove…”
- Guest v. Leis (Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 2001, 255 F.3d 325)“…7 *340 In their brief, plaintiffs mention in passing 18 U.S.C. § 2701 , which prohibits intentional unlawful…”
- City of Ontario v. Quon (Supreme Court of the United States 2010, 560 U.S. 746)“…Raising claims under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983; 18 U. S. C. §2701 et seq., popularly known as the Stored…”
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North Carolina General Statutes, Chapter 75: Monopolies, Trusts and Consumer Protection.
§ 75-65Protection from security breachesIn forcecited in 5 of our articles
(a) Any business that owns or licenses personal information of residents of North Carolina or any business that conducts business in North Carolina that owns or licenses personal information in any form (whether computerized, paper, or otherwise) shall provide notice to the affected person that there has been a security breach following discovery or notification of the breach. The disclosure notification shall be made without unreasonable delay, consistent with the legitimate needs of law enforcement, as provided in subsection (c) of this section, and consistent with any measures necessary to determine sufficient contact information, determine the scope of the breach and restore the reasonable integrity, security, and confidentiality of the data system. For the purposes of this section, personal information shall not include electronic identification numbers, email names or addresses, internet account numbers, internet identification names, parent's legal surname prior to marriage, or a password unless this information would permit access to a person's financial account or resources.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-16 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ncleg.gov
Cited in 2 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Rogers v. Keffer, Inc. (District Court, E.D. North Carolina 2017, 243 F. Supp. 3d 650)“…TPA for failing to notify the victim of a security breach. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-65 . “Any business that maintains or posse…”
- Rhodes v. Navy Federal Credit Union (District Court, E.D. North Carolina 2025)“…n. Stat. § 53-176; 5) “financial privacy violation,” under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-65; and 6) intentional infliction of emot…”
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§ 75-61DefinitionsIn forcecited in 4 of our articles
The following definitions apply in this Article: (1) "Business". - A sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, association, or other group, however organized and whether or not organized to operate at a profit. The term includes a financial institution organized, chartered, or holding a license or authorization certificate under the laws of this State, any other state, the United States, or any other country, or the parent or the subsidiary of any such financial institution. Business shall not include any government or governmental subdivision or agency. (2) "Consumer". - An individual. (3) "Consumer report" or "credit report". - Any written, oral, or other communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer's creditworthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer's eligibility for any of the following: a. Credit to be used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. b. Employment purposes. c.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ncleg.gov
Cited in 4 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Fisher v. Commc'n Workers of Am. (North Carolina Business Court 2008, 2008 NCBC 18)“…nized and whether or not organized to operate at a profit.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-61(1) (2007). {48} A business does not…”
- DiCesare v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. (Supreme Court of North Carolina 2020)“…chase of electricity or other municipal utilities) and N.C.G.S. § 75-61(9) (adopting a separate definition of…”
- Rogers v. Keffer, Inc. (District Court, E.D. North Carolina 2017, 243 F. Supp. 3d 650)“…s and is not subject to further unauthorized disclosure. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-61 (14). A plaintiff must bring a claim fo…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
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Sources and References
- North Carolina House Bill 846 (2013), Job and Education Privacy Act, bill lookup and legislative history (passed House, referred to Senate Rules and Operations of the Senate Committee 5/20/2013, no further action taken, never enacted)(ncleg.gov).gov
- NCSL, Privacy of Employee and Student Social Media Accounts (50-state tracker; North Carolina not listed among states with a social media password law)(ncsl.org)
- 18 U.S.C. section 2701, Stored Communications Act (unauthorized access to stored electronic communications)(law.cornell.edu).gov
- 18 U.S.C. section 2510(5)(a), business-extension exemption excluding employer-provided equipment used in the ordinary course of business from the Wiretap Act's device definition(law.cornell.edu).gov
- Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983)(law.resource.org)
- N.C.G.S. 14-196.3, Cyberstalking (electronic tracking device offense and exceptions)(ncleg.gov).gov
- N.C. Gen. Stat. section 15A-287, Electronic surveillance (one-party consent)(ncleg.gov).gov
- N.C. Gen. Stat. section 14-202, Secretly peeping/voyeurism and hidden camera offenses(ncleg.gov).gov
- N.C. Gen. Stat. section 75-65, Identity Theft Protection Act (notice-of-breach duty)(ncleg.gov).gov
- N.C. Gen. Stat. section 75-61, Identity Theft Protection Act definitions (personal information defined by reference to G.S. 14-113.20(b))(ncleg.gov).gov
- N.C. Gen. Stat. section 14-113.20(b), identifying information definitions (biometric data, fingerprints)(ncleg.gov).gov
- 18 U.S.C. section 2511, Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications prohibited(uscode.house.gov).gov
- N.C. Gen. Stat. section 15A-286(7)a.1, Electronic Surveillance Act definitions (North Carolina's business-extension carve-out excluding provider-furnished equipment used in the ordinary course of business from the definition of an intercepting device)(ncleg.gov)