District of Columbia
District of Columbia AI Meeting Recording Laws (2026)
Independently fact-checked against primary sources (last audited August 16, 2026). · Reviewed by the RecordingLaw editorial team. · Law checked current as of August 16, 2026. · 8 primary sources cited on this page. How we verify our legal content
Under D.C. Code § 23-542, the District of Columbia follows a one-party consent rule, so an AI meeting recorder activated by any participating party is lawful without notifying other attendees. Criminal violations carry up to five years imprisonment and fines up to $12,500, and stricter consent laws in other states apply when out-of-state participants join.
The District of Columbia's one-party consent law makes it one of the more straightforward jurisdictions for AI meeting recorder compliance. Under D.C. Code § 23-542, a person who is a party to a conversation may record it without the other participants' knowledge, and that same principle extends to AI tools activated by a consenting participant. But straightforward does not mean risk-free. DC's position as the hub of federal government introduces complications that no other jurisdiction shares: federal agency recording policies, the Privacy Act of 1974, and classified information protocols can all override the baseline consent framework for meetings involving government employees.
The penalties for getting it wrong are substantial. Criminal violations carry up to five years in prison and $12,500 in fines, while civil claims allow statutory damages that accumulate at $100 per day with a $1,000 floor. As of April 2026, the growing wave of litigation against AI meeting tools nationally, including the Otter.ai class action and the Ambriz v. Google ruling, means that even one-party consent jurisdictions like DC require careful attention to how AI recording tools are deployed. Consult an attorney for advice specific to your situation.
DC's One-Party Consent Framework
The Core Statute: D.C. Code § 23-542
D.C. Code § 23-542 prohibits the willful interception of any wire or oral communication. The statute makes it unlawful to intentionally intercept, disclose, or use the contents of any wire or oral communication obtained through unauthorized interception.
The critical exception for AI meeting recorders appears in subsection (b)(3). A person not acting under color of law may intercept a wire or oral communication where that person is a party to the communication, or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the interception. This exception has one important limitation: the interception cannot be carried out for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act, or for committing any other injurious act.
What "One-Party Consent" Means for AI Tools
Under DC law, if a meeting participant activates an AI recording tool, that participant's own consent satisfies the statute. The tool does not need separate permission from every other person in the meeting. This applies equally to in-person meetings, telephone calls, and virtual meetings conducted over platforms like Zoom, Microsoft Teams, or Google Meet.
The consent must come from a party to the communication. An AI tool that records a conversation without any participant's knowledge or authorization would violate § 23-542 because no party has consented. The distinction matters for automated recording features: a tool that auto-joins meetings based on a calendar integration still requires that the account holder (who is a meeting participant) has authorized the recording for that specific meeting or category of meetings.
The "Criminal or Tortious Purpose" Exception
DC's one-party consent exception contains a carve-out that can trip up AI meeting recorder users. If the recording is made for the purpose of committing a criminal act, a tortious act, or any other injurious act, the one-party consent exception does not apply. Recording a meeting to gather evidence for insider trading, to facilitate blackmail, or to engage in corporate espionage would fall outside the consent exception and constitute a criminal interception.
For typical business uses of AI meeting recorders (generating transcripts, action items, and meeting summaries), this exception is unlikely to apply. But organizations using AI meeting tools to conduct covert competitive intelligence or to build legal cases against employees should consider whether the purpose behind the recording could invalidate the consent exception.
AI Meeting Recorders Under DC Law
How AI Recording Tools Operate
AI meeting recording tools like Otter.ai, Fireflies.ai, Microsoft Copilot, and Zoom AI Companion work by capturing audio from virtual or in-person meetings, transmitting that audio to remote servers, and processing it through speech recognition models to produce transcripts, summaries, and other outputs. Some tools join meetings as visible bot participants. Others operate in the background through platform integrations.
Under DC's one-party consent framework, the legality of these tools hinges on whether a consenting party activated them. If the meeting host or a participant enabled the AI recorder, that person's consent satisfies § 23-542 for DC purposes.
When One-Party Consent Is Not Enough
DC's permissive consent standard does not override the laws of other jurisdictions. When a DC-based participant records a virtual meeting that includes participants in all-party consent states like California, Connecticut, or Illinois, the stricter consent requirements of those states apply to protect their residents. An AI meeting tool activated by a DC participant in a multi-state meeting must comply with the most restrictive applicable law.
This is the most common compliance pitfall for DC-based organizations. A government contractor headquartered in Washington, DC, conducting a Zoom meeting with team members in California (all-party consent under Cal. Penal Code § 632) and Illinois (all-party consent under 720 ILCS 5/14-2, plus BIPA voiceprint protections) cannot rely solely on DC's one-party standard.
Data Use and AI Training Concerns
Several AI meeting tools use recorded audio and transcripts to train and improve their machine learning models. The Otter.ai class action (Brewer v. Otter.ai, Inc., N.D. Cal., No. 5:25-cv-06911, filed August 2025) alleges that Otter retains conversational data indefinitely and uses it to refine its speech recognition technology without participant consent.
Even in one-party consent jurisdictions like DC, using intercepted communications for purposes beyond the original recording (such as AI model training) may implicate additional legal theories. The capability test established in Ambriz v. Google (N.D. Cal., Feb. 2025) held that a company's technical capability to use intercepted data for its own purposes was sufficient to state a wiretap claim under California law. While that ruling arose under California law, it highlights the expanding legal theories that could affect AI meeting tool providers and users regardless of jurisdiction.
However, the Ninth Circuit's August 2025 ruling in Popa v. Microsoft required more than a bare statutory violation, holding that the plaintiff had not alleged a concrete injury tied to her own circumstances. How the Ambriz and Popa rulings will interact in future AI meeting tool cases remains unsettled as of April 2026, creating uncertainty for AI meeting tool providers.
Popular AI Meeting Tools and DC Compliance
DC's one-party consent standard makes most AI meeting tools legally compliant when activated by a participating party. The compliance differences between tools matter more for transparency and participant trust than for strict legal compliance in DC.
Otter.ai / OtterPilot
Otter's AI notetaker can auto-join meetings via calendar integration and appears as a visible participant named "Otter.ai." Under DC law, if the Otter account holder is a party to the meeting, that person's consent is sufficient. However, Otter's automatic joining without per-meeting authorization raises questions when the account holder forgets the tool is enabled or when Otter joins meetings where the account holder is absent.
Microsoft Teams / Copilot
Microsoft Teams provides built-in recording notifications and requires the meeting organizer to enable recording. When Copilot is active, Teams displays an indicator to all participants. This transparency exceeds DC's legal requirements, where no notification is necessary under one-party consent. The notifications serve as best practice rather than legal obligation in DC.
Zoom AI Companion
Zoom provides both visual and audio indicators when recording or AI features are active. Meeting hosts control whether AI Companion features are enabled, and participants see clear indicators. Like Teams, Zoom's notification approach exceeds what DC law requires.
Fireflies.ai
Fireflies joins meetings as a visible bot participant. The tool's presence in the participant list serves as de facto notification, though DC law does not require even this level of transparency. Users should still verify that their own consent to the recording satisfies the one-party requirement.
Google Meet Recording
Google Meet displays a recording indicator and announces when recording starts. Participants who object can leave the meeting. While Google Meet's approach is designed for all-party consent jurisdictions, it functions smoothly in DC's one-party framework as well.
Penalties for Violating DC Recording Laws
Criminal Penalties
D.C. Code § 23-542 imposes criminal penalties for three categories of violations:
| Violation | Maximum Imprisonment | Maximum Fine |
|---|---|---|
| Willful interception | 5 years | $12,500 |
| Willful disclosure of intercepted contents | 5 years | $12,500 |
| Willful use of intercepted contents | 5 years | $12,500 |
The fine amounts are set by D.C. Code § 22-3571.01, which establishes a fine schedule based on the maximum imprisonment for the underlying offense. For offenses carrying up to 5 years imprisonment, the maximum fine is $12,500.
Civil Remedies
D.C. Code § 23-554 creates a private right of action for any person whose wire or oral communication is intercepted, disclosed, or used in violation of the wiretap statute. Recoverable damages include:
| Damage Type | Amount |
|---|---|
| Actual damages | Amount suffered |
| Statutory damages | $100 per day of violation |
| Minimum recovery | $1,000 (if statutory damages would be less) |
| Punitive damages | Available at court discretion |
| Attorney fees | Recoverable by prevailing plaintiff |
The statute awards whichever is greater: actual damages or the statutory minimum. The $100 per day calculation means a recording that persists for 30 days could generate $3,000 in statutory damages per affected individual, even without proof of specific harm.
Government Liability
D.C. Code § 23-554 explicitly defines "person" to include the District of Columbia government and prohibits the District from asserting governmental immunity to avoid liability. This provision means DC government agencies that illegally intercept communications face the same civil liability as private actors.
Device Confiscation
Under D.C. Code § 23-544, any device used in violation of the wiretap statute is subject to seizure and forfeiture. For AI meeting recorders, this could theoretically extend to the computers, phones, or other hardware running the recording software.
Employer and Workplace Considerations
DC Private Sector Employers
DC does not have a standalone employee electronic monitoring statute comparable to Connecticut's § 31-48d or Delaware's 19 Del. C. § 705. Private employers in DC are governed by the general wiretap statute (§ 23-542), meaning one-party consent applies to workplace recordings. An employer who is a party to a workplace conversation can record it without notifying the employee, provided the recording is not for a criminal, tortious, or injurious purpose.
Despite the permissive legal standard, employment attorneys in DC generally recommend that employers adopt clear recording policies and provide notice to employees before deploying AI meeting tools. The absence of a legal requirement does not eliminate the practical risks of secret recording: employee morale, trust, and potential wrongful termination claims tied to how recorded information is used.
Federal Government Workplace Meetings
DC's unique position as the seat of the federal government creates workplace recording challenges found nowhere else. Many meetings in DC involve federal employees, and federal agencies maintain their own recording and surveillance policies that often exceed DC law's requirements.
Federal agencies generally prohibit employees from secretly recording workplace conversations, even in one-party consent jurisdictions like DC. Agency-specific policies frequently require express authorization before any recording occurs. An employee who secretly records a meeting using an AI tool may face disciplinary action up to and including termination, even if the recording itself is lawful under DC's wiretap statute.
The Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. § 552a) adds another layer. Federal agencies that maintain systems of records containing personal information must comply with the Privacy Act's notice, access, and amendment requirements. AI meeting tools that create transcripts and store them in searchable databases could create Privacy Act obligations for the agency deploying the tool.
Government Contractors and Meetings with Federal Employees
Government contractors working in DC frequently participate in meetings with federal employees. These meetings may involve sensitive but unclassified information, controlled unclassified information (CUI), or classified material. AI meeting recorders are generally prohibited in meetings involving classified information, and CUI handling requirements may restrict the use of AI tools that transmit data to third-party servers.
Even for unclassified meetings, contractors should verify that their AI recording practices comply with the terms of their government contracts. Many federal contracts include clauses restricting the use of recording devices and requiring specific data handling protocols.
Classified and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Settings
AI meeting recording tools are categorically prohibited in Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs) and other classified environments. Bringing any internet-connected recording device into a SCIF violates security protocols regardless of consent. This restriction applies to all smartphones, laptops, and other devices capable of running AI meeting recorders.
DC's AI Governance Framework
Mayor's Order 2024-028
On February 8, 2024, Mayor Muriel Bowser signed Mayor's Order 2024-028, establishing DC's Artificial Intelligence Values and creating strategic benchmarks for AI use in District government. The order articulates six core AI values: Clear Benefit to the People, Safety and Equity, Accountability, Transparency, Sustainability, and Privacy and Cybersecurity.
The order established an AI Taskforce within the executive branch and an Advisory Group on AI Values Alignment with public membership. DC agencies must submit AI strategic plans on a rolling schedule through fiscal year 2026, identifying how AI tools may improve performance and what safeguards will mitigate risks.
While Mayor's Order 2024-028 governs DC government's own use of AI rather than private sector AI use, it signals the District's policy direction. AI meeting recorders used by DC government agencies must align with these values, including privacy and transparency requirements that exceed the baseline wiretap statute.
Stop Discrimination by Algorithms Act (Proposed)
The DC Council has considered the Stop Discrimination by Algorithms Act in various forms since 2021. The proposed legislation would prohibit companies from using algorithms that produce discriminatory results in housing, education, employment, credit, and insurance decisions. It would require annual algorithmic audits and increase transparency about how personal data is used in automated decision-making.
As of April 2026, the Act has not been enacted. If passed, it could affect AI meeting tools that generate sentiment analysis, performance scores, or other outputs used in employment decisions. The proposed penalties include civil fines of up to $10,000 per violation and a private right of action allowing courts to award between $100 and $10,000 per violation.
Federal Law Context
The Federal Wiretap Act (18 U.S.C. § 2511)
18 U.S.C. § 2511 establishes the federal baseline of one-party consent. DC's wiretap statute mirrors this standard. Under D.C. Code § 23-556, the DC wiretap provisions supplement federal law and do not supersede or limit the federal statute except in cases of irreconcilable conflict.
This supplementary relationship means both DC and federal wiretap laws apply simultaneously. A recording that violates either the DC statute or the federal statute (or both) exposes the recorder to liability under each applicable law.
The Ambriz and Popa Decisions
Two 2025 federal court decisions frame the current legal landscape for AI meeting tools.
In Ambriz v. Google (N.D. Cal., Feb. 2025), the court ruled that Google's technical capability to use customer call data for AI training was sufficient to state a claim under California's Invasion of Privacy Act. The court denied Google's motion to dismiss, allowing the class action to proceed based on the "capability test," which asks whether the vendor had the ability to use intercepted data for its own purposes.
Six months later, the Ninth Circuit decided Popa v. Microsoft (9th Cir., Aug. 2025) on standing grounds. The court held that the plaintiff lacked standing because she did not allege a concrete injury, rejecting Popa's arguments that a bare statutory violation, or generalized potential harms like identity theft not tied to her own alleged experience, were enough to establish a concrete injury. The Ninth Circuit found the alleged injury was not analogous to recognized common-law privacy torts.
These rulings create uncertainty for AI meeting tool providers and users in DC. While DC applies one-party consent, the data handling practices of AI tools (particularly using meeting data for model training) could trigger federal claims regardless of state-level consent compliance.
The Otter.ai Class Action
The Otter.ai class action (Brewer v. Otter.ai, Inc., N.D. Cal., No. 5:25-cv-06911, filed August 2025) alleges that Otter's AI notetaker secretly records private conversations and repurposes them to train its machine learning models. The complaint asserts violations of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), and California state privacy laws.
For DC users, the Otter.ai lawsuit illustrates that one-party consent to the initial recording does not necessarily authorize all downstream uses of the recorded data. Even if a DC participant lawfully consented to an Otter recording, the tool's alleged retention and AI training use of that data raises separate legal questions about data use, purpose limitation, and consent scope.
More DC Laws
Explore other District of Columbia law topics on Recording Law:
This article provides general legal information about District of Columbia recording laws as they apply to AI meeting tools. Recording laws and their interaction with federal workplace policies are subject to change. Consult a DC-licensed attorney for advice specific to your situation.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is DC a one-party or two-party consent jurisdiction for recording?
The District of Columbia is a one-party consent jurisdiction under D.C. Code § 23-542. A person who is a party to a conversation may record it without the other participants' knowledge, provided the recording is not made for a criminal, tortious, or other injurious purpose.
Can I legally use AI meeting recorders like Otter.ai in DC?
Yes, if you are a participant in the meeting and have consented to the recording. Under DC's one-party consent standard, your own consent is sufficient to satisfy D.C. Code § 23-542. However, if any meeting participants are in all-party consent states like California or Illinois, you must also comply with those stricter requirements.
What are the penalties for illegally recording a meeting in DC?
Criminal penalties include up to 5 years imprisonment and fines up to $12,500 under D.C. Code § 23-542. Civil remedies under D.C. Code § 23-554 allow victims to recover actual damages or statutory damages of $100 per day (with a $1,000 minimum), whichever is greater, plus punitive damages and attorney fees.
Do federal workplace recording policies override DC's one-party consent law?
Federal agency recording policies do not override DC law in a statutory sense, but they create independent consequences. Even though DC law permits one-party consent recording, federal employees who secretly record workplace meetings may face disciplinary action up to termination for violating agency policy. AI meeting recorders are categorically prohibited in classified settings.
Does DC's recording law apply to virtual meetings?
Yes. The statute reaches the interception of any wire or oral communication, and coverage of a virtual meeting rests on the oral-communication branch. D.C. Code § 23-541(2) defines an oral communication as speech uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that the communication is not subject to interception, under circumstances justifying that expectation. Nothing in that definition limits it to in-person speech, so what participants say into a Zoom, Teams, or Google Meet session falls within the statute's scope. The wire-communication branch is narrower than it sounds: § 23-541(1) reaches only communications carried in whole or in part over facilities furnished or operated by a common carrier, and this subchapter defines no separate category of electronic communication. Either way, the one-party consent standard applies to virtual meetings the same way it applies to in-person conversations.
Updates
Corrected the description of Popa v. Microsoft to reflect that the Ninth Circuit dismissed for lack of a concrete injury, rejecting a bare-statutory-violation theory and generalized potential harms, rather than requiring proof of actual harm.
Corrected the explanation of how the District's wiretap statute reaches virtual meetings, grounding coverage in the statutory definition of oral communication, and fixed a workplace electronic-monitoring link that pointed to an unrelated article.
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources; governing law re-checked for recent changes
Governing law re-checked for recent changes
Governing law re-checked for recent changes
Reviewed and approved by an editor
The Law Behind This Article
This article rests on the statutory provisions below, held in our own legal record and retrieved from the official source. Tap a section to read the operative text.
Code of the District of Columbia, Title 23: Criminal Procedure. - Chapter 5: Warrants and Arrests. - Subchapter III: Wire Interception and Interception of Oral Communications.
§ 23-542Interception, disclosure, and use of wire or oral communications prohibited.In forcecited in 22 of our articles
(a) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this subchapter, any person who in the District of Columbia — (1) willfully intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire or oral communication; (2) willfully discloses or endeavors to disclose to any other person the contents of any wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire or oral communication; or (3) willfully uses or endeavors to use the contents of any wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, knowing or having reason to know, that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire or oral communication; shall be fined not more than the amount set forth in [§ 22-3571.01] or imprisoned not more than five years, or both; except that paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subsection shall not apply to the contents of any wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, that has become common knowledge or public information.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-23 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at github.com
Cited in 16 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2024
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):District of Columbia courts have construed the one-party consent provision of D.C. Code 23-542(b)(2). United States v. Sell (1985) held the consent must be voluntary, the government meeting its burden by showing the party cooperated knowing what officers were doing. Thomas v. United States (2017) applied it to an interstate call.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- United States v. Sell (District of Columbia Court of Appeals 1985, 487 A.2d 225)✓Police recorded a woman's calls with an officer she accused of coercing sex acts. Construing the one-party consent provision for the first time, the court held the government need only show she cooperated knowing what police were doing, and reversed the suppression order.
- David Thomas v. United States (District of Columbia Court of Appeals 2017)“…s. & .lud. Proc. § 10- 402 [c)(.'£)(ii) (West 2015). Under D.C. Code § 23-542." the legislature has clearly defined w…”
- Thomas v. United States (District of Columbia Court of Appeals 2017, 171 A.3d 151)✓Police in the District recorded a call between a voyeurism victim and the defendant, who was in Maryland and did not consent. The court held this section governs admissibility in District courts and does not incorporate Maryland's two-party rule, so suppression was denied.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
§ 23-554Authorization for recovery of civil damages.In forcecited in 14 of our articles
(a) Any person whose wire or oral communication is intercepted, disclosed, or used in violation of this subchapter shall — (1) have a civil cause of action against any person who intercepts, discloses, or uses, or procures any other person to intercept, disclose, or use, such communications; and (2) be entitled to recover from any such person — (A) actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages computed at the rate of $100 a day for each day of violation, or $1,000 whichever is higher; (B) punitive damages; and (C) a reasonable attorney’s fee and other litigation costs reasonably incurred. (b) Good faith reliance on a court order or legislative authorization shall constitute a complete defense to an action brought under this section or any other law. (c) As used in this section, the term “person” includes the District of Columbia. The District of Columbia shall not assert any governmental immunity to avoid liability under this section. Judgment against the District of Columbia shall not constitute a bar to action against any other person.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-30 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at github.com
Cited in 3 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2022
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Democracy Partners, LLC v. Project Veritas Action Fund (District Court, District of Columbia 2020)“…each day of violation, or $1,000, whichever is higher. See D.C. Code § 23-554(a)(2)(A). Both statutes also allow for…”
- Council on American-Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc. v. Gaubatz (District Court, District of Columbia 2022)“…oral or wire communication.” D.C. Code § 23-542(a)(2)-(3); D.C. Code § 23-554(a)(1) (authorizing civil action for re…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
§ 23-556Relation to Federal law on wire interception and interception of oral communications.In forcecited in 2 of our articles
(a) Sections 23-542, 23-543, 23-545 [repealed], 23-553, 23-554, and 23-555 of this subchapter shall be construed to supplement, and not to supersede or otherwise limit, the provisions of chapter 119 of Title 18, United States Code (relating to wire interception and interception of oral communications). (b) Sections 23-546, 23-547, 23-548, 23-549, 23-550, 23-551, and 23-552 of this subchapter shall be construed not to supersede or otherwise limit the provisions of chapter 119 of Title 18, United States Code, except in cases of irreconcilable conflict.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-30 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at github.com
Cited in 2 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2020
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- United States v. Gerald F. Johnson, United States of America v. Thomas Johnson, United States of America v. Edward T. Wooten (Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 1982, 696 F.2d 115)“…es us to reject that reading — can be easily parried: Under D.C.Code Ann. § 23-556(b) (1981), the specific authorization p…”
- Democracy Partners, LLC v. Project Veritas Action Fund (District Court, District of Columbia 2020)“…erwise limit, the provisions of [the Federal Wiretap Act].” D.C. Code § 23-556(a).…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
§ 23-544Confiscation of wire or oral communication intercepting devices.In force
Any intercepting device in the District of Columbia — (1) possessed; (2) used; (3) sold; (4) distributed; or (5) manufactured or assembled; in violation of section 23-542 or 23-543 may be seized and forfeited to the District of Columbia. Insofar as applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter, all provisions of law relating to the seizure, summary and judicial forfeiture, and condemnation of property for violation of the customs laws; the disposition of such property; the remission or mitigation of such forfeitures; the compromise of claims; and the award of compensation to informers in respect of such forfeitures shall apply to seizures and forfeitures incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, under the provisions of this title; except that such duties as are imposed upon the customs officer or any other person with respect to the seizure and forfeiture of property under the customs laws shall be performed with respect to seizures and forfeitures of property under this section by such officers, agents or other persons as may be authorized or designated for that purpose by the Mayor, except to the extent that such duties arise from seizures and…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-30 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at github.com
§ 23-541Definitions.In forcecited in 6 of our articles
As used in this subchapter — (1) the term “wire communication” means any communication made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception furnished or operated by any person engaged as a common carrier in providing or operating such facilities; (2) the term “oral communication” means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that the communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying the expectation; (3) the term “intercept” means the aural acquisition of the contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any intercepting device; (4) the term “intercepting device” means any electronic, mechanical, or other device or apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire or oral communication other than — (A) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment, or facility, or any component thereof, (i) furnished to the subscriber or user by a communications common carrier in the ordinary course of its business and being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-30 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at github.com
Cited in 8 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2023
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- United States v. Sell (District of Columbia Court of Appeals 1985, 487 A.2d 225)“…itution because she had not recanted her statement. . D.C.Code §§ 23-541, -556 (1981). . Section 23-542(b)…”
- United States v. Gerald F. Johnson, United States of America v. Thomas Johnson, United States of America v. Edward T. Wooten (Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 1982, 696 F.2d 115)“…conceded, D.C.Code Ann. § 23-547 (1981), read together with D.C.Code Ann. § 23-541(7) (1981), explicitly authorizes the is…”
- Democracy Partners, LLC v. Project Veritas Action Fund (District Court, District of Columbia 2018)“…against all defendants (id. ¶¶ 78-85); (4) violation of D.C. Code § 23-541 et seq. (“D.C. Wiretap Act”) against al…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Code of the District of Columbia, Title 22: Criminal Offenses and Penalties. - Chapter 35B: Fines for Criminal Offenses.
§ 22-3571.01Fines for criminal offenses.In forcecited in 15 of our articles
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, and except as provided in § 22-3571.02, a defendant who has been found guilty of an offense under the District of Columbia Official Code punishable by imprisonment may be sentenced to pay a fine as provided in this section. (b) An individual who has been found guilty of such an offense may be fined not more than the greatest of: (1) $100 if the offense is punishable by imprisonment for 10 days or less; (2) $250 if the offense is punishable by imprisonment for 30 days, or one month, or less but more than 10 days; (3) $500 if the offense is punishable by imprisonment for 90 days, or 3 months, or less but more than 30 days; (4) $1,000 if the offense is punishable by imprisonment for 180 days, or 6 months, or less but more than 90 days; (5) $2,500 if the offense is punishable by imprisonment for one year or less but more than 180 days; (6) $12,500 if the offense is punishable by imprisonment for 5 years or less but more than one year; (7) $25,000 if the offense is punishable by imprisonment for 10 years or less but more than 5 years; (8) $37,500 if the offense is punishable by imprisonment for 15 years or less but more than…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-30 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at github.com
Cited in 5 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Gilberto Lopez-Ramirez v. United States (District of Columbia Court of Appeals 2017, 171 A.3d 169)“…dardized the maximum fine for 180-day crimes at 31,000. See D.C. Code § 22-3571.01 ibi (2012 Repi. a supp. 2014); 60 D.C.R…”
- Mario Giovani Valendzuela-Castillo v. United States (District of Columbia Court of Appeals 2018, 180 A.3d 74)“…eamlining Act set maximum fines for misdemeanors at $1000); D.C. Code § 22-3571.01 (2013 Repl.) (standardizing $1000 as th…”
- Tornero v. United States (District of Columbia Court of Appeals 2025)“…onment may be sentenced to pay a fine as provided” therein. D.C. Code § 22-3571.01(a). The provision also enumerates the s…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
United States Code Title 18
§ 2511Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications prohibitedIn forcecited in 441 of our articles
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who— intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication; intentionally uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to use or endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral communication when— such device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a signal through, a wire, cable, or other like connection used in wire communication; or such device transmits communications by radio, or interferes with the transmission of such communication; or such person knows, or has reason to know, that such device or any component thereof has been sent through the mail or transported in interstate or foreign commerce; or such use or endeavor to use (A) takes place on the premises of any business or other commercial establishment the operations of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or (B) obtains or is for the purpose of obtaining information relating to the operations of any business or other commercial establishment the operations of which affect interstate or foreign…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-17 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 2,045 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Griggs-Ryan v. Smith (1990) applied the Section 2511(2)(d) prior-consent exception, treating a tenant repeatedly told that all incoming calls were taped as having impliedly consented. United States v. United States District Court (1972) read the then-current Section 2511(3) as conferring no presidential surveillance power.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Mitchell v. Forsyth (Supreme Court of the United States 1985, 472 U.S. 511)✓The Attorney General authorized a warrantless 1970 national security wiretap that caught the plaintiff's calls; the Court held the since-repealed Section 2511(3) disclaimer left the tap lawful under Title III, and that Mitchell had qualified immunity.
- United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (Supreme Court of the United States 1972, 407 U.S. 297)✓The Attorney General approved warrantless wiretaps on members of a domestic group accused of bombing a CIA office; the Court read Section 2511(3) as a congressional disclaimer conferring no surveillance power, then held the Fourth Amendment required prior judicial approval.
- Forsyth v. Barr (Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 1994, 19 F.3d 1527)✓Dallas police used, in an internal affairs probe of an officer, calls private parties allegedly intercepted illegally; assuming that was unlawful, the Fifth Circuit held Section 2517(1) and (2) allowed the disclosure and use, defeating the Section 2511(1)(c) and (d) claims.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
United States Code Title 5
§ 552aRecords maintained on individualsIn forcecited in 6 of our articles
For purposes of this section— the term “agency” means agency as defined in section 552(e) 1 See References in Text note below. of this title; the term “individual” means a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence; the term “maintain” includes maintain, collect, use, or disseminate; the term “record” means any item, collection, or grouping of information about an individual that is maintained by an agency, including, but not limited to, his education, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history and that contains his name, or the identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual, such as a finger or voice print or a photograph; the term “system of records” means a group of any records under the control of any agency from which information is retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual; the term “statistical record” means a record in a system of records maintained for statistical research or reporting purposes only and not used in whole or in part in making any determination about…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 3,701 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Siegert v. Gilley (Supreme Court of the United States 1991, 500 U.S. 226)“…n that Bartel had violated the federal Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U. S. C. § 552a, during his previous tenure with the FA…”
- United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (Supreme Court of the United States 1989, 489 U.S. 749)“…terized information is the Privacy Act of 1974, codified at 5 U. S. C. § 552a (1982 ed. and Supp. V). The Privacy Act…”
- Department of the Air Force v. Rose (Supreme Court of the United States 1976, 425 U.S. 352)“…ngress’ recent manifest concern in the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U. S. C. § 552a (1970 ed.; Supp. Y), for “governmental…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Illinois Compiled Statutes Chapter 720, Act 5 (Criminal Code of 2012)
§ 14-2Elements of the offense; affirmative defenseIn forcecited in 63 of our articles
(a) A person commits eavesdropping when he or she knowingly and intentionally: (1) Uses an eavesdropping device, in a surreptitious manner, for the purpose of overhearing, transmitting, or recording all or any part of any private conversation to which he or she is not a party unless he or she does so with the consent of all of the parties to the private conversation; (2) Uses an eavesdropping device, in a surreptitious manner, for the purpose of transmitting or recording all or any part of any private conversation to which he or she is a party unless he or she does so with the consent of all other parties to the private conversation; (3) Intercepts, records, or transcribes, in a surreptitious manner, any private electronic communication to which he or she is not a party unless he or she does so with the consent of all parties to the private electronic communication; (4) Manufactures, assembles, distributes, or possesses any electronic, mechanical, eavesdropping, or other device knowing that or having reason to know that the design of the device renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious overhearing, transmitting, or recording of private conversations or the…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-23 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ilga.gov
Cited in 92 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- People v. Melongo (Illinois Supreme Court 2014, 2014 IL 114852)“…ations of section 14-2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/14-2 (West 2008)), which defines the offense…”
- People v. Smith (Appellate Court of Illinois 2025, 2025 IL App (1st) 220116)“…ropping violated section 14-2 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/14-2 (West 2014)) and that then State’s Att…”
- Cook Au Vin, LLC v. Mid-Century Insurance Co. (Appellate Court of Illinois 2023, 226 N.E.3d 694)“…onversation by one who is not a party to the conversation. 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1) (West 2020). In enacting the stat…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Search our full record of US law — 2.1 million sections, every state + federal →
Sources and References
- D.C. Code § 23-542 - Interception, disclosure, and use of wire or oral communications prohibited(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Code § 23-554 - Authorization for recovery of civil damages(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Code § 22-3571.01 - Fines for criminal offenses(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Code § 23-556 - Relation to Federal law on wire interception(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Code § 23-544 - Confiscation of intercepting devices(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- Mayor's Order 2024-028 - DC AI Values and Strategic Plan(mayor.dc.gov).gov
- 18 U.S.C. § 2511 - Federal Wiretap Act(uscode.house.gov).gov
- AG Racine - Stop Discrimination by Algorithms Act(oag.dc.gov).gov
- Brewer v. Otter.ai Class Action (N.D. Cal., No. 5:25-cv-06911)(npr.org)
- Popa v. Microsoft - Ninth Circuit Ruling on AI Privacy Standing(wlf.org)
- D.C. Code § 23-541 - Definitions (wire communication, oral communication)(code.dccouncil.gov)