Ohio Anti-SLAPP Denial Affirmed in Facebook Defamation Case

Ohio Anti-SLAPP Ruling: Appeals Court Affirms Denial of UPEPA Motion Over a Facebook Post

Ohio's Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion on September 21, 2026, holding that a horse farm made a prima facie showing on every element of defamation, including falsity, over a Facebook comment that named the farm as a sex offender's registered work location.

Information last verified on September 28, 2026. This is a developing story; we update it as the record changes.

Status: Decided September 21, 2026. The Fifth District affirmed the denial of Taniya Avena's motion for expedited relief under Ohio's Uniform Public Expression Protection Act, so the defamation claim against her continues in the Licking County Court of Common Pleas. No court has found Avena liable for defamation as of September 28, 2026.

Jurisdiction scope: This report covers one Ohio intermediate appellate decision from the Fifth Appellate District, which decided this appeal from the Licking County Court of Common Pleas. The defamation elements and the substantial truth defense discussed here are Ohio law; for the underlying rules see our Ohio defamation law guide. Anti-SLAPP statutes are not uniform across the country. Ohio's version is the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act, which the opinion's own footnote says seventeen states had enacted as of July 2026 (fn. 2, at ¶ 19), so nothing below describes the procedure, burdens or deadlines in any other state.

What Happened

The Ohio Court of Appeals for the Fifth Appellate District, Licking County, decided Watson Horse Farms, L.L.C. v. Avena, Case No. 2026-CA-00039, 2026-Ohio-3694, on September 21, 2026. The panel was Judges William B. Hoffman, Robert G. Montgomery and Kevin W. Popham. Popham, J., wrote the opinion; Hoffman, P.J., and Montgomery, J., concurred, with no separate concurrence and no dissent. The appeal came from the Licking County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2025-CV-01491.

The dispute began with someone else's post. On September 6, 2025, a co-defendant posted statements on Facebook about a man she described as a convicted child rapist and a Tier III sexual offender, and asserted that he was seeking work at area horse farms in order to find new victims (¶ 2).

Taniya Avena, a former romantic partner of the man, replied publicly in the comments. She linked a Newark Advocate article about his sentencing and added a comment that the opinion quotes in full at ¶ 3. The part that produced this lawsuit reads:

"[...] Current work location on his registration comes back to Watson Horse Farms in Newark, Ohio. I will always encourage others to be mindful of surroundings and the predators that are around. Cognitive awareness is a defense mechanism."

The bracketed opening marks text we omitted from the quoted comment, which subsumes an ellipsis the opinion itself carries at that point.

On September 22, 2025, Aria Watson, her husband Bill Watson and Watson Horse Farms sued Avena and two other defendants, asserting defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Avena, and moved the same day for a preliminary injunction (¶ 4). The trial court held a hearing on that motion on October 27, 2025. Aria Watson testified that she runs the farm, that the man has no connection to it, does not work there and never has, and that the statement was untrue because multiple businesses operate at 7868 Licking Springs Road Northeast in Newark (¶ 5).

Bill Watson testified that he owns the farm, that twelve different businesses use that same address, and that the man is employed by Watson General Contracting, a business he described as unrelated to the horse farm (¶ 6). He also testified that Avena had sent him a private Facebook message about the man, and that she made no effort during that exchange to determine whether the man worked at the horse farm (¶ 7). Avena did not appear at the hearing, and the trial court granted the preliminary injunction on October 28, 2025 (¶ 8).

On December 2, 2025, Avena filed a motion for expedited review under R.C. Chapter 2747, attaching exhibits that were not incorporated into or accompanied by an affidavit (¶ 9). The trial court heard the motion on February 2, 2026, at Avena's request, but no transcript of that hearing was made part of the appellate record (¶ 9).

The trial court ruled on April 20, 2026, granting the motion in part and denying it in part. It found that Chapter 2747 applied because the claims arose from public statements on a matter of public concern, described as the location of a sex-offender registrant, and that none of the exceptions in R.C. 2747.01(C) applied (¶ 10). It granted the motion as to the emotional distress claim, finding no prima facie case there (¶ 11). It denied the motion as to defamation, finding a prima facie case whether the claim was characterized as defamation per se or per quod, and finding that the statement was not substantially true because an ordinary reader would take it to mean that public information placed the man at the specific business named, to the exclusion of any other business at the same address (¶ 12).

Avena appealed that denial and raised four assignments of error: that the trial court relied on pleadings rather than evidence, that it wrongly rejected the substantial truth defense by conflating literal meaning with reader inferences, that the plaintiffs failed to plead special damages for defamation per quod, and that the court failed to address fault (¶ 15 through ¶ 18). The court of appeals overruled all four (¶ 44, ¶ 53, ¶ 61, ¶ 68) and held: "For the reasons stated in our Opinion, the judgment of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed." (¶ 70). Costs were assessed to Avena (¶ 71).

How Ohio's Anti-SLAPP Law Works

Ohio's anti-SLAPP statute is the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act, codified in Chapter 2747 of the Revised Code (¶ 19). The chapter took effect April 9, 2025, enacted by Senate Bill 237 of the 135th General Assembly, according to the section pages on codes.ohio.gov.

Coverage. R.C. 2747.01(B) applies the chapter to a civil cause of action based on a person's communication in or about a governmental proceeding, or on the exercise of free speech, press, assembly, petition or association rights under the United States or Ohio Constitutions on a matter of public concern. R.C. 2747.01(C) carves out four categories, including claims against governmental units and their agents, enforcement actions brought in a governmental unit's name against an imminent threat to public health or safety, claims arising from a commercial seller's communications about its own goods or services, and survivorship, bodily injury and wrongful death claims. R.C. 2747.01(E) states that the General Assembly intended to confer substantive immunity from suit, not merely immunity from liability.

The motion and the deadline. R.C. 2747.02 lets a party file a motion for expedited relief to dismiss the action or claim not later than sixty days after being served with the pleading that asserts a covered cause of action, and lets the court extend that period for good cause shown. The court of appeals described the same mechanism at ¶ 19.

The stay. R.C. 2747.03(A) requires the court to stay all other proceedings between the moving and responding parties once the motion is filed, including discovery and any other pending hearing or motion. Under R.C. 2747.03(B) the stay runs until thirty days after a ruling on the motion, or until an appeal of the ruling concludes, whichever is later, and all proceedings between all parties are stayed during such an appeal. R.C. 2747.03(C) permits limited discovery where a party shows specific information is necessary to establish whether a burden under R.C. 2747.04 has been satisfied and cannot be obtained otherwise. R.C. 2747.03(F) lets the court, for good cause, hear and rule on a motion for a temporary or preliminary injunction to protect against an imminent threat to public health or safety during the stay.

What the court may look at. R.C. 2747.04(A)(1) requires a hearing within sixty days of filing, subject to extensions for limited discovery or other good cause, and R.C. 2747.04(D) requires a ruling within sixty days after the hearing. R.C. 2747.04(B), quoted by the court at ¶ 26, provides that the court "shall consider the pleadings, the motion, any response to the motion, and any evidence that could be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil Procedure."

The three steps. R.C. 2747.04(C) directs dismissal with prejudice only if all three of its conditions apply: the moving party establishes that the cause of action is based on a communication or action described in R.C. 2747.01(B); the responding party fails to establish that the chapter does not apply because of an exception in R.C. 2747.01(C); and, under R.C. 2747.04(C)(3), "[e]ither the responding party fails to establish a prima-facie case for each essential element of the cause of action or the moving party establishes one of the following: (a) The responding party failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. (b) There is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the cause of action or part of the cause of action."

The court of appeals stated the same framework in its own words at ¶ 23: the appellant bears the burden of establishing that UPEPA applies; the burden then shifts to the responding parties on the statutory exceptions; and, third, the court "must dismiss the action if either (1) the Watsons fail to establish a prima facie case as to each essential element of their cause of action; or (2) Appellant establishes that the Watsons failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted, or that there is no genuine issue of materiel fact and Appellant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (¶ 23, spelling as in the original). Because neither party challenged coverage or the exceptions on appeal, the burden had already shifted to the plaintiffs to make a prima facie case on each element (¶ 24).

The standard of review and the weight of the burden. The court held that review of a statutory UPEPA appeal is de novo, citing UPEPA decisions from Minnesota, Washington, Kentucky and Hawaii (¶ 21). On the strength of the plaintiffs' burden, the court said a plaintiff "must present some competent evidence on every element needed to make out a cause of action," and that prima facie evidence is not conclusive but rather evidence that "will support, but does not require, a verdict in favor of the party offering the evidence." (¶ 35). It described the burden as "akin to that of a party opposing a motion for summary judgment," said a plaintiff "need only produce evidence that, if believed, would establish each element of the challenged cause of action," and stated that "the court may not weigh the evidence" at that stage (¶ 36). It also held that the court must review the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party (¶ 34), and that a responding party gets "a certain degree of leeway" given the early stage and limited discovery (¶ 36).

Evidence from an earlier injunction hearing counts. Avena argued the trial court had improperly leaned on the preliminary injunction record. The court of appeals answered that nothing in the judgment entry showed the trial court applied the injunction standard of likelihood of success on the merits (¶ 28), and that R.C. 2747.04(B) lets the court consider anything admissible on summary judgment, which under Civ.R. 56(C) expressly includes transcripts of evidence; the injunction hearing transcript is such a transcript (¶ 29). Because Avena did not file a transcript of the UPEPA hearing itself, the court also applied the presumption of "regularity in the proceedings" (¶ 30).

Fees and appeal rights. R.C. 2747.05(A) requires an award of reasonable attorney fees, court costs and other reasonable litigation expenses to a moving party whose motion is granted, and forbids reducing or denying that award because the representation was pro bono or contingent. R.C. 2747.05(B) awards fees to the responding party only if the court denies the motion and finds it was frivolous conduct as defined in R.C. 2323.51, and only after any appeal affirming the denial. R.C. 2747.05(C) makes a denial a final order under R.C. 2505.02 with an interlocutory right of appeal, to be filed within thirty days after entry of the order. R.C. 2747.06(B) tells courts to construe and apply the chapter broadly to protect the covered rights, and R.C. 2747.06(C) tells them to consider the need for uniformity with other states that enact a substantially similar law.

Why the Motion Failed

By the time the court reached step three, publication and identification were not in dispute: the statements were posted on Facebook and referred to Watson Horse Farms, which Avena named expressly, so the open question on the first assignment of error was falsity (¶ 37).

Falsity in Ohio is measured by "an objective, reasonable reader standard," and the Supreme Court of Ohio has said the law "charges the author of an allegedly defamatory statement with the meaning that the reasonable reader attaches to the statement," because otherwise publishers of false statements "could routinely escape liability for their harmful and false assertions simply by advancing a harmless, subjective interpretation of those statements." (¶ 38, quoting McKimm v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 2000-Ohio-118, 89 Ohio St.3d 139, at 143 and 145).

Avena's argument was that her statement was not false because the man's work address and the farm's address are the same. The court rejected that reading of her words:

"Appellant did not state that [the registrant's] work address was 7868 Licking Springs Road Northeast, which is the same address as Watson Horse Farms, or that his work address was affiliated with Watson Horse Farms. Rather, she stated that his publicly available work address was that of Watson Horse Farms itself, thereby explicitly identifying that business specifically and implicitly excluding other business entities that might operate at the same address. To be sure, this is a distinction with a difference." (¶ 39)

The bracket in that passage replaces the registrant's name, which the opinion uses and which we do not repeat.

The shared-address fact cut against her rather than for her. Both owners testified that multiple businesses operate out of the Licking Springs Road address, that the man never worked at Watson Horse Farms and that he "never even set foot in the horse barn" (¶ 40); both owners put the number of businesses at that address at twelve (¶ 6, ¶ 48). Viewing that evidence and all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs' favor, the court found prima facie evidence from which an ordinary reader could conclude the statement was false, while adding that "[t]he trier of fact may ultimately reach a different conclusion." (¶ 41)

On the second assignment of error, the court treated substantial truth as what it is under Ohio law: a defense. A defendant may "completely defend" a defamation action "by showing that the gist, or imputation of the [defamatory] statement is substantially true and, hence, the statement is not false." (¶ 46, quoting Ackison v. Gergley, 2025-Ohio-1112, at ¶ 23 (5th Dist.)). Because it is a defense, the court said, truthfulness is viewed in favor of the non-moving party, which means assuming the statement is false unless and until the moving party establishes its truth, and whether a statement is substantially true is generally a question of fact, including in UPEPA proceedings (¶ 47).

Construing the owners' testimony in the plaintiffs' favor, the court held it was "sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the substantial truth defense at this stage of the litigation." (¶ 48). It also rejected Avena's alternative readings of her own comment, that the registry listed an address appearing in public search results or associated with the farm, on the ground that "these are not the words Appellant used." (¶ 49). The court then drew the line on what it was deciding: "While the ultimate trier of fact might see this differently and decide to apply the 'substantial truth' defense, we decline to conclude, as a matter of law at this stage of the litigation, that Appellant's statement is subject to different interpretations such that it is not false." (¶ 50). As the court put it, the statutory inquiry "is whether the Watsons stated a prima facie case, not whether Appellant has a meritorious defense to the Watsons' claim." (¶ 52)

Special damages and fault

The third assignment of error argued that no special damages were pleaded or proven, which defamation per quod requires (¶ 54, ¶ 57). The court held the plaintiffs made a prima facie showing: Aria Watson testified the farm lost two long-term boarders who had given no indication of leaving before the posts and left immediately after them (¶ 58), and Bill Watson testified that boarding fees are part of the farm's income and that he believed the losses were directly tied to the posts (¶ 59). That testimony, the court said, could support but would not require a verdict for the plaintiffs, and may be contradicted (¶ 60).

The fourth assignment of error argued the trial court never addressed fault. The court disagreed, pointing to the trial court's express statement of the fault element and its finding that the plaintiffs presented evidence that Avena did not try to verify the statement before publishing it, including that she contacted Bill Watson about the conviction but never asked whether the man worked at the horse farm (¶ 63). Where a private-figure plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of defamation and fault is the only remaining issue, Ohio places the burden on the plaintiff to show the defendant failed to act reasonably in attempting to discover the truth or falsity of the publication, and the degree of fault must at least amount to negligence. The court cites Landsdowne v. Beacon Journal Pub. Co., 32 Ohio St.3d 176, at 179 (1987), for the burden, and Bosak v. Kalmer for the negligence floor (¶ 65). The court held the burden stayed with the plaintiffs, that they did not have to prove Avena's mental state at this stage, and that the absence of direct evidence of her state of mind was not fatal to the prima facie showing (¶ 66, ¶ 67).

What Happens Next

The judgment on appeal is the April 20, 2026 order, and the Fifth District affirmed it (¶ 1, ¶ 70). The practical effect is that the defamation claim against Avena returns to the Licking County Court of Common Pleas for ordinary litigation, because the statute's dismissal command in R.C. 2747.04(C) was not satisfied and the claim was not dismissed.

The emotional distress claim against Avena is not part of that remaining case: the trial court granted her motion as to that claim, and the opinion records no cross-appeal from that ruling (¶ 11).

Under R.C. 2747.03(B), the stay of proceedings triggered by a UPEPA motion remains in effect until thirty days after entry of a ruling on the motion or the conclusion of an appeal of the ruling, whichever is later. The opinion does not set a trial date, does not address further appellate review, and does not decide any question about the October 28, 2025 preliminary injunction. Costs of the appeal were assessed to Avena (¶ 71).

Analysis: Why This Matters

The following is analysis from the Recording Law Editorial Team.

Read carefully, this decision is about who has to show what, and when. The court said so twice in almost the same words: the trier of fact "may ultimately reach a different conclusion" on falsity (¶ 41), and the court declined to hold as a matter of law at this stage that the statement was not false (¶ 50). Nothing in the opinion finds that Avena defamed anyone, and the statutory inquiry the court applied asks about the plaintiffs' prima facie case rather than the strength of the defendant's defense (¶ 52).

The most transferable point is the one at ¶ 39. The comment did not say the registry listed an address that the farm happens to share; it said the registered work location "comes back to Watson Horse Farms." Under the reasonable-reader standard the court applied (¶ 38), naming a specific business is a factual assertion about that business, and the shared address then becomes evidence of falsity rather than a safe harbor. A more cautious statement of the same underlying record would have described the address rather than the business, which is precisely the difference the court identified.

The procedural record mattered as much as the wording. Avena's exhibits were not supported by an affidavit (¶ 9), she did not appear at the injunction hearing, whose transcript is the only hearing transcript in the appellate record (¶ 8, ¶ 9, fn. 1), and she did not file a transcript of the UPEPA hearing, which triggered the presumption of regularity (¶ 30). Under R.C. 2747.04(B) the injunction transcript was fair game as Civ.R. 56 material (¶ 29), so the hearing she missed supplied the evidence used against her motion.

Note also the asymmetry Chapter 2747 builds into the fee rules. A movant who wins gets a mandatory award of fees and expenses under R.C. 2747.05(A), while a responding party who defeats the motion recovers fees only if the court finds the motion was frivolous conduct under R.C. 2323.51, and only after an affirming appeal, under R.C. 2747.05(B). A defendant weighing a UPEPA motion is therefore weighing a one-sided upside; the corresponding cost of losing here shows up as appellate costs (¶ 71) and the delay built into the R.C. 2747.03 stay.

Two smaller observations about the opinion itself. First, the citation numbering is not clean: the first assignment of error as quoted at ¶ 15 refers to "R.C. 2747.03(C)(3)," while the court's analysis proceeds under R.C. 2747.04(C) (¶ 22, ¶ 23), and R.C. 2747.03 contains no subdivision (C)(3). At ¶ 52 the opinion attributes the prima facie inquiry to R.C. 2747.04(C)(3)(a), although in the enacted text the prima facie clause sits in the lead-in of division (C)(3) and subdivision (a) addresses failure to state a claim. Anyone citing this case should pin the framework to the statutory text and to ¶ 23 rather than to the subdivision labels. Second, for the de novo standard the court cited only out-of-state UPEPA decisions (¶ 21), which is consistent with the uniformity instruction in R.C. 2747.06(C) and reflects how new this chapter is.

How This Affects You

This decision is about a category of online post that is common and well intentioned: a public-safety warning aimed at a neighborhood or an industry. The opinion shows that Ohio's anti-SLAPP statute can apply to that kind of speech and still leave the speaker in litigation. The trial court found the chapter applied because the statements concerned a matter of public concern (¶ 10), and Avena's motion was nonetheless denied on the defamation claim.

The reason is that UPEPA screens for a prima facie case; it does not decide whether a statement was true. Under R.C. 2747.04(C)(3) the claim survives if the plaintiff produces some competent evidence on each element (¶ 35), and the court may not weigh that evidence (¶ 36). Substantial truth remains available as a defense later in the case, and the court described it as generally a question of fact (¶ 46, ¶ 47).

Good faith is also not an element that decides these cases. Where the plaintiff is a private figure and fault is the only remaining issue, Ohio requires the plaintiff to show the defendant failed to act reasonably in trying to discover the truth or falsity of the publication, with fault at least amounting to negligence (¶ 65). Here the evidence cited on that element was the absence of any attempt to verify the specific claim, even during a direct exchange with one of the owners (¶ 63, ¶ 67). Those Ohio elements and defenses are set out in more detail in our guide to Ohio defamation claims, with the general concepts in our defamation of character explainer and state-by-state variations on our defamation law hub.

Two mechanical points in the statute are easy to miss and are not specific to any reader's situation. The motion deadline is sixty days after service of the pleading, extendable for good cause (R.C. 2747.02), and filing it stays the rest of the case, including discovery, until thirty days after a ruling or the end of an appeal, whichever is later (R.C. 2747.03(A) and (B)). A denial can be appealed immediately, within thirty days (R.C. 2747.05(C)).

Nothing here is a template or a recommendation about what to post, and none of it assesses any particular statement, post or dispute. Whether a specific statement is defamatory, substantially true, privileged or protected depends on facts, evidence and jurisdiction, which is a question for a licensed attorney reviewing the actual record.

This is general legal information, not legal advice. It reports one Ohio appellate decision and the text of Ohio's Uniform Public Expression Protection Act as verified on September 28, 2026, and it does not assess any reader's situation, statement or dispute. Ohio law and the procedural posture of this case can change. For advice about your own facts, consult an attorney licensed in Ohio.

Related articles

• Ohio defamation laws, covering the elements, defenses and deadlines that govern claims like this one.
• Defamation laws by state, our comparison hub for all fifty states.
• What defamation of character means, a plain-language explainer on libel, slander and proof.

Last updated: 2026-09-28. This is a developing story; details verified as of 2026-09-28.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is an anti-SLAPP motion, in plain terms?

In Ohio it is a 'motion for expedited relief to dismiss' under the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act, R.C. Chapter 2747. A defendant who is sued over covered speech may file it within sixty days after being served with the pleading (R.C. 2747.02). Filing it stays the rest of the case, including discovery (R.C. 2747.03(A)). The court holds a hearing within sixty days and rules within sixty days after that (R.C. 2747.04(A)(1) and (D)), and dismissal is with prejudice when the three conditions of R.C. 2747.04(C) are met. The Fifth District described the same framework in Watson Horse Farms, L.L.C. v. Avena, 2026-Ohio-3694, at ¶ 19 and ¶ 23.

Did this Ohio court decide that the Facebook comment was defamatory?

No. The court affirmed the denial of the anti-SLAPP motion, which means the plaintiffs produced enough evidence to proceed, not that they won. The opinion states that the trier of fact 'may ultimately reach a different conclusion' on falsity (¶ 41) and that the court declined to decide the substantial truth question as a matter of law at this stage (¶ 50). It also frames the statutory inquiry as whether the plaintiffs stated a prima facie case rather than whether the defendant has a meritorious defense (¶ 52). As of September 28, 2026 no court has found liability.

Is truth a defense to defamation in Ohio?

Under this opinion, substantial truth is a complete defense: a defendant may 'completely defend' a defamation action 'by showing that the gist, or imputation of the [defamatory] statement is substantially true and, hence, the statement is not false' (¶ 46, quoting Ackison v. Gergley, 2025-Ohio-1112, at ¶ 23 (5th Dist.)). Because it is a defense, at the anti-SLAPP stage the court views truthfulness in favor of the party opposing the motion and treats substantial truth as generally a question of fact (¶ 47). That is why raising it did not end this case.

The registry address and the business address were the same. Why was that not enough?

Because of what the comment said. The court found the comment asserted that the registered work location came back to Watson Horse Farms itself, 'thereby explicitly identifying that business specifically and implicitly excluding other business entities that might operate at the same address,' which it called 'a distinction with a difference' (¶ 39). Both owners testified that twelve businesses use the address and that the man never worked at the farm (¶ 6, ¶ 40, ¶ 48). Ohio measures falsity by an objective, reasonable-reader standard (¶ 38).

Can a denied anti-SLAPP motion be appealed right away in Ohio?

Yes. R.C. 2747.05(C) provides that a denial of a motion for expedited relief is a final order under R.C. 2505.02 and that the moving party has an interlocutory right of appeal, which must be filed within thirty days after entry of the order. The Fifth District quoted the first sentence of that provision at ¶ 20, and this appeal is an example of it.

Who pays attorney fees under Ohio's anti-SLAPP statute?

R.C. 2747.05(A) requires the court to award reasonable attorney fees, court costs and other reasonable litigation expenses to the moving party if the motion is granted, and bars reducing that award because the representation was pro bono or contingent. If the motion is denied, R.C. 2747.05(B) awards fees to the responding party only where the court finds the motion was frivolous conduct as defined in R.C. 2323.51, and only after disposition of any appeal affirming the denial. In this case the opinion assessed appellate costs to the appellant (¶ 71) and did not address fees.

What happened to the emotional distress claim?

The trial court granted Avena's motion on that claim, finding the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case for intentional infliction of emotional distress (¶ 11). Only the defamation claim was at issue on appeal, and the opinion records no cross-appeal on the emotional distress ruling.

What evidence can a court consider on an Ohio anti-SLAPP motion?

R.C. 2747.04(B) directs the court to consider the pleadings, the motion, any response, and any evidence that could be considered on a motion for summary judgment under Civ.R. 56 (quoted at ¶ 26). The Fifth District held that this includes a transcript of a preliminary injunction hearing, because Civ.R. 56(C) expressly lists transcripts of evidence (¶ 29). It also noted that the appellant's failure to file a transcript of the anti-SLAPP hearing required the court to presume regularity in the proceedings (¶ 30).

Does this ruling apply outside Ohio?

No. It is a decision of the Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals applying R.C. Chapter 2747 and Ohio defamation law. Ohio's statute is the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act, which the opinion's footnote says seventeen states had enacted as of July 2026 (fn. 2, at ¶ 19), and R.C. 2747.06(C) directs Ohio courts to consider uniformity with states that adopt a substantially similar law. Anti-SLAPP procedures, burdens and deadlines elsewhere are set by each state's own statute.