Florida Court: No Jail Threat to Collect an Anti-SLAPP Fee Award

Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed a contempt order on September 25, 2026, holding that a trial court cannot threaten a litigant with jail to make him pay an attorney fee award entered under the state's anti-SLAPP statute. A fee judgment is a debt, and Florida's constitution forbids imprisonment for debt.

Information last verified on September 26, 2026. This is a developing story; we update it as the record changes.

Status: Decided and released September 25, 2026, but not yet final. The opinion carries the standard notation: "Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331," which are the rules governing rehearing and review by the full court.

Jurisdiction scope: This is a Florida state appellate decision interpreting the Florida Constitution and Florida's anti-SLAPP statute. It binds the trial courts within the Fifth District, and under Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1992), "in the absence of interdistrict conflict, district court decisions bind all Florida trial courts," so its reach elsewhere in Florida turns on whether another district rules differently. It does not bind Florida's other district courts of appeal. It says nothing about anti-SLAPP fee collection in any other state, and nothing about federal court.

What Happened

The case reached the Fifth District as a direct appeal from a post-judgment contempt order out of the Circuit Court for Lake County, Judge Dan R. Mosley. The appellant is Bowen Kou, represented by Anthony F. Sabatini of the Sabatini Law Firm in Mount Dora. The appellees are the Florida Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee, Inc. and Ben Albritton, represented by Mohammad O. Jazil of Holtzman Vogel Baran Torchinsky & Josefiak PLLC.

The appellees had obtained a money judgment against Kou for attorney fees and costs under Section 768.295, Florida Statutes, the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court later entered a post-judgment contempt order. The opinion does not recount what preceded it. The appellate court described what that order did in a single sentence:

"Appellant claims that the trial court was not authorized to use its contempt power to threaten Appellant with incarceration unless he posted a bond or deposited into the court registry the full monetary judgment awarding fees and costs to Appellees pursuant to section 768.295, Florida Statutes, Florida's anti-SLAPP statute. We agree."

The opinion is three pages and per curiam. It does not describe the underlying lawsuit, name the speech at issue, or state the amount of the fee judgment, and we are not going to supply any of those details from elsewhere.

Why the Contempt Order Failed

The constitutional provision is short. Article I, Section 11 of the Florida Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be imprisoned for debt, except in cases of fraud."

The panel treated the question as settled, citing eight decisions from four district courts of appeal going back to 1965 for the proposition that Florida courts have "consistently applied this provision to prevent use of the contempt power to enforce the payment of monetary judgments not involving child support or alimony." Those two exceptions are the familiar ones: support obligations can be enforced by contempt, ordinary debts cannot.

The harder question in this line of cases is characterisation, because a creative order can dress a payment obligation up as something else. The Fifth District quoted the First District's answer from Schroll v. Schroll, 262 So. 3d 832, 835 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018), which draws the line at what the obligation actually is rather than what it is called. Courts can use contempt to compel specific acts that facilitate property transfers, such as ordering the return of personal property, but as Schroll put it, they "cannot convert a general payment obligation into something enforceable by contempt by simply characterizing it as an obligation to perform a specific action."

Applying that, the panel held:

"Here, the trial court was not authorized to use its contempt power to enforce payment of a monetary judgment for fees and costs under Florida's anti-SLAPP statute as this constituted a violation of the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt."

The court then closed the two side doors. A bond under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.310 and a deposit into the court registry under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.600 were both unavailable as compelled alternatives, because, in the panel's words, "neither rule is compulsory." Rule 9.310 is the provision a losing party uses voluntarily to obtain a stay pending appeal; it is an option, not an obligation a court can impose. The court cited First States Investments 3300, LLC v. Pheil, 52 So. 3d 845, 848 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), and Morroni v. Fisher, 647 So. 2d 127, 129 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).

The disposition is one word: "REVERSED."

What Florida's Anti-SLAPP Statute Provides

Section 768.295 was enacted in 2000 and amended in 2015 (s. 1, ch. 2000-174; s. 1, ch. 2015-70). Subsection (3) makes it unlawful for a person or governmental entity to file a claim "without merit and primarily because such person or entity has exercised the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue," or the rights to assemble, instruct representatives, or petition for redress of grievances.

Subsection (4) supplies the remedy. A party sued in violation of the section has "a right to an expeditious resolution," may move for dismissal or final judgment, and may seek summary judgment on the question. The court must set a hearing at the earliest possible time. The fee provision is the final sentence of that subsection: the court "shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in connection with a claim that an action was filed in violation of this section."

That mandatory fee award is the engine of the statute. Florida's anti-SLAPP protection is narrower than the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act regimes that a growing number of states have adopted, a difference set out in our guide to Florida defamation law and its procedural traps. Where Florida's statute does apply, fee-shifting is most of what it delivers.

Which is why collection is not a footnote. A mandatory fee award that cannot be collected is a deterrent on paper. After this ruling, a prevailing Florida anti-SLAPP movant still has the full set of ordinary judgment-enforcement tools, the same ones any judgment creditor uses, several of which carry their own Florida-specific limits described in our note on Florida judgment collection and the head of family exemption. What that party does not have is the threat of jail.

Analysis: Why This Matters

The following is analysis from the Recording Law Editorial Team.

Almost everything written about anti-SLAPP statutes stops at the motion. Does the statute cover this speech, what is the standard, can the defendant get out early. The back half, whether the fee award that follows is worth anything, gets far less attention, and this ruling lands squarely there.

The constitutional holding itself is not a surprise. Florida's prohibition on imprisonment for debt is old and the panel found eight cases across four districts pointing the same way, which is why the opinion runs three pages and issues per curiam. What makes it worth reporting is the specific application. Anti-SLAPP fee awards can carry a moral character that ordinary debts lack, at least in the paradigm case, where the party paying has filed a meritless suit to suppress protected speech. That is not a safe assumption on this record. Section 768.295(4) shifts fees to "the prevailing party" on the question whether an action was filed in violation of the section, so the award can run in either direction, and the opinion never says which posture produced this one. A trial court looking at an unpaid award in that posture may feel the equities differently than it would with an unpaid invoice. The Fifth District's answer is that the equities do not change the category. A fee judgment is a money judgment, and Article I, Section 11 draws its line by category rather than by sympathy.

There is a symmetry worth naming. The same fee-shifting that protects a speaker from a meritless suit can, in the wrong hands, become its own pressure device. A rule that let courts jail non-paying judgment debtors would be available in every case, including those where the anti-SLAPP ruling itself is contestable and the debtor is simply unable to pay. Confining collection to the ordinary tools keeps the statute's teeth pointed at the litigation rather than at the litigant's liberty.

For practitioners the practical takeaway is about expectations rather than strategy. A client weighing an anti-SLAPP motion should understand that winning produces a judgment, and that a judgment is only as good as the defendant's collectable assets. That was already true. This decision confirms that the shortcut some litigants hope for does not exist in Florida.

One limit on how far to read this. The opinion does not tell us what the underlying case was about, and it does not address whether the fee award was correctly entered. It resolves one question about one contempt order.

What Happens Next

The decision is not final. Under the notation on its face, it becomes final only after disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.330, which covers rehearing, clarification and certification, or 9.331, which covers en banc determination. A motion under those rules is due within the period the rules set, and until that window closes and any motion is resolved, the opinion can still change.

If it stands, it becomes binding precedent for the trial courts within the Fifth District and, under Pardo, for Florida trial courts generally for as long as no other district rules the other way. It is persuasive rather than binding on Florida's other district courts of appeal. We have not found another Florida district addressing anti-SLAPP fee awards in these terms, though we have not run an exhaustive search.

How This Affects You

These are general observations, not advice about any specific case.

Florida separates the question of whether a fee award is owed from the question of how it can be collected. Losing the second does not disturb the first, and a reversed contempt order does not erase the judgment underneath it.

The two recognised exceptions to Article I, Section 11 are narrow. Florida courts have applied the imprisonment-for-debt bar outside child support and alimony consistently, and the constitutional text carves out only cases of fraud.

Anyone relying on a fee-shifting statute as the reason a claim is worth bringing or defending should think about collectability at the outset rather than after judgment, because the enforcement route is the same one that applies to any money judgment.

This is general legal information, not legal advice. It covers a Florida appellate decision and Florida statutes as verified on September 26, 2026, and the decision is expressly not final. Judgment-enforcement questions turn on facts specific to a case and to a debtor's circumstances. Consult a lawyer licensed in Florida about your own situation.

Related articles

• Florida defamation law: limitations, pre-suit notice and anti-SLAPP
• Defamation laws by state
• Florida judgment collection and the head of family exemption
• When a public figure can sue for defamation

---

Last updated: 2026-09-26. This is a developing story; details verified as of 2026-09-26.