Rhode Island Easement and Eminent Domain Laws (2026)

In Rhode Island, a prescriptive easement generally takes ten years of actual, open, notorious, hostile and continuous use under a claim of right, a period the Rhode Island Supreme Court takes from the state's adverse-possession statute (R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-7-1; Altieri v. Dolan, 1980). On the eminent domain side, a 2008 statute lets the government take property for economic development only with explicit authority, a public plan and hearing, and council or General Assembly approval (with limited exceptions), and it pays such owners at least 150 percent of fair market value (§§ 42-64.12-7, 42-64.12-8).

This page covers both halves of Rhode Island law: easements between private landowners first, then the government's power to take private property. For other states, see our guide to easement laws by state.

Information last verified on October 19, 2026. This article has not been reviewed by a licensed lawyer.

Jurisdiction scope: This article covers Rhode Island state law on private easements (R.I. Gen. Laws chapters 34-7, 34-9.1, 34-13.1 and 34-40, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court decisions applying them) and on the condemnation of private property (R.I. Const. art. I, § 16; chapters 42-64.12, 37-6, 37-6.1, 37-7 and 24-1; §§ 39-1-31 and 42-64-9). It does not cover adverse possession of title (see Rhode Island squatters' rights and adverse possession), homeowner association covenants, zoning or regulatory takings, federal condemnation, or local ordinances.

Easements in Rhode Island

An easement is a right to use someone else's land for a limited purpose, such as a driveway, a utility line or a path to the water. This section covers easements created by written grant, by necessity when land is divided, and by long adverse use (prescription). The statutes that matter most sit in chapter 34-7 of the General Laws, titled "By Possession and Prescription," which also contains several rules found in few other states.

Express Easements and Recording

Rhode Island's general conveyancing statute makes every conveyance of lands "for any term longer than one year" void unless it is "made in writing duly signed, acknowledged as hereinafter provided, delivered, and recorded in the records of land evidence in the town or city where the lands, tenements or hereditaments are situated" (R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-11-1). The same section adds that an unrecorded conveyance, if delivered, is still "valid and binding" between the parties and their heirs and "against those taking by gift or devise, or those having notice thereof."

Recorded easements are found in the land evidence records kept by each city or town; our guide to Rhode Island property records explains how to search them.

Solar easements have their own statute. A property owner "may grant a solar easement in the same manner and with the same effect as a conveyance of an interest in real property"; it must be "created in writing," it is subject to the same recording requirements as any other title instrument, and it runs with the land as "a perpetual easement, absent any terms and/or conditions under which the solar easement is granted or may be terminated" (§ 34-40-2).

Prescriptive Easements: Ten Years of Adverse Use

Chapter 34-7 does not mention easements in its ten-year rule. Section 34-7-1 makes ten years of "uninterrupted, quiet, peaceful and actual seisin and possession" under a claim of fee simple ownership enough to give good title. The Rhode Island Supreme Court applies that same ten-year period to easements:

"This court has stated frequently, however, that in order to create an easement by prescription, claimants have the burden of establishing actual, open, notorious, hostile, and continuous use under a claim of right for ten years, as required by G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 34-7-1. Each of these elements must be established by a preponderance of clear and satisfactory evidence." (Altieri v. Dolan, 423 A.2d 482 (R.I. 1980))

So the elements come from case law, not from the statute's text. On hostility, the Court said in Tavares v. Beck (2003), an adverse possession case, that the claimant "need only establish" a use "inconsistent with the right of the owner, without permission asked or given, * * * such as would entitle the owner to a cause of action against the intruder [for trespass]." A use the owner permitted is therefore not hostile.

The Court's more recent decisions use both phrasings. In Drescher v. Johannessen (2012), it said a claimant must prove each element "by clear and satisfactory evidence," quoted an earlier holding requiring "a preponderance of clear and convincing evidence," and affirmed a ruling that a neighbor who had used a right-of-way intermittently for almost twenty-five years "failed to demonstrate the requisite elements for a prescriptive easement by clear and convincing evidence." The same decision notes that, unlike adverse possession of title, "exclusivity is not a necessary element for a valid claim to an easement by prescription."

The burden stays with the person claiming the easement. In Altieri, claimants who had shared a driveway with their neighbors for over seventeen years argued that once they showed adverse use, the owners had to prove the use was permissive. The Court rejected that argument, holding that the burden "falls to the claimant to establish adversity and remains with the claimant to establish each element of adversity by strict proof." It upheld the trial finding that the shared use of the driveway "was by agreement and permission" and the judgment against the claimants, who had sued to stop a fence along the boundary.

A claimant's own conduct can also stop the clock. The Court often looks to its adverse possession decisions when it decides prescriptive-easement claims (Drescher). In Cahill v. Morrow (2011), an adverse possession case, it held that a claimant's letter asking the owner whether the land was for sale, and offering to discuss buying it, acknowledged the owner's title, "thereby halting her adverse-possession claim at that time." The Court distinguished older cases in which an offer to buy was made during an ongoing dispute.

Section 34-7-2 provides that nothing in chapter 34-7 prejudices the rights of owners who are minors, of unsound mind, imprisoned or outside the United States if they sue within ten years after the impediment is removed, or of owners of a reversion or remainder who sue within ten years after their right of action accrues.

Prescriptive easements sit close to adverse possession, which uses the same ten-year statute to transfer title to the land itself; see Rhode Island squatters' rights and adverse possession for the title side.

Uses that never ripen into an easement

Rhode Island's statutes rule out several kinds of prescriptive claims entirely:

• Footpaths. "No right of footway, except claimed in connection with a right to pass with carriages, shall be acquired by prescription or adverse use for any length of time" (§ 34-7-4). A walking path alone cannot become a prescriptive easement, however long it is used.
• Utility poles and wires. Maintaining "telegraph, telephone, electric, or other posts, wires or apparatus" on another person's land, "for any length of time," does not "confer any right to the continued enjoyment of the easement or raise any presumption of a grant thereof" (§ 34-7-5).
• Light and air. An owner whose building has windows overlooking a neighbor's land does not, "by mere continuance of the windows, acquire any easement of light or air so as to prevent the erection of any building thereon" (§ 34-7-3).
• Conservation and cemetery land. "Any land held or preserved by a nonprofit corporation or nonprofit association for purposes of conservation, open space, or a cemetery is not subject to adverse possession or prescription" (§ 34-7-9, added in 2008).

Public roads created by use

A separate rule applies to the public. Land "quietly, peaceably, and actually used and improved and considered as public highways for the space of twenty (20) years," and declared a public highway by the town council, is treated as a public highway "as fully and effectually as if the lands had been regularly laid out" (§ 24-2-1). Section 24-2-9 preserves the public's ability to acquire a way "by dedication or user" under the common law.

How to Stop a Prescriptive Easement

Rhode Island gives owners a statutory notice procedure. An owner who wants to stop a use from ripening "may give notice in writing to the person claiming or using the lands, way, easement, or privilege, of his or her intention to dispute any right arising from that claim or use" (§ 34-7-6). Once "served and recorded as hereinafter provided," the notice "shall be deemed an interruption of the use and prevent the acquiring of any right thereto by the continuance of the use for any length of time thereafter."

The timing step is easy to miss: the notice, "with the return thereon, shall be recorded within three (3) months thereafter in the records of land evidence in the town in which the land is situated" (§ 34-7-6). Section 34-7-6 also governs how the notice is served.

The notice opens the door to a lawsuit. Under § 34-7-7, the notice counts as "a disturbance of the right or claim as to enable the party claiming to bring an action for disturbing the same, in order to try the right; and if the plaintiff in the suit prevails, he or she shall recover full costs."

Landlocked Property and Easements by Necessity

Rhode Island has no statute that lets a landlocked owner petition for a private way across a neighbor's land. Title 34 (property) and chapter 34-7 contain no such procedure, and chapters 24-1 and 24-2 deal with public highways. The remedy is the common-law easement by necessity.

The Rhode Island Supreme Court restated the test in Nunes v. Meadowbrook Development Co. (2003), quoting its 1928 decision in Wiesel v. Smira: "the test of necessity is whether the easement is reasonably necessary for the convenient and comfortable enjoyment of the property as it existed when the severance was made." The Court added that it "should consider whether 'a substitute could be procured without unreasonable trouble or expense.'"

Two features of that test matter. Necessity is judged as of the moment the commonly owned land was divided (the severance), not as of today. And the standard is reasonable necessity, so a court looks at whether another means of access was available without unreasonable trouble or expense.

Shared Driveways: Who Pays for Maintenance

Since 2018, chapter 34-9.1 sets a default rule for private access easements serving homes. The chapter applies to one- to four-family residential real estate and private appurtenant easements, and it excludes property owned by the state or a political subdivision (§ 34-9.1-1). Under § 34-9.1-2, "In the absence of an enforceable, written agreement to the contrary, the owner of any residential real property that benefits from an easement or right-of-way, the purpose of which is to provide access to the residential real property, shall be responsible for the cost of maintaining the easement or right-of-way in good repair and the cost of repairing or restoring any damaged portion of the easement or right-of-way."

Where several properties benefit, the cost "shall be shared by each owner of a benefited property in proportion to the benefit received by each property" (§ 34-9.1-2(b)). A 2026 amendment, enacted June 24, 2026 and effective upon passage, deleted the former proviso that each property's market value or assessed valuation could not be considered in calculating the benefit received (P.L. 2026, chs. 341 and 342).

Maintenance includes snow removal. Any owner, benefited or burdened, who directly or indirectly damages the easement is solely responsible for repairing the part that owner damaged. An owner who refuses to repair that damage, or who fails after a written demand to pay a share of the cost, may be sued in Superior Court for specific performance or contribution by the other owners (§ 34-9.1-2(a), (c), (d)). Where a written agreement conflicts with these rules, the agreement controls (§ 34-9.1-2(e)).

Blocking a Right-of-Way

A court may order a landowner to stop blocking an easement. In Frenchtown Five L.L.C. v. Vanikiotis (2004), the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld a preliminary injunction that barred a landowner from blocking or impeding a neighbor's right-of-way after she installed a cement barrier on it. The Court repeated its holding in Thomas v. Ross (1984) that when vehicles were parked so as to block a right-of-way but did not necessarily occupy the easement itself, the easement was not defeated.

How an Easement Ends

Nonuse alone does not end an easement created by express grant. The Rhode Island Supreme Court treats abandonment as "one of intention that must be determined by the facts of each case," requiring proof that the holder "acted voluntarily and in such a decisive manner as to show an unequivocal intention to abandon the easement" (Jackvony v. Poncelet, 1991). In the same case it held that "a right-of-way by express grant is not extinguished by mere nonuse," and that finding a more convenient route does not take the easement away.

A written release ends the part it covers. In Jackvony, a holder's written release of the portion of a right-of-way crossing one neighbor's land extinguished his interest in that portion, while his interest in the rest of the easement "remains unaffected."

In Frenchtown Five L.L.C. v. Vanikiotis (2004), the Court rejected a landowner's argument that a right-of-way had been abandoned because it went unused during her twenty-one years of ownership: the facts showed no intent to abandon, and "any nonuse present here is insufficient to extinguish the easement." The Court also restated that an easement may be extinguished by adverse possession, which requires clear and convincing evidence of possession that is "actual, open, notorious, hostile, under claim of right, continuous, and exclusive," plus proof "that he exercised complete dominion over the property."

Rhode Island's Marketable Record Title Act (chapter 34-13.1) can cut off older recorded easements. A person with an unbroken record chain of title of 40 years or more has marketable record title (§ 34-13.1-2), and interests that depend on events before the effective date of the root of title are "declared to be null and void" unless the Act preserves them (§§ 34-13.1-3, 34-13.1-4). A general reference in the deeds to earlier easements does not preserve them "unless specific identification is made therein of a recorded title transaction" that created the easement (§ 34-13.1-3(1)).

An easement holder can preserve the interest by recording, during the 40 years after the root of title, a written notice "duly verified by oath, setting forth the nature of the claim" (§ 34-13.1-5(a)). The same subsection provides: "No disability or lack of knowledge of any kind on the part of anyone suspends the running of the forty (40) year period." The notice must describe the land "in particular terms and not by general inclusions," state the owners of record, and be recorded in the town's land records (§ 34-13.1-6).

The Act does not bar or extinguish an easement whose existence "is evidenced by the location beneath, upon or above any part of the land described in such instrument of any pipe, valve, road, wire, cable, conduit, duct, sewer, track, hole, tower or other physical facility and whether or not the existence of such facility is observable," or any interest of the United States, the state, its political subdivisions or a public utility company (§ 34-13.1-7). Marketable title also remains subject to rights arising from adverse possession or use after the root of title and to qualifying conservation or preservation easements (§ 34-13.1-3(3), (6)).

A solar easement lasts as long as its terms say; absent terms or conditions for its end, it is perpetual (§ 34-40-2).

A prescriptive claim that has not yet ripened is cut off by a § 34-7-6 notice that is served and recorded as that section requires.

Eminent Domain in Rhode Island

Eminent domain is the government's power to take private property for public use on payment of just compensation. For how every state compares and how federal condemnation works, see our national guide to eminent domain laws by state.

The Rhode Island Constitution provides: "Private property shall not be taken for public uses, without just compensation" (R.I. Const. art. I, § 16). The same section adds that state and municipal regulation of land and waters to preserve the natural environment and to protect fishery and shore rights is an exercise of the police power and "shall not be deemed to be a public use of private property."

In Kelo v. City of New London (2005), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a city's economic development plan "unquestionably serves a public purpose," so the takings "satisfy the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment," while stressing that "nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power." Rhode Island answered three years later.

Public Use Limits After Kelo: The 2008 Eminent Domain Act

In 2008 the General Assembly enacted the Rhode Island Home and Business Protection Act of 2008, chapter 42-64.12 (P.L. 2008, ch. 169; § 42-64.12-1). Its findings cite Kelo directly, and its stated purposes are "to set forth permissible uses of eminent domain power and to define, limit, and restrict the use of eminent domain for economic development purposes" (§§ 42-64.12-2, -3). The chapter applies to state departments, agencies, authorities, political subdivisions and all other entities with delegated eminent domain powers (§ 42-64.12-4).

Permissible uses. Section 42-64.12-6 lists the purposes for which condemnors may take property, "consistent with other restrictions and limitations established by law": public ownership and use; transportation infrastructure; "public utilities, including telecommunications, and for common carriers"; eliminating an identifiable public harm, including "the elimination and prevention of blighted and substandard areas" as defined in chapter 45-31; and providing good and marketable title.

Economic development is restricted, not banned. The chapter defines economic development as "the mobilization of intellectual, human, capital, physical and natural resources to generate marketable goods and services for purposes including, but not limited to, creating jobs, economic and employment opportunities, tax base, and wealth" (§ 42-64.12-5(1)). Under § 42-64.12-7, "No entity subject to the provisions of the chapter shall exercise eminent powers to acquire any property for economic development purposes unless it has explicit authority to do so and unless it conforms to the provisions of this section." The section requires:

• a plan for the proposed development, adopted "only ... after public notice of not less than fourteen (14) days, a public hearing and a period for public comment of not less than thirty (30) days";
• provisions or analyses in the plan "which can support a rational-basis determination that potential takings by eminent domain inure a preponderance of benefits, to the public with only incidental, benefits to a private party or parties" (§ 42-64.12-7(b));
• advance notice to owners of "the potential taking" and "the opportunity to sell the property for a negotiated, mutually agreed upon price"; and
• approval of the acquisition "by the city or town council" for a local government entity, or "by an act of the general assembly" for a state entity.

Exceptions. Local redevelopment agencies keep the powers they held before 2008, except that the council-approval requirement in § 42-64.12-7(d) applies to them (§ 42-64.12-9). And "The planning requirements and the restrictions established by this chapter shall not apply to condemnations for easements or other partial takings for less than five (5) years' duration where the effect of the taking is not the ousting of the owner from possession or the displacing of a lawful occupant" (§ 42-64.12-10).

Courts police the purpose. Before the 2008 act, the Rhode Island Supreme Court rejected a quick-take condemnation as applied. In Rhode Island Economic Development Corp. v. The Parking Co. (2006), the Court held "that the EDC's quick-take condemnation statute, § 42-64-9, is constitutional on its face, but that the manner in which it was applied in the case sub judice fails to pass constitutional scrutiny," concluding "that the principal purpose for the taking in this case was not a valid public use." Under § 42-64-9, which now names the Rhode Island Commerce Corporation as the condemnor, the necessity of an acquisition "shall be conclusively presumed" once the corporation votes that it is necessary for a project, so the challenge in that case turned on public use rather than necessity.

Utility takings. Before a company exercises any power of condemnation, it must petition the Public Utilities Commission, which issues a certificate authorizing the taking only if it determines that the taking "is for the benefit of the people of the state," that it "is necessary in order that the petitioner may render adequate service to the public," and that the use "will not unduly interfere with the orderly development of the region and scenic development" (R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-1-31(a)). A company that acquires an interest this way must indemnify present and future owners of the land against harm caused by its operations (§ 39-1-31(b)). Electric transmission companies have the power of eminent domain, exercisable after such a petition (§ 39-1-2).

Who Decides Compensation and the Deadlines

Rhode Island has more than one condemnation procedure. This section covers two of them: the state highway procedure in chapter 37-6 and the city and town highway procedure in chapter 24-1. Other condemning bodies act under their own enabling statutes, which may set different steps.

State takings (chapter 37-6)

1. Authorization and filing. For highway, street and parkway projects, the state properties committee authorizes condemnation on the opinion of the director of transportation (§ 37-6-13; it may not authorize a taking of railroad land without a hearing and the consent of the division of public utilities and carriers). "Within six (6) months" after that authorization, the acquiring authority files a description, a plat and a statement of the taking with the recorder of deeds or town clerk, and "upon the filing of the description, plat, and statement the title of such land ... shall vest in the state of Rhode Island" (§ 37-6-14). Title passes on the filing, before compensation is agreed or paid, and the state may rent the land and any buildings on it until they are needed for the project (§ 37-7-1).
2. Notice. A deputy sheriff or constable serves the owners (§ 37-6-15), and notice of condemnation is published in the newspaper of greatest circulation in the city or town "at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks" (§ 37-6-16).
3. Payment pending the case. If the parties disagree on price, the committee, "upon the application of the party in interest and of the joinder of all other parties in interest," orders paid "not less than one hundred percent (100%) of the acquiring authority's offer pending final disposition of the court proceeding" (§ 37-6-17).
4. One-year petition deadline. An owner "who cannot agree with the acquiring authority upon the price ... may within one year from the filing of the description and statement aforesaid, apply by petition to the superior court ... praying for an assessment of damages by a jury" (§ 37-6-18). The clock runs from the filing, not from when the owner learns of it. The court may, in its discretion, allow a late petition only if the person had "no actual knowledge of the taking of the land in time to file the petition" and the state has not paid another claimant or become liable to pay one under a judgment under the chapter (§ 37-6-19).
5. Conference, then trial. Within 60 days after a certified copy is served on the head of the acquiring authority, the owner "shall confer with the state properties committee," and if there is no agreement on price after 90 days the owner "may proceed to the trial thereof in the superior court" (§ 37-6-20; the conference step does not apply where federal funds participate). The trial is conducted "as other civil actions at law are tried," with the usual rights to move for a new trial and to appeal (§ 37-6-21).
6. If no one files. After one year with no petition, the acquiring authority may ask the Superior Court for permission to deposit the amount its reviewing appraiser approved as fair market value (§ 37-6-23.2).

City and town highway takings (chapter 24-1)

A city or town council adopts a resolution and files it with a description and plat, together with "a statement of the sum of money estimated to be just compensation," which it deposits in the Superior Court (§§ 24-1-2, 24-1-3). Title vests in the municipality on the filing and the deposit, and "the right to just compensation for the real property shall vest in the persons entitled thereto" (§ 24-1-4).

An owner may petition the Superior Court "within one year from the time the sum of money estimated to be just compensation is deposited," asking for "an assessment of damages by the court or by a jury" (§ 24-1-8). The court may, in its discretion, allow a late petition within the following year only if the owner had no actual knowledge of the taking in time, no other claimant has been paid, and no judgment has been entered against the city or town for payment to another claimant (§ 24-1-12).

Just Compensation in Rhode Island

Economic development takings. Owners of property taken for economic development purposes "shall be compensated for: (1) A minimum of one hundred fifty percent (150%) of the fair market value of the real property," plus expenses incidental to the transfer (recording fees, transfer taxes, title evidence, surveys, mortgage prepayment penalties, a pro rata share of prepaid taxes and assessments) and relocation expenses, "including, but not limited to, actual, reasonable and necessary moving and reestablishment expenses" (§ 42-64.12-8). Tenants of a dwelling taken for economic development receive at least 150 percent of one month's rent plus relocation expenses (§ 42-64.12-8.1).

The 150 percent minimum is written only for takings for economic development purposes. Chapter 42-64.12 limits it to those takings, and the state and municipal procedures in chapters 37-6 and 24-1 contain no percentage premium above fair market value.

Interest. In a state taking, if a petition for assessment of damages is filed, "the property owner shall be entitled to interest on the fair market value of the property taken by the acquiring authority from the date it is condemned to the day that judgment enters," calculated on the part of the fair market value "which exceeds the amount offered by the acquiring authority" (§ 37-6-23). Interest is compounded annually at a rate tied to the weekly average one-year constant maturity Treasury yield (§ 37-6-23). The verdict may not include interest on any amount that "shall be or could have been ordered paid" by the state properties committee for the period beginning 30 days after the acquiring authority's written offer (§ 37-6-17).

Remainder damage. The state petition covers both "the price to be paid" for the interest taken "and the appurtenant damage to the remainder" (§ 37-6-18), so a partial taking can include damage to the land the owner keeps.

Attorney fees. None of the condemnation chapters covered here (chapters 37-6, 37-7, 37-6.1, 24-1 and 42-64.12) contains a provision awarding attorney fees to the property owner. If no owner petitions within the year after the filing and publication, the acquiring authority may petition the Superior Court to determine the value itself, and the court enters "a decision for the amount or amounts to be awarded and costs" (§ 37-6-23.1(a)). Where an owner is unknown, a minor, in military service, in default or otherwise unable to act, the court appoints a lawyer as guardian ad litem, whose fee and any appraisers' fees are deducted from the sum deposited for that owner (§ 37-6-23.1(b)).

Relocation Payments

For people displaced by state highway projects, chapter 37-6.1 provides relocation payments. A displaced person moving from a dwelling may elect, instead of actual reasonable moving expenses, "A moving expense allowance ... not to exceed two hundred dollars ($200)" and "A dislocation allowance of one hundred dollars ($100)" (§ 37-6.1-3). A displaced business or farm operation may instead elect a fixed payment equal to its average annual net earnings or $5,000, whichever is less, subject to conditions in the same section (§ 37-6.1-3(c)). The director of transportation also reimburses the owner's reasonable and necessary recording fees, transfer taxes and similar conveyance expenses, good-faith mortgage prepayment penalties, and the pro rata share of real property taxes paid for the period after the state took title or possession (§ 37-6.1-5). Replacement-housing payments for qualifying owners and tenants may not exceed the amounts authorized by the federal Uniform Relocation Act, P.L. 91-646, and its amendments (§ 37-6.1-4). These payments are in addition to just compensation only to the extent they are not otherwise included in the condemnation award (§ 37-6.1-6). Separately, the state and all of its agencies and departments are authorized "to comply fully" with the federal Uniform Relocation Assistance and Land Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 "by making all of the payments authorized and set forth in the federal act" (§§ 37-6-28, 37-6.1-8.1).

Chapter 42-64.12 separately requires relocation expenses for owners and tenants displaced by economic development takings (§§ 42-64.12-8, -8.1).

If the State No Longer Needs the Land

When land the state took by condemnation is no longer required for the purpose for which it was taken, the acquiring authority, with the state properties committee's approval, may reconvey it with the consent of the former owner (or heirs, successors or assigns), and the fair market value of what is returned "shall be considered in mitigation of damages" in any proceeding over the taking (R.I. Gen. Laws § 37-7-3). If the state instead leases or sells the land, the person in whom title was vested when it was acquired "shall, if living, have the right to lease, purchase, or reinvest" before it goes to anyone else. That prior right is "conclusively presumed to have been waived" if a written offer sent by registered or certified mail to the person's last known address is not accepted within 30 days, and the city or town then has a second right on the same terms (§ 37-7-3).

Section 37-7-4 gives a similar first right to buy or lease extra land taken next to a public highway, street, place, park or parkway, with the same 30-day mailed-offer rule and a second right for the city or town.

Rhode Island Easement and Eminent Domain Laws at a Glance

Related Rhode Island and National Guides

• Easement laws by state
• Eminent domain laws by state
• Rhode Island squatters' rights and adverse possession
• Rhode Island property records

This article provides general legal information about Rhode Island easement and eminent domain law as of October 19, 2026. It is not legal advice. For advice about a specific property, easement or taking, contact a lawyer licensed in Rhode Island.

Last updated: October 19, 2026.

Frequently Asked Questions

How long does it take to get a prescriptive easement in Rhode Island?

Generally ten years. The Rhode Island Supreme Court requires actual, open, notorious, hostile and continuous use under a claim of right for the ten years set by R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-7-1 (Altieri v. Dolan, 1980), with each element proved by clear and satisfactory evidence, which the Court also calls clear and convincing evidence (Drescher v. Johannessen, 2012). Section 34-7-2 preserves the rights of certain owners, such as minors, who sue within ten years after the impediment is removed. A footpath cannot become a prescriptive easement unless it is claimed with a right to pass with carriages (§ 34-7-4).

Can a walking path become a prescriptive easement in Rhode Island?

Generally no. Section 34-7-4 provides that no right of footway, except one claimed in connection with a right to pass with carriages, can be acquired by prescription or adverse use for any length of time.

How do I stop someone from getting a prescriptive easement over my land in Rhode Island?

Section 34-7-6 lets the owner give written notice of intent to dispute the use, served as that section provides and recorded with the return in the town's land evidence records within three months; once served and recorded, the notice counts as an interruption of the use. The user may then sue to try the right and recovers full costs if successful (§ 34-7-7).

What if my land is landlocked in Rhode Island?

Rhode Island has no statute for petitioning a private way across a neighbor's land. A court may recognize a common-law easement by necessity where the easement is reasonably necessary for the convenient and comfortable enjoyment of the property as it existed when it was severed, considering whether a substitute could be procured without unreasonable trouble or expense (Nunes v. Meadowbrook Development Co., 2003).

Who pays to maintain a shared driveway easement in Rhode Island?

Without an enforceable written agreement to the contrary, the owners of the one- to four-family homes that the access easement benefits pay to keep it in good repair and to repair damage, shared in proportion to the benefit each property receives (R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-9.1-2). Maintenance includes snow removal, and any owner who damages the easement is solely responsible for repairing that damage.

Can a neighbor block an easement in Rhode Island?

A court may order a landowner to stop. In Frenchtown Five L.L.C. v. Vanikiotis (2004), the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld an injunction barring a landowner from blocking or impeding a neighbor's right-of-way after she installed a cement barrier on it.

Does an easement end if it is not used in Rhode Island?

Nonuse alone does not end a right-of-way created by express grant. Abandonment depends on intent, and the holder must have acted voluntarily and decisively in a way that shows an unequivocal intention to abandon the easement (Jackvony v. Poncelet, 1991; Frenchtown Five L.L.C. v. Vanikiotis, 2004). Older recorded easements can also be cut off under the Marketable Record Title Act unless preserved (R.I. Gen. Laws chapter 34-13.1).

Can Rhode Island take property for private economic development?

Only under conditions. Chapter 42-64.12 (2008) requires explicit authority, a plan adopted after at least 14 days' notice, a public hearing and at least 30 days of public comment, a plan that can support a finding that the public receives a preponderance of the benefits, advance notice to owners with an opportunity to sell, and approval by the city or town council or by an act of the General Assembly (§ 42-64.12-7). Local redevelopment agencies keep their prior powers except for the approval rule, and short-term partial takings are exempt (§§ 42-64.12-9, -10).

Do Rhode Island owners get more than fair market value in eminent domain?

For takings for economic development purposes, § 42-64.12-8 sets a minimum of 150 percent of fair market value plus transfer expenses and relocation costs; tenants receive at least 150 percent of one month's rent plus relocation expenses (§ 42-64.12-8.1). The state and municipal procedures in chapters 37-6 and 24-1 contain no percentage premium above fair market value.

What is the deadline to challenge a condemnation award in Rhode Island?

For state takings under chapter 37-6, one year from the filing of the description and statement to petition the Superior Court for a jury assessment (§ 37-6-18). For city or town takings under chapter 24-1, one year from the deposit of the estimated compensation in the Superior Court (§ 24-1-8). Each chapter lets the court, in its discretion, allow a late petition only in narrow circumstances (§§ 37-6-19, 24-1-12).

Does Rhode Island pay interest on an eminent domain award?

In a state taking where the owner files a petition for assessment of damages, § 37-6-23 provides interest from the date of condemnation to judgment, calculated on the part of the fair market value that exceeds the amount the acquiring authority offered. The verdict may not include interest on amounts the state properties committee could have ordered paid, for the period beginning 30 days after the written offer (§ 37-6-17).