CA Court Backs Journalist Who Published Sealed Arrest Report

California Appeals Court Upholds Anti-SLAPP Dismissal Over a Published Sealed Arrest Report

A California appellate court on September 29, 2026 affirmed the dismissal of a 15-count suit against journalist Jack Poulson, Substack, Inc. and Tech Inquiry, Inc. over reporting built on an arrest report a court had ordered sealed. The First Amendment and Section 230 barred the claims.

Information last verified on October 1, 2026.

Status: Opinion filed and certified for publication on September 29, 2026 by the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, in Blackman v. Substack, Inc., Nos. A173244 and A174800 (San Francisco City and County Super. Ct. No. GC24618681). The decision is not final. Under California Rules of Court, rule 8.264(b)(1), a Court of Appeal decision in a civil appeal is final in that court 30 days after filing, which is October 29, 2026 here, and under rule 8.264(c)(1) the court may modify the decision until then. A petition for rehearing was due within 15 days of filing under rule 8.268(b)(1)(A). A petition for California Supreme Court review may be served and filed within 10 days after the decision becomes final, under rule 8.500(e)(1).

Jurisdiction scope: This article covers one published California state appellate decision and the California and federal provisions it applied. It does not address how other states treat the publication of sealed or expunged records, and it is not a guide to sealing an arrest record. For the surrounding California doctrine on reputational claims, see how California handles defamation claims.

What Happened

Maury Blackman was arrested in December 2021 for felony domestic violence while he was the chief executive of Premise Data, a private company. Police prepared an investigative report, which the opinion calls the incident report. No charges were pursued, and on February 15, 2022 the San Francisco Superior Court entered an order sealing the arrest and related records under Penal Code sections 851.91 and 851.92 (Op. pp. 2-3).

The report did not stay inside the agency. According to Blackman's own declaration, an attorney named Newton Oldfather made public-records requests to the San Francisco Police Department for copies of the incident report on May 3 and May 9, 2022. On May 17, 2022 the SFPD told him his May 9 request had been processed and the documents were available through the San Francisco Public Records Portal. Blackman declared that the copy the SFPD released carried a unique watermark identifier, and that the copy Poulson later published carried the same watermark (Op. pp. 6-7).

Poulson declared that he received the incident report in early September 2023 through an unsolicited message on an end-to-end encrypted messaging platform from a confidential source, that he did not know it was sealed, and that there were no markings on it indicating that it was. He also stated that he called the SFPD, gave the report number, and "asked for and received confirmation of each pertinent detail in the report," and that the SFPD did not tell him the report was sealed (Op. p. 4).

Poulson writes a newsletter called All-Source Intelligence, started in April 2023 and published through Substack roughly once a week, with 3,000 subscribers at the time of his declaration; he has also done freelance investigative work for The Guardian and The Intercept. He is also the founder and executive director of Tech Inquiry, a separate legal entity that publishes government records and analysis about surveillance and defense contracting (Op. pp. 3-4, 38).

On September 14, 2023 Poulson published an article titled "The Covert Gig-Work Surveillance CEO Arrested for Felony Domestic Violence," which linked to a redacted copy of the incident report and later embedded it (Op. pp. 4, 30). Blackman then filed a 15-count complaint against Poulson, Substack and Tech Inquiry, pleading negligence, gross negligence, interference claims, public disclosure of private facts, false light, intrusion into private affairs, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, defamation, unfair competition under Business and Professions Code section 17200, a California constitutional privacy claim, and violations of Penal Code sections 851.92 and 11143 (Op. p. 3 n.3).

Each defendant moved to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court, Judge Christine Van Aken, granted all three motions and later granted the defendants' fee request. Blackman appealed both orders, and the Court of Appeal decided them together in a single opinion captioned A173244 and A174800.

The appellate court affirmed on every point. On the first anti-SLAPP step, it held the injury-producing conduct was Poulson's speech, that the speech was made in a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest under section 425.16(e)(3), and that the Flatley illegality exception did not apply because the defendants disputed both the reach of the statutes and their constitutionality, and the evidence did not conclusively establish illegality (Op. pp. 24-35). On the second step, it held the First Amendment barred the claims against Poulson and that section 230(c)(1) barred the claims against the two platforms.

The opinion grounds the First Amendment result in the government's own release of the record:

The press is responsible for reporting on government operations, including those of the police, and, by publicly releasing the incident report without restriction, the government impliedly determined its dissemination was in the public interest. The government cannot fairly punish a media defendant for relying on that determination.

Blackman v. Substack, Inc., Nos. A173244 and A174800, Op. p. 40 (Cal. Ct. App., 1st Dist., Div. Four, Sept. 29, 2026).

The court concluded that while "the state interest in protecting Blackman's privacy interests is significant, it does not survive strict scrutiny," reasoning that the only logical inference from the matching watermark was that the government itself had released the copy at issue without restriction (Op. p. 41).

Presiding Justice Brown authored the opinion. Justice Chou, an associate justice of the First Appellate District, Division Five, and Judge Sweet of the Marin County Superior Court concurred, both sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution (Op. p. 48).

The disposition reads: "The court's order granting defendants' anti-SLAPP motions and the order granting attorney fees are affirmed." (Op. p. 48.)

What the Law Actually Says

The sealing statutes direct courts and the criminal justice system, and the only provision reaching anyone else is a capped civil penalty. That difference sits at the center of the case, and the statutory text shows why. Penal Code section 851.92(b)(3) requires that a police investigative report related to a sealed arrest "shall, only as to the person whose arrest was sealed, be stamped 'ARREST SEALED: DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTOR,'" and it places the duty to carry that stamp onto every master copy on "[t]he responsible local law enforcement agency." Section 851.92(b)(5) then bars disclosure of sealed records "to any person or entity except the person whose arrest was sealed or a criminal justice agency."

Section 851.92(c) is the only provision aimed at outsiders, and it is a civil penalty, not a publication ban: a person or entity other than a criminal justice agency or the arrestee "who disseminates information relating to a sealed arrest is subject to a civil penalty of not less than five hundred dollars ($500) and not more than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) per violation," enforceable by a city attorney, district attorney, or the Attorney General, and the subdivision "does not limit any existing private right of action." Blackman pleaded a violation of that section as his fourteenth cause of action.

The First Amendment rule the court applied. The opinion opens and closes its step-two analysis with the Daily Mail principle as restated in The Florida Star v. B.J.F. (1989) 491 U.S. 524, 533: "[I]f a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order." The court walked through the Supreme Court line behind it, from Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn (1975) 420 U.S. 469 through Bartnicki v. Vopper (2001) 532 U.S. 514, and through the California Supreme Court's decision in Gates v. Discovery Communications, Inc. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 679, which overruled Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n (1971) 4 Cal.3d 529 (Op. pp. 8-22).

Gates mattered to the timing argument. The opinion refers to "the 18-month lapse in time between the arrest and Poulson's September 14 article" and declined to treat it as dispositive, relying on Gates for the point that the considerations behind the federal cases do not lend themselves to temporal limitation (Op. pp. 39-40).

Who counts as a journalist, and what that did here. This is the part most likely to be misread. The court did not decide a reporter's-privilege question about protecting a source. It reached Evidence Code section 1070 because the statutes Blackman invoked for unlawful receipt and possession, Penal Code sections 11143 and 13304 and Labor Code section 432.7(g)(3), exempt from their application persons described in section 1070 (Op. p. 37). Section 1070(a) covers "[a] publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or employed upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication." Following O'Grady v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1423, which read "periodical publication" to include ongoing, recurring online news publications, the court held Poulson's declaration "provides sufficient evidence that he is a reporter connected with an ongoing, recurring online news periodical publication" (Op. p. 38). The practical effect in this case was on the lawfulness of his acquisition of the report, which is an element of the Florida Star rule.

The court also rejected the argument that confidentiality by statute removes a subject from public interest, concluding "that speech can implicate an issue of public interest even though statutory protections exist to keep that information confidential" (Op. p. 33). It separately held that Premise Data's work for the federal government was a matter of public interest, and that Blackman's arrest was not "completely untethered" to that work, because federal adjudicative guidelines for access to classified information treat allegations of criminal conduct as relevant regardless of whether charges were filed (Op. pp. 31-32).

Section 230. The federal provision says: "No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider." (47 U.S.C. 230(c)(1).) Blackman did not dispute that Substack and Tech Inquiry are providers of interactive computer services; he argued they had helped develop the content. The court applied the material-contribution test and F.T.C. v. Accusearch Inc. (10th Cir. 2009) 570 F.3d 1187, and concluded on the evidence that "Substack and Tech Inquiry were neutral conduits for the content at issue, not 'internet content providers' under section 230(c)(1)" (Op. p. 45). It held Blackman's briefing on the publisher-or-speaker question was insufficient to preserve an appellate challenge, and was unpersuaded by his argument that Section 230 does not reach claims alleging violation of a state court order (Op. pp. 46-48). That focus on what the platform did, rather than on the label attached to the claim, recurs across Section 230 litigation, including in a recent federal ruling on the limits of Section 230.

Fees. Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16(c)(1) provides that, with a narrow exception, "a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover that defendant's attorney's fees and costs." Because the fee appeal, A174800, raised only the argument that the award had to fall with the underlying ruling, affirming the anti-SLAPP orders disposed of it (Op. p. 48). The mandatory character of that entitlement is why anti-SLAPP fee fights carry real consequences, as a Florida fee-award dispute that escalated into contempt proceedings illustrates.

Analysis: Why This Matters

The following is analysis from the Recording Law Editorial Team.

The decision turns on a distinction that is easy to lose: a sealing order and a restraint on publication are different legal instruments. Section 851.92 directs courts, law enforcement agencies, and the Department of Justice to mark, withhold, and stop circulating specified records, and it attaches a modest civil penalty to downstream dissemination. The court held the First Amendment barred tort liability against someone who lawfully obtained a copy the agency had already handed out. It put the point narrowly when rejecting Blackman's framing of the defense as an attempt to unseal the record:

The issue here is whether the First Amendment protects the lawfully obtained truthful disclosure of information of public significance at issue here, not whether defendants can unseal documents sealed by the court.

Blackman v. Substack, Inc., Nos. A173244 and A174800, Op. p. 43 (Cal. Ct. App., 1st Dist., Div. Four, Sept. 29, 2026).

Two features of the record did a great deal of work, and both are worth separating from the legal rule. The first is the watermark. Blackman's own evidence identified the released copy and matched it to the published one, which is what let the court find that the government was the original, unrestricted source. The second is the stamp requirement in section 851.92(b)(3). Poulson's undisputed declaration said the document bore no sealing markings, which is the condition the statute tells the responsible agency to prevent. On this record, the absence of a statutory marking and the agency's unrestricted release pointed the same direction.

It is also worth being precise about what the court did not do. It did not hold that sealed records may be published generally, it did not decide whether Penal Code section 851.92 is facially unconstitutional, and it expressly reserved the narrow-tailoring question because Blackman had not argued it (Op. p. 42 n.11, n.12). The Section 230 ruling likewise rested partly on the state of the briefing rather than on a broad construction of the statute. Published opinions are read for their reasoning, and the reasoning here is tied closely to a government agency having released the document without restriction. Our observation, not the court's holding, is that a case where the record never left official custody would present a materially different question.

The anti-SLAPP posture is the other half of the story. The claims were resolved on a special motion to strike, before discovery and trial, and a prevailing defendant's fee entitlement attached. That procedural combination is what makes California's statute consequential in practice, and it cuts in both directions, as a recent reversal in an anti-SLAPP libel appeal shows.

How This Affects You

For a California publisher, the decision is a citable application of an established rule rather than a new permission. The elements the court actually examined were whether the information was obtained lawfully, whether it was truthful, and whether it concerned a matter of public significance. Each of those was supported by specific evidence in the record, including a declaration about how the document arrived and a confirmation call to the agency. Pleading a claim under a confidentiality statute did not change the analysis.

For a person whose arrest has been sealed, the decision does not alter the sealing statutes or the duties they impose on agencies. Section 851.92 still directs the court to notify the arresting agency, still requires the investigative report to be stamped, and still restricts disclosure outside the criminal justice sector. What this case addresses is who can be held liable in tort after an agency has released a record anyway. The remedy the Florida Star passage the court quoted points toward is directed at the government's mishandling of the information, not at the publisher. Anyone in that position should consult a California attorney about the options that remain, which this article does not attempt to assess. The broader doctrinal background sits in our defamation and reputation law coverage.

What Happens Next

The opinion is not final and can still change. Under rule 8.264(b)(1) it becomes final in the Court of Appeal 30 days after the September 29, 2026 filing, which is October 29, 2026, and under rule 8.264(c)(1) the court may modify its decision until that date. A petition for rehearing was due within 15 days of filing under rule 8.268(b)(1)(A). Rule 8.268(d) provides that an order granting rehearing "vacates the decision and any opinion filed in the case and sets the cause at large in the Court of Appeal."

After finality, rule 8.500(e)(1) gives a party 10 days to serve and file a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. Whether a petition is filed, and how the court would act on one, is not something we will predict.

The publication status matters for what the opinion can be used for in the meantime. Rule 8.1115(d) provides that "[a] published California opinion may be cited or relied on as soon as it is certified for publication or ordered published," so it is citable now. If the Supreme Court grants review, rule 8.1115(e)(1) provides that the published Court of Appeal opinion "has no binding or precedential effect, and may be cited for potentially persuasive value only" while review is pending, and any citation must note the grant of review.

One question is squarely left open. The court granted an application by the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression, the First Amendment Coalition, and Eugene Volokh to file an amici curiae brief, and then declined to reach the argument advanced by amici and Tech Inquiry that Penal Code section 851.92 is facially unconstitutional (Op. p. 42 n.12). That challenge remains undecided in California.

This article is information, not legal advice. It summarizes one published California appellate decision and the statutes and rules it applied as of October 1, 2026. The opinion is not final and may be modified, and appellate outcomes turn on the specific record before the court. Nothing here creates an attorney-client relationship or predicts how any court would resolve a different dispute. For advice about your own situation, consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction.

Related articles

• California defamation law explained
• Defamation law across the United States
• A Ninth Circuit ruling on Section 230 as a defense rather than immunity
• A Florida anti-SLAPP fee award that led to contempt proceedings
• A California court reversing an anti-SLAPP denial in a libel case

Last updated: 2026-10-01. Details verified as of 2026-10-01.

Frequently Asked Questions

Did the court rule that sealed arrest records can be published in California?

No. The court held that on this record the First Amendment barred tort claims against a journalist who lawfully obtained and truthfully reported a matter of public significance, where the San Francisco Police Department had itself released the incident report without restriction (Op. pp. 36-42). The opinion is tied to that government release and does not announce a general rule about sealed records.

How much were the attorney fees the court affirmed?

The opinion does not state a dollar amount. It affirms the fee order under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16(c) without naming a figure (Op. p. 48), so we do not report one.

Is Penal Code section 851.92 still in effect after this decision?

Yes. The decision did not strike down the statute, and the court expressly declined to reach the argument that section 851.92 is facially unconstitutional (Op. p. 42 n.12). Its sealing, stamping and non-disclosure duties on courts and law enforcement agencies are unchanged.

Why did Substack and Tech Inquiry win on different grounds than the journalist?

The First Amendment analysis addressed Poulson's own publication, while the platform claims were resolved under 47 U.S.C. 230(c)(1), which bars treating a provider of an interactive computer service as the publisher or speaker of another party's content. The court found both platforms were 'neutral conduits' rather than information content providers (Op. p. 45).

Does this decision mean a newsletter writer is legally a journalist in California?

It means that for the statutes at issue here, the court found Poulson was a person described in Evidence Code section 1070, which covers a reporter connected with a 'periodical publication,' read under O'Grady v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1423 to include ongoing, recurring online news publications (Op. pp. 37-38). That finding went to whether he obtained the report lawfully, not to a source-protection privilege.

Can this opinion be cited in other California cases?

Yes, for now. It was certified for publication on filing, and California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(d) provides that a published California opinion may be cited or relied on as soon as it is ordered published. Under rule 8.1115(e)(1), a grant of Supreme Court review would leave it citable for potentially persuasive value only.

What is the penalty under Penal Code section 851.92 for disseminating a sealed arrest record?

Section 851.92(c) sets a civil penalty of not less than $500 and not more than $2,500 per violation for a person or entity other than a criminal justice agency or the arrestee, enforceable by a city attorney, district attorney, or the Attorney General, and states that the subdivision does not limit any existing private right of action.

When does this decision become final?

Under California Rules of Court, rule 8.264(b)(1), a Court of Appeal decision in a civil appeal is final in that court 30 days after filing, which is October 29, 2026 for this September 29, 2026 opinion. The court may modify the decision until then under rule 8.264(c)(1), and a petition for Supreme Court review may follow within 10 days of finality under rule 8.500(e)(1).