Illinois
Illinois AI Meeting Recording Laws (2026)
Independently fact-checked against primary sources (last audited August 16, 2026). · Reviewed by the RecordingLaw editorial team. · Law checked current as of August 16, 2026. · 3 primary sources cited on this page. How we verify our legal content
Illinois requires all-party consent under 720 ILCS 5/14-2, which makes it unlawful to record a private conversation in a surreptitious manner without the agreement of every participant. Most AI meeting tools also trigger the Biometric Information Privacy Act (740 ILCS 14), which mandates written consent before collecting voiceprints, creating dual legal exposure for operators and users.
Illinois presents the most legally hostile environment in the United States for AI meeting recording tools. Where most states require consent from only one party to a conversation, Illinois demands consent from all parties under its eavesdropping statute. That alone would make the state challenging for AI meeting recorders, but Illinois layers on a second, arguably more powerful law: the Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA), which treats voiceprints as protected biometric data requiring written consent, purpose disclosure, and public retention policies before any collection can occur.
The result is a dual-threat legal framework that has already produced multiple lawsuits against AI meeting tool providers. As of April 2026, companies operating these tools in Illinois face potential criminal prosecution under the eavesdropping statute, class action liability under BIPA, and new employment discrimination restrictions under HB 3773. This guide covers each layer of Illinois law, the active litigation, penalties, and what it all means for anyone using AI meeting tools in or with participants in Illinois. Consult an attorney for advice specific to your situation.
Illinois Eavesdropping Law: All-Party Consent
The Current Statute
Under the Illinois eavesdropping statute, 720 ILCS 5/14-2, a person commits eavesdropping when he or she "uses an eavesdropping device, in a surreptitious manner, for the purpose of overhearing, transmitting, or recording all or any part of any private conversation to which he or she is not a party unless he or she does so with the consent of all of the parties to the private conversation." Subsection (a)(2) applies the same rule to a conversation the recorder is a party to, and subsection (a)(3) extends it to intercepting or transcribing a private electronic communication. Our Illinois recording laws guide covers the statute in general terms.
Two elements have to be met, not one. The recording must capture a private conversation, and it must be made in a surreptitious manner. Section 14-1(g) defines "surreptitious" as "obtained or made by stealth or deception, or executed through secrecy or concealment." A recording made openly, where the device and its operation are apparent to the participants, does not obviously satisfy that element even if not every participant affirmatively agreed. Illinois courts have not squarely applied the surreptitious-manner element to an AI notetaker, so how far it reaches in this context is unsettled.
That two-element structure is a critical distinction from one-party consent states like Idaho or Indiana, where a participant's own consent is sufficient no matter how the recording is made. It also means the safest reading for anyone recording in Illinois is still to obtain consent from every participant, because relying on openness alone means relying on an element that has not been tested for this technology.
History: Unconstitutional, Then Re-enacted
Illinois's eavesdropping statute has a turbulent legal history. On March 20, 2014, the Illinois Supreme Court declared the original statute unconstitutional in People v. Clark, 2014 IL 115776. The court held that the prior version was overbroad because it criminalized the recording of conversations where no party had a reasonable expectation of privacy, including recording police officers in public.
On December 30, 2014, Governor Pat Quinn signed SB 1342, which created the current eavesdropping law. The re-enacted version narrowed the statute's scope in two ways that matter here: it limited the offense to "private conversations," defined as oral communications between two or more persons where at least one party intended the communication to be private under circumstances reasonably justifying that expectation, and it added the surreptitious-manner element discussed above.
What Counts as a "Private Conversation"
The re-enacted statute defines a private conversation as one where at least one participant intended the communication to be private under circumstances that reasonably justify that expectation. A business meeting conducted over Zoom, Teams, or Google Meet between a limited number of identified participants would generally qualify as a private conversation under this standard.
Public meetings, broadcasts, and conversations where participants have no reasonable expectation of privacy fall outside the statute's scope. Section 14-2(e) also provides that nothing in the Article prohibits an individual who is not a law enforcement officer from recording a law enforcement officer in the performance of his or her duties in a public place, or in circumstances in which the officer has no reasonable expectation of privacy.
Application to AI Meeting Tools
When an AI meeting recorder captures a private virtual meeting in Illinois, whether the eavesdropping statute is violated turns on both elements. If the tool records without the participants' knowledge, by stealth, deception, secrecy, or concealment, the operator needs the consent of all parties. If the tool joins openly as a named, visible participant and announces that it is recording, the surreptitious-manner element is genuinely contested, and a prosecution under 14-2 would be a harder case.
That is a narrow and untested defense, not a green light. It does nothing for the BIPA analysis below, which is the more predictable exposure and applies to open and covert recording alike. The practical guidance is unchanged: obtain consent from every participant before recording begins.
BIPA: The Biometric Privacy Layer
The Biometric Information Privacy Act (740 ILCS 14), enacted in 2008, creates a separate and independent legal framework that applies to AI meeting tools operating in Illinois. BIPA governs the collection, use, storage, and destruction of biometric identifiers, which explicitly include voiceprints.
Why Voiceprints Matter for AI Meeting Tools
BIPA defines "biometric identifier" to include "a retina or iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or scan of hand or face geometry." AI meeting tools that perform speaker identification, speaker diarization (labeling who said what), or voice-based sentiment analysis create voiceprints as part of their processing pipeline. Under BIPA, these voiceprints are protected biometric data subject to strict consent and handling requirements.
BIPA's Core Requirements
Before collecting any biometric identifier, a private entity must satisfy four requirements under 740 ILCS 14/15:
- Written notice: Inform the individual in writing that biometric data is being collected or stored
- Purpose disclosure: Inform the individual of the specific purpose and length of time for which the data will be collected, stored, and used
- Written release: Obtain a written release from the individual authorizing the collection
- Public retention policy: Develop and make publicly available a written policy establishing a retention schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying biometric data when the initial purpose is satisfied or within three years of the individual's last interaction, whichever comes first
These requirements create significant compliance challenges for AI meeting tools. A tool like Otter.ai or Fireflies.ai that joins a meeting and processes voices must, under BIPA, provide written notice to each Illinois participant, explain exactly why it is collecting their voiceprint and how long the data will be kept, obtain each participant's written release, and maintain a publicly available retention and destruction policy. Notably, none of this turns on whether the tool recorded openly or covertly, which is why BIPA is the stronger exposure of the two.
The 2024 BIPA Amendment
On August 2, 2024, Governor JB Pritzker signed SB 2979, which amended BIPA's damages provisions. The amendment clarified that an individual can recover statutory damages only once per type of violation, rather than per each individual scan or collection. This change addressed concerns that damages could multiply into astronomical sums based on repeated routine biometric scans, but it does not eliminate the per-person damages structure that makes class actions viable.
BIPA Statutory Damages
| Violation Type | Damages Per Violation |
|---|---|
| Negligent violation | $1,000 |
| Reckless or intentional violation | $5,000 |
| Attorney fees and costs | Recoverable |
| Injunctive relief | Available |
Even with the 2024 amendment limiting damages to one recovery per type of violation per person, the potential class-wide liability for an AI meeting tool with thousands of Illinois users remains substantial. A tool that collected voiceprints from 10,000 Illinois residents without consent could face $10 million to $50 million in statutory damages alone.
Litigation Against AI Meeting Tools
Three lawsuits filed in 2025 directly target AI meeting recorders, and all three have connections to Illinois law. One of the three, Cruz v. Fireflies.AI Corp., was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice in March 2026 and is no longer pending; it is discussed below as an illustration of the legal theory, not as active litigation.
Cruz v. Fireflies.AI Corp. (C.D. Ill., Dec. 2025, voluntarily dismissed Mar. 2026)
Filed on December 18, 2025, in the Central District of Illinois (Case No. 3:25-cv-03399), this BIPA class action alleged that Fireflies.ai's meeting assistant collected voiceprints from virtual meeting participants without providing the required written notice, obtaining written consent, or maintaining a public data retention and destruction policy. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice on March 11, 2026, so it is no longer pending; a complaint is an allegation, not a court ruling, and this one was never decided on the merits.
The complaint specifically alleged that the Fireflies tool records, analyzes, transcribes, and stores voices of meeting participants, including the voices of people who are not Fireflies users, without any of the safeguards BIPA requires. The complaint sought to represent a class of all Illinois residents whose biometric speaker data was collected by Fireflies without consent, but the case was dismissed before any class was certified or any allegation was tested in court.
Walker v. Otter.ai (N.D. Cal., Aug. 2025)
Filed on August 26, 2025, in the Northern District of California (Case No. 5:25-cv-07187), this BIPA class action alleges that Otter.ai's transcription software collects and uses voiceprints from meeting participants without providing written notice, obtaining written consent, or maintaining the required public retention schedule.
The plaintiffs allege that Otter's system captures voiceprints during video conference calls and uses those voiceprints to identify speakers in later meetings. The proposed class includes all individuals whose voiceprints were collected by Otter.ai while they were in Illinois during the five years preceding the complaint. Although filed in California, the case applies Illinois BIPA because the plaintiffs were located in Illinois when the alleged collection occurred.
Lisota v. Heartland Dental (N.D. Ill., July 2025)
Filed on July 3, 2025, in the Northern District of Illinois, this case takes a different legal angle. Plaintiff Megan Lisota alleged that dental support organization Heartland Dental used RingCentral's AI product to listen to, analyze, and transcribe patient calls in violation of the Federal Wiretap Act (18 U.S.C. Section 2511). The complaint noted that RingCentral's AI provided real-time voice transcription, call highlights, automated summaries, and sentiment voice analysis.
On January 13, 2026, the court granted motions to dismiss, ruling that the alleged interception fell within the "ordinary course of business" exception under ECPA. This ruling provides some guidance for AI tool providers, but it applies to the federal wiretap claim; BIPA claims proceed under a separate legal theory that the ordinary course of business exception does not cover.
The Broader BIPA Enforcement Landscape
Illinois BIPA has become the most aggressively enforced biometric privacy law in the country, and the wave of enforcement directly affects AI meeting tools.
2025 BIPA Litigation Volume
Over 107 new BIPA class actions were filed in 2025 alone, targeting companies across industries for collecting biometric data without the required notice and consent procedures. The pace of litigation shows no signs of slowing.
Landmark BIPA Settlements
| Case | Settlement Amount | Year |
|---|---|---|
| Clearview AI | $51.75 million (equity) | 2025 |
| Speedway | $12.1 million | 2025 |
| Facebook (Meta) | $650 million | 2021 |
| TikTok | $92 million | 2022 |
The Clearview AI settlement, approved on March 20, 2025, was notable for its structure: class members received a 23% equity stake in Clearview AI valued at approximately $51.75 million, rather than a cash payment. The settlement resolved claims that Clearview scraped facial images and created biometric identifiers without consent.
These settlement figures illustrate the financial stakes for AI meeting tool providers that collect voiceprints from Illinois residents without BIPA-compliant consent procedures.
HB 3773: AI Employment Discrimination (Effective Jan. 1, 2026)
Illinois HB 3773, signed by Governor Pritzker on August 9, 2024 and effective January 1, 2026, adds a third regulatory layer for AI meeting tools used in workplace settings. The law amends the Illinois Human Rights Act to expressly prohibit employers from using AI that has the effect of subjecting employees to discrimination based on protected classes.
What HB 3773 Covers
The law prohibits employers from using AI, including generative AI, in ways that discriminate against employees with respect to recruitment, hiring, promotion, renewal of employment, selection for training or apprenticeship, discharge, discipline, tenure, or the terms, privileges, or conditions of employment. It also prohibits using zip codes as a proxy for protected classes.
Notice Requirements
HB 3773 requires employers to notify employees and applicants when AI is being used during any of these employment processes. This notice requirement applies regardless of whether the AI tool's use is directly discriminatory.
How This Applies to AI Meeting Tools
AI meeting tools that go beyond basic transcription into sentiment analysis, performance evaluation, or participation tracking could fall within HB 3773's scope. For example, an AI meeting tool that analyzes an employee's speaking patterns, engagement level, or communication style during meetings, and that data influences employment decisions, could trigger both the notice requirement and the anti-discrimination provision.
The Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR) is developing implementing rules, but the core statutory requirements took effect on January 1, 2026.
Popular AI Meeting Tools and Illinois Compliance
The major AI meeting tools each face distinct compliance challenges in Illinois.
Otter.ai joins meetings as a visible bot and announces its presence in meeting chat. That visibility cuts against the surreptitious-manner element of the eavesdropping statute, so an open, self-announcing bot is not a clear 14-2 violation, though it also falls short of the actual all-party consent the statute contemplates when the element is met. What the notification plainly does not satisfy is BIPA's written consent requirement, and Otter faces active class action litigation under BIPA (Walker v. Otter.ai).
Fireflies.ai joins as a bot participant named "Fireflies.ai Notetaker." The same analysis applies: the named, visible bot weakens an eavesdropping theory, but the notification mechanism does not constitute the written consent BIPA requires. Fireflies faced BIPA litigation over this practice (Cruz v. Fireflies.AI Corp.), which the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed without prejudice in March 2026.
Microsoft Copilot in Teams operates differently by providing platform-level recording notifications and requiring the meeting organizer to enable recording, which all participants can see. This approach makes an eavesdropping claim harder still, but written BIPA consent for voiceprint collection would remain a separate obligation.
Zoom AI Companion provides visual and audio indicators when active. Zoom's approach of requiring the host to enable AI features and providing clear participant notices addresses the eavesdropping issue more directly, but BIPA's written consent requirement remains a separate obligation.
No major AI meeting tool currently provides a BIPA-compliant consent mechanism by default. Employers and users in Illinois who rely on these tools bear the legal responsibility for ensuring all required consents are obtained.
Penalties for Violations in Illinois
Eavesdropping Penalties (720 ILCS 5/14-4)
The offense classifications below come from 720 ILCS 5/14-4; the sentencing ranges come from 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5.
| Offense | Classification | Penalty |
|---|---|---|
| First offense (non-law enforcement) | Class 4 felony | 1 to 3 years imprisonment, up to $25,000 fine |
| Subsequent offense | Class 3 felony | 2 to 5 years imprisonment |
| Recording law enforcement, first offense | Class 3 felony | 2 to 5 years imprisonment |
| Recording law enforcement, subsequent offense | Class 2 felony | 3 to 7 years imprisonment |
BIPA Penalties (740 ILCS 14/20)
| Violation Type | Statutory Damages |
|---|---|
| Negligent | $1,000 per violation |
| Reckless or intentional | $5,000 per violation |
| Attorney fees and costs | Recoverable by prevailing plaintiff |
| Injunctive relief | Available |
Combined Exposure
An AI meeting tool that surreptitiously records a private meeting without all-party consent and simultaneously collects voiceprints without BIPA-compliant procedures faces both criminal eavesdropping charges and civil BIPA class action liability. The criminal penalties apply to the individuals who operated the recording, while the BIPA claims typically target the corporate entity behind the tool.
Employer and Workplace Considerations
Illinois employers face the most complex compliance landscape in the country when deploying AI meeting tools.
Three-Layer Compliance Framework
Employers must navigate three separate legal requirements simultaneously:
- Eavesdropping compliance: Obtain consent from all meeting participants before activating any AI recording or transcription tool in private meetings, and never let a tool record covertly
- BIPA compliance: Provide written notice, obtain written releases, and maintain public retention policies for any voiceprint data collected by AI tools
- HB 3773 compliance: Notify employees when AI is used in employment-related processes, and ensure AI tools do not produce discriminatory effects
Practical Steps for Employers
Organizations using AI meeting tools with Illinois participants should consider implementing a written AI meeting recording policy that addresses all three legal requirements. Before activating AI recording in any meeting with Illinois participants, obtain documented consent from all participants that satisfies both the eavesdropping statute and BIPA. Maintain a publicly available biometric data retention and destruction policy. Audit AI meeting tools for any sentiment analysis, performance evaluation, or other features that could implicate HB 3773. Train managers and meeting organizers on Illinois's unique requirements.
Remote Work and Multi-State Meetings
The growth of remote work has amplified the practical impact of Illinois's strict consent requirements. Even if an employer is based outside Illinois, any meeting participant located in Illinois brings the state's eavesdropping and BIPA requirements into play. A company headquartered in Idaho conducting a team meeting where one employee works from Chicago must comply with Illinois law for that meeting.
Federal Law Context
Federal wiretap law under 18 U.S.C. Section 2511 establishes a one-party consent baseline, but Illinois's stricter standard controls for conduct occurring within the state. The federal law does not preempt state wiretapping statutes that provide greater privacy protections.
The "Capability Test" (Ambriz v. Google, N.D. Cal. 2025)
The federal "capability test" established in Ambriz v. Google adds another dimension. The court ruled that a company's technical capability to use intercepted communications for AI training was sufficient to state a wiretap claim, even absent evidence the company actually used the data that way. For Illinois, this test reinforces the legal risk: AI meeting tools that have the capability to process meeting data for purposes beyond transcription face additional liability theories beyond the state's already strict requirements.
The Ordinary Course of Business Exception
The Lisota v. Heartland Dental dismissal (N.D. Ill., Jan. 2026) showed that the federal "ordinary course of business" exception can shield some AI recording uses from federal wiretap claims. However, this exception is narrow and does not apply to BIPA claims or Illinois eavesdropping claims. It may protect companies using AI call analytics in their core business operations, but it does not create a general safe harbor for AI meeting recording.
More Illinois Laws
- Illinois Data Privacy Laws
- Illinois Deepfake Laws
- Illinois Employee Monitoring Laws
- Illinois Recording Laws
Frequently Asked Questions
Is it legal to use an AI meeting recorder like Otter.ai or Fireflies.ai in Illinois?
Not without extra steps. Illinois requires all-party consent under 720 ILCS 5/14-2 for a private conversation recorded in a surreptitious manner, so a tool that records covertly needs every participant's agreement. Separately, and regardless of how visible the tool is, most AI meeting tools process voices to identify speakers, which can trigger Illinois' Biometric Information Privacy Act (740 ILCS 14) and its written consent requirements. No major AI meeting tool currently provides a BIPA compliant consent mechanism by default, so the legal responsibility for obtaining proper consent generally falls on whoever is operating the tool.
Do I have to notify everyone in a meeting before turning on an AI notetaker in Illinois?
Notice and consent are not the same thing, and the safe practice is to get consent. The eavesdropping statute, 720 ILCS 5/14-2, applies to recording done in a surreptitious manner, which section 14-1(g) defines as made by stealth or deception or executed through secrecy or concealment. A bot that joins openly under its own name and announces itself is arguably not recording surreptitiously, so whether 14-2 is violated in that situation is genuinely contested and has not been settled by an Illinois court. That argument does nothing for BIPA, which requires a written release before a voiceprint is collected whether the recording was open or covert. Obtaining actual consent from every participant satisfies both.
Why does Illinois' Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) matter for AI meeting tools?
AI meeting tools that identify speakers, label who said what, or run voice based sentiment analysis typically create a voiceprint, which BIPA (740 ILCS 14) treats as protected biometric data. Before collecting it, an operator generally must provide written notice, disclose the purpose and retention period, obtain a written release from each participant, and maintain a publicly available data retention and destruction policy. BIPA is the more predictable exposure of the two Illinois laws because, unlike the eavesdropping statute, it does not matter whether the recording was surreptitious.
What are the penalties for illegally recording a meeting in Illinois?
Eavesdropping is a Class 4 felony for a first offense, punishable by 1 to 3 years in prison and up to a $25,000 fine, and a Class 3 felony (2 to 5 years) for a subsequent offense. Illegally recording a law enforcement officer, State's Attorney, or judge carries its own enhanced penalty: a Class 3 felony (2 to 5 years) for a first offense and a Class 2 felony (3 to 7 years) for a subsequent offense. Separately, BIPA violations can carry statutory damages of $1,000 per negligent violation or $5,000 per reckless or intentional violation, plus attorney fees, and these claims are frequently brought as class actions.
Does Illinois' new AI employment law (HB 3773) affect AI meeting recording tools?
It can, for tools used in employment decisions. HB 3773, effective January 1, 2026, prohibits employers from using AI that has a discriminatory effect on employees and generally requires notice when AI is used in hiring, promotion, discipline, or similar decisions. An AI meeting tool that analyzes an employee's sentiment, engagement, or communication style, where that data feeds into employment decisions, could trigger HB 3773's notice and anti-discrimination requirements in addition to the eavesdropping and BIPA rules.
Affected by a data breach or biometric privacy violation?
If your personal data was exposed in a breach, or your fingerprint or face scan was collected without your consent, you may be eligible to join a claim for compensation. Find out for free, with no obligation.
Updates
Corrected the statement of the Illinois eavesdropping offense to include the statute's surreptitious manner element and the 720 ILCS 5/14-1(g) definition of that term, softened the conclusion that an openly announced AI notetaker violates 720 ILCS 5/14-2 to reflect that the question is genuinely contested, repaired a mangled internal link in the sentence about recording law enforcement officers, and added direct ilga.gov citations for 720 ILCS 5/14-2 and 720 ILCS 5/14-4.
Corrected active/present-tense litigation framing throughout the page (section heading, the Cruz subsection, KeyTakeaways, and the tool-comparison table): the Cruz v. Fireflies.AI BIPA lawsuit was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice in March 2026 and is no longer pending.
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources; governing law re-checked for recent changes
Governing law re-checked for recent changes
Corrected a factual error in the criminal-penalties table and FAQ: verified 720 ILCS 5/14-4 and 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5 directly against ilga.gov. The 'subsequent offense' eavesdropping penalty was misstated as 3 to 7 years imprisonment; a Class 3 felony's actual sentencing range under 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-40 is 2 to 5 years (3 to 7 years is the Class 2 felony range). The 'recording law enforcement unlawfully' row made the same error and also collapsed two distinct tiers into one: under 720 ILCS 5/14-4(b), a first offense against a law enforcement officer, State's Attorney, or judge is a Class 3 felony (2 to 5 years), while a second or subsequent such offense is a Class 2 felony (3 to 7 years). The table now lists all four tiers correctly and the FAQ answer was updated to match. The Class 4 felony first-offense figures (1 to 3 years, up to $25,000 fine) and the BIPA statutory-damages figures were already correct and left unchanged.
Reviewed and approved by an editor
The Law Behind This Article
This article rests on the statutory provisions below, held in our own legal record and retrieved from the official source. Tap a section to read the operative text.
Illinois Compiled Statutes Chapter 720, Act 5 (Criminal Code of 2012)
§ 14-2Elements of the offense; affirmative defenseIn forcecited in 63 of our articles
(a) A person commits eavesdropping when he or she knowingly and intentionally: (1) Uses an eavesdropping device, in a surreptitious manner, for the purpose of overhearing, transmitting, or recording all or any part of any private conversation to which he or she is not a party unless he or she does so with the consent of all of the parties to the private conversation; (2) Uses an eavesdropping device, in a surreptitious manner, for the purpose of transmitting or recording all or any part of any private conversation to which he or she is a party unless he or she does so with the consent of all other parties to the private conversation; (3) Intercepts, records, or transcribes, in a surreptitious manner, any private electronic communication to which he or she is not a party unless he or she does so with the consent of all parties to the private electronic communication; (4) Manufactures, assembles, distributes, or possesses any electronic, mechanical, eavesdropping, or other device knowing that or having reason to know that the design of the device renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious overhearing, transmitting, or recording of private conversations or the…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-23 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ilga.gov
Cited in 92 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- People v. Melongo (Illinois Supreme Court 2014, 2014 IL 114852)“…ations of section 14-2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/14-2 (West 2008)), which defines the offense…”
- People v. Smith (Appellate Court of Illinois 2025, 2025 IL App (1st) 220116)“…ropping violated section 14-2 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/14-2 (West 2014)) and that then State’s Att…”
- Cook Au Vin, LLC v. Mid-Century Insurance Co. (Appellate Court of Illinois 2023, 226 N.E.3d 694)“…onversation by one who is not a party to the conversation. 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1) (West 2020). In enacting the stat…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Illinois Recording Laws (2026): All-Party Consent Rules, Illinois Audio Recording Laws: All-Party Consent Rules and Penalties (2026), Illinois Security Camera Laws: BIPA, Audio Rules, and Placement (2026)
§ 14-4SentenceIn forcecited in 9 of our articles
(a) Eavesdropping, for a first offense, is a Class 4 felony and, for a second or subsequent offense, is a Class 3 felony. (b) The eavesdropping of an oral conversation or an electronic communication of any law enforcement officer, State's Attorney, Assistant State's Attorney, the Attorney General, Assistant Attorney General, or a judge, while in the performance of his or her official duties, if not authorized by this Article or proper court order, is a Class 3 felony, and for a second or subsequent offense, is a Class 2 felony.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ilga.gov
Cited in 5 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- People v. Jenkins (Appellate Court of Illinois 2012, 2012 IL App (2d) 91168)“…y if the officer was engaged in his or her official duties. 720 ILCS 5/14-4(b) (West 2008). A person commits eavesd…”
- Morris v. Ameritech Illinois (Appellate Court of Illinois 2003)“…acts of high managerial agents. Eavesdropping is a felony. 720 ILCS 5/14-4 (West 1994). Therefore, Ameritech can…”
- Acuff v. IBP, Inc. (District Court, C.D. Illinois 1999, 65 F. Supp. 2d 866)“…4. Illinois’ Eavesdropping Statute, 720 ILCS 5/14-2 and 720 ILCS 5/14-4; and 5. Illinois Constitution Ar…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Illinois Surveillance Camera Laws (2026 Guide), Illinois Ring Doorbell Laws: What You Need to Know in 2026, Illinois Smart Glasses Recording Laws: Audio, BIPA & Consent
Illinois Compiled Statutes Chapter 740, Act 14 (Biometric Information Privacy Act)
§ 15Retention; collection; disclosure; destructionIn forcecited in 12 of our articles
(a) A private entity in possession of biometric identifiers or biometric information must develop a written policy, made available to the public, establishing a retention schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying biometric identifiers and biometric information when the initial purpose for collecting or obtaining such identifiers or information has been satisfied or within 3 years of the individual's last interaction with the private entity, whichever occurs first. Absent a valid warrant or subpoena issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, a private entity in possession of biometric identifiers or biometric information must comply with its established retention schedule and destruction guidelines.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-08-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ilga.gov
Cited in 208 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Cothron v. White Castle System, Inc. (Illinois Supreme Court 2023, 466 Ill. Dec. 85)“…15(d) of the Biometric Information Privacy Act (Act) (740 ILCS 14/15(b), (d) (West 2018)) in an action…”
- Tims v. Black Horse Carriers, Inc. (Illinois Supreme Court 2023, 466 Ill. Dec. 12)“…15(a) of the Biometric Information Privacy Act (Act) (740 ILCS 14/15(a) (West 2018)), providing for the rete…”
- Watson v. Legacy Healthcare Financial Services, LLC (Appellate Court of Illinois 2021, 458 Ill. Dec. 267)“…d, and (4) to obtain his or her written consent. 740 ILCS 14/15(a), (b) (West 2018). The complaint alle…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: BIPA Compliance for Employers (2026): Step-by-Step, BIPA Explained: Illinois Biometric Privacy Act (740 ILCS 14), Do You Have a BIPA Claim? Check Your Eligibility (2026)
§ 20Right of actionIn forcecited in 11 of our articles
(a) Any person aggrieved by a violation of this Act shall have a right of action in a State circuit court or as a supplemental claim in federal district court against an offending party. A prevailing party may recover for each violation: (1) against a private entity that negligently violates a provision of this Act, liquidated damages of $1,000 or actual damages, whichever is greater; (2) against a private entity that intentionally or recklessly violates a provision of this Act, liquidated damages of $5,000 or actual damages, whichever is greater; (3) reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, including expert witness fees and other litigation expenses; and (4) other relief, including an injunction, as the State or federal court may deem appropriate.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-08-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ilga.gov
Cited in 94 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp. (Illinois Supreme Court 2019, 2019 IL 123186)“…Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/20, and may seek statutory liquidated…”
- Cothron v. White Castle System, Inc. (Illinois Supreme Court 2023, 466 Ill. Dec. 85)“…scretionary rather than mandatory under the Act. See 740 ILCS 14/20 (West 2018) (detailing the amounts and…”
- Tims v. Black Horse Carriers, Inc. (Appellate Court of Illinois 2021, 451 Ill. Dec. 879)“…ainment Corp., 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 1 (quoting 740 ILCS 14/20 (West 2016)). ¶ 25 The Act works…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: BIPA Damages: What a Violation Is Worth (2026), BIPA Statute of Limitations: The 5-Year Deadline (2026), Illinois Data Privacy Laws: BIPA, Consumer Rights & Penalties (2026)
§ 10DefinitionsIn forcecited in 4 of our articles
In this Act: "Biometric identifier" means a retina or iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or scan of hand or face geometry. Biometric identifiers do not include writing samples, written signatures, photographs, human biological samples used for valid scientific testing or screening, demographic data, tattoo descriptions, or physical descriptions such as height, weight, hair color, or eye color. Biometric identifiers do not include donated organs, tissues, or parts as defined in the Illinois Anatomical Gift Act or blood or serum stored on behalf of recipients or potential recipients of living or cadaveric transplants and obtained or stored by a federally designated organ procurement agency. Biometric identifiers do not include biological materials regulated under the Genetic Information Privacy Act. Biometric identifiers do not include information captured from a patient in a health care setting or information collected, used, or stored for health care treatment, payment, or operations under the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ilga.gov
Cited in 109 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- West Bend Mutual Insurance Co. v. Krishna Schaumburg Tan, Inc. (Illinois Supreme Court 2021, 451 Ill. Dec. 1)“…ual’s biometric identifier used to identify an individual.” 740 ILCS 14/10 (West 2018). The Act regulates the…”
- Watson v. Legacy Healthcare Financial Services, LLC (Appellate Court of Illinois 2021, 458 Ill. Dec. 267)“…fingerprint” or “scan of hand,” such as what was used here. 740 ILCS 14/10 (West 2018). The same sectio…”
- Mosby v. Ingalls Memorial Hospital (Appellate Court of Illinois 2022, 2022 IL App (1st) 200822)“…Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,’ 740 ILCS 14/10, when the…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Illinois Biometric Privacy Laws: Collection, Consent & Penalties (2026)
United States Code Title 18
§ 2511Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications prohibitedIn forcecited in 441 of our articles
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who— intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication; intentionally uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to use or endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral communication when— such device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a signal through, a wire, cable, or other like connection used in wire communication; or such device transmits communications by radio, or interferes with the transmission of such communication; or such person knows, or has reason to know, that such device or any component thereof has been sent through the mail or transported in interstate or foreign commerce; or such use or endeavor to use (A) takes place on the premises of any business or other commercial establishment the operations of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or (B) obtains or is for the purpose of obtaining information relating to the operations of any business or other commercial establishment the operations of which affect interstate or foreign…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-17 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 2,045 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Griggs-Ryan v. Smith (1990) applied the Section 2511(2)(d) prior-consent exception, treating a tenant repeatedly told that all incoming calls were taped as having impliedly consented. United States v. United States District Court (1972) read the then-current Section 2511(3) as conferring no presidential surveillance power.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Mitchell v. Forsyth (Supreme Court of the United States 1985, 472 U.S. 511)✓The Attorney General authorized a warrantless 1970 national security wiretap that caught the plaintiff's calls; the Court held the since-repealed Section 2511(3) disclaimer left the tap lawful under Title III, and that Mitchell had qualified immunity.
- United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (Supreme Court of the United States 1972, 407 U.S. 297)✓The Attorney General approved warrantless wiretaps on members of a domestic group accused of bombing a CIA office; the Court read Section 2511(3) as a congressional disclaimer conferring no surveillance power, then held the Fourth Amendment required prior judicial approval.
- Forsyth v. Barr (Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 1994, 19 F.3d 1527)✓Dallas police used, in an internal affairs probe of an officer, calls private parties allegedly intercepted illegally; assuming that was unlawful, the Fifth Circuit held Section 2517(1) and (2) allowed the disclosure and use, defeating the Section 2511(1)(c) and (d) claims.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Connecticut Recording Laws (2026): Hybrid Consent Rules Explained, Oregon Recording Laws (2026): Hybrid One-Party and All-Party Rules, US Recording Laws by State (2026): All 50 States Explained
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Sources and References
- 720 ILCS 5/14-2 - Illinois Eavesdropping Statute(ilga.gov).gov
- 740 ILCS 14 - Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA)(ilga.gov).gov
- People v. Clark, 2014 IL 115776 - Illinois Supreme Court(illinoiscourts.gov).gov
- 18 U.S.C. Section 2511 - Federal Wiretap Act(law.cornell.edu)
- HB 3773 - Illinois AI Employment Discrimination Law(natlawreview.com)
- Cruz v. Fireflies.AI Corp. - BIPA Class Action(natlawreview.com)
- Walker v. Otter.ai - BIPA Class Action(workplaceprivacyreport.com)
- Lisota v. Heartland Dental - Federal Wiretap Dismissal(troutmanprivacy.com)
- Clearview AI $51.75M BIPA Settlement(loevy.com)
- ACLU of Illinois - BIPA Campaign(aclu-il.org)
- Ambriz v. Google - Capability Test(goodwinlaw.com)
- Illinois BIPA Reform SB 2979 (2024)(kslaw.com)
- 720 ILCS 5/14-2 - Illinois Eavesdropping Statute (full text)(ilga.gov)
- 720 ILCS 5/14-1 - Eavesdropping Definitions (surreptitious; private conversation)(ilga.gov)
- 720 ILCS 5/14-4 - Eavesdropping Sentence(ilga.gov)