District of Columbia Easement and Eminent Domain Laws (2026)

In the District of Columbia, a prescriptive easement requires use that is open, notorious, exclusive, continuous and adverse for 15 years. The period comes from D.C. Code § 12-301(a)(1), and the elements come from the D.C. Court of Appeals in Chaconas v. Meyers (1983). On the eminent domain side, the District's condemnation statute lets the Mayor sue to condemn land for listed public facilities "or any other authorized municipal use" (D.C. Code § 16-1311). That chapter contains no provision limiting takings for economic development, the Council has passed site-specific laws authorizing redevelopment takings, and the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a redevelopment taking in the District in Berman v. Parker (1954).

This page covers both halves of District law: easements between private owners first, then the government's power to take private property. For other jurisdictions, see our guide to easement laws by state.

Information last verified on October 19, 2026. This article has not been reviewed by a licensed lawyer.

Jurisdiction scope: This page covers District of Columbia law on private easements (prescriptive, implied, express and conservation easements) and the District's own condemnation of private property under D.C. Code Title 16, chapter 13, subchapters II and III. Out of scope: adverse possession of title (see our D.C. squatters' rights guide), condominium and HOA covenants, zoning and regulatory takings, condemnation by the United States under subchapters IV and V of chapter 13 (heard in federal court), and federal relocation figures.

Prescriptive Easements in D.C.: 15 Years of Use

The period for a prescriptive easement in the District is the limitation period for actions to recover land. D.C. Code § 12-301(a)(1) bars those actions after "15 years" from "the time the right to maintain the action accrues," "Except as otherwise specifically provided by law." The 15-year limit has a government exception: § 12-301(b) states that the section does not apply "to actions brought by the District of Columbia government." That section is covered in more detail in our D.C. statute of limitations guide.

The elements come from case law. In Chaconas v. Meyers, 465 A.2d 379 (D.C. 1983), the D.C. Court of Appeals, quoting an earlier federal appellate decision, stated:

"Effective user to establish a prescriptive easement must be open, notorious, exclusive, continuous and adverse," ... for the statutory period of fifteen years.

The same opinion placed the burden on the person claiming the easement: "The burden of establishing such user by a preponderance of the evidence ... rests upon the claimant."

The presumption of adversity, and how permission defeats it

In Chaconas, the court held that the claimants' "evidence of an open, notorious and exclusive user for the statutory period raised a presumption that the user was adverse." The presumption did not carry the case. The court found it "rebutted by testimony establishing that appellees' use was, at the least, with appellant's implicit permission."

The practical point: under Chaconas, evidence that the owner permitted the use, even implicitly, can defeat a prescriptive easement claim.

Limits from Hefazi v. Stiglitz

In Hefazi v. Stiglitz, 862 A.2d 901 (D.C. 2004), the D.C. Court of Appeals added two limits:

• Use by the title holder is not adverse. "[A] use cannot be adverse where the user has full legal title to the underlying property."
• No negative easements by prescription. "[I]t is well settled that a negative easement cannot be created by prescription. ... a negative easement can only be created by an express grant." A negative easement restricts what the burdened owner may do on their own land rather than giving a right to enter or cross it.

Preventing a prescriptive easement in D.C.

D.C. Code § 12-301 sets only the time period. It contains no procedure for posting a sign or recording a notice to stop prescription, of the kind some states provide. The rule that matters is the one in Chaconas: proof that the use was with the owner's permission, even implicit permission, rebutted the presumption of adversity.

Adverse possession of the land itself, as opposed to a right to use it, runs on the same 15-year period in § 12-301(a)(1). Our D.C. squatters' rights guide covers that claim.

Landlocked Property and Implied Easements in D.C.

The District's condemnation chapter (D.C. Code Title 16, chapter 13) gives a private owner no procedure to condemn a road or way across a neighbor's land to reach a landlocked lot. Some states have such a "way of necessity" or private-road statute; this chapter does not.

The D.C. Court of Appeals has recognized implied easements in some circumstances and described "two types of implied easements, an implied grant, and an implied reservation" (Hefazi v. Stiglitz, 2004). For a seller who keeps part of the land, the court stated the general rule that "[t]here is no implied reservation of an easement in case one sells a part of his land over which he has previously exercised a privilege in favor of the land he retains, unless the burden is apparent, continuous and strictly necessary for the enjoyment of the land retained."

Hefazi also described an exception: an easement that "is reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the estate ... retained by the grantor, and the easement is in fact annexed to it and in use at the time of the grant, and is, as well, open, apparent and continuous" may be recognized by implication. "Necessary" there means "there could be no other reasonable mode of enjoying the dominant tenement without this easement."

In DLY-Adams Place, LLC v. Waste Management of Maryland, Inc., 2 A.3d 163 (D.C. 2010), the court applied that rule. The claimant conceded that use of the alleyway was "not necessary," and the court quoted the trial court's conclusion that "[t]he fact that those other routes are less convenient is not sufficient to give defendant an implied easement in the alleyway."

That case concerned a seller trying to keep (reserve) an easement over land it sold. Whether a buyer of a landlocked parcel gets an implied easement by necessity over the seller's remaining land is a separate common-law question that this page does not answer.

Express and Recorded Easements in D.C.

An agreement to sell or create an interest in land generally must be in writing to be enforced. D.C. Code § 28-3502 provides that an action may not be brought "upon a contract or sale of real estate, of any interest in or concerning it, ... unless the agreement upon which the action is brought, or a memorandum or note thereof, is in writing, which need not state the consideration and signed by the party to be charged therewith or a person authorized by him."

Recording controls who is bound. Under D.C. Code § 42-401, a deed conveying District real property "or interest therein" takes effect from delivery, "except, that as to creditors and subsequent bona fide purchasers and mortgagees without notice of said deed, and others interested in the property, it shall only take effect from the time of its delivery to the Recorder of Deeds for record."

Conservation easements

D.C. Code § 42-201(1) defines a conservation easement as "a nonpossessory interest of a holder in real property imposing limitations or affirmative obligations the purposes of which include retaining or protecting natural, scenic, or open-space values of real property," along with the other listed purposes, including agricultural, forestal or recreational use, natural resources, air or water quality, and historical, architectural, archaeological or cultural preservation. Under § 42-202.01, the "written consent of the holder of the registered and recorded conservation easement shall be required prior to the recordation of a subdivision by the Office of the Surveyor, and to the issuance of a permit for construction, demolition, alteration, or repair, except solely for interior work."

Moving an Easement in D.C.

In Carrollsburg v. Anderson, 791 A.2d 54 (D.C. 2002), the burdened owner moved an access route that the easement holders had used for some thirty years. The D.C. Court of Appeals held that under either the majority rule or § 4.8(3) of the Restatement, the burdened owner's position that it could relocate the easement "cannot be sustained." Under the majority rule, the route "had been fixed for some thirty years, and its unilateral relocation did not have the consent of the Carrollsburg Square owners. Thus, the relocation was invalid."

How an Easement Ends in D.C.

An easement can be lost to the owner of the land it burdens. In Smith v. Tippett, 569 A.2d 1186 (D.C. 1990), the D.C. Court of Appeals stated: "It is undisputed that an easement is a property right which may be extinguished by adverse possession."

The court also set out two presumptions that apply to adverse possession. "Courts presume that one who occupies the land of another does so with the latter's consent, and adversity must be established by clear and convincing evidence." Courts "also indulge a presumption, however, that possession is adverse whenever there is open and continuous use of another's land for the statutory period."

Note the different standards. Smith v. Tippett speaks of clear and convincing evidence for adverse possession, while Chaconas placed a preponderance burden on a person claiming a prescriptive easement. The two opinions address different claims.

Eminent Domain in District of Columbia

The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." In the District, the procedure for a taking is statutory, set out in D.C. Code Title 16, chapter 13. For how other jurisdictions and the federal government handle takings, see our guide to eminent domain laws by state.

Two courts, two systems

D.C. Code § 16-1303 gives the D.C. Superior Court jurisdiction "of all proceedings for the condemnation of real property authorized by subchapters II and III" of chapter 13. Under § 16-1301, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia "has exclusive jurisdiction of all proceedings for the condemnation of real property authorized by subchapters IV and V." Those subchapters govern condemnation of land in the District by the United States; under § 16-1352, the U.S. Attorney General brings those cases in the U.S. District Court. This page covers the District's own proceedings under subchapters II and III.

Other D.C. Code provisions also grant condemnation power. The D.C. Housing Authority may acquire property "by power of eminent domain as herein conferred" (§ 6-203(1)). The Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington Railroad Company, "its successors or assigns," may condemn land for track extensions and sidings in the U.S. District Court using the §§ 16-1311 to 16-1321 procedure (§ 9-1203.06). The Secretary of the Army or the Mayor may condemn "lands, easements, and rights-of-way for pipelines" for the water supply purposes of § 34-2411.01 (§ 34-2411.03).

Can D.C. take property for private development?

D.C. Code § 16-1311 authorizes condemnation when property is needed by the Mayor "for sites of schoolhouses, fire or police stations, rights-of-way for roads, highways, streets and alleys or parts thereof, rights-of-way for water mains or sewers, or any other authorized municipal use," and the property "cannot be acquired by purchase from the owners thereof at a price satisfactory to the officers of the District authorized to negotiate for the property."

Chapter 13 contains no provision barring takings for economic development or for transfer to a private developer. One check sits in the community-development statute: under D.C. Code § 6-1005(a), property acquired for that subchapter's purposes "shall be acquired pursuant to subchapter II of Chapter 13 of Title 16," and "No such property shall be acquired unless its acquisition be authorized by the Council after notice of public hearing."

The Council has also passed site-specific laws letting the Mayor condemn under subchapter II for redevelopment, such as the Skyland Shopping Center (D.C. Code § 2-1225.42(b)) and the New Convention Center Hotel (§ 10-1202.33(a)). Separately, § 42-3171.02(a) lets the Mayor acquire abandoned or deteriorated property "for the public purpose of eliminating slum and blight" under §§ 16-1311 through 16-1321. The Mayor may not acquire occupied deteriorated property from which tenants "shall, or will likely, be displaced" until a tenant relocation plan has been made available "for public review and comment, for a period of at least 30 days" (§ 42-3171.02(c)).

A U.S. Supreme Court redevelopment case arose in the District. In Berman v. Parker (1954), the Court upheld the taking of a department-store property in Southwest Washington under the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, reasoning that Congress might conclude that "[t]he public end may be as well or better served through an agency of private enterprise than through a department of government."

The condemnation process and the owner's deadlines

The case begins with a complaint filed in Superior Court in the name of the District of Columbia "for the condemnation of the property or rights-of-way and the ascertainment of its value" (§ 16-1311). The court appoints "a jury of five capable and disinterested persons" (§ 16-1313) to appraise the property.

Under § 16-1318(a), "Objections or exceptions to an appraisement of the jury pursuant to section 16-1317 may be filed within twenty days after the return of the appraisement to the court." The court "may vacate and set aside the appraisement, in whole or in part, when satisfied that it is unjust or unreasonable." This 20-day window is short and easy to miss.

The court rules add two more deadlines. Under Superior Court Civil Rule 71.1(e)(2), a defendant "that has an objection or defense to the taking must serve an answer within 21 days after being served with the notice," and under Rule 71.1(e)(3) a defendant "waives all objections and defenses not stated in its answer." The notice served on the owner must state that failing to answer "constitutes consent to the taking and to the court's authority to proceed with the action and fix the compensation" (Rule 71.1(d)(2)(A)(vi)). At the trial on compensation, an owner who did not answer may still "present evidence on the amount of compensation to be paid and may share in the award."

A notice of appeal in a civil case must be filed with the Clerk of the Superior Court "within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken unless a different time is specified" by the appellate rules or the D.C. Code (D.C. App. R. 4(a)(1)).

Quick-take: the declaration of taking

The District can take title before the value is decided. Under § 16-1314(a), the District may file "with the complaint or at any time before judgment, a declaration of taking, signed by the Mayor," which must include a "statement of the sum of money estimated by the Mayor to be just compensation for the property taken."

Under § 16-1314(b), on "the filing of the declaration of taking and the deposit in the registry of the court ... of the amount of the estimated compensation stated in the declaration," title "in fee simple absolute, or such less estate or interest therein as is specified in the declaration, shall vest in the District of Columbia."

After the deposit, the court, "upon the application of the parties in interest, may order that the money so deposited, or any part thereof, be paid forthwith" toward the compensation, and on the final award it enters judgment "for the amount of any deficiency or overpayment" (§ 16-1315). Without a declaration of taking, title vests in the District when, after the appraisement stands, the Mayor pays or deposits the amount the jury awarded (§ 16-1319).

After a declaration is filed, the court "may fix the time within which and the terms upon which the parties in possession shall be required to surrender possession" (§ 16-1316). The statute itself sets no fixed number of days.

How compensation is set

The five-person jury appraises the property. In a partial taking, § 16-1317 directs that "the jury shall take into consideration, when a part only is taken, the benefit to the remainder of the tract, and shall give their appraisement accordingly." A benefit to the land the owner keeps can therefore reduce the award.

When the District uses a declaration of taking, the judgment must include "interest at the rate of 6 per centum per annum on the amount finally awarded as the value of the property as of the date of taking, from that date to the date of payment." The same section adds: "Interest may not be allowed on as much thereof as has been paid into the registry" (§ 16-1314(b)).

Sections 16-1311 to 16-1321 and 16-1331 to 16-1337 contain no added percentage for homes or homesteads.

When the United States condemns land in the District under subchapter IV, a different valuation rule applies. Section 16-1360 provides that a new structure or permanent alteration made after the case begins, whose "purpose or natural effect" is to raise the property's value, "may not be taken into consideration," and that property taken by a declaration of taking under § 16-1353 is valued "as of the date of the taking."

Attorney fees and litigation expenses

Under § 16-1321, the Mayor may either abide by the jury's verdict and occupy the property or, "within a reasonable time to be fixed by the court in its order confirming the verdict," abandon the proceeding. Within §§ 16-1311 to 16-1321 and 16-1331 to 16-1337, counsel fees appear only in the abandonment rule. Under § 16-1321, "If the proceeding is abandoned, the court shall award to the owner or owners of the property involved therein such sum or sums as will in the opinion of the court reimburse the owner or owners for all reasonable costs and expenses, including reasonable counsel fees, incurred by him or them in the proceeding."

The same section adds a limit: "An owner is not entitled to the reimbursement in any case where the proceeding is abandoned at the request, or with the consent, of the owner of the property." Those sections contain no rule shifting fees when the award exceeds the District's offer.

A separate statute reaches further. D.C. Code § 6-333.01(a) requires the Mayor, whenever real property is acquired for a covered program or project, to "make all payments and meet all requirements prescribed for a federal agency by title III" of the federal Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970. Title III includes a litigation-expense provision, 42 U.S.C. § 4654(a), under which the court reimburses an owner's reasonable costs, "including reasonable attorney, appraisal, and engineering fees," when "the final judgment is that the Federal agency cannot acquire the real property by condemnation" or the proceeding is abandoned. Section 4654(a) is written in terms of a federal court and a federal agency, and § 6-333.01 does not say how it applies to a District case in Superior Court.

Relocation assistance

D.C. Code § 6-333.01(a) applies when the District or the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority acquires real property "for a program or project which is not subject to §§ 210 and 211 of this title, and such acquisition will result in the displacement of any person on or after January 2, 1971." In that case, the Mayor or the Transit Authority "shall make all relocation payments and provide all assistance required of a federal agency by this act." The section ties District relocation benefits to what federal law requires of a federal agency; our national eminent domain guide covers the federal rules.

The same subsection adds that whenever real property is acquired for such a program or project, the Mayor or the Transit Authority "shall make all payments and meet all requirements prescribed for a federal agency by title III" of that federal act. Title III's acquisition policies, which agencies follow "to the greatest extent practicable," call for the property to be "appraised before the initiation of negotiations" (with a waiver procedure for some low-value acquisitions), for the owner to have "an opportunity to accompany the appraiser during his inspection of the property," and for a prompt offer never "less than the agency's approved appraisal of the fair market value of such property," with "a written statement of, and summary of the basis for," that amount (42 U.S.C. § 4651). Federal law adds that those policies "create no rights or liabilities and shall not affect the validity of any property acquisitions by purchase or condemnation" (42 U.S.C. § 4602(a)).

Excess property and repurchase

When the District condemns excess real property, "assessments for benefits may not be levied by the jury in respect to the acquisition of the property" (§ 16-1336(d)). Property sold under § 16-1332 "shall be sold at not less than the fair market value at the time sold, as determined by appraisement of the assessor of the District of Columbia" (§ 16-1332(b)).

The excess-property sections (§§ 16-1331 to 16-1337) give a former owner no right to buy back condemned land. A separate disposition statute, D.C. Code § 10-801(e), requires the Mayor, in a negotiated sale under that section, to keep "the right of the District to reacquire the property at the price originally conveyed plus any amounts secured by the property that have been approved by the Mayor, if the property is no longer used for the authorized purpose." That right belongs to the District, not to the owner whose land was taken.

D.C. Easement and Eminent Domain Rules at a Glance

Related Pages

• Easement laws by state
• Eminent domain laws by state
• D.C. squatters' rights and adverse possession
• D.C. statute of limitations

Disclaimer: This article provides general legal information about District of Columbia easement and eminent domain law as of October 19, 2026. It is not legal advice. For advice about a specific property or condemnation case, contact a lawyer licensed in the District of Columbia.

Last updated: October 19, 2026.

Frequently Asked Questions

How long does it take to get a prescriptive easement in D.C.?

Fifteen years. The D.C. Court of Appeals requires open, notorious, exclusive, continuous and adverse use for the 15-year period in D.C. Code § 12-301(a)(1), and the claimant must prove it by a preponderance of the evidence (Chaconas v. Meyers, 1983). Section 12-301 does not apply to actions brought by the D.C. government.

Does permission stop a prescriptive easement in D.C.?

Use with the owner's permission is not adverse. In Chaconas v. Meyers (1983), 15 years of open, notorious and exclusive use raised a presumption of adversity, but testimony that the use was with the owner's implicit permission rebutted it.

Is there a landlocked property law in D.C.?

The District's condemnation chapter (D.C. Code Title 16, chapter 13) gives a private owner no procedure to condemn a way across a neighbor's land. On implied easements, the D.C. Court of Appeals has applied the general rule that a seller keeps an implied easement over land sold only if the burden is apparent, continuous and strictly necessary, with an exception for an easement that is reasonably necessary, in use at the sale and open, apparent and continuous (Hefazi v. Stiglitz, 2004). In DLY-Adams Place v. Waste Management (2010), routes that were merely less convenient did not support an implied easement.

Can an easement be lost in D.C.?

Yes. The D.C. Court of Appeals has stated that an easement is a property right which may be extinguished by adverse possession (Smith v. Tippett, 1990).

Can D.C. take property for economic development?

D.C. Code § 16-1311 allows condemnation for listed public facilities or any other authorized municipal use, and the condemnation chapter contains no provision barring takings for economic development. Community-development acquisitions require Council authorization after notice of a public hearing (D.C. Code § 6-1005(a)). The Council has also authorized specific redevelopment takings, such as the Skyland Shopping Center (D.C. Code § 2-1225.42), § 42-3171.02 lets the Mayor acquire abandoned or deteriorated property to eliminate slum and blight, and the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a redevelopment taking in the District in Berman v. Parker (1954).

Who decides compensation in a D.C. eminent domain case?

A jury of five appointed by the Superior Court appraises the property (D.C. Code § 16-1313). When only part is taken, the jury considers the benefit to the remainder (§ 16-1317), and objections to its appraisement may be filed within 20 days after it is returned to the court (§ 16-1318(a)). An owner who objects to the taking itself must serve an answer within 21 days after being served with the notice (Super. Ct. Civ. R. 71.1(e)(2)).

Does D.C. pay attorney fees in eminent domain cases?

Within D.C. Code Title 16, chapter 13, counsel fees appear only when the proceeding is abandoned: the court then awards the owner reasonable costs and expenses, including reasonable counsel fees, unless the owner requested or consented to the abandonment (D.C. Code § 16-1321). Separately, D.C. Code § 6-333.01(a) requires the District to meet the federal Uniform Act's title III requirements for covered acquisitions, and title III includes a litigation-expense provision (42 U.S.C. § 4654).

Does D.C. pay relocation costs when it takes property?

For covered District and WMATA acquisitions that displace a person on or after January 2, 1971, D.C. Code § 6-333.01(a) requires the relocation payments and assistance required of a federal agency, and covered acquisitions must also meet the federal title III acquisition requirements.