Indiana
Indiana AI Meeting Recording Laws (2026)
Independently fact-checked against primary sources (last audited November 1, 2026). · Reviewed by the RecordingLaw editorial team. · Law checked current as of November 1, 2026. · 2 primary sources cited on this page. How we verify our legal content
Indiana permits AI meeting recording under a one-party consent rule. Ind. Code Section 35-31.5-2-176 defines an unlawful interception as recording a communication by a person other than a sender or receiver of it, without the consent of the sender or receiver, so a meeting participant who activates an AI notetaker is not intercepting anything and commits no offense under Ind. Code Section 35-33.5-5-5.
Indiana's one-party consent law provides a straightforward legal foundation for using AI meeting recording tools. Ind. Code Section 35-33.5-5-5 punishes only an unlawful interception, and Ind. Code Section 35-31.5-2-176 defines that term to exclude recording done by a sender or receiver of the communication, or done with the consent of a sender or receiver. A meeting participant who activates an AI notetaker is a party to the communication, so no interception occurs under Indiana law.
The simplicity of Indiana's framework contrasts sharply with neighboring Illinois, where all-party consent and BIPA create a dual-threat environment for AI tools. Indiana users still need to understand cross-state complications, federal developments, and workplace-specific considerations. This guide covers Indiana's consent framework, how it applies to AI meeting recorders, criminal and civil penalties, employer obligations, and the federal cases reshaping this area of law. Consult an attorney for advice specific to your situation.
Indiana's One-Party Consent Framework
Indiana's wiretapping and electronic surveillance laws are codified in Ind. Code Title 35, Article 33.5. Section 35-33.5-5-5(b) makes it a Level 5 felony to knowingly or intentionally intercept a communication in violation of that article.
The consent rule is not stated in Section 35-33.5-5-5 itself. It comes from the definition of interception in Ind. Code Section 35-31.5-2-176, which reaches only the intentional recording or acquisition of an electronic communication "by a person other than a sender or receiver of that communication, without the consent of the sender or receiver." A recording made by a party, or with a party's consent, is therefore not an interception at all, and no offense attaches under Section 35-33.5-5-5.
The practical result is the familiar one-party consent rule: if you are a participant in a meeting or conversation, you can record it without notifying or obtaining permission from the other participants. Your own status as a party to the communication is what places the recording outside the statutory definition.
Scope of the Law
Indiana's wiretapping article covers one category of communication, not the wire, oral, and electronic trichotomy used in the federal wiretap statute. Ind. Code Section 35-31.5-2-110 defines "electronic communication," for purposes of IC 35-33.5, as any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, oral communication, digital information, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, a radio, or an electromagnetic, a photoelectronic, or a photo-optical system.
Virtual meetings conducted over platforms like Zoom, Microsoft Teams, or Google Meet fall squarely within that definition, as do telephone calls. An unaided in-person conversation that is not transmitted by any of those systems is outside IC 35-33.5 altogether. It is not covered by a one-party consent exception; the article simply does not reach it. In-person conversations are still covered by the federal Wiretap Act, which lets a participant record but makes it a federal crime to record a private in-person conversation you are not part of without a participant's consent.
What "Consent" Means for AI Recording
When a meeting participant activates an AI recording tool such as Otter.ai or Fireflies.ai, a sender or receiver of the communication is consenting to the recording, which takes the act outside the statutory definition of interception. Indiana's statute does not require that consent to be in writing or in any particular form. The act of intentionally activating the recording tool is enough.
The AI tool itself is not a party to the conversation. It functions as the recording mechanism authorized by the consenting participant, similar to pressing record on a digital voice recorder.
How AI Meeting Recorders Work Under Indiana Law
AI meeting recording tools join virtual meetings either as visible bot participants or as integrated platform features. They record audio, generate transcripts, identify speakers, produce summaries, and in some cases analyze sentiment or extract action items.
Under Indiana's one-party consent standard, the legal analysis is straightforward: if the person who activated the tool is a participant in the meeting, the recording is lawful under state law.
Common Scenarios
| Scenario | Legal in Indiana? | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| You activate an AI recorder for your own meeting | Yes | You are a party to the communication |
| Your manager activates AI recording in a team meeting | Yes | The manager is a party, so no interception occurs |
| An AI tool records a meeting where no participant activated it | Not unless a participant consents | Can be an interception; whether attendees who see the bot consent by conduct is unsettled |
| You record a meeting with participants in Illinois | Depends | Illinois all-party consent may apply |
| AI tool processes voice data for model training | Uncertain | Emerging federal litigation applies |
Cross-State Meeting Risks
Indiana borders Illinois, one of the most restrictive states for recording. A meeting between participants in Indianapolis and Chicago raises immediate legal questions. Illinois bars recording a private conversation in a surreptitious manner without every party's consent (720 ILCS 5/14-2), and its BIPA requires written consent before a voiceprint is collected. If Illinois law applies, the Indiana participant's one-party consent would not satisfy it, but courts have not settled when Illinois law reaches a recording made by someone in Indiana; Illinois statutes generally reach conduct that occurs primarily and substantially in Illinois.
For any meeting with participants in all-party consent jurisdictions (Illinois, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oregon, Pennsylvania, or Washington), the safest approach is to notify all participants and obtain explicit consent before recording. Several of these are partial: Connecticut (a civil rule) and Nevada require every party's consent only for phone calls, Oregon only for in-person conversations and video calls, and Delaware has two conflicting statutes.
Popular AI Meeting Recording Tools
Several AI meeting tools are commonly used by Indiana professionals. Each handles the consent question differently.
Otter.ai joins meetings as a visible bot participant and posts a notification in the meeting chat. Under Indiana law, the user who activated Otter provides legally sufficient one-party consent. Otter.ai faces federal litigation (In re Otter.AI Privacy Litigation, N.D. Cal., which consolidates Brewer v. Otter.ai, Walker v. Otter.ai and two related suits) alleging that its data collection practices exceed the scope of consent provided by the activating user, including Illinois BIPA claims on behalf of Illinois participants. In August 2026 the court let the core wiretap, California privacy and Illinois biometric claims proceed past a motion to dismiss.
Fireflies.ai joins as a named bot participant and records, transcribes, and summarizes meetings. Fireflies faced a BIPA class action (Cruz v. Fireflies.AI Corp., C.D. Ill. 2025) over voiceprint collection; the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice in March 2026. Indiana users are not directly affected by BIPA, but should be aware of the litigation when meetings include Illinois participants.
Microsoft Copilot integrates into Microsoft Teams, providing transcription and AI-generated meeting summaries. Teams provides platform-level recording notifications to all participants, offering a more transparent approach that also helps with cross-state compliance.
Zoom AI Companion provides meeting summaries and action items from within the Zoom platform. Zoom gives visual and audio indicators when AI features or recording are active, and the meeting host must enable these features.
Penalties for Illegal Recording in Indiana
Indiana treats unlawful interception of communications as a serious criminal offense with both criminal and civil consequences.
Criminal Penalties
Under Ind. Code Section 35-33.5-5-5(b), unlawful interception of communications is classified as a Level 5 felony. Indiana's felony sentencing structure provides the following penalties for a Level 5 felony:
| Penalty Component | Amount |
|---|---|
| Imprisonment range | 1 to 6 years |
| Advisory sentence | 3 years |
| Maximum fine | $10,000 |
A conviction can result in both imprisonment and a fine. The court has discretion within these ranges based on aggravating and mitigating factors.
Civil Liability
Indiana law also provides civil remedies for victims of unlawful interception. Under Ind. Code Section 35-33.5-5-4, a person whose communications are illegally intercepted may recover the greater of:
- Actual damages
- Liquidated damages computed at $100 for each day of violation
- $1,000
That is a single damages figure, not three separate awards that stack. On top of whichever amount is greatest, the statute allows court costs (including fees), punitive damages when the court determines they are appropriate, and reasonable attorney's fees. An action must be brought within two years after the violation initially occurs.
The civil remedies are separate from criminal prosecution. A victim can pursue civil damages even if the state does not bring criminal charges.
Voyeurism and Related Statutes
Indiana's voyeurism statute (Ind. Code Section 35-45-4-5) makes it a crime to peep, including with a camera, into another person's home or a place where people undress, such as a restroom or dressing room, without consent, or to peep at and record someone's private areas. Using a camera to peep into a home or changing area is a Level 6 felony. While primarily focused on peeping and hidden cameras, this statute could be relevant if an AI meeting tool captures video in addition to audio in private settings.
Employer and Workplace Considerations
Indiana employers using AI meeting tools should understand the legal framework and practical best practices.
The One-Party Consent Advantage
Indiana's one-party consent rule means that an employer or manager who participates in a meeting can legally activate an AI recording tool without notifying other attendees under state law. This gives Indiana employers more flexibility than their counterparts in Illinois or California.
Why Written Policies Still Matter
Despite the legal flexibility, written AI recording policies protect employers in several ways. A clear policy establishes employee expectations about when meetings may be recorded and how recordings are used. It reduces the risk of employee complaints or morale issues. It provides documentation of the employer's consent practices if the recording is later challenged. And it addresses cross-state compliance for remote or multi-location teams.
Data Handling Obligations
AI meeting tools store recordings, transcripts, and AI-generated summaries on third-party servers. Indiana's data breach notification law (Ind. Code Section 24-4.9) requires businesses to notify Indiana residents if their personal information is compromised in a data breach. Meeting recordings containing personal information could trigger these obligations if the AI tool provider experiences a breach.
Indiana Consumer Data Protection Act (ICDPA)
Indiana enacted the Indiana Consumer Data Protection Act (ICDPA), codified at Ind. Code Article 24-15. It grants consumers rights over their personal data, including the right to access, correct, delete, and opt out of certain processing.
The ICDPA does not reach employee meeting data. Ind. Code Section 24-15-2-8(b) provides that a consumer "does not include an individual acting in a commercial or employment context," so an employer's recordings of its own staff meetings fall outside the act entirely. The ICDPA can still matter when an Indiana business records meetings with customers or other individuals acting in a personal, family, or household capacity. The act treats biometric data processed to uniquely identify a person as sensitive data (Ind. Code Section 24-15-2-28), and a covered business may not process a consumer's sensitive data without that consumer's consent (Ind. Code Section 24-15-4-1(5)). So an AI tool that builds voice profiles of customers on a covered business's calls can raise an ICDPA consent issue. The act applies only to businesses that process the personal data of at least 100,000 Indiana consumers a year, or 25,000 if they earn more than half their revenue from selling personal data.
Enforcement rests solely with the Attorney General. Ind. Code Section 24-15-10-1 gives the Attorney General exclusive enforcement authority, Section 24-15-10-3 requires 30 days' written notice and an opportunity to cure before an action is filed, Section 24-15-10-2 caps civil penalties at $7,500 per violation, and Section 24-15-10-4 states that nothing in the article creates a private right of action. Individuals cannot sue an employer under the ICDPA over a recorded meeting.
Multi-State Workforce Issues
Indiana employers with remote workers in Illinois face particularly high risk. A team meeting recorded from Indianapolis where one employee participates from Chicago may bring in Illinois's eavesdropping law and potentially BIPA's voiceprint protections, although courts have not settled when Illinois law reaches a recording made from Indiana. Employers should maintain records of employee locations and, when AI recording tools are used, tell everyone and get their consent.
Federal Law and AI Recording
Federal wiretap law under 18 U.S.C. Section 2511 also lets a participant record, with one difference that matters for AI tools: under 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(d), a participant's consent does not protect a recording made to commit a criminal or tortious act, a limit Indiana's definition does not contain.
The Otter.ai Litigation (In re Otter.AI Privacy Litigation, N.D. Cal.)
The most significant pending federal case, In re Otter.AI Privacy Litigation (N.D. Cal., No. 5:25-cv-06911, formerly Brewer v. Otter.ai), challenges Otter.ai's practice of joining meetings as a bot and processing conversation data. Plaintiffs invoke the "crime-tort" exception to federal one-party consent, which withdraws the exception for a recording made for the purpose of committing a criminal or tortious act (18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(d)).
In August 2026 the court let the core wiretap, California privacy and Illinois biometric claims proceed past a motion to dismiss. The federal claim survived on the theory that using meeting conversations without consent to train Otter's own models could be a tortious purpose that defeats the federal one-party exception. That is the theory most relevant to Indiana, because it rests on federal law that applies here. The case is now in discovery, and no court has decided whether Otter actually violated the law.
The "Capability Test" (Ambriz v. Google, N.D. Cal. 2025)
In Ambriz v. Google (N.D. Cal., Feb. 10, 2025), a federal judge refused to dismiss California wiretapping claims over Google's contact-center AI. On whether a software vendor is a third-party eavesdropper under California Penal Code 631, the court noted that trial courts are split between requiring actual use of the recordings and asking only whether the vendor is capable of using them, and it applied the broader capability approach first used in Javier v. Assurance IQ (N.D. Cal. 2023).
That pleading-stage ruling is a California-law decision that binds no other court, and in October 2026 the same judge dismissed the remaining plaintiffs' claims on consent and intent grounds (with leave to amend) and sent others to arbitration. It could still matter for AI meeting tools that can use meeting data for purposes beyond the transcription the user requested.
The Ordinary Course of Business Exception
Lisota v. Heartland Dental (N.D. Ill.), a federal Wiretap Act case over RingCentral's AI phone features, was dismissed with prejudice on July 24, 2026. The court held that any interception happened in the ordinary course of RingCentral's business as the communication service provider, under 18 U.S.C. 2510(5)(a)(ii). The ruling concerns the provider's exception; it does not create a general business-use defense for employers that deploy AI tools, and it was a phone-call case, not a meeting-recorder case.
What Federal Developments Mean for Indiana
Indiana users currently benefit from the alignment of state and federal one-party consent rules. However, a federal court has already accepted the crime-tort theory against Otter.ai at the pleading stage, and California courts are split on the capability approach, so these questions could reshape the consent framework. No appellate court has decided either one, so Indiana users should monitor developments and consider whether their AI meeting tools' data practices extend beyond basic recording and transcription.
More Indiana Laws
- Indiana Data Privacy Laws
- Indiana Deepfake Laws
- Indiana Employee Monitoring Laws
- Indiana Recording Laws
Frequently Asked Questions
Is it legal to use Otter.ai or another AI notetaker during a meeting in Indiana?
Yes, generally. Indiana is a one-party consent state: Ind. Code Section 35-31.5-2-176 defines an unlawful interception to cover only recording by a person other than a sender or receiver of the communication, without the consent of a sender or receiver. If you are a participant in the meeting and you are the one who activates the AI recording tool, no interception occurs and no offense arises under Ind. Code Section 35-33.5-5-5. You are not required to notify or obtain permission from the other participants under Indiana law.
Do I have to tell other meeting participants that an AI bot is recording in Indiana?
No, not under Indiana's one-party consent rule. Because you are a party to the communication, your decision to activate the tool takes the recording outside the statutory definition of interception, and Indiana law does not require disclosure to the other attendees. Many organizations still choose to notify participants anyway and document the practice in a written policy.
What if an AI recorder captures an Indiana meeting where no participant activated it?
Unless a participant consents, it can be unlawful. The one-party consent rule works because a sender or receiver of the communication chose to record. If no one in the conversation authorized the AI tool, the recording can meet the definition of interception in Ind. Code Section 35-31.5-2-176 and be charged as a knowing or intentional interception under Ind. Code Section 35-33.5-5-5. Two questions remain open: whether attendees who see a named bot or recording notice and keep talking have consented by their conduct (federal courts accept implied consent; Indiana courts have not decided), and whether the absent account holder or the vendor is the one who intercepted.
What happens if my Indiana meeting includes a participant in Illinois?
Cross-state meetings are the main risk for Indiana users. Illinois requires all-party consent under 720 ILCS 5/14-2 and can treat voiceprint collection by AI tools as a violation of its Biometric Information Privacy Act without written consent. If Illinois law applies, an Indiana participant's one-party consent would not satisfy it, and courts have not settled when Illinois law reaches a recording made by someone in Indiana, so the safer approach is to notify everyone and obtain explicit consent before recording.
What are the penalties for illegal interception of a conversation in Indiana?
Unlawful interception is a Level 5 felony, punishable by one to six years in prison and a fine of up to $10,000. Civil remedies are also available under Ind. Code Section 35-33.5-5-4. A victim recovers the greater of actual damages, liquidated damages of $100 for each day of violation, or $1,000, and may also recover court costs, punitive damages when the court finds them appropriate, and reasonable attorney's fees.
Updates
We clarified that an AI recording made when no participant activated the tool can be unlawful unless a participant consents, with implied consent and who counts as the interceptor still unsettled, and that federal law, unlike Indiana's, withdraws one-party protection for recordings made for a criminal or tortious purpose.
We added the Indiana Consumer Data Protection Act's consent rule for biometric data, updated the Otter.ai and Lisota lawsuits to their 2026 rulings (and dropped a withdrawn conversion claim), corrected the description of Ambriz v. Google, noted that federal law still covers in-person conversations, narrowed the voyeurism statute to its actual scope, and presented when Illinois law reaches an Indiana recording as unsettled.
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources; governing law re-checked for recent changes
Corrected the legal basis for Indiana's one-party consent rule, which the page had attributed to Ind. Code Section 35-33.5-5-5 rather than to the definition of interception in Ind. Code Section 35-31.5-2-176; fixed the description of the statute's scope, clarified that civil damages are the greater of actual damages, $100 per day, or $1,000 rather than stacked awards, corrected the statement that the Indiana Consumer Data Protection Act reaches employee meeting data, and replaced a broken statutory link with direct links to the official Indiana Code.
Corrected present-tense 'faces' framing: the Cruz v. Fireflies.AI BIPA lawsuit was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice in March 2026.
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources
Governing law re-checked for recent changes
Corrected a factual error: unlawful interception of communications under Ind. Code § 35-33.5-5-5 was listed as a Level 6 felony (6 months to 2.5 years imprisonment, 1-year advisory sentence), but the statute actually classifies it as a Level 5 felony, carrying 1 to 6 years imprisonment with a 3-year advisory sentence under Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6. The $10,000 maximum fine was already correct and is unchanged. Updated the KeyTakeaways, penalty table, penalty-section prose, and FAQ answer to reflect the correct felony level and sentencing range.
Reviewed and approved by an editor
The Law Behind This Article
This article rests on the statutory provisions below, held in our own legal record and retrieved from the official source. Tap a section to read the operative text.
Indiana Code, TITLE 35. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 35-33.5-5-5Nonapplicability to interceptions authorized under federal law; classification of offensesIn forcecited in 15 of our articles
Sec. 5. (a) This section does not apply to a person who makes an interception authorized under federal law. (b) A person who knowingly or intentionally intercepts a communication in violation of this article commits unlawful interception, a Level 5 felony. (c) A person who, by virtue of the person's employment or official capacity in the criminal justice system, knowingly or intentionally uses or discloses the contents of an interception in violation of this article commits unlawful use or disclosure of an interception, a Level 5 felony.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-08-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at iga.in.gov
Cited in 2 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2007
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Edwards v. State (Indiana Court of Appeals 2007, 862 N.E.2d 1254)“…or disclosure of an interception, a Class C felony. I.C. § 35-33.5-5-5. The Indiana Wiretap Act defines interc…”
- State of Indiana v. John Lombardo (Indiana Supreme Court 2000)“…disclosure of an interception, a Class C felony. Ind. Code § 35-33.5-5-5 (1993) (emphases added). The statute…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Indiana Smart Glasses Recording Laws 2025, Indiana Recording Laws (2026): One-Party Consent Rules, Indiana Audio Recording Laws: One-Party Consent Rules and Penalties
§ 35-31.5-2-176"Interception"In forcecited in 8 of our articles
Sec. 176. "Interception", for purposes of IC 35-33.5, means the intentional recording or acquisition of the contents of an electronic communication by a person other than a sender or receiver of that communication, without the consent of the sender or receiver, by means of any instrument, device, or equipment under this article. This term includes the intentional recording or acquisition of communication through the use of a computer or a fax (facsimile transmission) machine. The term does not include recording or acquiring the contents of a radio transmission that is not: (1) scrambled or encrypted; (2) transmitted using modulation techniques whose essential parameters have been withheld from the public with the intention of preserving the privacy of the communication; (3) carried on a subcarrier or other signal subsidiary to a radio transmission; (4) transmitted over a communication system provided by a common carrier, unless the communication is a tone only paging system communication; or (5) transmitted on frequencies allocated under part 25, subpart D, E, or F of part 74, or part 94 of the Rules of the Federal Communications Commission, unless, in the case of…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at iga.in.gov
Cited in 1 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2019
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Edward Gaeta v. The Huntington National Bank (mem. dec.) (Indiana Court of Appeals 2019)“…App. 2005) (citing Ind. Code § 35-33.5-1-5 (now codified at Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-176)), trans. denied; see also Wynne…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Indiana Phone Call Recording Laws: One-Party Consent Rules Explained, Indiana Employee Monitoring Laws (2026): Tracking, GPS & More, Indiana Nursing Home Camera Laws: No Statute After SB 378 Died
§ 35-33.5-5-4Violations; cause of action; damages and costs; defenses; statute of limitationsIn forcecited in 8 of our articles
Sec. 4. (a) A person whose communications are intercepted, disclosed, or used in violation of this article: (1) has a civil cause of action against a person who intercepts, discloses, uses, or procures another person to intercept, disclose, or use a communication in violation of this article; and (2) is entitled to recover from that person the following: (A) The greater of: (i) actual damages; (ii) liquidated damages computed at a rate of one hundred dollars ($100) each day for each day of violation; or (iii) one thousand dollars ($1,000). (B) Court costs (including fees). (C) Punitive damages, when determined to be appropriate by the court. (D) Reasonable attorney's fees. (b) A good faith reliance on a warrant or an extension issued under this article constitutes a complete defense to a civil action brought under this section.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at iga.in.gov
Cited in 1 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2011
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Rene v. G.F. Fishers, Inc. (District Court, S.D. Indiana 2011, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1090)“…ercepted, disclosed, or used in violation of this article.” Ind.Code 35-33.5-5-4. Rene claims that, by accessing, viewin…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Indiana Voyeurism and Hidden Camera Laws: Statutes and Penalties, Indiana Workplace Recording Laws: Employee Rights and Employer Rules, Indiana Surveillance Camera Laws: Video and Audio (2027)
§ 35-45-4-5Voyeurism; public voyeurism; aerial voyeurismIn forcecited in 16 of our articles
Sec. 5. (a) The following definitions apply throughout this section: (1) "Camera" means a camera, a video camera, a device that captures a digital image, or any other type of video recording device. (2) "Peep" means: (A) any looking of a clandestine, surreptitious, prying, or secretive nature; or (B) using a concealed camera with the intent of capturing an intimate image (as defined by IC 34-21.5-2-1). (3) "Private area" means the naked or undergarment clad genitals, pubic area, or buttocks of an individual. (b) A person: (1) who knowingly or intentionally: (A) peeps; or (B) goes upon the land of another with the intent to peep; into an occupied dwelling of another person; or (2) who knowingly or intentionally peeps in or into an area where an occupant of the area reasonably can be expected to disrobe or is actually expected to disrobe, including: (A) restrooms; (B) baths; (C) showers; and (D) dressing rooms; without the consent of the other person, commits voyeurism, a Class B misdemeanor.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at iga.in.gov
Cited in 19 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Casady v. State (2010) held restrooms and showers are areas where occupants reasonably can be expected to disrobe under 35-45-4-5, whether or not they actually did. Steven M. Sandleben v. State of Indiana (2014) read the public voyeurism definition of private area disjunctively, covering undergarment-clad or naked areas.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Casady v. State (Indiana Court of Appeals 2010, 934 N.E.2d 1181)✓A man videotaped men at urinals and in a shower while hiding in a stall and a doorway; the court affirmed his voyeurism convictions, holding the filming was a clandestine peep and that restrooms are listed places where occupants can reasonably be expected to disrobe.
- Steven M. Sandleben v. State of Indiana (Indiana Court of Appeals 2014, 22 N.E.3d 782)✓A man put a camera under a four-year-old's skort in a store and filmed two girls underwater at a pool; the court upheld his public voyeurism convictions, holding the statute reaches naked or undergarment clad areas and was not vague as applied to him.
- David Delagrange v. State of Indiana (Indiana Court of Appeals 2013, 981 N.E.2d 1227)“…e other person, commits voyeurism, a Class B misdemeanor. Ind.Code § 35-45-4-5(a) (2005). After Delagrange committed t…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Indiana Landlord-Tenant Recording Laws: Rights for Renters and Property Owners, Indiana Medical Recording Laws: Patient Rights, HIPAA, and Provider Rules, Indiana Laws on Recording in Public: Rights, Limits, and Practical Rules
§ 35-31.5-2-110"Electronic communications"In forcecited in 10 of our articles
Sec. 110. "Electronic communication", for purposes of IC 35-33.5, means any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, oral communication, digital information, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, a radio, or an electromagnetic, a photoelectronic, or a photo-optical system.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at iga.in.gov
Also relied on in: Indiana School Recording Laws: Student Privacy, FERPA, and Parent Rights, Indiana Ring Doorbell Laws: What You Need to Know in 2026
United States Code Title 18
§ 2511Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications prohibitedIn forcecited in 441 of our articles
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who— intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication; intentionally uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to use or endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral communication when— such device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a signal through, a wire, cable, or other like connection used in wire communication; or such device transmits communications by radio, or interferes with the transmission of such communication; or such person knows, or has reason to know, that such device or any component thereof has been sent through the mail or transported in interstate or foreign commerce; or such use or endeavor to use (A) takes place on the premises of any business or other commercial establishment the operations of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or (B) obtains or is for the purpose of obtaining information relating to the operations of any business or other commercial establishment the operations of which affect interstate or foreign…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-17 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 2,045 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Griggs-Ryan v. Smith (1990) applied the Section 2511(2)(d) prior-consent exception, treating a tenant repeatedly told that all incoming calls were taped as having impliedly consented. United States v. United States District Court (1972) read the then-current Section 2511(3) as conferring no presidential surveillance power.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Mitchell v. Forsyth (Supreme Court of the United States 1985, 472 U.S. 511)✓The Attorney General authorized a warrantless 1970 national security wiretap that caught the plaintiff's calls; the Court held the since-repealed Section 2511(3) disclaimer left the tap lawful under Title III, and that Mitchell had qualified immunity.
- United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (Supreme Court of the United States 1972, 407 U.S. 297)✓The Attorney General approved warrantless wiretaps on members of a domestic group accused of bombing a CIA office; the Court read Section 2511(3) as a congressional disclaimer conferring no surveillance power, then held the Fourth Amendment required prior judicial approval.
- Forsyth v. Barr (Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 1994, 19 F.3d 1527)✓Dallas police used, in an internal affairs probe of an officer, calls private parties allegedly intercepted illegally; assuming that was unlawful, the Fifth Circuit held Section 2517(1) and (2) allowed the disclosure and use, defeating the Section 2511(1)(c) and (d) claims.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Can an Employer Record Conversations Without Consent? (2026), Can I Record My Boss Harassing Me? State-by-State Legal Guide (2026), Can I Sue Someone for Recording Me on Private or Public Property?
Illinois Compiled Statutes Chapter 720, Act 5 (Criminal Code of 2012)
§ 14-2Elements of the offense; affirmative defenseIn forcecited in 63 of our articles
(a) A person commits eavesdropping when he or she knowingly and intentionally: (1) Uses an eavesdropping device, in a surreptitious manner, for the purpose of overhearing, transmitting, or recording all or any part of any private conversation to which he or she is not a party unless he or she does so with the consent of all of the parties to the private conversation; (2) Uses an eavesdropping device, in a surreptitious manner, for the purpose of transmitting or recording all or any part of any private conversation to which he or she is a party unless he or she does so with the consent of all other parties to the private conversation; (3) Intercepts, records, or transcribes, in a surreptitious manner, any private electronic communication to which he or she is not a party unless he or she does so with the consent of all parties to the private electronic communication; (4) Manufactures, assembles, distributes, or possesses any electronic, mechanical, eavesdropping, or other device knowing that or having reason to know that the design of the device renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious overhearing, transmitting, or recording of private conversations or the…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-23 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ilga.gov
Cited in 92 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- People v. Melongo (Illinois Supreme Court 2014, 2014 IL 114852)“…ations of section 14-2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/14-2 (West 2008)), which defines the offense…”
- People v. Smith (Appellate Court of Illinois 2025, 2025 IL App (1st) 220116)“…ropping violated section 14-2 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/14-2 (West 2014)) and that then State’s Att…”
- Cook Au Vin, LLC v. Mid-Century Insurance Co. (Appellate Court of Illinois 2023, 226 N.E.3d 694)“…onversation by one who is not a party to the conversation. 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1) (West 2020). In enacting the stat…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Illinois Recording Laws (2026): All-Party Consent Rules, Illinois Audio Recording Laws: All-Party Consent Rules and Penalties (2026), Illinois Dashcam Laws: Audio Rules, Placement, and Legal Use (2026)
Indiana Code, TITLE 24. TRADE REGULATION
§ 24-15-10-1Attorney general's exclusive enforcement authorityIn forcecited in 4 of our articles
Sec. 1. The attorney general has exclusive authority to enforce the provisions of this article.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at iga.in.gov
Also relied on in: INCDPA Compliance Checklist for Indiana Businesses, INCDPA Consumer Rights: Indiana Data Privacy Rights, What Is the INCDPA? Indiana's Data Privacy Law
§ 24-15-2-8"Consumer"In force
Sec. 8. (a) "Consumer" means an individual who: (1) is a resident of Indiana; and (2) is acting only for a personal, family, or household purpose. (b) The term does not include an individual acting in a commercial or employment context.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at iga.in.gov
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This article also draws on these acts and chapters (opening at their first section): Indiana Code, TITLE 35. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 35-33.5-2-1 (Application for warrant by prosecuting or designated deputy prosecuting attorney; coapplicant; interception equipment under control of state police; reimbursement to state police)
Related law for further reading — not part of this article’s citations.
Sources and References
- Indiana Code Title 35, Article 33.5 - Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance(in.gov).gov
- Indiana Attorney General - Data Breach Notification(in.gov).gov
- 18 U.S.C. Section 2511 - Federal Wiretap Act(law.cornell.edu)
- In re Otter.AI Privacy Litigation (formerly Brewer v. Otter.ai) - NPR coverage of the original complaint(npr.org)
- Cruz v. Fireflies.AI Corp. - BIPA Class Action(natlawreview.com)
- Walker v. Otter.ai - BIPA Class Action(workplaceprivacyreport.com)
- Ambriz v. Google - Capability Test(goodwinlaw.com)
- Lisota v. Heartland Dental - ECPA Dismissal(troutmanprivacy.com)
- Indiana Recording Laws - Reporters Committee(rcfp.org)
- Ind. Code Section 35-33.5-5-5 - Nonapplicability to interceptions authorized under federal law; classification of offenses(iga.in.gov)
- Ind. Code Section 35-31.5-2-176 - Definition of "Interception" for purposes of IC 35-33.5(iga.in.gov)
- Ind. Code Section 35-31.5-2-110 - Definition of "Electronic communications" for purposes of IC 35-33.5(iga.in.gov)
- Ind. Code Section 35-33.5-5-4 - Violations; cause of action; damages and costs; defenses; statute of limitations(iga.in.gov)
- Ind. Code Section 24-15-2-8 - ICDPA definition of "Consumer" (excludes commercial and employment contexts)(iga.in.gov)
- Ind. Code Section 24-15-10-1 - Attorney general's exclusive authority to enforce the ICDPA(iga.in.gov)