Massachusetts
Punitive Damages in Massachusetts: Statute-Only Rule (2026)
Independently fact-checked against primary sources (last audited October 18, 2026). · 36 primary sources cited on this page. How we verify our legal content
Massachusetts allows punitive damages only when a statute expressly authorizes them. The Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) put the rule in one sentence in Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp., 410 Mass. 805, 813 (1991): "Punitive damages are not allowed in this Commonwealth unless expressly authorized by statute." There is no general cap. The main authorizing statute, the wrongful death law (G.L. c. 229, s. 2), sets a minimum punitive award of $5,000 and no maximum.
In April 2026 the SJC decided Fontaine v. Philip Morris USA Inc., a decision on punitive damages under the wrongful death statute: the statute does not require clear and convincing evidence, bifurcation is up to the trial judge, and a $1 billion jury award remitted to seven times compensatory damages stood. For how other states compare, see punitive damages laws by state.
Information last verified on 2026-10-18. This article has not been reviewed by a licensed lawyer.
Jurisdiction scope: This article covers Massachusetts state law on punitive and multiple damages in civil cases: the statute-only rule of Flesner, the wrongful death statute (G.L. c. 229, s. 2) as read in Fontaine v. Philip Morris USA Inc. (2026), chapter 93A multiple damages, and the other General Laws sections named below. It does not cover compensatory damages or medical malpractice damage limits (see Massachusetts medical malpractice law), wrongful-death procedure, deadlines and beneficiaries (see Massachusetts wrongful death law), federal claims, or every statute that authorizes punitive, exemplary or multiple damages for a particular claim beyond those named here.
Does Massachusetts allow punitive damages?
Only when a statute says so. Massachusetts courts do not award punitive damages as a common-law remedy for outrageous conduct. In Flesner, the SJC applied that rule to throw out a punitive damages claim:
"Punitive damages are not allowed in this Commonwealth unless expressly authorized by statute. ... Because no such legislative authorization applies to this case, Flesner's claim for punitive damages cannot stand."
The SJC quoted and applied Flesner again in Fontaine in 2026. The practical question in any Massachusetts case is therefore not how bad the conduct was in the abstract, but whether a specific statute covering the claim authorizes punitive, exemplary or multiple damages, and on what terms.
The statutes that do so fall into a few groups: the wrongful death statute; chapter 93A multiple damages; employment, insurance and recording statutes; and a set of narrower claim-specific provisions. Several other statutes bar punitive damages for particular claims or defendants. Each group is covered below.
Wrongful death: the main authorization
The wrongful death statute, G.L. c. 229, s. 2, makes liable a person who (1) by negligence causes a death, (2) by a willful, wanton or reckless act causes a death "under such circumstances that the deceased could have recovered damages for personal injuries if his death had not resulted," (3) or (4) operates a common carrier of passengers and by negligence or a willful, wanton or reckless act causes a passenger's death, or (5) "is responsible for a breach of warranty arising under Article 2 of chapter one hundred and six which results in injury to a person that causes death."
Among the damages the section lists is clause (3):
"(3) punitive damages in an amount of not less than five thousand dollars in such case as the decedent's death was caused by the malicious, willful, wanton or reckless conduct of the defendant or by the gross negligence of the defendant; except that (1) the liability of an employer to a person in his employment shall not be governed by this section, ..."
Three points follow from the text:
- The standard. Ordinary negligence can support the wrongful death claim itself, but punitive damages require malicious, willful, wanton or reckless conduct, or gross negligence.
- A floor, not a ceiling. The statute sets a $5,000 minimum and no maximum.
- Employers and employees. The section states that the liability of an employer to a person in its employment "shall not be governed by this section."
The same section makes a person liable "for the negligence or the willful, wanton or reckless act of his agents or servants while engaged in his business to the same extent and subject to the same limits as he would be liable under this section for his own act." Separately, c. 229, s. 6 allows recovery for the decedent's conscious suffering in an action under section 2, with "any sum so recovered" held by the executors or administrators "as assets of the estate of the deceased."
Who brings the claim, who shares in the recovery and the filing deadline are on the Massachusetts wrongful death page.
What must be proven, and the burden of proof
For wrongful death punitive damages, the plaintiff must show that the death was caused by "malicious, willful, wanton or reckless conduct" or gross negligence (c. 229, s. 2). On the burden of proof, the SJC in Fontaine declined to require clear and convincing evidence:
"Here, punitive damages were awarded pursuant to the wrongful death statute, G. L. c. 229, § 2, which, although requiring a heightened showing of culpability ("malicious, willful, wanton or reckless conduct" or gross negligence) before punitive damages may be awarded, does not require proof by clear and convincing evidence. ... We see no reason to deviate from that approach here."
The trial judge in that case had instructed the jury on a preponderance of the evidence. Fontaine decided the burden under the wrongful death statute; each of the other statutes discussed below sets its own conditions in its own words.
Is there a cap on punitive damages in Massachusetts?
There is no general cap. For wrongful death, the SJC said so directly in Fontaine:
"We begin by noting that the Legislature has declined to cap punitive damages for egregious misconduct resulting in wrongful death. The Massachusetts wrongful death statute authorizes a minimum punitive award of $5,000 where death was caused by the "malicious, willful, wanton or reckless conduct of the defendant or by the gross negligence of the defendant," with no maximum penalty."
Some statutes for particular claims set their own measures, each in its own terms:
| Statute | Measure the statute sets |
|---|---|
| G.L. c. 229, s. 2 (wrongful death) | Not less than $5,000; no maximum |
| G.L. c. 176D, s. 7 (action to recover on an insurance policy) | Punitive damages "not to exceed twenty-five per cent of said claim," in addition to the claim |
| G.L. c. 93, s. 42B(b) (trade secrets) | Exemplary damages "not exceeding twice any award made under subsection (a)," for willful and malicious misappropriation |
| G.L. c. 66, s. 10A(d)(4) (public records; agency or municipality that did not act in good faith) | Not less than $1,000 nor more than $5,000, deposited into the Public Records Assistance Fund |
| G.L. c. 6, s. 177 (criminal offender record information, ss. 168-175) | On a willful violation, exemplary damages of $100 to $1,000 for each violation |
| G.L. c. 183, s. 64 (mortgage loans, location of property) | Actual damages or punitive damages of $5,000, whichever is greater, but not less than $2,500 |
| G.L. c. 222, s. 18(b) (notaries public not licensed to practice law, s. 17) | If the defendant knew or should have known the conduct violated s. 17, punitive damages of not more than $5,000 per violation |
| G.L. c. 214, s. 3B (violations of chapter 66A by public holders) | Exemplary damages of not less than $100 for each violation |
| G.L. c. 111, s. 199(b) (lead paint: owners notified of dangerous lead levels) | Treble the actual damages found, for a willful failure to take the required actions |
| G.L. c. 258C, s. 12 (claim by the commonwealth) | Not more than triple the damages the commonwealth sustains |
Constitutional review still applies. In Fontaine, the jury awarded $1 billion in punitive damages. The SJC described what happened next: "After trial, the judge remitted the punitive damages award to seven times the compensatory damages, i.e., to slightly more than $56 million. ... We also conclude that the judge remitted the punitive damages to an amount that was within constitutionally permissible bounds." The U.S. Supreme Court's due-process limits on the size of punitive awards, explained on the punitive damages hub, apply to Massachusetts verdicts too.
Fontaine is a slip opinion dated April 22, 2026, and remains subject to revision before publication in the official reports. Philip Morris USA Inc. filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court (No. 26-235) on August 20, 2026; the docket shows the time for a response extended to November 20, 2026, and the petition was pending as of October 18, 2026.
Chapter 93A: double or treble damages
Sections 9 and 11 of chapter 93A, the Massachusetts unfair trade practices law, describe multiple damages rather than punitive damages: they multiply actual damages for willful or knowing violations. For consumer actions, section 9(3) provides that recovery "shall be in the amount of actual damages or twenty-five dollars, whichever is greater; or up to three but not less than two times such amount if the court finds that the use or employment of the act or practice was a willful or knowing violation of said section two or that the refusal to grant relief upon demand was made in bad faith with knowledge or reason to know that the act or practice complained of violated said section two."
Section 9 generally requires a written demand for relief at least 30 days before suit; the demand requirement does not apply to a counterclaim or cross-claim, or where the prospective respondent does not maintain a place of business or keep assets in Massachusetts. If the business makes a written tender of settlement within 30 days, the claimant rejects it, and the court finds the relief tendered "reasonable in relation to the injury actually suffered," recovery is limited to the relief tendered; the multiple applies "in all other cases." The amount multiplied is "the amount of the judgment on all claims arising out of the same and underlying transaction or occurrence."
For actions between businesses, section 11 uses the same multiple: "up to three, but not less than two, times such amount if the court finds that the use or employment of the method of competition or the act or practice was a willful or knowing violation of said section two." Section 11 has a parallel rule for a written offer of settlement for single damages tendered with the answer: if it is rejected and the court finds it reasonable, "the court shall not award more than single damages." Under both sections, the multiple turns on what "the court finds."
Discrimination, insurance and recording statutes
Discrimination (c. 151B, s. 9). The civil remedies section of chapter 151B, the unlawful discrimination law, provides: "If the court finds for the petitioner, it may award the petitioner actual and punitive damages." For age discrimination in employment, the same section instead provides actual damages, "or up to three, but not less than two, times such amount" if the court finds the practice was committed with knowledge, or reason to know, that it violated section 4. The court must also award reasonable attorney's fees and costs "unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust."
Insurance claims (c. 176D, s. 7). "In any action to recover on an insurance policy, a court may award punitive damages, in addition to the amount of the claim, not to exceed twenty-five per cent of said claim if the court finds that the party seeking to recover on the insurance policy has been damaged by a violation of sections three or four that has been determined such by the commissioner." The 25% limit and the requirement of a violation determined by the commissioner are both part of the text.
Interception of wire and oral communications (c. 272, s. 99). Subsection Q of the statute provides a civil remedy: the person bringing the action "shall be entitled to recover from any such person 1. actual damages but not less than liquidated damages computed at the rate of $100 per day for each day of violation or $1000, whichever is higher; 2. punitive damages; and 3. a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation disbursements reasonably incurred."
Equal rights (c. 93, s. 102). A civil action may seek "injunctive and other appropriate equitable relief, including the award of compensatory and exemplary damages"; section 103(b) carries a parallel remedy for the age and disability provisions.
Other statutes that authorize punitive or exemplary damages
These narrower provisions authorize punitive or exemplary damages for the claims they cover (measures for the ones that set a figure are in the cap table above):
- Lead paint (c. 111, s. 199(b)). An owner notified of a dangerous level of lead in paint, plaster or other accessible structural material, or who receives a notice or order to comply, and "who willfully fails to take the actions required by" sections 189A to 199B, the regulations, or an order to remedy "said dangerous conditions" is subject to punitive damages "which shall be treble the actual damages found." Under c. 111, s. 197D, a secured lender that acquires legal title to premises in which a child under the age of six resides and does not take one of the required steps within 90 days "shall be fully liable for all damages, including punitive damages, under section one hundred and ninety-nine."
- Consumer credit reporting (c. 93, s. 63). A consumer reporting agency, a furnisher of information or a user of information that willfully fails to comply with sections 50 to 62A is liable for "such amount of punitive damages as the court may allow," plus costs and attorney's fees.
- Trafficking of persons for sexual servitude (c. 260, s. 4D(a)). "The court may award actual damages, compensatory damages, punitive damages, injunctive relief or any other appropriate relief," and "treble damages may be awarded on proof of actual damages if the defendant's acts were willful and malicious."
- Female genital mutilation (c. 260, s. 4E(a)). The court may award actual, compensatory and punitive damages, and "treble damages may be awarded on proof of actual damages if the defendant's acts were willful and malicious."
- Obstructing entry to or departure from medical facilities (c. 266, s. 120E). Relief may include "compensatory and exemplary damages."
- Interference with the lawful taking of fish or wildlife (c. 131, s. 5C). A person damaged "may bring a civil action for punitive damages."
- Real property purchased with chapter 44B funds (c. 44B, s. 15(b)). Damages, "including punitive damages for willful or wanton violation of this chapter."
- Servicemembers (c. 33, s. 13A(h)). The section does not "preclude or limit any other remedy otherwise available under law, including consequential and punitive damages or double or treble damages pursuant to chapter 93A."
Chapter 183B, section 7 works the other way: "consequential, special, or punitive damages may not be awarded except as specifically provided in this chapter or by other rule of law."
Where punitive damages are barred
Libel and slander. G.L. c. 231, s. 93: "In no action of slander or libel shall exemplary or punitive damages be allowed, whether because of actual malice or want of good faith or for any other reason. Proof of actual malice shall not enhance the damages recoverable for injury to the plaintiff's reputation." The rest of a defamation claim is on the Massachusetts defamation laws page.
Public employers. Under G.L. c. 258, s. 2, public employers "shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages or for any amount in excess of $100,000; provided, however, that all claims for serious bodily injury against the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority shall not be subject to a $100,000 limitation on compensatory damages."
Two public bodies with the same rule. The Authority under c. 15C, s. 22A and the connector under c. 176Q, s. 13 are each not liable "for punitive damages or for any amount in excess of" $100,000.
Judgments against the commonwealth under chapter 258D. "A judgment against the commonwealth may not include punitive or exemplary damages. The total liability of the commonwealth for any judgment entered under this chapter shall not exceed $1,000,000" (c. 258D, s. 5).
When the wrongdoer has died. G.L. c. 230, s. 2: "If an action of tort is commenced or prosecuted against the executor or administrator of the person originally liable, the plaintiff shall recover only the value of the goods taken, or the damage actually sustained, without vindictive or exemplary damages, or damages for any alleged outrage to the feelings of the injured party."
Does Massachusetts take a share of the award?
No general Massachusetts statute sends any part of a punitive award to the state or a public fund. The wrongful death statute and chapter 93A contain no such provision. One claim-specific statute does: punitive damages assessed against a defendant agency or municipality under G.L. c. 66, s. 10A(d)(4) are "to be deposited into the Public Records Assistance Fund established in section 35DDD of chapter 10."
How the amount is decided at trial
Bifurcation is discretionary. In Fontaine, the SJC held that the trial judge "did not abuse her discretion in denying Philip Morris's motion to bifurcate the trial," explaining that a trial judge, other than one sitting in the District Court, may, under Mass. R. Civ. P. 42(b), bifurcate any claim or issue "in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy." In the court's words, "The decision to bifurcate is one within the sound discretion of the judge."
The judge may remit. As Fontaine shows, a trial judge may reduce a jury's punitive award, and the SJC reviews whether the reduced amount is within constitutional bounds.
Under chapter 93A, the court decides the multiple. Sections 9 and 11 condition double or treble damages on what "the court finds."
Does insurance pay punitive damages in Massachusetts?
The SJC addressed one kind of coverage. In Santos v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 408 Mass. 70 (1990), a case about underinsured motorist coverage and punitive damages awarded under c. 229, s. 2, the court wrote: "We do not think that the Legislature, in devising a statutory scheme by which the victim of an underinsured motorist may be compensated for his or her losses, obligated the insurer to provide coverage for punitive damages." That holding concerns underinsured motorist coverage; it does not decide whether a liability policy may cover punitive damages. For other parts of a crash claim, see Massachusetts car accident laws.
Under federal law, punitive damages are generally taxable income even when they arise from a physical injury (26 U.S.C. 104(a)(2)); the personal injury settlement amounts guide covers taxes.
Massachusetts punitive damages at a glance
| Question | Massachusetts rule | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Source of the remedy | Statute only; not allowed unless expressly authorized by statute | Flesner (SJC 1991); Fontaine (SJC 2026) |
| Main authorization | Wrongful death: punitive damages of not less than $5,000 | G.L. c. 229, s. 2 |
| Wrongful death standard | Malicious, willful, wanton or reckless conduct, or gross negligence | G.L. c. 229, s. 2 |
| Burden of proof | Wrongful death: clear and convincing evidence not required; jury instructed on preponderance | Fontaine (SJC 2026, slip op.) |
| General cap | None; claim-specific measures in some statutes (for example 25% of the claim, twice the trade secrets award) | Fontaine; c. 176D, s. 7; c. 93, s. 42B(b) |
| Employer and employee | Section 2 does not govern an employer's liability to its own employee | G.L. c. 229, s. 2 |
| Chapter 93A | Two to three times actual damages for willful or knowing violations, as the court finds; a reasonable written settlement tender can limit recovery | G.L. c. 93A, ss. 9, 11 |
| Insurance claims | Up to 25% of the claim, on a violation determined by the commissioner | G.L. c. 176D, s. 7 |
| Libel and slander | Barred | G.L. c. 231, s. 93 |
| Public employers | Barred; $100,000 limit (MBTA serious bodily injury exception for compensatory damages) | G.L. c. 258, s. 2 |
| Wrongdoer's estate | No exemplary damages in a tort action against the executor or administrator | G.L. c. 230, s. 2 |
| State share | No general split; public records punitive damages go to the Public Records Assistance Fund | G.L. c. 66, s. 10A(d)(4) |
| Bifurcation | Trial judge's discretion | Mass. R. Civ. P. 42(b); Fontaine |
| Underinsured motorist coverage | Not obligated to cover c. 229, s. 2 punitive damages | Santos (SJC 1990) |
Recent changes
The main recent development is judicial: Fontaine v. Philip Morris USA Inc., decided April 22, 2026, which addressed the burden of proof, bifurcation and the constitutional review of a wrongful-death punitive award. On the statutory side, Acts of 2025, chapter 9, section 88 changed agency wording in c. 258C, s. 12, effective July 1, 2025; both versions keep the triple-damages sentence.
Related pages
- Punitive damages laws by state
- Massachusetts wrongful death law
- Massachusetts defamation laws
- Massachusetts medical malpractice law
This article provides general legal information about Massachusetts punitive damages law as of 2026-10-18. It is not legal advice. For advice about a specific situation, contact a lawyer licensed in Massachusetts.
Last updated: 2026-10-18.
Frequently Asked Questions
Does Massachusetts allow punitive damages?
Only where a statute expressly authorizes them. The Supreme Judicial Court stated in Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp. (1991) that punitive damages are not allowed in the Commonwealth unless expressly authorized by statute. The wrongful death statute, G.L. c. 229, s. 2, is the main authorization; others include c. 151B, s. 9, c. 176D, s. 7 and c. 272, s. 99.
Is there a cap on punitive damages in Massachusetts?
There is no general cap. The wrongful death statute sets a $5,000 minimum and no maximum, and the SJC noted in Fontaine (2026) that the Legislature has declined to cap them. Some claim-specific statutes set their own limits, such as up to 25% of the claim against an insurer under c. 176D, s. 7. Federal due-process limits on the size of an award also apply.
What is the standard for punitive damages in a Massachusetts wrongful death case?
Under G.L. c. 229, s. 2, the death must have been caused by the defendant's malicious, willful, wanton or reckless conduct or by gross negligence. In Fontaine v. Philip Morris USA Inc. (April 22, 2026, slip opinion), the SJC held that the statute does not require proof by clear and convincing evidence; the jury in that case was instructed on a preponderance of the evidence.
Are punitive damages available in a Massachusetts wrongful death case?
Yes, when the statute's standard is met. G.L. c. 229, s. 2 provides for punitive damages of not less than $5,000 where the death was caused by malicious, willful, wanton or reckless conduct or gross negligence. The section does not govern an employer's liability to a person in its employment.
Are treble damages under Chapter 93A the same as punitive damages?
Sections 9 and 11 of chapter 93A provide multiple damages rather than damages labeled punitive. They allow up to three but not less than two times actual damages if the court finds a willful or knowing violation of section 2; section 9 also allows the multiple for a refusal to grant relief on demand made in bad faith with knowledge or reason to know of the violation. A reasonable written settlement tender can limit recovery under both sections.
Are punitive damages available for libel or slander in Massachusetts?
No. G.L. c. 231, s. 93 provides that in no action of slander or libel shall exemplary or punitive damages be allowed, whether because of actual malice, want of good faith or any other reason.
Are punitive damages available against a Massachusetts public employer?
No. Under G.L. c. 258, s. 2, public employers are not liable for punitive damages, for interest before judgment or for any amount over $100,000, with an exception from the $100,000 limit on compensatory damages for serious bodily injury claims against the MBTA.
Does Massachusetts take a share of punitive damages?
No general statute sends any part of a punitive award to the state. One claim-specific statute does: punitive damages of $1,000 to $5,000 assessed against an agency or municipality under G.L. c. 66, s. 10A(d)(4) are deposited into the Public Records Assistance Fund.
Does underinsured motorist coverage pay punitive damages in Massachusetts?
Not under the SJC's decision in Santos v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. (1990), which held that the Legislature did not obligate an underinsured motorist insurer to cover punitive damages awarded under G.L. c. 229, s. 2. That decision concerned underinsured motorist coverage, not liability policies generally.
Updates
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources
The Law Behind This Article
This article rests on the statutory provisions below, held in our own legal record and retrieved from the official source. Tap a section to read the operative text.
Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 229
§ 2Wrongful death; damagesIn forcecited in 5 of our articles
Section 2. A person who (1) by his negligence causes the death of a person, or (2) by willful, wanton or reckless act causes the death of a person under such circumstances that the deceased could have recovered damages for personal injuries if his death had not resulted, or (3) operates a common carrier of passengers and by his negligence causes the death of a passenger, or (4) operates a common carrier of passengers and by his willful, wanton or reckless act causes the death of a passenger under such circumstances that the deceased could have recovered damages for personal injuries if his death had not resulted, or (5) is responsible for a breach of warranty arising under Article 2 of chapter one hundred and six which results in injury to a person that causes death, shall be liable in damages in the amount of: (1) the fair monetary value of the decedent to the persons entitled to receive the damages recovered, as provided in section one, including but not limited to compensation for the loss of the reasonably expected net income, services, protection, care, assistance, society, companionship, comfort, guidance, counsel, and advice of the decedent to the persons entitled to the…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-06 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at malegislature.gov
Cited in 283 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc. (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 1980, 381 Mass. 507)“…f the reasonably expected ... society ... of the decedent." G.L.c. 229, § 2, as appearing in St. 1973, c. 699, § 1.…”
- Gaudette v. Webb (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 1972, 362 Mass. 60)“…ul death statute in effect at the time of Gaudette’s death, G. L. c. 229, § 2, as appearing in St. 1958, c. 238, § 1,…”
- Gallant v. Worcester (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 1981, 383 Mass. 707)“…mental death liability mere surplusage after 1978. In 1979, G.L.c. 229, § 2, was amended to update the statute of l…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Massachusetts Wrongful Death Laws (2026): Deadlines, Medical Malpractice Laws in Massachusetts (2026): Deadlines, Massachusetts Motorcycle Accident Laws (2026): Deadlines
§ 6Conscious suffering; recovery of damagesIn force
Section 6. In any civil action brought under section two or five A, damages may be recovered for conscious suffering resulting from the same injury, but any sum so recovered shall be held and disposed of by the executors or administrators as assets of the estate of the deceased.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at malegislature.gov
Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 93A
§ 9Civil actions and remedies; class action; demand for relief; damages; costs; exhausting administrative remediesIn forcecited in 3 of our articles
Section 9. (1) Any person, other than a person entitled to bring action under section eleven of this chapter, who has been injured by another person's use or employment of any method, act or practice declared to be unlawful by section two or any rule or regulation issued thereunder or any person whose rights are affected by another person violating the provisions of clause (9) of section three of chapter one hundred and seventy-six D;;;MI;;0000000; may bring an action in the superior court, or in the housing court as provided in section three of chapter one hundred and eighty-five C whether by way of original complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim or third party action, for damages and such equitable relief, including an injunction, as the court deems to be necessary and proper.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at malegislature.gov
Cited in 1,043 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co. (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 2008, 451 Mass. 623)“…d injury *625 or manifested defect a bar to recovery under G. L. c. 93A, § 9, in this case. Nevertheless, we conclud…”
- Linthicum v. Archambault (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 1979, 379 Mass. 381)“…1977. The plaintiff then sent a demand letter pursuant to G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (3), to which the defendant made no wri…”
- Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc. (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 1975, 366 Mass. 688)“…ntiff, through counsel, sent a demand letter complying with G. L. c. 93A, § 9, and that the defendant failed to respo…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Massachusetts Scam and Fraud Laws: Where to Report, How to Sue, Massachusetts Identity Theft Laws: Penalties and Victim Rights
§ 11Persons engaged in business; actions for unfair trade practices; class actions; damages; injunction; costsIn forcecited in 2 of our articles
Section 11. Any person who engages in the conduct of any trade or commerce and who suffers any loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by another person who engages in any trade or commerce of an unfair method of competition or an unfair or deceptive act or practice declared unlawful by section two or by any rule or regulation issued under paragraph (c) of section two may, as hereinafter provided, bring an action in the superior court, or in the housing court as provided in section three of chapter one hundred and eighty-five C, whether by way of original complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party action for damages and such equitable relief, including an injunction, as the court deems to be necessary and proper. Such person, if he has not suffered any loss of money or property, may obtain such an injunction if it can be shown that the aforementioned unfair method of competition, act or practice may have the effect of causing such loss of money or property.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at malegislature.gov
Cited in 1,152 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Nader v. Citron (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 1977, 372 Mass. 96)“…J. This case presents questions about the scope of G. L. c. 93A, § 11, which gives a private cause of…”
- International Fidelity Insurance v. Wilson (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 1983, 387 Mass. 841)“…L. c. 93A count, and for attorneys’ fees of $19,990 under G. L. c. 93A, § 11. The judge also determined, based on th…”
- Uno Restaurants, Inc. v. Boston Kenmore Realty Corp. (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 2004, 441 Mass. 376)“…oston Kenmore engaged in “wilful” deception, as required by G. L. c. 93A, § 11. “Wilful” conduct is not required to sh…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Onsite Mammography Settlement: Claims Closed, Awaiting Court Approval
Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 151B
§ 9Construction and enforcement of chapter; inconsistent laws; exclusiveness of statutory procedure; civil remedies; speedy trial; attorney's fees and costs; damagesIn forcecited in 3 of our articles
Section 9. This chapter shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of its purposes, and any law inconsistent with any provision of this chapter shall not apply, but nothing contained in this chapter shall be deemed to repeal any provision of any other law of this commonwealth relating to discrimination; but, as to acts declared unlawful by section 4, the administrative procedure provided in this chapter under section 5 shall, while pending, be exclusive; and the final determination on the merits shall exclude any other civil action, based on the same grievance of the individual concerned.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at malegislature.gov
Also relied on in: Massachusetts Workplace Harassment Laws: Chapter 151B (2026), Wrongful Termination in Massachusetts (2026): Laws, Deadlines, How to File
Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 176D
§ 7Determination of violation; suspension or revocation of license; restitution; damages; reviewIn force
Section 7. If after such hearing, the commissioner shall determine that the person charged has engaged in an unfair or deceptive act or practice he shall reduce his findings to writing and shall issue and cause to be served upon the person charged with the violation a copy of such findings and an order requiring such person to cease and desist from engaging in such method of competition, act or practice and if the act or practice is a violation of sections three or four, the commissioner may suspend or in the case of repeated violations revoke the license of such a party and impose conditions for the reinstatement thereof. In addition whoever commits such an act or practice shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars for each and every act or practice. In addition to any other powers provided in this section, the commissioner may order that restitution be made by an insurer or its agent to any claimant who has suffered actual economic damage as a result of a violation of this chapter.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at malegislature.gov
Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 231
§ 93Retraction of libel; mitigation of damages; punitive damagesIn forcecited in 2 of our articles
Section 93. Where the defendant in an action for libel, at any time after the publication of the libel hereinafter referred to, either before or after such action is brought, but before the answer is required to be filed therein, gives written notice to the plaintiff or to his attorney of his intention to publish a retraction of the libel, accompanied by a copy of the retraction which he intends to publish, and the retraction is published, he may prove such publication, and, if the plaintiff does not accept the offer of retraction, the defendant may prove such nonacceptance in mitigation of damages. If within a reasonable time after receiving notice in writing from the plaintiff that he claims to be libelled the defendant makes such offer and publishes a reasonable retraction, and such offer is not accepted, he may prove that the alleged libel was published in good faith and without actual malice, and, unless the proof is successfully rebutted, the plaintiff shall recover only for any actual damage sustained. In no action of slander or libel shall exemplary or punitive damages be allowed, whether because of actual malice or want of good faith or for any other reason.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at malegislature.gov
Cited in 10 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2006
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Johnson v. Republican Co. (Massachusetts District Court, Appellate Division 1987, 1987 Mass. App. Div. 85)“…h therein regarding his person. The defendant argues that G.L. c. 231, § 93 prohibits exemplary or punitive damages…”
- Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc. (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 1975, 367 Mass. 849)“…ton Publishing Co., supra, even on proof of actual malice. G. L. c. 231, § 93, as appearing in St. 1943, c. 360. In a…”
- Ravnikar v. Bogojavlensky (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 2003, 438 Mass. 627)“…ounty Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 860-861 (1975). G. L. c. 231, § 93. The plaintiff does not claim th…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Massachusetts Defamation Laws: Libel & Slander (2026)
Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 258
§ 2Liability; exclusiveness of remedy; cooperation of public employee; subsequent actions; representation by public attorneyIn force
Section 2. Public employers shall be liable for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any public employee while acting within the scope of his office or employment, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, except that public employers shall not be liable to levy of execution on any real and personal property to satisfy judgment, and shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages or for any amount in excess of $100,000; provided, however, that all claims for serious bodily injury against the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority shall not be subject to a $100,000 limitation on compensatory damages.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at malegislature.gov
Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 230
§ 2Torts; amount of damagesIn force
Section 2. If an action of tort is commenced or prosecuted against the executor or administrator of the person originally liable, the plaintiff shall recover only the value of the goods taken, or the damage actually sustained, without vindictive or exemplary damages, or damages for any alleged outrage to the feelings of the injured party.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at malegislature.gov
Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 258D
§ 5DamagesIn force
Section 5. (A) Upon a finding or verdict that the claimant has met the requirements of section 1 by the requisite standard of proof and is not barred from compensation by section 2, the court or the jury shall determine the damages that shall be payable to the claimant. In making such determination, the court or jury shall consider, but not be limited to, the consideration of: the income the claimant would have earned, but for his incarceration; the particular circumstances of the claimant's trial and other proceedings; the length and conditions under which the claimant was incarcerated and; any other factors deemed appropriate under the circumstances in order to fairly and reasonably compensate the claimant. The court, in its discretion, may admit expert testimony on these or any factors.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at malegislature.gov
Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 272
§ 99Interception of wire and oral communicationsIn forcecited in 25 of our articles
Section 99. Interception of wire and oral communications.— A. Preamble. The general court finds that organized crime exists within the commonwealth and that the increasing activities of organized crime constitute a grave danger to the public welfare and safety. Organized crime, as it exists in the commonwealth today, consists of a continuing conspiracy among highly organized and disciplined groups to engage in supplying illegal goods and services. In supplying these goods and services organized crime commits unlawful acts and employs brutal and violent tactics. Organized crime is infiltrating legitimate business activities and depriving honest businessmen of the right to make a living. The general court further finds that because organized crime carries on its activities through layers of insulation and behind a wall of secrecy, government has been unsuccessful in curtailing and eliminating it. Normal investigative procedures are not effective in the investigation of illegal acts committed by organized crime.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-23 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at malegislature.gov
Cited in 271 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Commonwealth v. Blood (1987) read Section 99 as generally proscribing secret recording of oral communications without all parties' consent, and suppressed under art. 14 a warrantless police recording made with one party's consent. Commonwealth v. Vitello (1975) held Section 99 substantially complies with federal Title III.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Commonwealth v. Vitello (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 1975, 367 Mass. 224)✓In a gaming prosecution built on wiretapped phone calls, the SJC gave chapter 272 section 99 its first full review and held the state wiretap statute substantially complies with federal Title III and that the warrants issued under it met both standards.
- Commonwealth v. Blood (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 1987, 400 Mass. 61)✓Police wired an informant who recorded conversations in private homes about a planned break-in; the SJC held the recordings fell within section 99's one-party-consent exception but that article 14 nonetheless required a warrant, and reversed the convictions.
- Commonwealth v. D'Amour (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 1999, 428 Mass. 725)✓The SJC upheld a section 99 wiretap of a widow suspected of arranging her husband's murder for insurance money, holding the district attorney's written designation of an assistant satisfied Vitello and that probable cause supported the organized crime connection.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Massachusetts Recording Laws (2026): Two-Party Consent Rules, Massachusetts Landlord-Tenant Recording Laws, Massachusetts Nursing Home Camera Laws: All-Party Consent Risks
Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 93
§ 42BTrade secrets; damagesIn forcecited in 2 of our articles
[Text of section applicable as provided by 2018, 228, Sec. 70.] Section 42B. (a) Except to the extent that a material and prejudicial change of position prior to acquiring knowledge or reason to know of misappropriation renders a monetary recovery inequitable, a complainant is entitled to recover damages for misappropriation of information qualifying as a trade secret. Damages can include both the actual loss caused by misappropriation and the unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing actual loss. In lieu of damages measured by any other methods, the damages caused by misappropriation may be measured by the imposition of liability for a reasonable royalty for a misappropriator's unauthorized disclosure or use of a trade secret. (b) If willful and malicious misappropriation exists, the court may award exemplary damages in an amount not exceeding twice any award made under subsection (a).
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at malegislature.gov
Cited in 3 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2024
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- BioPoint, Inc. v. Dickhaut (Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 2024, 110 F.4th 337)“…n that is not taken into account in computing actual loss." Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, § 42B(a) (emphasis added); see also…”
- KPM Analytics North America Corporation v. Blue Sun Scientific, LLC (District Court, D. Massachusetts 2024)“…Trade Secrets Act (“MUTSA”). 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(C); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, § 42B(b). If the Court makes any such pred…”
- Software Pricing Partners, LLC v. Geisman (District Court, W.D. North Carolina 2022)“…ure or use of the trade secret. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(B); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93 § 42B. In determining damages for misa…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Massachusetts Trade Secret Laws: UTSA, Remedies & Deadlines
Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 66
§ 10APetition for determination of violation of Sec. 10; enforcement by Attorney General; civil actionsIn forcecited in 2 of our articles
Section 10A. (a) If an agency or municipality fails to comply with a requirement of section 10 or issues a response the requestor believes in violation of section 10, the person who submitted the initial request for public records may petition the supervisor of records for a determination as to whether a violation has occurred. In assessing whether a violation has occurred, the supervisor of records may inspect any record or copy of a record in camera; provided, however, that where a record has been withheld on the basis of a claim of the attorney-client privilege, the supervisor of records shall not inspect the record but shall require, as part of the decision making process, that the agency or municipality provide a detailed description of the record, including the names of the author and recipients, the date, the substance of such record, and the grounds upon which the attorney-client privilege is being claimed.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at malegislature.gov
Cited in 20 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Bos. Globe Media Partners, LLC v. Dep't of Pub. Health (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 2019, 482 Mass. 427)“…ecords (supervisor) in the Secretary of State's office. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A ( a ). The supervisor ordered DPH to d…”
- Mack v. District Attorney for the Bristol District (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 2024)“…tiff commenced an action in the Superior Court pursuant to G. L. c. 66, § 10A, seeking injunctive and declaratory rel…”
- Friedman v. Division of Administrative Law Appeals (Massachusetts Appeals Court 2024)“…September 2022, Friedman sued in the Superior Court under G. L. c. 66, § 10A (c), alleging that the bureau failed to…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Massachusetts Public Records Law: 10 Business Days, Fees, and Supervisor of Records Appeals
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Sources and References
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- G.L. c. 229, s. 2: Wrongful death; damages(malegislature.gov).gov
- Fontaine v. Philip Morris USA Inc., SJC-13778 (Mass. Apr. 22, 2026), slip opinion (appendix to U.S. Supreme Court application No. 25A1451)(www.supremecourt.gov).gov
- G.L. c. 229, s. 6: Conscious suffering; recovery of damages(malegislature.gov).gov
- G.L. c. 176D, s. 7: Determination of violation; restitution; damages(malegislature.gov).gov
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- G.L. c. 66, s. 10A: Civil actions for violations of section 10(malegislature.gov).gov
- G.L. c. 6, s. 177: Violations; civil liability(malegislature.gov).gov
- G.L. c. 183, s. 64: Discrimination in residential mortgage loans on basis of location of property(malegislature.gov).gov
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- G.L. c. 111, s. 199: Liability of owner of premises; punitive damages(malegislature.gov).gov
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- G.L. c. 151B, s. 9: Civil remedies; attorney's fees and costs; damages(malegislature.gov).gov
- G.L. c. 272, s. 99: Interception of wire and oral communications(malegislature.gov).gov
- G.L. c. 93, s. 102: Equal rights; violations; civil actions(malegislature.gov).gov
- G.L. c. 93, s. 63: Willful noncompliance with sections 50 to 62A; liability for damages(malegislature.gov).gov
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- G.L. c. 231, s. 93: Retraction of libel; mitigation of damages; punitive damages(malegislature.gov).gov
- G.L. c. 258, s. 2: Liability of public employers; exclusiveness of remedy(malegislature.gov).gov
- G.L. c. 15C, s. 22A: Civil actions; liability(malegislature.gov).gov
- G.L. c. 176Q, s. 13: Liabilities of the connector(malegislature.gov).gov
- G.L. c. 258D, s. 5: Damages(malegislature.gov).gov
- G.L. c. 230, s. 2: Torts; amount of damages(malegislature.gov).gov
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- Supreme Court of the United States, docket No. 26-235, Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Fontaine(www.supremecourt.gov).gov
- G.L. c. 6, s. 172: Criminal offender record information(malegislature.gov).gov
- G.L. c. 222, s. 17: Notaries public not licensed to practice law(malegislature.gov).gov
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