Colorado Easements and Eminent Domain: Prescriptive Rights and Takings

In Colorado, a prescriptive easement takes 18 years of open or notorious, continuous use that is either adverse or made under an attempted but ineffective grant. The 18 years come from the real property limitation statute, C.R.S. 38-41-101, and the elements come from Colorado case law (Lobato v. Taylor, Colo. 2002; Brown v. Faatz, Colo. App. 2008). On eminent domain, a 2006 amendment to C.R.S. 38-1-101 says that "public use" does not include taking private property for transfer to a private entity for economic development or to enhance tax revenue, and the Colorado Constitution makes the public character of a taking a question for the courts (Colo. Const. art. II, s. 15).

This page covers both halves of Colorado law: easements between private landowners first, then the power to take private property. For other states, see our guide to easement laws by state.

Information last verified on 2026-10-19. This article has not been reviewed by a licensed lawyer.

Jurisdiction scope: This page covers Colorado state law on private easements (C.R.S. 38-41-101, 38-10-108, 38-35-109 and 38-30.5, and Colorado case law) and on condemnation of private property (Colo. Const. art. II, s. 14 and 15; C.R.S. 38-1-101 to 38-1-122 and 38-1-202, the urban renewal condemnation rules in 31-25-105.5 and the relocation statute in 24-56). It does not cover adverse possession of title (see Colorado squatters' rights and adverse possession), HOA covenants, zoning and regulatory takings, condemnation by the federal government, or city and county ordinances.

Prescriptive Easements in Colorado: 18 Years

A prescriptive easement is a right to keep using a path, road or other part of someone else's land that is gained by long use rather than by a written grant. No Colorado statute lists its elements. The courts supply them and borrow the 18-year period from C.R.S. 38-41-101(1), which bars any action "to enforce or establish any right or interest of or to real property" unless it is brought "within eighteen years after the right to bring such action or make such entry has first accrued."

The Colorado Court of Appeals summarized the test in Brown v. Faatz, 197 P.3d 245 (Colo. App. 2008), citing two Colorado Supreme Court decisions:

"An easement by prescription is acquired when the prescriptive use is open or notorious, continuous without effective interruption for at least eighteen years, and either adverse or pursuant to an attempted but ineffective grant."

The Colorado Supreme Court stated the period directly in Lobato v. Taylor, 71 P.3d 938 (Colo. 2002): "the use must continue without effective interruption for the prescriptive period. In Colorado, the statutory period is eighteen years."

Three points shape how these claims play out:

• Burden of proof. In Brown v. Faatz, the Court of Appeals held that the party claiming the easement "bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence continuous, uninterrupted, adverse use of the easement for the statutory period of eighteen years."
• Presumption of adversity. The same court said that use of a roadway for the statutory period, "if unexplained, is presumed to be under a claim or assertion of right, and therefore adverse."
• Adversity is not always required. The Lobato court explained that adversity is not required when the evidence makes clear the parties intended an easement but failed, for example because they did not put their agreement in writing or did not meet some other formal requirement.

The 2008 adverse possession changes do not apply to easements

In 2008 the legislature added subsections (3) through (5) to C.R.S. 38-41-101. Subsection (3)(a) requires a person claiming fee simple title by adverse possession, in a civil action filed on or after July 1, 2008, to prove each element by clear and convincing evidence. Subsection (4) then limits subsections (3) and (5) to claims for fee simple title and says they do not apply to "the creation, establishment, proof, or judicial confirmation or delineation of easements by prescription, implication, prior use, estoppel, or otherwise."

So an owner of land and a claimant of a prescriptive easement face different standards under the same 18-year statute. Ownership claims are covered on our page on Colorado squatters' rights and adverse possession, and other time limits are collected on the Colorado statute of limitations page.

Public land and other limits on prescription

The 18-year limitation does not run against the state, counties, cities, irrigation districts or other public bodies. C.R.S. 38-41-101(2) adds that no possession of any land, water right, "easement, or other property whatsoever" owned by the state or one of those bodies "no matter how long continued," shall "ever ripen into any title, interest, or right" against it.

Other statutes limit prescription too. For Torrens-registered land, "No title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall ever be acquired by prescription or adverse possession" (C.R.S. 38-36-137). A solar easement "shall not be acquired by prescription" (C.R.S. 38-32.5-101). The recreational use statute says it does not "create a prescriptive easement" on land where an owner has acquiesced to public use of trails historically used by the public for recreation (C.R.S. 33-41-103(2)).

Public roads follow a separate rule with a different period. A road over private land that has "been used adversely without interruption or objection on the part of the owners of such lands for twenty consecutive years" is a public highway (C.R.S. 43-2-201(1)(c)).

How to Prevent a Prescriptive Easement in Colorado

Colorado's real property title (title 38 of the Colorado Revised Statutes) contains no posted-sign or recorded-notice procedure for stopping a prescriptive easement. The rules that matter come from case law:

• Permission. In Brown v. Faatz the Court of Appeals said that "Permissive use during any or all of that period defeats a claim of adverse use, and therefore precludes the acquisition of the prescriptive easement."
• Gates. The same court said that "Ordinarily, however, the use of a road is not deemed adverse where free travel along the road is obstructed by a gate, even if the gate is not locked." This is a Court of Appeals statement, not a Colorado Supreme Court holding.

Implied Easements and Landlocked Property in Colorado

Colorado law offers a landlocked owner three separate routes: an easement implied from prior use, a common-law way of necessity, and a condemnation of a private way of necessity under the constitution and statute.

Easement implied from prior use

The Colorado Supreme Court set out the elements in Lobato v. Taylor (2002). An easement implied from prior use is created when:

1. the servient and dominant estates were once under common ownership;
2. the rights alleged were exercised before the estate was severed;
3. the use was not merely temporary;
4. continuing the use was reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the parcel; and
5. a contrary intention is neither expressed nor implied.

Common-law way of necessity

The Colorado Supreme Court has listed three requirements for a common-law way of necessity: "(1) the original ownership of the entire tract of land was held by a single grantor prior to a division thereof; (2) the necessity existed at the time of the severance; and (3) the necessity for the particular right-of-way is great" (State Dep't of Highways v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 789 P.2d 1088 (Colo. 1990), restating Wagner v. Fairlamb, 151 Colo. 481 (1963)). The same court noted that "no compensation is due for an implied easement by way of necessity under common law," while just compensation must be paid to condemn a private way of necessity.

This kind of easement is not permanent. The Court of Appeals has described a way of necessity as one "which lasts only as long as the necessity continues" (Proper v. Greager, 827 P.2d 591 (Colo. App. 1992), quoting an earlier decision).

Condemning a private way of necessity

Article II, section 14 of the Colorado Constitution bars taking private property for private use without the owner's consent, but makes an exception:

"Private property shall not be taken for private use unless by consent of the owner, except for private ways of necessity, and except for reservoirs, drains, flumes or ditches on or across the lands of others, for agricultural, mining, milling, domestic or sanitary purposes."

C.R.S. 38-1-102(3) carries this into the condemnation statutes: under that section, "private property may be taken for private use, for private ways of necessity, and for reservoirs, drains, flumes, or ditches on or across the lands of others." C.R.S. 38-1-202(1)(k) lists among those authorized to use eminent domain "A person who, under general laws or special charter, requires and is entitled to private property of another for private use, private ways of necessity," or for those reservoir and ditch purposes "as authorized in section 38-1-102."

The landowner who condemns the way pays for it. Section 15 of the same article says private property "shall not be taken or damaged, for public or private use, without just compensation," set by a board of at least three freeholders or by a jury when the owner requires one. The claim proceeds as a condemnation case under article 1 of title 38.

The Colorado Supreme Court has said a constitutional way of necessity "exists where the common law or other remedies do not provide a basis of access," and it held that the state highway department had "no statutory authority which would allow it to condemn a private way of necessity" for a landowner (State Dep't of Highways v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 1990). The Court of Appeals has held that the necessity "need not be absolute, but rather the way must be 'reasonably necessary under the facts and circumstances of the case,'" and that an alternative route "is not acceptable if it is impractical, unreasonable, or prohibited by cost grossly in excess of the value of the dominant estate" (Bear Creek Dev. Corp. v. Genesee Found., 919 P.2d 948 (Colo. App. 1996)). The same court called the way "a 'remedy of last resort'" and said it "should also terminate upon a change of circumstances that eliminates the necessity."

Express Easements, Recording and Easement Types

An express easement is one created in writing. Colorado's statute of frauds makes every contract "for the sale of any lands or any interest in lands" void unless the contract, or a note or memorandum of it expressing the consideration, is in writing and signed by the party making the sale (C.R.S. 38-10-108).

Recording protects the holder against later buyers. Under C.R.S. 38-35-109(1), an unrecorded instrument is not valid against a person who acquires rights in the property and records first, except between the parties and against those who had notice before acquiring their rights. Our page on Colorado property records explains how to search recorded documents.

On easement types, the Lobato court explained that "An easement appurtenant, on the other hand, runs with the land," and that "An easement is presumed to be appurtenant, rather than in gross."

Conservation easements

A conservation easement in gross is "an interest in real property freely transferable in whole or in part" for the statute's conservation purposes, and it "shall be perpetual unless otherwise stated in the instrument creating it" (C.R.S. 38-30.5-103(1), (3)). Under a section added in 2022 (Senate Bill 22-208, C.R.S. 38-30.5-107.5), when a condemnor takes land subject to a statutory conservation easement in gross free and clear of the easement, or subordinates the easement, just compensation is determined "as if unencumbered by the conservation easement in gross" and allocated between the fee owner and the easement holder according to the value of their interests.

Pipeline easements

A pipeline easement or right-of-way may not be used by its owner for any purpose other than to construct, lay, install, replace, operate, inspect, maintain, repair, renew, substitute, monitor, change the size of, and remove the facilities placed within it, and the easement owner must mitigate any erosion it causes within the easement (C.R.S. 38-1-101.7(1), (2)).

How an Easement Ends in Colorado

An easement can be lost by adverse possession under the same 18-year statute. The Colorado Supreme Court held that "An easement is terminated by adverse possession upon a showing that use of the easement area was: (1) adverse to the easement holder's use of the easement; (2) open or notorious; and (3) continuous, without effective interruption, for the statutorily-mandated period of time for adverse possession." It added that "To be adverse, use of the easement area must be incompatible or irreconcilable with the easement holder's right to use the easement" (Matoush v. Lovingood, 177 P.3d 1262 (Colo. 2008)).

An easement that was created in writing but never used is harder to lose this way. In Matoush the court held that "When an easement is expressly created but never used," use of the easement area "will not trigger the statutorily-mandated period of time for adverse possession until the easement holder needs to use the easement, demands to use it, and is denied the right to use it."

Abandonment is a different route. The same court said that "Abandonment is not an element of a claim to terminate an easement by adverse possession, but rather is a separate and distinct method for terminating an easement," and that a claim to terminate an easement by abandonment "focuses on the conduct of the easement holder." It described an earlier Colorado Supreme Court decision, Rivera v. Queree (1961), as "requiring proof that an easement holder intended to abandon the easement."

A way of necessity, whether it arises at common law or by condemnation, ends when the necessity ends (Proper v. Greager; Bear Creek Dev. Corp. v. Genesee Found.).

Eminent Domain in Colorado

Eminent domain is the power to take private property for public use on payment of just compensation. For how Colorado compares with other states and the federal rules, see our guide to eminent domain laws by state.

The core protection is article II, section 15 of the Colorado Constitution:

"Private property shall not be taken or damaged, for public or private use, without just compensation. Such compensation shall be ascertained by a board of commissioners, of not less than three freeholders, or by a jury, when required by the owner of the property, in such manner as may be prescribed by law, and until the same shall be paid to the owner, or into court for the owner, the property shall not be needlessly disturbed, or the proprietary rights of the owner therein divested; and whenever an attempt is made to take private property for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial question, and determined as such without regard to any legislative assertion that the use is public."

Two features stand out. The clause covers property that is "damaged," not only property that is taken. And whether a use is really public is for the courts, not the legislature.

Can Colorado Take Property for Private Development?

Colorado's limit on economic development takings is in a statute, not the constitution. A 2006 act, House Bill 06-1411 (effective June 6, 2006), amended C.R.S. 38-1-101 to provide in subsection (1)(b)(I):

"For purposes of satisfying the requirements of this section, 'public use' shall not include the taking of private property for transfer to a private entity for the purpose of economic development or enhancement of tax revenue. Private property may otherwise be taken solely for the purpose of furthering a public use."

The statute also places the burden on the condemnor. Under C.R.S. 38-1-101(2)(b), in any condemnation without the owner's consent, the condemning entity must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the taking is for a public use. When the taking is for the eradication of blight, it must show by clear and convincing evidence that the taking is necessary for that purpose. The same act made any condemnation action commenced by an urban renewal authority on or after June 6, 2006 subject to these requirements (C.R.S. 31-25-105.7).

Other limits and carve-outs in the same section:

• Private condemnation preserved. "Nothing in this section shall affect the right of a private party to condemn property as otherwise provided by law" (C.R.S. 38-1-101(1)(c)). Private ways of necessity, reservoirs and ditches remain available. C.R.S. 38-1-202(2) also lists narrower private condemnation powers, including landowners building a drain to carry off surplus water (38-2-103), owners of mineral land not next to a railroad building a connecting railway spur "not to exceed fifteen miles in length" (38-2-104), and rights-of-way to bring water or air into a mine or carry away tailings (34-48-101 to 34-48-111).
• Outside city limits. Since January 1, 2004, no home rule or statutory municipality may condemn property outside its boundaries, or fund another party's condemnation there, except for water works, light plants, power plants, transportation systems, heating plants, other public utilities or public works, or purposes necessary for those uses (C.R.S. 38-1-101(4)(b)(I)).

At the federal level, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), that takings under an economic development plan serving a public purpose satisfied the Fifth Amendment's public use requirement, and it emphasized that nothing in its opinion precludes a state from placing further restrictions on its takings power. Colorado's 2006 amendment is that kind of state-level restriction.

Urban renewal takings

Urban renewal authorities have their own statute. Land an authority acquired by eminent domain after June 4, 2004 may be transferred to a private party only in limited cases (C.R.S. 31-25-105.5(1), (2)). One is that the owner consented in writing. Another is that the authority no longer needs the land and "first offers to sell the property to the owner from whom it was acquired, if the owner can be located, at a price not more than that paid by the authority," and the owner declines.

Otherwise, the governing body must determine that the area or the property is blighted, using a definition that requires "at least five" of the statutory blight factors, and the project must begin within seven years of that determination. Any owner of property in the urban renewal area may challenge the blight determination by filing a C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) action "not later than thirty days after the date the determination of blight is made," and the governing body bears the burden of proof. An authority acquiring under these rules must reimburse reasonable attorney fees to an owner who prevails on that challenge. When such a taking displaces a business, the authority must make a business interruption payment "not to exceed the lesser of ten thousand dollars or one-fourth of the average annual taxable income shown on the three most recent federal income tax returns of the business concern" (C.R.S. 31-25-105.5(2) to (5)).

Pipelines

When a court decides whether taking private land or nonfederal public land for a pipeline is necessary, C.R.S. 38-1-101.5(1) requires the pipeline company to show the land lies within the most direct route practicable, to post a bond equal to double the court's estimate of the cost of restoring the land, and, where the land is next to existing utility rights-of-way, to consider those rights-of-way before new routes are taken.

Colorado Condemnation Procedure and Deadlines

C.R.S. 38-1-202 lists the governmental entities, corporations and persons authorized to use eminent domain, including pipeline companies and natural gas public utilities (C.R.S. 38-1-202(2)(b), (h)). Recent additions to the list include the front range passenger rail district (Senate Bill 21-238, 2021), the Colorado electric transmission authority (Senate Bill 21-072, 2021) and county revitalization authorities (House Bill 24-1172, 2024) (C.R.S. 38-1-202(1)(f)).

The main steps in the general procedure are:

1. Notice of intent. As soon as a condemning authority decides it intends to acquire an interest in property, it must give notice of that intent, with a description of the interest, to everyone with an interest of record (C.R.S. 38-1-121(1)).
2. Owner's appraisal. If the property has an estimated value of $5,000 or more, the notice must say the condemning authority will pay the reasonable costs of an appraisal. The owner may submit a copy of that appraisal within 90 days of the notice, and the condemning authority must "immediately upon receipt thereof" give the owner copies of its own appraisals. The authority pays the reasonable cost of a submitted appraisal, but not if several owners cannot agree on one to submit. The case cannot go to trial on value until the 90 days pass or the appraisal is submitted, whichever is sooner (C.R.S. 38-1-121(1), (2), (5)). The statute does not limit the authority's duty "to negotiate in good faith" before filing (C.R.S. 38-1-121(3)).
3. Final offer. If the parties do not agree on fair market value, the condemning authority must give all owners of record a written final offer before proceeding to trial on valuation (C.R.S. 38-1-121(6)).
4. No hearing for 30 days. No cause may be heard earlier than 30 days after service on the owner or due publication (C.R.S. 38-1-104).
5. Jury or commissioners. The owner may demand a jury of freeholders from the county to decide compensation, but the demand must come before commissioners are appointed and before the time to appear and answer runs out. The jury has six members unless a party demands more (C.R.S. 38-1-106).

Immediate possession and withdrawing the deposit

At any stage, the court may let the condemnor take possession and use the property while the case continues if it pays into court a sum sufficient to cover the compensation once determined (C.R.S. 38-1-105(6)(a)). The owner may withdraw from that deposit up to three-fourths of the highest valuation the condemnor presented at the possession hearing, unless the condemnor agrees to a larger withdrawal, and only if all parties interested in the property consent. A withdrawal counts as partial payment and is deducted from the final award (C.R.S. 38-1-105(6)(b)). The condemnor may not take possession earlier than 30 days after the summons is served unless the owner consents (C.R.S. 38-1-105(6)(c)).

Withdrawal affects interest. When the condemnor took possession early, the award carries interest at the rate set under C.R.S. 5-12-106(2) from the date of possession until the award or verdict is filed, but no interest is allowed on the portion the owner "received or could have received" by withdrawing from the deposit (C.R.S. 38-1-116).

After a verdict, the court orders that the condemnor may enter and use the property "upon payment of full compensation as ascertained" (C.R.S. 38-1-108).

Final judgments are subject to appellate review (C.R.S. 38-1-110). The court, not the commissioners or jury, decides "All questions and issues, except the amount of compensation" (C.R.S. 38-1-101(2)(a)).

Owner deadlines and traps

This page does not state a limitation period for inverse condemnation claims.

How Just Compensation Is Calculated in Colorado

C.R.S. 38-1-114(1) sets the general formula:

• Valuation date. Compensation, including damages and benefits, is determined initially as of the date the condemnor is authorized to take possession or the date of the trial or hearing, whichever is earlier. The amount stays open to adjustment for one year afterward for additional damages or benefits that were not reasonably foreseeable.
• Property taken. "In estimating the value of all property actually taken, the true and actual value at such time shall be allowed and awarded. No deduction therefrom shall be allowed for any benefit to the residue of said property."
• Damage to the remainder. In a partial taking, damages to the rest of the owner's property may be reduced by the value of the project's benefits, but if the benefits exceed those damages, the owner does not pay or credit the excess.

Highway and transportation projects follow a different rule. Subsection (1) yields to subsection (2) for "acquisitions for highways and transportation projects undertaken by the regional transportation district." Under subsection (2), a whole taking is valued at reasonable market value, and in a partial taking the compensation for the property taken and damages to the remainder "shall be reduced by the amount of any special benefits which result from the improvement or project, but not to exceed fifty percent of the total amount of compensation to be paid for the property actually taken" (C.R.S. 38-1-114(2)(b), (d)).

Article 1 of title 38 (C.R.S. 38-1-101 to 38-1-122) contains no percentage bonus for homes, no separate compensation item for business losses or goodwill, and no general right for a former owner to buy back condemned land that goes unused. The urban renewal statute (C.R.S. 31-25-105.5) and the relocation statute (C.R.S. 24-56) add the business payments and the first-offer rule described on this page.

Attorney Fees in Colorado Eminent Domain Cases

C.R.S. 38-1-122 shifts the owner's attorney fees to the condemnor in two situations:

• No authority to take. If the court finds the petitioner "is not authorized by law to acquire" the property, it "shall award reasonable attorney fees, in addition to any other costs assessed," to an owner who participated (C.R.S. 38-1-122(1)).
• The 130% rule. Where the court's award exceeds $10,000, the condemning authority must reimburse "all of the owner's reasonable attorney fees" if the award "equals or exceeds one hundred thirty percent of the last written offer given to the property owner prior to the filing of the condemnation action" (C.R.S. 38-1-122(1.5)). This rule does not apply to proceedings to acquire rights-of-way under articles 4, 5 or 5.5 of title 38, article 45 of title 37, or section 7 of article XVI of the Colorado Constitution.

Other statutes add fee rules. Where a state agency or political subdivision condemns for a federally assisted project and the final judgment is that the land "cannot be acquired by condemnation or that the proceeding is abandoned," the court reimburses the owner's "reasonable attorney, appraisal, and engineering fees actually incurred" (C.R.S. 24-56-115). An owner who wins an inverse condemnation case over a federally assisted project recovers reasonable costs and expenses, including attorney, appraisal and engineering fees (C.R.S. 24-56-116). An owner who prevails in a challenge to an urban renewal blight determination recovers reasonable attorney fees (C.R.S. 31-25-105.5(3)). In a 1999 decision, before the 130% rule was added to the statute in 2003, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that section 38-1-122 did not support a fee award in an inverse condemnation action (Fowler Irrevocable Trust 1992-1 v. City of Boulder, 992 P.2d 1188 (Colo. App. 1999)).

For projects that receive federal financial assistance, federal law conditions federal approval on assurances that the acquiring agency "will be guided, to the greatest extent practicable under State law," by the federal land acquisition policies and that owners will be paid or reimbursed for certain expenses (42 U.S.C. 4655(a)). The eminent domain guide covers federal relocation rules.

Relocation assistance

Colorado's relocation statute applies when a state agency or political subdivision acquires land for a program or project that receives federal financial assistance (C.R.S. 24-56-121). It sets these limits:

• Reestablishment expenses for a displaced farm, nonprofit or small business of up to $50,000 on projects administered or overseen by the department of transportation and $10,000 on other projects (C.R.S. 24-56-103(1)(d)).
• An optional fixed business payment of not less than $1,000 nor more than $20,000 (C.R.S. 24-56-103(3)).
• Up to $22,500 in replacement-housing payments for an owner who occupied the home for at least 180 days before negotiations began (C.R.S. 24-56-104(1)).
• Up to $5,250 for tenants and certain others toward renting a comparable home (C.R.S. 24-56-105(1)).

On these projects the offer may not be less than the approved appraisal of fair market value, and no owner must surrender possession before the agreed price is paid or at least the approved appraisal or the award is deposited with the court (C.R.S. 24-56-117(1)(c), (d)). A person aggrieved by a final decision on eligibility for relocation payments may seek review in district court (C.R.S. 24-56-113).

Colorado Easement and Eminent Domain Laws at a Glance

Related Colorado Pages

• Easement laws by state
• Eminent domain laws by state
• Colorado squatters' rights and adverse possession
• Colorado property records
• Colorado statute of limitations

This page provides general legal information about Colorado easement and eminent domain law. It is not legal advice. For a specific situation, contact a lawyer licensed in Colorado.

Last updated: 2026-10-19.

Frequently Asked Questions

How long does it take to get a prescriptive easement in Colorado?

Generally eighteen years. Colorado courts apply the 18-year period in C.R.S. 38-41-101 and require use that is open or notorious, continuous without effective interruption, and either adverse or under an attempted but ineffective grant (Brown v. Faatz, Colo. App. 2008; Lobato v. Taylor, Colo. 2002). Prescription never runs against property of the state or the public bodies listed in C.R.S. 38-41-101(2), and a solar easement cannot be acquired by prescription (C.R.S. 38-32.5-101). For Torrens-registered land, no title in derogation of the registered owner's can be acquired by prescription (C.R.S. 38-36-137).

Does Colorado's clear and convincing evidence rule apply to prescriptive easements?

No. C.R.S. 38-41-101(4) limits the 2008 rules in subsections (3) and (5) to adverse possession claims for fee simple title and says they do not apply to easements by prescription, implication, prior use, estoppel or otherwise. The Court of Appeals in Brown v. Faatz applied a preponderance of the evidence burden to a prescriptive easement claim.

How do I stop someone from getting a prescriptive easement in Colorado?

Title 38 of the Colorado Revised Statutes has no posted-sign or recorded-notice procedure for this. Under Brown v. Faatz (Colo. App. 2008), permissive use during any part of the 18 years defeats a prescriptive claim, and a road's use is ordinarily not adverse where a gate obstructs free travel, even if it is unlocked.

What if my land is landlocked in Colorado?

A common-law way of necessity may exist, with no compensation due, where one owner divided the tract, the necessity existed at the division and the necessity is great (Wagner v. Fairlamb, Colo. 1963; State Dep't of Highways v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., Colo. 1990). An easement implied from prior use may exist if the five elements in Lobato v. Taylor (Colo. 2002) are met. Where no such remedy gives access, the Colorado Constitution (art. II, s. 14) and C.R.S. 38-1-102(3) allow a private way of necessity to be condemned, with just compensation set by commissioners or a jury (art. II, s. 15). Courts have said a way of necessity ends when the necessity ends.

Can Colorado use eminent domain for private development?

Under C.R.S. 38-1-101(1)(b)(I), public use does not include taking private property for transfer to a private entity for economic development or enhancement of tax revenue. The condemnor must prove public use by a preponderance of the evidence, or by clear and convincing evidence that a blight taking is necessary (C.R.S. 38-1-101(2)(b)), and courts decide whether a use is really public (Colo. Const. art. II, s. 15).

Can a pipeline company use eminent domain in Colorado?

Yes, subject to conditions. C.R.S. 38-1-202(2)(b) lists a pipeline company among those that may exercise eminent domain, and (2)(h) lists natural gas public utilities. C.R.S. 38-1-101.5 sets conditions when a court decides whether taking land for a pipeline is necessary: the company must show the land lies within the most direct route practicable, post a bond equal to double the estimated restoration cost, and consider adjacent existing utility rights-of-way first.

How is just compensation calculated in Colorado?

Generally, the property taken is valued at its true and actual value, with no deduction for benefits to the remaining land, as of the earlier of the authorized possession date or the trial date; benefits may reduce damages to the remainder, but the owner never pays for excess benefits (C.R.S. 38-1-114(1)). For highway and regional transportation district projects, special benefits may reduce the compensation, but not by more than 50% of the payment for the property actually taken (C.R.S. 38-1-114(2)(d)). The condemnation article has no percentage bonus for homes.

Who pays attorney fees in a Colorado eminent domain case?

Under C.R.S. 38-1-122, the condemnor reimburses the owner's reasonable attorney fees when the court's award exceeds $10,000 and is at least 130% of the last written offer made before the case was filed, except in certain listed right-of-way proceedings. Fees are also awarded when the court finds the condemnor was not authorized by law to acquire the property. On federally assisted projects, fees are also reimbursed when the land cannot be condemned or the case is abandoned, and to an owner who wins an inverse condemnation case (C.R.S. 24-56-115, 24-56-116); an owner who wins an urban renewal blight challenge recovers attorney fees (C.R.S. 31-25-105.5(3)).