Punitive Damages Laws by State: Caps, Proof and Rules (2026)
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Punitive damages, which many statutes call exemplary damages, are money a court orders a defendant to pay to punish serious misconduct and deter it, on top of the damages that compensate the injured person. Every state except Nebraska allows them in some form, but the rules vary widely from state to state: five states allow them only where a specific statute authorizes them, roughly half set a general cap, most demand clear and convincing proof, and a handful send part of some awards to a state fund.
Above the state rules sits the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause forbids grossly excessive punitive awards, and federal statutes and Supreme Court decisions set their own caps and bars for federal employment claims, suits against the United States and civil rights suits against cities. The state-by-state table below links to a full page for each state.
Information last verified on 2026-10-19. This article has not been reviewed by a licensed lawyer.
Jurisdiction scope: This hub compares punitive (exemplary) damages law in the 50 states and the District of Columbia, as each state page linked below describes it, and summarizes the federal constitutional limits and federal statutes that apply nationwide. It does not cover compensatory or noneconomic damages caps, wrongful-death procedure and beneficiaries, filing deadlines, or every statute that authorizes double, treble or punitive damages for one kind of claim; each state page names the claim-specific statutes it covers.
What are punitive damages?
Compensatory damages repay a plaintiff for a loss: medical bills, lost wages, pain and suffering. Punitive damages do something different. In the U.S. Supreme Court's words in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore (1996), "Punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a State's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition."
The name changes from state to state, but the remedy is the same. Texas uses "exemplary damages," and Civil Practice and Remedies Code 41.001(5) says the term includes punitive damages. Colorado, North Dakota and California's Civil Code 3294 also say exemplary damages, Louisiana's Civil Code uses that term, and Georgia's statute treats punitive, vindictive and exemplary damages as synonyms (O.C.G.A. 51-12-5.1(a)).
Two states use the vocabulary differently. In Michigan, common-law exemplary damages compensate the plaintiff for injured feelings rather than punish (Kewin, 1980). New Hampshire courts may award "enhanced" or "liberal" compensatory damages for wanton, malicious or oppressive conduct, but those compensate for aggravated harm and are not punitive (Munson v. Raudonis, 1978).
Punitive damages almost always ride on top of a real claim. Many states require an award of compensatory damages first: Ohio (R.C. 2315.21(C)(2)), North Dakota (32-03.2-11(4)), Utah (78B-8-201(1)(a), with listed exceptions), Mississippi (11-1-65(1)), Arkansas (16-55-206) and North Carolina (G.S. 1D-15(a)) among them. In New Jersey nominal damages cannot support a punitive award (2A:15-5.13(c)), and in Texas exemplary damages may not be awarded when only nominal damages are (41.004(a)).
Which states allow punitive damages?
The 50 states and the District of Columbia fall into four groups.

Barred: Nebraska
Nebraska does not allow punitive damages on state-law claims. The Nebraska Supreme Court has held that punitive, vindictive or exemplary damages contravene article VII, section 5 of the state constitution, which sends fines and penalties to the common schools (Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox, 1989). Two exceptions keep the topic alive there: a Nebraska state court can award punitive damages on a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 under the federal standard (State ex rel. Cherry v. Burns, 1999), and Nebraska courts must enforce another state's judgment that includes punitive damages (Miller v. Kingsley, 1975). Bills to authorize punitive damages, LB25 (2023) and LB57 (2024 special session), did not pass in that form.
Only where a statute authorizes them
Five states have no general punitive damages remedy. A plaintiff needs a statute that expressly allows them for the particular claim:
- Louisiana allows exemplary damages only where a statute expressly authorizes them (International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Seale, 1988). Civil Code articles cover intoxicated drivers (art. 2315.4), child sexual abuse materials, criminal sexual activity against a minor, domestic abuse, hazing deaths and sexual assault in the workplace, and other statutes cover claims such as wiretapping and human trafficking.
- Massachusetts follows the same rule (Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp., 1991, reaffirmed in 2026). The main authorization is the wrongful death statute, G.L. c. 229, s. 2, which allows punitive damages of not less than $5,000 for malicious, willful, wanton or reckless conduct or gross negligence. Chapter 93A, the unfair trade practices law, provides multiple damages rather than punitive damages.
- Michigan allows punitive damages only when the Legislature expressly authorizes them (Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 2004); statutes such as the eavesdropping statute and the Freedom of Information Act do.
- New Hampshire: "No punitive damages shall be awarded in any action, unless otherwise provided by statute" (RSA 507:16). Statutes such as the wiretapping chapter and the consumer credit reporting law provide for them.
- Washington has a long-standing rule against punitive damages without express legislative authorization (Dailey v. North Coast Life Insurance Co., 1996). Each authorizing statute, such as the hate crime civil action (RCW 9A.36.083), sets its own terms.
Common law, with no general statute
In these jurisdictions the courts define when punitive damages are available, and the legislature has not passed a general punitive damages statute (some have statutes on particular points):
Arizona (Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 1986), Connecticut (Berry v. Loiseau, 1992), Delaware (Jardel Co. v. Hughes, 1987), the District of Columbia (Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Breeden, 1995), Hawaii (Guieb v. Guieb, 2025), Illinois (Kelsay v. Motorola, 1978), Maine (Tuttle v. Raymond, 1985), Maryland (Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 1992), New Mexico (Uniform Jury Instruction 13-1827), New York (Ross v. Louise Wise Services, 2007), Pennsylvania (Hutchison v. Luddy, 2005), Rhode Island (Palmisano v. Toth, 1993), Vermont (Fly Fish Vermont v. Chapin Hill Estates, 2010), Virginia (Hamilton Development Co. v. Broad Rock Club, 1994) and Wyoming (Danculovich v. Brown, 1979).
Statutes still shape some of these states. Illinois bars punitive damages in medical, hospital, healing art and legal malpractice cases and requires leave of court to add them in negligence injury and product cases (735 ILCS 5/2-1115, 5/2-604.1). Virginia has no general punitive damages statute but does have a general cap (Va. Code 8.01-38.1). Connecticut adds statutes for product sellers (52-240b) and certain motor vehicle violations (14-295).
Regulated by a general statute
The remaining 30 states have a general statute that sets the standard, the procedure, the cap, or all three: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
Several of these statutes say they regulate an existing remedy and create no new claim, for example Alabama (6-11-28), Arkansas (16-55-209), Mississippi (11-1-65(4)), New Jersey (2A:15-5.15) and Tennessee (29-39-104(b)). California, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma and South Dakota limit them to actions for breach of an obligation not arising from contract.
Contract claims are a common dividing line. Punitive damages are not available for breach of contract under statutes or case law in Kentucky (KRS 411.184(4)), Montana (27-1-220(2), with exceptions for product liability and unfair claim settlement actions), Georgia (13-6-10, unless otherwise provided by law), Maryland (tort actions only, Bowden v. Caldor, 1998) and North Carolina (not solely for breach of contract, G.S. 1D-15(d)), and Ohio's statute covers tort actions only.
What has to be proven?
The conduct standard
Every state that allows punitive damages requires more than ordinary carelessness, but the line sits in different places:
- Malice, fraud or oppression. The classic statutory formula appears in California (Civil Code 3294), Nevada (NRS 42.005), North Dakota (32-03.2-11) and South Dakota (21-3-2). Montana requires actual fraud or actual malice (27-1-221).
- Gross negligence can qualify. Texas allows exemplary damages when harm results from fraud, malice or gross negligence (41.003(a)); Florida, for intentional misconduct or gross negligence (768.72(2)); Mississippi, for gross negligence that evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others (11-1-65(1)(a)). In Kentucky the state supreme court treats common-law gross negligence as a route alongside the statute (Saint Joseph Healthcare v. Thomas, 2016).
- Gross negligence is not enough. New Jersey's statute says no degree of negligence, including gross negligence, is enough (2A:15-5.12(a)). North Carolina defines willful or wanton conduct as more than gross negligence (G.S. 1D-5). The Nevada Supreme Court held that conscious disregard must exceed mere recklessness or gross negligence (Countrywide Home Loans v. Thitchener, 2008). Maryland requires actual malice (evil motive, intent to injure, ill will or fraud), and gross negligence does not meet it (Zenobia, 1992). Arizona's Supreme Court has said punitive damages may not rest on mere negligence, gross negligence or recklessness in negligence cases (Swift Transp. v. Carman, 2022).
- Malice in the personal sense. Maine requires express or implied malice, and mere reckless disregard is not enough (Tuttle v. Raymond, 1985). Vermont requires outrageously reprehensible conduct plus malice (Fly Fish, 2010). Rhode Island requires willfulness, recklessness or wickedness amounting to criminality (Palmisano, 1993).
The burden of proof
Most states require clear and convincing evidence, a higher bar than the preponderance standard in ordinary civil cases. That includes Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia and Wisconsin. The District of Columbia requires a tort proven by a preponderance and malice or its equivalent by clear and convincing evidence (Woodner, 1995). Iowa's statute uses its own phrase: "a preponderance of clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence" (668A.1).
The exceptions:
- Colorado requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt (C.R.S. 13-25-127(2)), and Oklahoma's uncapped Category III requires a court finding beyond a reasonable doubt (23 O.S. 9.1(D)).
- Preponderance or no higher standard: Connecticut (Freeman v. Alamo Management Co., 1992), Delaware (the Superior Court's civil pattern jury instruction), Massachusetts wrongful death claims (Fontaine v. Philip Morris USA, 2026), and Louisiana's art. 2315.4 as one appeals court applies it. South Dakota requires clear and convincing evidence at a pretrial hearing before discovery (21-1-4.1), then a preponderance at trial (Flockhart v. Wyant, 1991).
- Not settled by statute: New York's appellate departments differ; Pennsylvania has no statute requiring clear and convincing proof, and a 1985 plurality opinion described a preponderance threshold; in Illinois the clear and convincing text printed in 2-1115.05(b) is void (Best, 1997); and New Mexico's punitive damages jury instruction sets no special burden (outside medical malpractice claims arising on or after May 20, 2026, where NMSA 41-5-7.1(A) requires clear and convincing evidence). In Michigan, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, Washington and Wyoming, no general statute sets the burden of proof; each state page describes what the courts have said.
Which states cap punitive damages?
About half the states set a general cap. Every one has exceptions, and claim-specific statutes elsewhere in the code can set different limits, so a short summary is a starting point, not the full rule.
Greater of a multiple or a fixed sum
The most common design caps the award at a multiple of compensatory damages or a dollar figure, whichever is greater:
- 3 times or $500,000: Alabama (6-11-21; $1,500,000 in physical injury cases, with the fixed sums adjusted for inflation every three years), Alaska (09.17.020(f)), Florida (768.73, per claimant) and South Carolina (15-32-530, with the $500,000 adjusted annually to $739,245 under the February 3, 2026 adjustment).
- 3 times or $250,000: Idaho (6-1604(3)) and North Carolina (G.S. 1D-25(b), which the state supreme court applied per plaintiff in Rhyne v. K-Mart, 2004).
- 3 times or $50,000: Indiana (IC 34-51-3-4), for common-law punitive damages; the Indiana Supreme Court held the chapter does not reach statutory treble or exemplary awards (Andrews v. Mor/Ryde, 2014).
- 4 times or $500,000: West Virginia (55-7-29(c)).
- 5 times or $500,000: Missouri (510.265, measured against the net judgment for each defendant).
- 5 times or $350,000: New Jersey (2A:15-5.14(b)).
- 2 times or $500,000: Tennessee (29-39-104(a)(5)).
- 2 times or $250,000: North Dakota (32-03.2-11(4)).
- 2 times or $200,000: Wisconsin (895.043(6), measured against compensatory damages the plaintiff recovers).
- Texas caps exemplary damages against each defendant at the greater of $200,000 or two times economic damages plus noneconomic damages found by the jury up to $750,000 (41.008(b)); with several defendants, the economic damages are those attributable to that defendant by its percentage of responsibility (K&K Inez Properties v. Kolle, 2026).
- Nevada uses three times compensatory damages when those are $100,000 or more and $300,000 when they are less (NRS 42.005(1)).
Several of these states raise the cap for profit-driven misconduct known to management: Alaska (up to four times compensatory damages, four times the financial gain, or $7,000,000), Florida (4 times or $2 million) and South Carolina (4 times or $2,000,000).
Pure multiples and flat dollar caps
- Colorado limits exemplary damages to the amount of actual damages, and the court may raise them to three times actual damages only if the defendant continued or aggravated the conduct during the case (13-21-102).
- Ohio caps punitive damages at two times compensatory damages; for a small employer or an individual, at the lesser of that or 10% of net worth, up to $350,000 (R.C. 2315.21(D)(2)). The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the statute on its face (Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 2007).
- Georgia caps punitive damages at $250,000, with no cap in product liability cases or against a defendant who acted with specific intent to harm or while impaired (51-12-5.1(e)-(g)). The Supreme Court of Georgia upheld the general cap in Taylor v. Devereux Foundation (2023).
- Virginia limits the total punitive award against all defendants to $350,000, including in medical malpractice cases (8.01-38.1); fair housing actions allow punitive damages "without limitation otherwise imposed by state law" (36-96.18(C)).
Caps tied to the defendant's wealth
- Kansas: the lesser of the defendant's highest annual gross income in any of the five years before the act, or $5 million, with alternatives tied to net worth and to 1.5 times the profit from the misconduct (K.S.A. 60-3702(e)-(f)). The court, not the jury, sets the amount.
- Mississippi: tiers based on the defendant's net worth (11-1-65(3)(a)); see the state page for the brackets.
- Montana: the lesser of $10 million or 3% of the defendant's net worth, with no limit in class actions (27-1-220(3)).
- Oklahoma sorts conduct into three categories: Category I is capped at the greater of $100,000 or actual damages, Category II at the greatest of $500,000, twice actual damages or the defendant's increased financial benefit, and Category III has no limit (23 O.S. 9.1).
When the cap does not apply
Many caps lift for the worst conduct. Common triggers in the state statutes:
- Specific intent to harm: Florida (768.73(1)(c)), Georgia, South Carolina and Tennessee.
- A felony conviction or plea for the conduct: Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey (murder or manslaughter convictions), Ohio (felonies committed purposely or knowingly), South Carolina and Tennessee. Texas lifts its cap for conduct described as one of the felonies listed in 41.008(c), committed knowingly or intentionally (a requirement that does not apply to intoxication assault and intoxication manslaughter), without requiring a conviction.
- Impaired driving or impairment by alcohol or drugs: Florida (768.736), Georgia, Mississippi, New Jersey (after a drunk-driving or refusal conviction, 2A:15-5.14(c)), North Carolina (G.S. 1D-26), South Carolina, Tennessee, Wisconsin (intoxicated operation of a vehicle or boat), Texas (intoxication assault and intoxication manslaughter), and Nevada, where NRS 42.010 governs those claims instead of the capped section.
- Particular claim types: Alabama exempts wrongful death, intentional infliction of physical injury and class actions; Nevada exempts defective products, insurer bad faith, qualifying housing discrimination claims, the emission, disposal or spilling of toxic, radioactive or hazardous material or waste, and defamation; New Jersey exempts Law Against Discrimination, whistleblower (CEPA), bias-crime and child sexual abuse claims.
Some caps contain no exception in their own text: Idaho (6-1604), Indiana (IC 34-51-3-4 and 3-5) and West Virginia (55-7-29). Virginia's 8.01-38.1 contains no exception for drunk driving, hit-and-run, wrongful death or intentional conduct.
Caps struck down, limited or unresolved
A cap printed in the code is not always the law:
- Arkansas: the cap in 16-55-208 was held unconstitutional in Bayer CropScience v. Schafer (2011).
- Illinois: section 2-1115.05 is still printed with a cap of three times economic damages, but it was part of Public Act 89-7, which the Illinois Supreme Court held invalid in its entirety in Best v. Taylor Machine Works (1997).
- Missouri: the Supreme Court of Missouri held the cap unconstitutional as applied to a fraud claim in Lewellen v. Franklin (2014); the cap cannot apply to a common-law claim that existed in 1820 and would then have supported punitive damages, and the court upheld it for other common-law claims in All Star Awards (2022).
- Tennessee: the Sixth Circuit held the cap unenforceable in Lindenberg (2018), which binds federal courts in that circuit but not Tennessee state courts; the Tennessee Supreme Court has expressed no opinion on it.
- Montana: the Montana Supreme Court has not decided whether the cap is constitutional.
- Arizona and Kentucky: the state constitutions bar laws limiting damages for injury (Ariz. Const. art. 2, s. 31 and art. 18, s. 6; Ky. Const. s. 54), and neither state has a general cap.
States with no general cap
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington and Wyoming have no general cap on punitive damages. That does not mean no limit anywhere in their law:
- Claim-specific statutes set their own limits in nearly every state. The most common is the trade secrets act, which in many states limits exemplary damages for willful and malicious misappropriation to twice the damages award (Ohio's version allows up to three times).
- Connecticut limits a common-law punitive award to the plaintiff's litigation expenses less taxable costs (Waterbury Petroleum, 1984; Berry, 1992), while a product-seller statute allows punitive damages of up to twice the damages awarded, set by the court (52-240b), and a motor vehicle statute allows double or treble damages (14-295).
- Pennsylvania caps punitive damages against an individual physician at 200% of compensatory damages, except in cases alleging intentional misconduct (40 P.S. 1303.505(d)).
- Maine limits punitive damages in a wrongful death action to $500,000 (18-C M.R.S. 2-807(2)), and New Mexico added a medical malpractice cap for claims arising on or after May 20, 2026.
- Courts still review awards. Minnesota requires the court to review each award against statutory factors (549.20, subds. 3 and 5), Oregon requires review against the range a rational juror could award (ORS 31.730), and the federal due process limits below apply everywhere.
For noneconomic damages caps in malpractice cases, which several states say do not reach punitive damages (Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina and South Carolina among them), see medical malpractice laws by state.
Do states take a share of punitive damages?
In most states the plaintiff keeps the whole award (subject to fees and costs). A few states have split-recovery laws that send part of it to the state or a state fund:
- Alaska: 50% to the state general fund, with the attorney's contingent fee computed on the full award (AS 09.17.020(j); 09.60.080).
- Georgia: in product liability cases only, 75% of the award, less a proportionate part of litigation costs and fees, to the state treasury (51-12-5.1(e)(2)), upheld in Mack Trucks v. Conkle (1993).
- Illinois: no automatic share, but the trial court may apportion an award among the plaintiff, the plaintiff's attorney and the Department of Human Services (735 ILCS 5/2-1207).
- Indiana: for common-law punitive awards, 75% to the violent crime victims compensation fund and 25% to the person awarded the damages (IC 34-51-3-6), upheld in Cheatham v. Pohle (2003). The jury is not told about the split.
- Iowa: when the jury finds the conduct was not directed specifically at the claimant, the claimant receives no more than 25% (after costs and fees) and the rest goes to a civil reparations trust fund, with exceptions for listed health care claims and commercial motor vehicle cases (668A.1(2)).
- Missouri: a state lien for 50% of a punitive final judgment, after attorney fees and expenses, for the Tort Victims' Compensation Fund; it does not reach medical malpractice actions or cases settled before a punitive judgment (537.675.3).
- Montana: awards over $200,000 are divided equally between the prevailing party and the state general fund, after costs and reasonable attorney fees may be deducted (27-1-221(9)).
- Oregon: 30% to the prevailing party, 60% to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Account and 10% to the State Court Facilities and Security Account, with the attorney's share capped at 20% of the award (ORS 31.735), upheld in DeMendoza v. Huffman (2002).
- Utah: the first $50,000 goes to the injured party, and any amount over $50,000 is divided equally with the State (78B-8-201(3)).
Narrower rules exist elsewhere: Florida sends half of punitive awards in nursing home and assisted living facility cases to a state trust fund (400.0238(4), 429.298(4)), and Pennsylvania sends 25% of punitive damages in medical malpractice cases to the MCARE Fund (40 P.S. 1303.505(e)). A handful of other states route punitive damages from one particular statute to a public fund; each state page names those. Nebraska has no split because it awards no punitive damages on state-law claims.
How punitive damages are decided
The procedure matters almost as much as the standard, and many states built procedural guardrails into their statutes.
Leave to plead. In Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota and Oregon, a complaint may not ask for punitive damages when filed; the plaintiff must later ask the court for permission with an evidentiary showing. Illinois applies a similar rule in negligence injury, property damage and strict product liability cases, and California requires a court order to add a punitive claim against a health care provider (Code Civ. Proc. 425.13). Georgia takes the opposite approach: punitive damages must be specifically prayed for in the complaint (51-12-5.1(d)(1)).
Split trials. Many states separate the punitive phase from the rest of the trial. It is mandatory in Mississippi and Tennessee; available on request in states such as Arkansas, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas and West Virginia; and built into the statute's two-step structure in Alaska, Georgia, Montana, Nevada and Oklahoma.
Wealth evidence. Many states keep evidence of the defendant's net worth or financial condition away from the jury until it finds punitive damages warranted, or limit pretrial discovery of it. Colorado and North Dakota go further: in Colorado a party's income or net worth may not be considered at all (13-21-102(6)), and in North Dakota evidence of a defendant's financial condition or net worth is not admissible in the exemplary damages proceeding (32-03.2-11(3)).
Who sets the amount. In most states the jury does. In Kansas the jury decides only whether punitive damages are allowed and the court sets the amount (K.S.A. 60-3702), Ohio's court sets the amount in product liability cases (R.C. 2307.80), and Connecticut's court sets the amount under its product liability statute (52-240b). In Texas the jury must be unanimous on liability and amount (41.003(d)).
The jury is not told about the cap in states including Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia; the judge applies it after the verdict.
Punitive damages in wrongful death cases
Whether a family can recover punitive damages after a death depends heavily on the state, and on whether the claim is the wrongful death action or the estate's survival action. See wrongful death laws by state for deadlines and who may sue.
- Allowed in the death action by statute or case law: Alaska, Colorado (on the same one-to-one terms), Delaware (since July 17, 2023, for malice or reckless, wilful or wanton misconduct), Florida (Coates v. R.J. Reynolds, 2023, on how such awards are reviewed), Idaho, Illinois (for actions filed on or after August 11, 2023, not in malpractice cases), Kentucky, Maine (up to $500,000), Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi (McGowan v. Estate of Wright, 1988, reading 11-7-13), Missouri, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island (in an action commenced under 10-7-5), South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia and Wyoming. In Alabama the Supreme Court has held that wrongful death damages are punitive in nature. Arizona's death statute does not mention punitive damages but directs the jury to consider aggravating circumstances (A.R.S. 12-613), and punitive claims survive the death of either party (Quintero v. Rodgers, 2009).
- Not in the death action, but available through the survival claim: California (which also allows them in a death action after a felony homicide conviction), Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, under the rules each state page describes. Kansas and Hawaii courts have held punitive damages unavailable in the death action itself, with a survival route.
- Not recoverable: Georgia in the wrongful death claim itself (Engle v. Finch, 1927, applied by the Court of Appeals in 2026), Indiana (Durham v. U-Haul, 2001) and Michigan (Fellows, 1993), and Nebraska bars punitive damages on state-law claims generally.
- Not addressed by the death statute: the District of Columbia and Vermont, where the question is unresolved; Washington, a statute-only state whose wrongful death and survival statutes contain no punitive damages language; New Hampshire, whose damages statute lists compensatory elements; and Connecticut, where the death statute names just damages but a motor vehicle statute (14-295) reaches death actions.
Many states also bar punitive damages against the estate of a wrongdoer who has died, including Colorado, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Nevada, New Mexico, New York and Wisconsin. Some states go the other way: Oklahoma's wrongful death statute allows them against a deceased wrongdoer's representative (12 O.S. 1053(C)), and decisions in Delaware (Estate of Farrell v. Gordon, 2001), Texas (Hofer v. Lavender, 1984) and Arizona (Quintero v. Rodgers, 2009) allow punitive claims against a deceased tortfeasor's estate.
Drunk and impaired driving
Drunk driving crashes are where punitive damages come up most often in ordinary injury cases, and the states take very different positions. For the underlying claim, see car accident laws by state.
Some statutes treat impairment as enough for a jury to consider punitive damages. In Minnesota, evidence that a driver with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more caused the accident is sufficient for the jury to consider them, with no criminal charge required (169A.76). In Virginia, a driver with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more who knew or should have known of the impairment is deemed to have acted willfully or wantonly enough to support punitive damages (8.01-44.5). North Dakota lets the trier of fact consider exemplary damages against a driver shown by clear and convincing evidence to have been driving at 0.08 or more (32-03.2-11(9)), and Louisiana's Civil Code authorizes exemplary damages for injuries caused by an intoxicated driver (art. 2315.4).
Other states lift the cap for impaired defendants (listed above), and Utah's statute says its general punitive damages limits and standards do not apply to claims arising from voluntarily intoxicated or impaired driving (78B-8-201(1)(b)).
Courts in a few states have held that intoxication alone does not establish the required state of mind: Maryland in Komornik v. Sparks (1993), Vermont in Bolsta (2004, as described in Fly Fish), and New Hampshire, where driving under the influence is not equated with malice for measuring enhanced damages (Johnsen v. Fernald, 1980).
Punitive damages against government defendants
Nearly every state bars or sharply restricts punitive damages against the state and local governments, usually in its tort claims act. Examples include Alabama (6-11-26, with an exception for entities covered by the Medical Liability Act), California (Government Code 818), Florida (768.28(5)(a)), Idaho (6-918), Indiana (IC 34-13-3-4(b)), New Jersey (59:9-2(c)), New Mexico (41-4-19(D)), Oklahoma (51 O.S. 154(C)), South Carolina (15-78-120(b)), Texas (101.024), Utah (63G-7-603), Wisconsin (893.80(3)) and Wyoming (1-39-118(d)).
There are exceptions. Kansas carves out childhood sexual abuse claims (K.S.A. 75-6105(d)). Minnesota makes a government entity liable for exemplary damages for willful violations of its Government Data Practices Act (13.08). Kentucky authorizes punitive damages in public-employee whistleblower suits against the Commonwealth or a political subdivision (KRS 61.103(2)). The District of Columbia's rule bars them in tort absent extraordinary circumstances or statutory authorization (Smith v. District of Columbia, 1975). Federal law bars them against the United States and against cities in section 1983 suits (below).
Employer liability for an employee's conduct
Most states that address the question do not impose punitive damages on an employer simply because an employee acted within the scope of the job. They require the employer's own involvement: authorizing or ratifying the act, recklessly hiring or keeping an unfit employee, or a managerial employee acting in the scope of employment. Statutes in Alaska (09.17.020(k)), California (Civil Code 3294(b)), Minnesota (549.20, subd. 2), Missouri (510.261.3), Nevada (NRS 42.007), North Dakota (32-03.2-11(8)) and Tennessee (29-39-104(g)) follow versions of that rule, as do decisions in Iowa, Idaho and New York. Rhode Island allows no punitive damages on a respondeat superior theory (Palmisano), and Utah adopted a similar limit for claims arising on or after May 6, 2026 (78B-8-204).

A few states go the other way. Oregon holds a corporation liable for punitive damages for an employee's act within the scope of employment (Stroud, 1975), and Arizona applies vicarious liability for acts in furtherance of the business (Wiper, 1987).
Does insurance cover punitive damages?
The states divide into three broad positions, and the policy wording often decides the case:
- Public policy or statute bars coverage for the insured's own misconduct: California (PPG Industries, 1999), Colorado (Lira v. Shelter Insurance, 1996), New York (generally, Zurich v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 1994), New Jersey (an Appellate Division decision), Rhode Island (Allen v. Simmons, 1987), Utah (31A-20-101, by statute) and Ohio (R.C. 3937.182, for covered policies issued or renewed on or after October 31, 2001). Florida, Illinois, Oklahoma and Pennsylvania bar coverage for a person's own conduct but allow it for vicarious liability; Minnesota allows vicarious coverage by statute (60A.06) and its Supreme Court has said public policy in most instances prohibits insuring one's own punitive liability (Wojciak, 1981); and Kansas allows coverage only of vicarious liability without prior knowledge (40-2,115).
- Coverage only if the policy expressly includes it: Hawaii (HRS 431:10-240) and Montana (33-15-317).
- No public policy bar: Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Maryland, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming, among others, with coverage turning on the policy's terms. Some statutes draw the line by conduct: Nevada allows coverage unless the insured acted with intent to cause injury (NRS 681A.095), Virginia allows it for negligence, including willful and wanton negligence, but not intentional acts (38.2-227), and West Virginia deems a standard liability policy to cover punitive damages for gross, reckless or wanton negligence unless the policy expressly excludes them (Hensley v. Erie, 1981).
Punitive damages laws by state: comparison table
Each row summarizes the general rule on that state's page; caps and shares have exceptions, and statutes for particular claims can set different rules. Follow the state link for the full statute text, exceptions and cases.
| State | Availability | Standard and burden | General cap | State share |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alabama | Allowed; regulated by statute (Ala. Code 6-11-20) | Conscious or deliberate oppression, fraud, wantonness or malice; clear and convincing | Generally greater of 3x compensatory or $500,000 ($1,500,000 physical injury), inflation-adjusted; no cap in wrongful death | None (6-11-21(l)) |
| Alaska | Allowed; regulated by statute (AS 09.17.020) | Outrageous conduct or reckless indifference; clear and convincing | Greater of 3x or $500,000; up to 4x or $7,000,000 for known financial-gain conduct | 50% to the state general fund |
| Arizona | Allowed at common law | Evil mind; aggravated, outrageous conduct; clear and convincing | No general cap; constitution bars laws limiting damages for death or injury | No general split |
| Arkansas | Allowed; standard set by statute (16-55-206) | Malice or reckless disregard, or intentional conduct to cause injury; clear and convincing | No general cap; 16-55-208 cap struck down in 2011 | No general split |
| California | Allowed by statute (Civ. Code 3294), non-contract claims; called exemplary damages | Oppression, fraud or malice; clear and convincing | No general cap or ratio | None in the exemplary damages article |
| Colorado | Allowed by statute; called exemplary damages | Fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct; beyond a reasonable doubt | Generally the amount of actual damages; court may raise to 3x for conduct during the case | None generally |
| Connecticut | Allowed at common law, plus statutes | Reckless indifference or intentional and wanton violation of rights; preponderance (no higher standard) | No general statutory cap; common-law award limited to litigation expenses less taxable costs | No general split |
| Delaware | Allowed at common law | Outrageous conduct from evil motive or reckless indifference; preponderance (pattern instruction) | No general statutory cap | No general split |
| District of Columbia | Allowed at common law | Malice or its equivalent, by clear and convincing evidence | No general cap | No general split |
| Florida | Allowed; statute requires leave to add the claim (768.72) | Intentional misconduct or gross negligence; clear and convincing | Generally greater of 3x per claimant or $500,000; higher or none in listed cases | None generally; half in nursing home and assisted living cases |
| Georgia | Allowed in tort (O.C.G.A. 51-12-5.1) | Willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression or conscious indifference; clear and convincing | $250,000 generally; none in product liability, specific intent or impairment cases | 75% in product liability cases only, less a share of costs and fees |
| Hawaii | Allowed at common law | Recoverable tort liability plus intent to harm, reckless disregard of a substantial risk of harm, or otherwise outrageous or malicious conduct (Guieb v. Guieb, 2025); clear and convincing | No general cap | No general split |
| Idaho | Allowed; regulated by statute (6-1604); leave to add the claim | Oppressive, fraudulent, malicious or outrageous conduct; clear and convincing | Greater of $250,000 or 3x compensatory | No general split |
| Illinois | Allowed at common law; barred in medical and legal malpractice cases | Fraud, actual malice, willful conduct or wanton gross negligence; no statutory burden in force | No general cap in force; printed cap held void (Best, 1997) | None automatic; court may apportion part to the Department of Human Services |
| Indiana | Allowed; regulated by statute (IC 34-51-3) | Conduct inconsistent with mistake or mere negligence; clear and convincing | Greater of 3x compensatory or $50,000 (common-law awards) | 75% of common-law awards to the violent crime victims compensation fund |
| Iowa | Allowed; regulated by statute (Iowa Code 668A.1) | Willful and wanton disregard for rights or safety; preponderance of clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence | No general cap | If conduct not directed at the claimant, claimant keeps no more than 25%; exceptions |
| Kansas | Allowed; regulated by statute (K.S.A. 60-3702); court sets the amount | Willful or wanton conduct, fraud or malice; clear and convincing | Lesser of highest annual gross income (prior 5 years) or $5 million; profit alternative | No general split |
| Kentucky | Allowed; regulated by statute (KRS 411.184) | Oppression, fraud or malice, or common-law gross negligence; clear and convincing | No general cap; constitution bars limiting injury damages | No general split |
| Louisiana | Only where a statute expressly authorizes them; called exemplary damages | Mostly wanton and reckless disregard; burden not stated in the Civil Code articles | No general cap | None in the Civil Code articles |
| Maine | Allowed at common law | Express or implied malice; clear and convincing | No general cap; $500,000 in wrongful death actions | No general split |
| Maryland | Allowed at common law; tort actions only | Actual malice; clear and convincing | No general cap | No general split |
| Massachusetts | Only where a statute expressly authorizes them; mainly wrongful death | Death statute: malicious, willful, wanton or reckless conduct or gross negligence; clear and convincing not required | No general cap; death statute sets a $5,000 minimum | No general split |
| Michigan | Only where a statute expressly authorizes them | Set by each statute; common-law exemplary damages compensate injured feelings | No general cap; authorizing statutes set their own amounts | No general split |
| Minnesota | Allowed; regulated by statute (Minn. Stat. 549.20); leave to amend | Deliberate disregard for the rights or safety of others; clear and convincing | No general cap; mandatory court review | None generally |
| Mississippi | Allowed; regulated by statute (11-1-65) | Actual malice, gross negligence evidencing a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or actual fraud; clear and convincing | Tiered by the defendant's net worth, with exceptions (see state page) | No general split |
| Missouri | Allowed; regulated by statute (510.261); leave to add the claim | Intentional harm without just cause or deliberate and flagrant disregard for safety; clear and convincing | Generally greater of $500,000 or 5x net judgment; not where the State is plaintiff or after a related felony plea or conviction; cannot apply to a common-law claim that existed in 1820 and would then have supported punitive damages (Lewellen, 2014; All Star Awards, 2022) | 50% lien for the Tort Victims' Compensation Fund |
| Montana | Allowed by statute (Mont. Code Ann. 27-1-220) | Actual fraud or actual malice; clear and convincing | Lesser of $10 million or 3% of net worth; not in class actions | Half of awards over $200,000 to the state general fund |
| Nebraska | Barred on state-law claims (Neb. Const. art. VII, s. 5) | Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
| Nevada | Allowed by statute (NRS 42.005), non-contract claims | Oppression, fraud or malice; clear and convincing | 3x compensatory if $100,000 or more, else $300,000; listed exceptions | No general split |
| New Hampshire | Only where a statute provides (RSA 507:16); enhanced compensatory damages at common law | Enhanced damages: ill will, hatred, hostility or evil motive; burden not stated | No general cap on enhanced compensatory damages | No general split |
| New Jersey | Allowed; regulated by the Punitive Damages Act | Actual malice or wanton and willful disregard; clear and convincing | Greater of 5x or $350,000; listed exceptions | None from a private award |
| New Mexico | Allowed at common law (UJI 13-1827) | Malicious, willful, reckless, wanton, fraudulent or bad-faith conduct; no special burden in UJI 13-1827 (general greater-weight instruction); clear and convincing for medical malpractice claims arising on or after May 20, 2026 (NMSA 41-5-7.1(A)) | No general cap; medical malpractice claims arising on or after May 20, 2026 capped by reference to the 41-5-6 limits (41-5-7.1) | No general split |
| New York | Allowed at common law | Exceptional misconduct such as malice or wantonness; burden differs by court | No general cap | No general split |
| North Carolina | Allowed; regulated by statute (G.S. Chapter 1D) | Fraud, malice, or willful or wanton conduct; clear and convincing | Greater of 3x or $250,000 per defendant; impaired-driving exception | None |
| North Dakota | Allowed by statute, non-contract claims; called exemplary damages | Oppression, fraud or malice; clear and convincing | Greater of 2x compensatory or $250,000 | No general statute |
| Ohio | Allowed in tort actions (R.C. 2315.21) | Malice or aggravated or egregious fraud; clear and convincing | Generally 2x compensatory; small employer or individual lesser of that or 10% of net worth, up to $350,000; no cap after a qualifying felony conviction or plea | None in R.C. 2315.21 |
| Oklahoma | Allowed by statute (23 O.S. 9.1), non-contract claims | Three categories of conduct; clear and convincing (Category III also a court finding beyond a reasonable doubt) | Category I greater of $100,000 or actual damages; Category II greatest of $500,000, 2x or financial benefit; Category III none | No general split |
| Oregon | Allowed; regulated by statute (ORS 31.730); leave to amend | Malice, or reckless and outrageous indifference to a highly unreasonable risk; clear and convincing | No general cap; court review of every award | 60% to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Account and 10% to a court facilities account |
| Pennsylvania | Allowed at common law | Outrageous conduct from evil motive or reckless indifference; no statute requires clear and convincing | No general cap; 200% limit for individual physicians (MCARE) | Medical malpractice only: 25% to the MCARE Fund |
| Rhode Island | Allowed at common law | Willfulness, recklessness or wickedness amounting to criminality; standard of proof not stated | No general cap | No general split |
| South Carolina | Allowed; regulated by statute (15-32-510 to 540) | Wilful, wanton or reckless conduct; clear and convincing | Generally greater of 3x or $500,000 as adjusted ($739,245 under the 2026 adjustment); higher or none in listed cases | None |
| South Dakota | Allowed by statute (SDCL 21-3-2), non-contract claims | Oppression, fraud or malice; clear and convincing showing at a pretrial hearing (21-1-4.1), preponderance at trial (Flockhart, 1991) | No general cap | No general split |
| Tennessee | Allowed; regulated by statute (29-39-104) | Malicious, intentional, fraudulent or reckless conduct; clear and convincing | Greater of 2x or $500,000, with exceptions; Sixth Circuit held it unenforceable in federal court | No general split |
| Texas | Allowed; called exemplary damages (Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code ch. 41) | Fraud, malice or gross negligence; clear and convincing; unanimous jury | Greater of $200,000 or 2x economic plus noneconomic up to $750,000, per defendant; exceptions | None in chapter 41 |
| Utah | Allowed; regulated by statute (78B-8-201) | Willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or knowing and reckless indifference; clear and convincing | No general cap | Amounts over $50,000 split equally with the State |
| Vermont | Allowed at common law | Outrageously reprehensible conduct plus malice; burden not set by statute | No general cap | No general statute |
| Virginia | Allowed at common law and under statutes | Actual malice or conscious disregard of others' rights; burden not stated in the statutes | Generally $350,000 total against all defendants; fair housing claims excepted (36-96.18(C)) | No general split |
| Washington | Only where a statute expressly authorizes them | Set by each authorizing statute | No general cap | No general split |
| West Virginia | Allowed; regulated by statute (W. Va. Code 55-7-29) | Actual malice or conscious, reckless and outrageous indifference; clear and convincing | Greater of 4x compensatory or $500,000 | No general statute |
| Wisconsin | Allowed; regulated by statute (Wis. Stat. 895.043) | Malice or intentional disregard of rights; clear and convincing | Greater of 2x compensatory recovered or $200,000; intoxicated-operation exception | No general statute |
| Wyoming | Allowed at common law | Willful and wanton misconduct (Danculovich, 1979); burden not set by statute (a federal trial applying Wyoming law used a preponderance instruction) | No general cap | No general split |
Federal law: constitutional limits on punitive damages
Federal law does not create a general right to punitive damages; state law supplies the remedy in most suits. But the U.S. Supreme Court has read the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to limit how large a state-law award can be.
The Gore guideposts. In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore (1996), the Court held a $2 million punitive award "grossly excessive" where compensatory damages were $4,000. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell (2003) restated the three guideposts courts use: "(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases."
The single-digit ratio. State Farm declined to set a bright-line ratio, but said that "in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process." It added: "When compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee." The Court held a $145 million punitive award on $1 million in compensatory damages excessive, and said "The wealth of a defendant cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages award."
Earlier cases. In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip (1991), the Court said it could not "draw a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case," but that unlimited discretion of a jury or judge "in the fixing of punitive damages may invite extreme results that jar one's constitutional sensibilities." The syllabus of TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp. (1993), a plurality decision, repeats that no mathematical bright line fits every case.
Harm to others. As the syllabus of Philip Morris USA v. Williams (2007) states the holding, the Due Process Clause forbids a state to use a punitive award to punish a defendant for injury inflicted on strangers to the litigation. Evidence of harm to nonparties can still show that the conduct was particularly reprehensible.
Judicial review. Due process requires courts to review the size of punitive awards (Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 1994), and federal courts of appeals review whether an award is constitutional de novo, without deferring to the trial court (Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 2001).
Maritime cases
In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker (2008), a maritime case with no intentional or malicious conduct and no behavior driven primarily by desire for gain, the Court held that "a 1:1 ratio, which is above the median award, is a fair upper limit in such maritime cases." That is a federal common-law rule for maritime law, not a constitutional limit; the Court said its review there considered punitive damages "not their intersection with the Constitution" but as a common-law remedy.
Federal statutes and decisions that cap or bar punitive damages
Employment discrimination (Title VII and the ADA). Under 42 U.S.C. 1981a(b)(1), a complaining party may recover punitive damages for intentional employment discrimination against a respondent "other than a government, government agency or political subdivision" that acted "with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual." Section 1981a(b)(3) caps the combined total of punitive damages and compensatory damages for future pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses, for each complaining party, by employer size:
| Employees (in each of 20 or more weeks) | Combined cap |
|---|---|
| More than 14 and fewer than 101 | $50,000 |
| More than 100 and fewer than 201 | $100,000 |
| More than 200 and fewer than 501 | $200,000 |
| More than 500 | $300,000 |
The jury is not told of these limits (1981a(c)(2)), and they do not limit relief under 42 U.S.C. 1981, the race discrimination statute (1981a(b)(4)). Several states have their own employment discrimination caps under state law; the state pages for Alaska, Maine, Maryland and Texas, among others, describe them.
Suits against the United States. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the United States "shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages" (28 U.S.C. 2674). Where the law of the state where the act occurred allows only punitive damages in a death case, the United States instead pays actual or compensatory damages measured by the pecuniary injuries from the death.
Civil rights suits under section 1983. A jury may assess punitive damages against an individual defendant in a section 1983 action when the conduct is "shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others" (Smith v. Wade, 1983). A municipality is immune from punitive damages under section 1983 (City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 1981). This federal claim is one route by which punitive damages can be recovered in a Nebraska state court.
Disability and federal-funding statutes. Punitive damages may not be awarded in private suits under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title II of the ADA (public entities) or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Barnes v. Gorman, 2002).
Are punitive damages taxable?
Under federal tax law, damages received on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness are generally excluded from income, but the exclusion in 26 U.S.C. 104(a)(2) expressly carves out punitive damages. The IRS says to include "Punitive damages in most cases" as ordinary income and that "It doesn't matter if they relate to a physical injury or physical sickness" (Publication 525). A narrow exception in 104(c) covers punitive damages in a wrongful death action where state law, as in effect on September 13, 1995, provided that only punitive damages may be awarded in that action. For how settlements and verdicts are taxed more generally, see personal injury settlement amounts.
Related pages
- Wrongful death laws by state
- Medical malpractice laws by state
- Car accident laws by state
- Truck accident laws by state
- Personal injury settlement amounts
- Statute of limitations in the United States
Disclaimer: This page provides general legal information about punitive damages under the laws of the 50 states, the District of Columbia and federal law, current as of October 19, 2026. It is not legal advice, and it does not assess any particular case. Punitive damages rules change through legislation and court decisions, and many statutes for particular claims carry their own rules. For advice on a specific situation, consult a lawyer licensed in the state where the claim arises.
Last updated: October 19, 2026.
Frequently Asked Questions
Which states do not allow punitive damages?
Nebraska bars punitive damages on state-law claims under article VII, section 5 of its constitution (Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox, 1989). Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire and Washington allow them only where a statute expressly authorizes them for the particular claim.
Which states cap punitive damages?
Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin have a general cap, each with its own formula and exceptions. Missouri's cap cannot be applied to a common-law claim that existed in 1820 and would then have supported punitive damages, and the Sixth Circuit held Tennessee's cap unenforceable in federal court.
Which states have no cap on punitive damages?
About half the states, including California, Illinois, New York, Pennsylvania, Arizona and Kentucky, have no general cap; Arizona and Kentucky constitutions bar laws limiting damages for injury, and Arkansas and Illinois caps were struck down. Statutes for particular claims, such as trade secrets acts, often set their own limits even where there is no general cap.
What is the burden of proof for punitive damages?
Most states require clear and convincing evidence of the aggravating conduct. Colorado requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, Connecticut and Delaware apply a preponderance standard, and in several common-law states no statute sets the burden.
Which states take a share of punitive damages awards?
Alaska (50%), Indiana (75% of common-law awards), Missouri (a 50% lien after fees and expenses), Montana (half of awards over $200,000), Oregon (60% and 10% to two state accounts), Utah (half of amounts over $50,000) and Georgia (75% in product liability cases) have split-recovery laws, and Iowa and Illinois have narrower versions. Florida and Pennsylvania take a share only in nursing home and medical malpractice cases, respectively.
Are punitive damages taxable?
Generally yes under federal law. 26 U.S.C. 104(a)(2) excludes damages for physical injury from income but carves out punitive damages, and IRS Publication 525 says punitive damages are ordinary income in most cases even when they relate to a physical injury.
Does insurance cover punitive damages?
It depends on the state and the policy. California, Colorado, New York and Utah are among the states that bar coverage for an insured's own punitive damages, Hawaii and Montana read policies to exclude them unless expressly included, and states such as Georgia, Washington and Wisconsin find no public policy bar.
What is the maximum ratio of punitive to compensatory damages?
The U.S. Supreme Court has refused to set a bright-line ratio, but said in State Farm v. Campbell (2003) that few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process and that a ratio of about 1:1 may be the limit when compensatory damages are substantial. In maritime cases without intentional or malicious conduct or behavior driven primarily by desire for gain, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker (2008) set 1:1 as a fair upper limit as a matter of federal maritime common law.
Are punitive damages available in wrongful death cases?
In many states, yes: Texas, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Virginia and Illinois (for actions filed on or after August 11, 2023) are among the states that allow them in the death action. Others, such as Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio and Pennsylvania, allow them only through the survival claim, and Georgia, Indiana and Michigan courts have held them unavailable in a wrongful death action.
Are punitive damages available against the government?
Almost never. Nearly every state bars punitive damages against the state and local governments in its tort claims act, the Federal Tort Claims Act bars them against the United States (28 U.S.C. 2674), and municipalities are immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 1981).
Are punitive damages available in drunk driving cases?
Some statutes address this directly: Minnesota treats an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more as enough for the jury to consider punitive damages, Virginia deems a driver at 0.15 or more who knew of the impairment to have acted willfully or wantonly, and Louisiana authorizes exemplary damages for injuries caused by an intoxicated driver. Several states also lift their caps for impaired defendants, while courts in Maryland and Vermont have held that intoxication alone did not meet their standard.
What is the difference between punitive and exemplary damages?
None in substance; they are two names for the same remedy. Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code 41.001(5) says exemplary damages include punitive damages, and Georgia treats punitive, vindictive and exemplary damages as synonyms (O.C.G.A. 51-12-5.1(a)).
Updates
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources
State-by-state comparison
Each state guide below is paired with the governing statute our editors adjudicated for it, held in our own legal record and verified against the official source.
Each statute shown is the same adjudicated anchor its state guide renders, independently verified against primary sources. A dash means not yet adjudicated in our record — never that no law exists.
The Law Behind This Article
This article rests on the statutory provisions below, held in our own legal record and retrieved from the official source. Tap a section to read the operative text.
United States Code Title 42
§ 1981aDamages in cases of intentional discrimination in employmentIn forcecited in 5 of our articles
In an action brought by a complaining party under section 706 or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000e–5, 2000e–16] against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact) prohibited under section 703, 704, or 717 of the Act [42 U.S.C. 2000e–2, 2000e–3, 2000e–16], and provided that the complaining party cannot recover under section 1981 of this title, the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b), in addition to any relief authorized by section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent. In an action brought by a complaining party under the powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in section 706 or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000e–5, 2000e–16] (as provided in section 107(a) of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 2,938 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White (Supreme Court of the United States 2006, 548 U.S. 53)“…uoting H. R. Rep. No. 102–40, pt. 1, pp. 64–65 (1991)); see 42 U. S. C. §§1981a(a)(1), (b). We would undermine the sign…”
- Faragher v. City of Boca Raton (Supreme Court of the United States 1998, 524 U.S. 775)“…holding. Civil Rights Act of 1991, §102, 105 Stat. 1072 , 42 U.S.C. § 1981a; see Keene Corp. v. United States,…”
- Landgraf v. USI Film Products (Supreme Court of the United States 1994, 511 U.S. 244)“…of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Rev. Stat. § 1977A(a), 42 U. S. C. § 1981a(a) (1988 ed., Supp. IV), as added by §…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: EEOC Sues Mercy Health Over Alleged Antisemitic Harassment, Eleventh Circuit Revives Race Bias Claims Over Drug Test Firings, Texas Jury Finds School Defamed HR Director; No Judgment Yet
United States Code Title 26
§ 104Compensation for injuries or sicknessIn forcecited in 3 of our articles
Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in excess of) deductions allowed under section 213 (relating to medical, etc., expenses) for any prior taxable year, gross income does not include— amounts received under workmen’s compensation acts as compensation for personal injuries or sickness; the amount of any damages (other than punitive damages) received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness; amounts received through accident or health insurance (or through an arrangement having the effect of accident or health insurance) for personal injuries or sickness (other than amounts received by an employee, to the extent such amounts (A) are attributable to contributions by the employer which were not includible in the gross income of the employee, or (B) are paid by the employer); amounts received as a pension, annuity, or similar allowance for personal injuries or sickness resulting from active service in the armed forces of any country or in the Coast and Geodetic Survey or the Public Health Service, or as a disability annuity payable under the provisions of section 808…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 460 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- United States v. Burke (Supreme Court of the United States 1992, 504 U.S. 229)“…me under § 104(a)(2) of the federal Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. § 104 (a)(2), as "damages received . . . on a…”
- Commissioner v. Schleier (Supreme Court of the United States 1995, 515 U.S. 323)“…s settlement proceeds are excluded from § 61(a)’s reach by 26 U. S. C. § 104 (a). 3 Section 104(a) provides an excl…”
- Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp. (Supreme Court of the United States 1981, 453 U.S. 473)“…ation, § 104 (a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 104 (a) (2). In so ruling the court relied…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Are Class Action Settlements Taxable?, Selling a Structured Settlement: Court Approval, Taxes and Discounts
Search our full record of US law — 2.1 million sections, every state + federal →
Sources and References
- BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996)(tile.loc.gov).gov
- Ala. Code 6-11-20: Punitive damages; definitions(alison.legislature.state.al.us).gov
- AS 09.17.020: Punitive damages(www.akleg.gov).gov
- Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 150 Ariz. 326, 723 P.2d 675 (Ariz. 1986)(www.courtlistener.com)
- Ark. Code 16-55-206: Standards for award of punitive damages (Arkansas Code, public access)(www.arkleg.state.ar.us).gov
- Cal. Civ. Code 3294: Exemplary damages(leginfo.legislature.ca.gov).gov
- C.R.S. 13-21-102: Exemplary damages(olls.info).gov
- Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., 193 Conn. 208, 477 A.2d 988 (1984)(www.courtlistener.com)
- Jardel Co. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518 (Del. 1987)(www.courtlistener.com)
- Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Breeden, 665 A.2d 929 (D.C. 1995)(www.courtlistener.com)
- Fla. Stat. 768.72: Pleading in civil actions; claim for punitive damages(www.leg.state.fl.us).gov
- O.C.G.A. 51-12-5.1, Punitive damages(law.justia.com)
- Guieb v. Guieb, 156 Hawaiʻi 162, 571 P.3d 382 (2025)(www.courtlistener.com)
- Idaho Code 6-1604: Limitation on punitive damages(legislature.idaho.gov).gov
- Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172 (1978)(static.case.law)
- IC 34-51-3: Punitive damages(iga.in.gov).gov
- Iowa Code 668A.1, Punitive or exemplary damages(www.legis.iowa.gov).gov
- K.S.A. 60-3702: Punitive damages; trier of fact determines whether allowed; court sets amount; limitations(www.ksrevisor.gov).gov
- KRS 411.184: Definitions, punitive damages, proof of punitive damages(apps.legislature.ky.gov).gov
- International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Seale, 518 So. 2d 1039 (La. 1988)(www.courtlistener.com)
- Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353 (Me. 1985)(www.courtlistener.com)
- Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992)(www.courtlistener.com)
- Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp., 410 Mass. 805 (1991)(static.case.law)
- Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 470 Mich. 749 (2004)(static.case.law)
- Minn. Stat. 549.20: Punitive damages(www.revisor.mn.gov).gov
- Miss. Code Ann. 11-1-65, Punitive damages; limitations (Mississippi Code, official public access)(www.lexisnexis.com)
- Mo. Rev. Stat. 510.261: Punitive damages, restrictions on award of(revisor.mo.gov).gov
- Mont. Code Ann. 27-1-220: Punitive damages, when allowed, limitation(mca.legmt.gov).gov
- Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox, 232 Neb. 846, 443 N.W.2d 566 (Neb. 1989)(static.case.law)
- NRS 42.005: Exemplary and punitive damages(www.leg.state.nv.us).gov
- RSA 507:16: Punitive Damages Outlawed(gc.nh.gov).gov
- N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.12: Standard of proof; factors(lis.njleg.state.nj.us).gov
- UJI 13-1827 NMRA: Punitive damages (civil uniform jury instruction)(nmonesource.com).gov
- Ross v. Louise Wise Services, Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 478 (2007)(www.courtlistener.com)
- G.S. 1D-10: Scope of the Chapter(www.ncleg.gov).gov
- N.D.C.C. 32-03.2-11: When court or jury may give exemplary damages (chapter 32-03.2)(ndlegis.gov).gov
- Ohio Revised Code 2315.21, Punitive or exemplary damages(codes.ohio.gov).gov
- 23 O.S. 9.1: Punitive damages awards by jury; 23 O.S. 111-114: patent infringement communications (Oklahoma Statutes Title 23)(www.oklegislature.gov).gov
- ORS 31.730, Standards for award of punitive damages; required review of award by court; additional reduction of award for remedial measures(www.oregonlegislature.gov).gov
- Hutchison v. Luddy, 582 Pa. 114, 870 A.2d 766 (Pa. 2005)(static.case.law)
- Palmisano v. Toth, 624 A.2d 314 (R.I. 1993)(www.courtlistener.com)
- S.C. Code 15-32-520: Bifurcated trials; clear and convincing evidence standard; factors; review(www.scstatehouse.gov).gov
- SDCL 21-3-2, Punitive damages in discretion of jury(sdlegislature.gov).gov
- Tenn. Code Ann. 29-39-104, Punitive damages (Tennessee Code Annotated, official public access)(www.lexisnexis.com)
- Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code ch. 41: Damages (41.001-41.014)(statutes.capitol.texas.gov).gov
- Utah Code 78B-8-201, Basis for punitive damages awards; division of award with state(le.utah.gov).gov
- Fly Fish Vermont, Inc. v. Chapin Hill Estates, Inc., 2010 VT 33, 187 Vt. 541(www.courtlistener.com)
- Va. Code 8.01-38.1: Limitation on recovery of punitive damages(law.lis.virginia.gov).gov
- Dailey v. North Coast Life Insurance Co., 129 Wn.2d 572, 919 P.2d 589 (1996)(static.case.law)
- W. Va. Code 55-7-29: Limitations on punitive damages(code.wvlegislature.gov).gov
- Wis. Stat. 895.043: Punitive damages(docs.legis.wisconsin.gov).gov
- Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187 (Wyo. 1979)(www.courtlistener.com)
- State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003)(tile.loc.gov).gov
- Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991)(tile.loc.gov).gov
- TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993)(tile.loc.gov).gov
- Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007)(tile.loc.gov).gov
- Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994)(tile.loc.gov).gov
- Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001)(tile.loc.gov).gov
- Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008)(tile.loc.gov).gov
- 42 U.S.C. 1981a: Damages in cases of intentional discrimination in employment(www.govinfo.gov).gov
- 28 U.S.C. 2674: Liability of United States (Federal Tort Claims Act)(www.govinfo.gov).gov
- Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983)(tile.loc.gov).gov
- City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981)(tile.loc.gov).gov
- 26 U.S.C. 104: Compensation for injuries or sickness(www.govinfo.gov).gov
- IRS Publication 525: Taxable and Nontaxable Income(www.irs.gov).gov
- Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002)(tile.loc.gov).gov
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