First Circuit Affirms Dismissal, Leaves Self-Help Discovery Undecided

The First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a senior data architect's suit against HealthEquity, Inc. on November 2, 2026. The court assumed that emailing company documents to preserve evidence could be protected conduct, then held she had not pleaded facts making it plausible that she was fired for that reason. Grygiel v. HealthEquity, Inc., No. 25-2109.

Information last verified on November 9, 2026. We update this page if the court issues an errata or amended opinion or if further review is sought.

Scope. This article covers one federal appellate decision applying Title VII and Massachusetts employment law in the First Circuit, which hears appeals from Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Puerto Rico. It does not address recording or surveillance law, and it decides nothing about any employer's data security duties. For the state-law background, see how Massachusetts treats at-will employment and its narrow exceptions.

What Happened

A three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Tracy Grygiel's employment suit against HealthEquity, Inc. on November 2, 2026. Judge Rikelman wrote for a panel of Judges Rikelman, Howard and Dunlap.

The appeal came from the District of Massachusetts, where Judge Allison D. Burroughs granted HealthEquity's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Grygiel v. HealthEquity, Inc., No. 25-cv-11970, 2025 WL 3451342 (D. Mass. Oct. 14, 2025). The court's own opinions listing marks the appellate opinion Published, records it as issued 11/02/2026, and gives the originating case number as 1:25-cv-11970-ADB.

Everything that follows is an allegation. The case was decided at the pleading stage, so the panel accepted Grygiel's well-pleaded facts as true and drew reasonable inferences in her favor without any finding that those events occurred. Slip op. 7.

Grygiel began work in May 2023 as a remote Senior Data Architect for HealthEquity, a Utah-based Health Savings Account provider. Her manager, Darek Easterly, did not supervise any other women in a technical role. Slip op. 2.

Weeks into the job, at Easterly's request, she ran a security audit of one of the company's databases to evaluate compliance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. She alleged the database failed the audit because it had insufficient access controls and other vulnerabilities. Slip op. 3.

Easterly told her no changes were needed. When she pressed the point with him and Greg Fortune, the employee responsible for the database, the complaint alleges they "vociferously demanded she drop her concerns entirely." She kept meeting with data security and tech support teams anyway, to demonstrate how the database protections could be bypassed. Slip op. 3.

Around the same time, a project manager named Ajay Sahu allegedly called her a "token woman" and "Miss Know-It-All," repeating those terms frequently. Slip op. 3.

Easterly placed her on a performance improvement plan in late July 2023, which human resources later told her was "water under the bridge." Slip op. 4.

In December 2023, federal officials investigated HealthEquity over a data breach relating to the vulnerabilities Grygiel had identified. The opinion notes that the complaint does not specify the nature of that breach. Easterly allegedly told her not to speak at a meeting with investigators. Slip op. 4.

Before the end of 2023, Easterly set her bonus at $3,000, far less than her offer letter had promised, and she reported to human resources that the figure was unjustly low. Slip op. 5.

A second performance improvement plan came in April 2024. Grygiel alleged she was told she could accept it or resign with two months' severance, and that Jordan Griggs, the Vice President of Human Resources, said "the chief complaint is that you're a know-it-all and will not stay in your lane." Slip op. 5.

At that point, the complaint says, it became clear to her that the company was discriminating and retaliating against her. In late April 2024, "[t]o preserve evidence for potential claims," she forwarded copies of both improvement plans, training certifications and "important email correspondence" from her work account to her personal email account. Slip op. 5.

HealthEquity placed her on administrative leave when it learned of the emails and terminated her on May 7, 2024, citing a violation of its "Security and People" policy. Slip op. 6.

She sued in Massachusetts state court in June 2025. HealthEquity removed the case under 28 U.S.C. section 1441, and in August 2025 she filed the operative amended complaint, pleading sex discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. sections 2000e-2(a)(1) and 2000e-3(a) and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, section 4(1) and (4), plus wrongful termination in violation of public policy and interference under ch. 151B, section 4(4A). She did not pursue the interference claim on appeal. Slip op. 6.

The question the panel left open

On the retaliation count, the panel declined to resolve the issue this case is most likely to be cited for. It wrote that it was not addressing whether Grygiel's self-help discovery qualifies as protected conduct under federal law, calling that "an issue we have yet to resolve," or under Massachusetts state law, and it pointed to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Verdrager v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., 50 N.E.3d 778, 803-07 (Mass. 2016) as "detailing multifactor test for assessing whether self-help discovery constitutes protected conduct under Chapter 151B." It then assumed in Grygiel's favor that it does qualify. Slip op. 13 n.5.

Having granted her that assumption, the court still found the claim deficient:

Even accepting her position that self-help discovery qualifies as protected conduct, being fired on grounds unrelated to preparing a discrimination case would not give rise to a retaliation claim. Source: Grygiel v. HealthEquity, Inc., No. 25-2109 (1st Cir. Nov. 2, 2026), at slip op. 16.

The gap was knowledge. The complaint alleged that HealthEquity knew she had emailed the files, but no pleaded fact indicated the company knew she was acting in support of a discrimination claim when she did it. She did not allege that she told HealthEquity she needed the documents to pursue such a claim, or that the contents of the documents should have made her purpose apparent. Slip op. 15.

The one-week interval between the emails and the firing could not carry the inference by itself, because the circuit draws a causation inference from timing only where facts suggest the employer knew of the protected conduct. Slip op. 14 to 15. The panel also rejected her analogy to the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, observing that even under 38 U.S.C. section 4311(a) an employer must still know that the employee took military leave. Slip op. 16 n.8.

The discrimination and wrongful termination counts

The sex discrimination count failed for a related reason. The comments Grygiel identified came from colleagues she never alleged had decision-making authority over her employment or influence over those who did, and under circuit precedent discriminatory intent "must be traceable to the person or persons who made the decision to fire" the plaintiff. Thompson v. Coca-Cola Co., 522 F.3d 168, 178 (1st Cir. 2008). Slip op. 10 to 11. The panel recorded that the district court had read Griggs's "stay in your lane" remark as gender neutral and that Grygiel did not argue otherwise on appeal, and the panel itself found the remark consistent with Grygiel's own allegations that she continued raising database security concerns against her supervisor's directions. Slip op. 11 to 12.

On the Massachusetts wrongful termination count, the panel held her theory sat outside the recognized public policy exception:

Thus, we hold that the district court correctly dismissed Grygiel's wrongful termination claim. Source: Grygiel v. HealthEquity, Inc., No. 25-2109 (1st Cir. Nov. 2, 2026), at slip op. 20.

What the Law Actually Says

Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. section 2000e-3(a), makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against an employee "because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter."

Massachusetts has a close analogue. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, section 4(4) bars an employer from discharging or otherwise discriminating against a person "because he has opposed any practices forbidden under this chapter or because he has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under section five." The discrimination provisions Grygiel invoked are 42 U.S.C. section 2000e-2(a)(1), which reaches discharge "because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin," and ch. 151B, section 4(1).

Both statutes turn on the word "because." To plead a plausible retaliation claim in the First Circuit, a plaintiff must allege protected conduct "and that, because of her conduct, her employer took materially adverse action against her." Deangelis v. Hasbro, Inc., 165 F.4th 646, 652 (1st Cir. 2026). Slip op. 13.

That causation element carries a knowledge requirement. The circuit has held that a retaliating party "must be aware of the protected activity that he is believed to be retaliating against," Ponte v. Steelcase Inc., 741 F.3d 310, 323 n.11 (1st Cir. 2014), and that "[o]ne way of showing causation is by establishing that the employer's knowledge of the protected activity was close in time to the employer's adverse action," Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1994). See also Stratton v. Bentley Univ., 113 F.4th 25, 45 (1st Cir. 2024). Slip op. 14 to 15.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission states the practical limit on its retaliation page: engaging in equal employment opportunity activity "does not shield an employee from all discipline or discharge," and employers remain free to discipline or terminate for non-retaliatory and non-discriminatory reasons.

Where self-help discovery fits in that scheme is unresolved in the First Circuit, and this opinion left it that way. Other federal circuits have reached the question and have weighed the employee's conduct against the employer's interest in confidentiality rather than treating it as categorically protected or unprotected. See Niswander v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., 529 F.3d 714 (6th Cir. 2008) (deciding the question as a matter of first impression in that circuit and applying a balancing test). Massachusetts, by contrast, has addressed it: the panel cited Verdrager, 50 N.E.3d at 803-07, as detailing a multifactor test for whether self-help discovery is protected conduct under Chapter 151B. The Grygiel panel never applied that test, because it assumed the answer in the plaintiff's favor and resolved the claim on causation instead.

The Massachusetts public policy exception

Grygiel's second theory was a common-law claim. Massachusetts follows at-will employment, under which an employee generally can be terminated "without notice, for almost any reason or for no reason at all." Sutherland v. Peterson's Oil Serv., Inc., 126 F.4th 728, 744 (1st Cir. 2025) (quoting Jackson v. Action for Bos. Cmty. Dev., Inc., 525 N.E.2d 411, 412 (Mass. 1988)). The Supreme Judicial Court has carved out an exception where a termination "violates a clearly established public policy." King v. Driscoll, 638 N.E.2d 488, 492 (Mass. 1994). Slip op. 17.

That exception is, in the court's words, designed to be "narrow." It typically covers employees fired "for asserting a legally guaranteed right (e.g., filing [a] workers' compensation claim), for doing what the law requires (e.g., serving on a jury), or for refusing to do that which the law forbids (e.g., committing perjury)." Flesner v. Tech. Commc'ns Corp., 575 N.E.2d 1107, 1110 (Mass. 1991). A footnote records a further variant for employees fired for "performing important public deeds," a version of the exception Grygiel did not argue. Slip op. 17 to 18 and n.9.

As the panel framed it, quoting Sutherland, the exception does not reach terminations based on concerns an employee raises about "purely internal matters," such as a company's "administration, policy, [or] functioning." Sutherland, 126 F.4th at 745 (quoting King, 638 N.E.2d at 492). Whether a retaliatory firing violates public policy is a question of law for the court. Slip op. 18.

Applying that framework, the panel said Grygiel never alleged that HIPAA or another law required the actions she took. It contrasted Hobson v. McLean Hosp. Corp., 522 N.E.2d 975, 977 (Mass. 1988), which it described as holding that the plaintiff there stated a claim when she alleged that state and local law required the action that led to her termination. Treating a firing for raising concerns "generally related to legal compliance" as actionable would expand the "doing what the law requires" prong beyond the confines Massachusetts courts have recognized. Slip op. 19.

The panel added that her conduct may have been "appropriate and 'socially desirable'" without earning the protection she sought, quoting Mercado v. Manny's T.V. & Appliance, Inc., 928 N.E.2d 979, 983 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010). It drew on a line of Massachusetts authority to the same effect, citing Wright v. Shriners Hospital for Crippled Children, 589 N.E.2d 1241, 1245 (Mass. 1992) as declining to apply the exception simply because a plaintiff claims to be reporting on issues felt to be detrimental to health care. Closest to Grygiel's own allegations, the panel wrote that the Supreme Judicial Court has explained that circumstances much like hers, actions "opposing management policies and organizational issues" that an employee believed to be "potentially compromising" patients, do not fit within the exception. Murray v. Warren Pumps, LLC, 821 F.3d 77, 91 (1st Cir. 2016) (citing Smith-Pfeffer v. Superintendent of the Walter E. Fernald State Sch., 533 N.E.2d 1368, 1371-72 (Mass. 1989)). Slip op. 19 to 20.

Our standing coverage sets out the doctrine this decision applies. Our guide to wrongful termination claims in Massachusetts walks through the filing routes and deadlines, and our survey of at-will rules in every state shows how other states draw comparable exceptions.

One distinction is worth flagging. Grygiel pleaded the common-law public policy claim, not a claim under any Massachusetts whistleblower statute, and the opinion does not discuss statutory whistleblower protection at all. For how statutory reporting regimes are structured differently from the common-law exception, see our page on Massachusetts whistleblower protections.

Analysis: Why This Matters

The following is analysis from the Recording Law Editorial Team.

This decision will be read for a question it does not answer. The reader question behind it is a common one: can an employee forward company documents to a personal account to preserve evidence of discrimination? Nothing in this opinion answers that, in either direction.

The panel wrote that whether self-help discovery is protected conduct under federal law is an issue the First Circuit has yet to resolve, and it assumed in Grygiel's favor that it is. Slip op. 13 n.5. So the case is not authority that the conduct is unprotected. It is equally not authority that the conduct is safe. The federal question remains open in this circuit, and for the Massachusetts analysis the panel pointed to the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Verdrager, which it described as detailing a multifactor test under Chapter 151B rather than any blanket rule.

What actually decided the retaliation count is narrower and more technical: the employer has to know what it is retaliating against. Grygiel's theory was that HealthEquity fired her because she was preparing a discrimination claim. That theory makes the employer's understanding of her purpose the operative fact. The complaint alleged the company knew she sent the files; it did not allege facts showing the company knew why. Slip op. 15. On that pleading, the firing and the protected purpose are two separate things that happened to the same person in the same week.

There is a second, quieter lesson in the discrimination analysis. The panel observed that the explanation Grygiel was given, that she would not stay in her lane, was consistent with her own allegations that she kept raising database security concerns against her supervisor's directions. Slip op. 11 to 12. Facts pleaded to support one theory can supply the obvious alternative explanation that undercuts another. See Frith v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 38 F.4th 263, 275-76 (1st Cir. 2022).

The Massachusetts count turned on a line Massachusetts courts have drawn repeatedly: between being fired for doing what the law requires and being fired for raising concerns related in a general way to legal compliance. Hobson is the contrast the panel chose, because there the plaintiff alleged a legal requirement. Grygiel alleged that she monitored HIPAA compliance and identified problems that could have put the company out of compliance, which the court placed on the general-compliance side of that line. Slip op. 18 to 19.

The HIPAA and data-breach allegations are background in this opinion, not its subject. The panel resolved nothing about whether HealthEquity's database controls satisfied HIPAA, nothing about what the December 2023 federal investigation found, and nothing about any employer's data security duty. The opinion itself notes that the complaint does not specify the nature of the breach. Slip op. 4.

Finally, the posture limits what the decision establishes. Affirming a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal means the complaint as written did not state a claim. It is not a finding that the employer's account is accurate, and no discovery or trial tested either side's version. Slip op. 7.

How This Affects You

General implications only, and none of this is advice about an individual situation.

Courts applying Title VII and Chapter 151B require a plaintiff to plead causation, not merely sequence. A complaint that establishes an adverse action shortly after protected conduct still needs facts about the employer's knowledge, as the First Circuit explained in Wyatt and Ponte.

In Massachusetts, the public policy exception to at-will employment remains narrow, and whether a given firing violates public policy is decided by the court as a matter of law. Slip op. 18. As the panel applied that limit, concerns an employee raises about purely internal company matters fall outside the exception, and a plaintiff invoking the doing-what-the-law-requires category has to identify the law that required the conduct. Other states draw their own public policy exceptions, and the categories vary.

Employer document and security policies continue to operate alongside anti-discrimination law, which, as the EEOC puts it, does not shield an employee from all discipline or discharge.

This is general legal information, not legal advice. It covers federal law in the First Circuit and Massachusetts and reflects sources verified on November 9, 2026. Laws change and this story is developing; consult a lawyer licensed in your jurisdiction about your specific situation.

Related articles

• Massachusetts at-will employment and its exceptions
• Wrongful termination in Massachusetts: laws, deadlines and filing
• Massachusetts whistleblower protections and how to report
• At-will employment by state

Last updated: 2026-11-09. Details verified against the slip opinion as of 2026-11-09.

Frequently Asked Questions

Did the First Circuit hold that emailing company documents to yourself is not protected?

No. The panel expressly declined to decide whether self-help discovery is protected under federal law, calling it 'an issue we have yet to resolve,' and it assumed in Grygiel's favor that the conduct qualifies as protected (slip op. 13 n.5).

Does this ruling mean an employee may safely copy documents to support a discrimination claim?

No. The opinion decides nothing about whether that conduct is protected. In Massachusetts the question runs through the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Verdrager v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., 50 N.E.3d 778 (Mass. 2016), which the First Circuit described as setting out a multifactor test under Chapter 151B.

Why did the retaliation claim fail?

For want of pleaded causation. The First Circuit held the complaint contained no facts indicating HealthEquity knew she was acting in support of a discrimination claim when she emailed the documents (slip op. 15).

She was fired one week after sending the emails, so why was the timing not enough?

First Circuit precedent draws a causation inference from timing only where facts suggest the employer knew of the protected conduct, citing Stratton v. Bentley University, 113 F.4th 25, 45 (1st Cir. 2024), and Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1994).

What is the Massachusetts public policy exception to at-will employment?

It is a narrow carve-out, recognized in King v. Driscoll, 638 N.E.2d 488, 492 (Mass. 1994), for terminations that violate a clearly established public policy. It typically covers asserting a legally guaranteed right, doing what the law requires, or refusing to do what the law forbids, per Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp., 575 N.E.2d 1107, 1110 (Mass. 1991).

Why did raising HIPAA concerns not fit that exception?

The panel said Grygiel never alleged that HIPAA or another law required the actions she took, and that extending the exception to concerns generally related to legal compliance would go beyond what Massachusetts courts have recognized (slip op. 19).

Did the court rule on HealthEquity's data security or on the December 2023 breach investigation?

No. Those allegations are background in the opinion, which notes that the complaint does not specify the nature of the data breach (slip op. 4). The decision addresses only whether the complaint stated employment claims.

What happened to the sex discrimination claim?

It was dismissed as well. The panel held that comments such as 'token woman' came from colleagues never alleged to have had a role in the termination, and that discriminatory intent must be traceable to the decisionmakers, citing Thompson v. Coca-Cola Co., 522 F.3d 168, 178 (1st Cir. 2008).

Is the opinion published, and has it been amended?

The First Circuit's opinions listing marks No. 25-2109 as Published and records it as issued 11/02/2026. No errata or amended version appeared for this case as of November 9, 2026.

Which jurisdictions does this decision bind?

The First Circuit covers federal appeals from Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Puerto Rico. Its reading of the Massachusetts public policy exception applies state law, which the Massachusetts state courts have the final word on.