California Appeals Court Narrows, But Keeps Alive, Leah Remini's Scientology Defamation Suit

California Appeals Court Narrows, But Keeps Alive, Leah Remini's Scientology Defamation Suit

On July 31, 2026, California's Second Appellate District, Division Two, issued a mixed, unpublished ruling on the Church of Scientology's anti-SLAPP motion against Leah Remini's defamation suit, striking about a dozen statements as non-actionable opinion while reviving others and sending the case back toward trial.

Information last verified on August 3, 2026. This is a developing story; we update it as the record changes.

Status: The Court of Appeal ruled on the anti-SLAPP motion on July 31, 2026 (unpublished). Surviving claims return to the trial court; no trial verdict has been reached as of August 3, 2026.

Jurisdiction scope: This article covers a California state appellate ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion under California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, plus the California and constitutional standards for opinion versus fact, actual malice, and the statute of limitations for defamation. These rules are California-specific and constitutional in part; other states have their own anti-SLAPP statutes, limitations periods, and defamation elements. See California defamation law for state-specific detail.

What Happened

Actress and former Scientology member Leah Remini sued the Church of Scientology International and its leader, David Miscavige, in August 2023, alleging a years-long harassment and defamation campaign following her public departure from the church and her subsequent television and podcast work criticizing it. The operative complaint raised multiple causes of action, including defamation, false light, and intentional interference, built around statements the church and people it directed allegedly made about Remini across websites, social media, and other channels.

The church responded with an anti-SLAPP motion under California's statute aimed at early dismissal of claims arising from protected speech. In 2024, the Los Angeles County trial court granted that motion in part, striking roughly half of Remini's defamation claims on the ground that the underlying statements were opinion, rhetorical hyperbole, or otherwise not actionable, while allowing most of her causes of action, including claims tied to alleged stalking and harassment, to move forward. Both sides appealed: the church argued the trial court had not struck enough, while Remini cross-appealed the claims that were thrown out.

On July 31, 2026, a three-judge panel of the Second Appellate District, Division Two, issued an unpublished opinion affirming the trial court's order in part and reversing it in part. The panel agreed with the church on some points, ordering roughly a dozen additional statements struck as non-actionable opinion or rhetorical hyperbole, including statements calling Remini an 'unhinged religious bigot' and 'a one-woman hate machine.' In explaining why some of Remini's claims did not survive, the panel wrote that the church's word choices, even harsh or unflattering ones, did not by themselves create liability: defendants' statements "possibly exaggerated and overdramatized the events, but Remini failed to demonstrate that they were false, actionable statements of fact."

At the same time, the panel sided with Remini on other points. It reinstated three defamation claims the trial court had dismissed as time-barred, statements calling her a liar, accusing her of refusing to help pay for her father's cancer treatment, and claiming she ransacked her dying grandmother's apartment, finding that a subsequent republication of those statements on Twitter (now X) restarted California's one-year statute of limitations. And on the claims that survive, the panel found the evidentiary record could support a finding of actual malice, the fault standard required of public-figure defamation plaintiffs, concluding that Remini's evidence could establish a pattern and practice of deliberate attacks by the church and those it directed, intended to harm the reputations of perceived opponents, including through the dissemination of defamatory statements.

The opinion is unpublished and non-precedential under California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), meaning it resolves this case but cannot be cited as binding authority in other California litigation. With the anti-SLAPP motion resolved, the surviving claims return to the Los Angeles County Superior Court for discovery and, eventually, trial. No trial has occurred and no verdict has been reached.

What the Law Actually Says

California's anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, lets a defendant move to strike claims arising from acts in furtherance of speech on a public issue unless the plaintiff shows a probability of prevailing on the merits. It is a two-step test: the defendant first shows the challenged claim arises from protected activity, then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the claim has at least minimal merit. A motion can be granted or denied claim-by-claim, or even statement-by-statement within a single cause of action, which is why this case produced a mixed ruling rather than an all-or-nothing result. For a general overview of what a defamation plaintiff must prove before reaching that merits question, see the elements of a defamation claim.

A central issue on appeal was whether specific statements were actionable statements of fact or protected opinion and rhetorical hyperbole. Only a false statement of fact can support a defamation claim; name-calling, exaggeration, and other language that a reasonable reader would understand as figurative or subjective commentary, rather than a verifiable factual assertion, is generally not actionable, even when it is harsh. That is the doctrine the panel applied in striking statements it viewed as hyperbolic labels rather than factual accusations, while leaving in place other statements it viewed as factual claims capable of being proven true or false. Both the defenses available to a defendant and the line between opinion and fact are discussed further at defenses to a defamation claim.

Because Remini is a public figure, her surviving claims also require proof of actual malice, the constitutional standard from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), which requires a public-figure plaintiff to show the defendant made a false statement knowing it was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was false. Courts often look to circumstantial evidence, including a pattern of conduct, ill will, and departures from ordinary standards, to infer that state of mind, which is the kind of evidence the panel pointed to here. For more on how this heightened standard applies to plaintiffs like Remini, see public figure defamation and the actual malice standard.

Finally, the ruling turns on California's discovery rule for defamation's one-year statute of limitations. Ordinarily, the clock starts running when a statement is first published. But republishing a statement, including posting it again or reposting it to a new audience such as followers on a social media platform, can create a new, independent publication that restarts the limitations period for that specific instance. The panel applied that rule to find that a later republication of otherwise older statements on Twitter meant three of Remini's claims were not time-barred after all. General procedural steps for pursuing a defamation claim, including timing considerations, are covered at how to sue for defamation of character.

Analysis: Why This Matters

The following is analysis from the Recording Law Editorial Team.

This ruling is a useful, real-world illustration of how California's anti-SLAPP statute actually operates in a high-profile defamation case: not as a blunt instrument that kills or clears an entire lawsuit, but as a claim-by-claim, and here statement-by-statement, filter. A single anti-SLAPP motion can simultaneously end some claims permanently while letting others proceed, and an appellate panel can adjust that mix in both directions, as this one did by striking additional statements the trial court had left in place while also reviving statements the trial court had struck.

The opinion-versus-fact line the panel drew is also instructive on its own terms. Calling someone an epithet, however cutting, is treated differently under defamation law than attributing specific, checkable conduct to them, such as refusing to pay for a parent's medical care. The former tends to read as the speaker's characterization; the latter reads as a factual claim a reasonable audience could verify or disprove, which is why it can support a defamation claim where name-calling alone cannot.

The republication finding is worth watching for a separate reason: it reflects how courts are applying an old limitations doctrine to modern social media conduct, where reposting or resurfacing older material can, under the right facts, restart a limitations clock that would otherwise have run out. That question increasingly shows up outside the entertainment context, in ordinary online disputes.

None of this resolves the underlying factual dispute. The panel's ruling addresses only whether the surviving claims are legally viable enough to proceed past the anti-SLAPP stage; it does not decide whether any statement is actually false or whether Remini will ultimately prevail at trial. We are not predicting how the case will turn out, and readers should not treat this appellate ruling as a finding on the merits.

How This Affects You

This case does not create new law for the general public, but it illustrates principles that come up in ordinary defamation disputes far removed from Scientology or celebrity litigation. First, harsh language alone rarely supports a defamation claim; courts distinguish between name-calling or rhetorical exaggeration, which is typically protected opinion, and specific factual assertions that can be shown true or false. Someone upset about being called an insulting name online should understand that the label itself is unlikely to be actionable, while a specific false factual claim about their conduct may be.

Second, anyone posting or reposting potentially defamatory content on social media should understand that republishing a statement, including sharing, quoting, or reposting older material to a new audience, can restart the limitations clock for a defamation claim tied to that specific post, separate from whenever the statement first appeared. That cuts both ways: it can extend a plaintiff's window to sue over resurfaced content, and it means someone who reposts an old, disputed claim can create fresh legal exposure even if the original post is long past any limitations deadline.

Third, if you are a public figure or become involved in a public controversy, understand that pursuing a defamation claim requires proving the higher actual-malice standard, not just that a statement was false and damaging. These are general legal principles, not case-specific advice, and how they apply to any individual dispute depends on the specific statements, the parties' status, and the jurisdiction involved.

This is general legal information, not legal advice. This article covers a California appellate ruling and California defamation law, and reflects sources verified as of August 3, 2026. This is a developing story and details may change as the case proceeds. Consult a lawyer licensed in your jurisdiction about your specific situation.

Related articles

• California defamation and libel law
• The elements of a defamation claim
• Public figure defamation and the actual malice standard
• Defenses to a defamation claim
• How to sue for defamation of character

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Last updated: 2026-08-03. This is a developing story; details verified as of 2026-08-03.