Ninth Circuit: No Injunction Against Seattle Gig Deactivation Law

Ninth Circuit: No Injunction Against Seattle Gig Deactivation Law

On October 29, 2026 a Ninth Circuit panel withdrew its March 4, 2026 opinion and filed a superseding amended opinion affirming the denial of a preliminary injunction against Seattle's App-Based Worker Deactivation Rights Ordinance. The city's written-policy duty stands for now, and the merits remain undecided.

Information last verified on November 1, 2026. This is a developing story; we update it as the record changes.

Jurisdiction scope: This article addresses one Ninth Circuit appeal and one City of Seattle ordinance, Seattle Municipal Code Chapter 8.40. It does not address deactivation rules in any other city or state, federal or Washington State tests for worker classification, or rideshare driving, which the ordinance excludes.

What Happened

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit filed an order and amended opinion on October 29, 2026 in Uber Technologies, Inc. v. City of Seattle, Nos. 25-228 and 25-231, an appeal from the Western District of Washington, No. 2:24-cv-02103-MJP (Pechman, J.). The case was argued and submitted on July 10, 2025 in Seattle. The panel was Circuit Judges Susan P. Graber, Richard R. Clifton and Mark J. Bennett, with the opinion written by Judge Clifton.

The first thing the filing does is erase the panel's own earlier work. Anyone relying on the March 2026 version of this decision is relying on a document the court has pulled.

"Pursuant to General Order 5.3(c)(1), the panel withdraws the opinion and dissent filed on March 4, 2026, and concurrently files a superseding amended opinion and dissent. Appellant's petition for rehearing en banc (Docket Entry No. 51) is denied as moot. G.O. 5.3(c)(1). Further petitions for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc may be filed from the superseding amended opinion." Source: Order, Uber Techs., Inc. v. City of Seattle, Nos. 25-228, 25-231 (9th Cir. Oct. 29, 2026), at page 6

Uber Technologies and its wholly owned subsidiary Portier filed the action seeking a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to stop Seattle from enforcing the ordinance. Maplebear Inc., which does business as Instacart, intervened and agreed to forego independent briefing on the temporary restraining order in the district court. The companies argued the ordinance compels speech in violation of the First Amendment and is void for vagueness. A third claim about expressive associational rights was pleaded but, the panel noted, was not argued on appeal (page 10, note 3).

The appellate court reviewed the denial of preliminary relief for abuse of discretion, a standard the opinion calls "limited and deferential," while reviewing the underlying legal questions de novo (page 11). Jurisdiction rested on 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1).

The disposition is narrow, and the court said so in its own words.

"Assuming, without deciding, that the Ordinance regulates speech, it is commercial speech, and the Ordinance overcomes the appropriate level of scrutiny under the First Amendment. Plaintiffs also fail to show that the law is unconstitutionally vague. Because Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the preliminary injunction." Source: Amended Opinion, Uber Techs., Inc. v. City of Seattle, Nos. 25-228, 25-231 (9th Cir. Oct. 29, 2026), at page 22

Two limits on that holding deserve emphasis. First, the panel never decided whether the ordinance regulates speech; it assumed that it does and ruled against the companies anyway. Second, the panel distanced itself from the policy, writing that "[b]y affirming the authority of Seattle to enact and enforce the Ordinance, we do not express a view on the merits of the policy" (page 22).

On the First Amendment analysis, the panel reasoned that communications from a platform to temporary app-based workers about the terms of engagement, including grounds for deactivation, are commercial speech, citing Valle Del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 709 F.3d 808, 817 to 818 (9th Cir. 2013) and Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 387 to 388 (1973). It distinguished NetChoice, LLC v. Bonta, 113 F.4th 1101 (9th Cir. 2024) and X Corp. v. Bonta, 116 F.4th 888 (9th Cir. 2024), where state laws forced social media companies to file reports to the government stating their own conclusions about contested public issues (pages 13 to 14).

Because Seattle compels a disclosure rather than restricting speech, the panel applied Zauderer rather than the intermediate-scrutiny test of Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).

"[T]he government may compel truthful disclosure in commercial speech as long as the compelled disclosure is reasonably related to a substantial governmental interest and involves purely factual and uncontroversial information that relates to the service or product provided." Source: Amended Opinion, at page 16, quoting CTIA v. City of Berkeley, 928 F.3d 832, 842 (9th Cir. 2019)

Applying that standard, the panel held the notice requirement in subsection 8.40.050.A.1 is reasonably related to Seattle's interest in worker and public safety, is factual rather than controversial, and is not unduly burdensome because it "can be satisfied by a single webpage" (page 18). As to subsection 8.40.050.A.2, which requires that deactivation policies be reasonably related to safe and efficient operations, the panel concluded it is not an impermissible regulation of commercial speech (pages 18 to 19).

On vagueness, measured against Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982), the panel held the word "reasonable" is a well-established standard that the ordinance's eight examples and carve-outs further clarify.

"The Ordinance provides fair notice to a person of ordinary intelligence as to what grounds for deactivation are reasonably related to safety and efficiency." Source: Amended Opinion, at page 21

Judge Bennett dissented in part. He agreed the ordinance is not vague, but concluded the ordinance does compel speech and that the companies have at least raised serious questions on the merits. He would have vacated and remanded so the district court could decide in the first instance whether the ordinance survives Zauderer, and could reexamine all four preliminary injunction factors from Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (pages 27 to 36).

One procedural detail in the opinion matters for anyone tracking enforcement. The panel recorded that "[a] stay pending final resolution of the appeals, entered by the district court based on a stipulation of the parties, is currently in place" (page 11). The opinion does not describe that stay's scope, and we are not characterizing it beyond what the court wrote.

What the Law Actually Says

Seattle enacted Ordinance 126878 on August 8, 2023, and Mayor Bruce Harrell approved it on August 14, 2023. Section 2 of that ordinance added Chapter 8.40 to the Seattle Municipal Code, and section 5 set the operative date: "Section 2 of this ordinance shall take effect on January 1, 2025." The Seattle Office of Labor Standards describes the law as going into effect on January 1, 2025. Signing and taking effect were about 16 months apart here, which is why the companies sued in late 2024.

The chapter reaches "network companies" that facilitate work performed by 250 or more app-based workers worldwide (section 8.40.040.A). For most of the chapter, a worker is covered if at least 25 percent of their completed offers, or offers cancelled with cause, in the previous 180 days involved performing services in Seattle for a covered network company, or if the deactivation relates to an incident while performing services in Seattle for such a company (section 8.40.030.A). Section 8.40.100, the written notice of rights, uses a broader test: it reaches any app-based worker who performs services in Seattle for a covered network company (section 8.40.030.B). A worker who is a covered employee under Seattle Municipal Code Chapter 14.20 either for the network company or for a customer of an online order is not covered by Chapter 8.40 (section 8.40.030.C). Transportation network company dispatched trips, taxicabs and for-hire vehicles are excluded from the definition of an online order (section 8.40.020), which is why the panel stressed that the services at issue are delivery, not ridesharing.

The duties the companies challenged sit in section 8.40.050. Subsection A.1 requires a written deactivation policy, specific enough for a worker to understand what counts as a violation and how to avoid one, available in English and in any language the company knows or has reason to know is the worker's primary language, and accessible for at least three years after deactivation. Subsection A.2 requires that the policy be reasonably related to the company's safe and efficient operations, and lists eight examples of policies that are not, including deactivation based solely on aggregate customer ratings, on a worker's statements about pay or working conditions, or on asserting legal rights.

The provisions a deactivated worker actually feels are elsewhere in the chapter. Section 8.40.070.A requires that a company "provide an app-based worker with notice of deactivation 14 days in advance of the deactivation, as well as upon the effective date of deactivation," and that notice must state the reasons, the policy violated, the specific incidents, the effective date and length, the steps to remedy it, and "[a]ny and all records relied upon to substantiate deactivation." For egregious misconduct, the notice is due no later than the effective date (section 8.40.070.C).

Section 8.40.060.B gives the worker a right to an internal challenge, available immediately on notice and for up to 90 days after receipt, which the company must review and answer within 14 days. The answer must be certified by someone with authority to reinstate, and it must either substantiate the deactivation with evidence, explain extraordinary circumstances and give an anticipated response date, or state "[a] determination that the worker did not violate the network company's deactivation policy and therefore must be reinstated on the platform."

Enforcement is deliberately phased. Under section 8.40.130.A the Office of Labor Standards has had power to administer and enforce the chapter since January 1, 2025, but under section 8.40.130.B the agency "shall not have the power to enforce subsections 8.40.050.A.3, 8.40.050.A.4, 8.40.050.A.5, 8.40.050.A.6, 8.40.050.B, 8.40.050.C, and 8.40.060.A until June 1, 2027." That subsection expressly does not limit a worker's other avenues of relief, and section 8.40.230.A creates a private right of action with reasonable attorney fees and costs for a prevailing plaintiff. Penalty amounts in section 8.40.170 are adjusted annually for inflation, so figures printed in the 2023 ordinance text are not today's figures.

The Office of Labor Standards issued final rules for the chapter, Seattle Human Rights Rules Chapter 260, on March 26, 2025, effective June 24, 2025. Those rules repeat the 14-day notice requirement and spell out the required contents of the notice. Since July 1, 2026 the ordinance and the Director's rules have required the affirmative records that network companies transmit to the agency at least every six months rather than at least quarterly (section 8.40.090.A; rule SHRR 260-170.2), though the schedule itself is set by the agency, whose published guidance still describes quarterly reporting.

Two boundaries are worth stating plainly, because they are where readers most often go wrong. First, this is a municipal labor standard, not a classification rule: section 8.40.240.D says "[n]o provision of this Chapter 8.40 shall be construed as providing a determination about the legal classification of any individual as an employee or independent contractor," and rule SHRR 260-070 says the same. If you are trying to work out whether a gig worker is a contractor or an employee for wage, tax or benefits purposes, that question runs through the separate federal and state tests described in our guide to how the IRS, Labor Department and state ABC tests sort contractors from employees.

Second, losing app access is not the same legal event as being fired from a job. Washington is an at-will state, which means an employer may generally end employment for any lawful reason, subject to recognized exceptions, as we cover in Washington's at-will employment rules and their exceptions. Seattle's Chapter 8.40 does not change at-will law. It adds process duties that a specific class of platform company owes a specific class of app-based worker, and section 8.40.240.A.1 says those provisions supplement rather than replace other bases of liability.

Analysis: Why This Matters

The following is analysis from the Recording Law Editorial Team.

The most consequential thing about this filing may be the withdrawal itself. A superseding amended opinion replaces the earlier text entirely, and the order expressly reopens the rehearing window. Secondary coverage and memos written against the March 4, 2026 version are now describing a document that no longer exists, even where the amended analysis reaches the same result. The amended opinion notes at page 15 that the Second Circuit in DoorDash, Inc. v. City of New York, 185 F.4th 1, 7 (2d Cir. 2026) cited with approval, while distinguishing, the Zauderer application in the original opinion, which the panel says "remains substantively the same in this amended opinion."

The doctrinal line the panel drew is about who the speech is aimed at. In NetChoice and X Corp., the compelled communications ran to the government and required a company to state its own conclusions about contested public controversies. Here the communication runs inward, from a platform to the workers subject to its rules, which the panel at page 14 described as "a modern version of established workplace disclosure laws." That framing, if it holds, places platform notice obligations in the same category as handbooks and workplace postings rather than in the category of compelled political speech.

Judge Bennett's partial dissent identifies the real pressure point, and it is worth reading on its own terms. He observes that the ordinance defines an unwarranted deactivation by reference to section 8.40.050, and argues that the section does not independently forbid deactivating a worker for reasons unrelated to safe and efficient operations; it forbids having, and therefore stating, a policy that is not so related. He also notes the enforcement asymmetry in section 8.40.130: for a period that includes today, the agency may fine a company for the policy requirement but not for the prohibition on unwarranted deactivations.

Nothing here resolves the constitutional question. The panel assumed a speech regulation and still found no likelihood of success; the partial dissent would have found serious questions and sent the case back. Those are compatible with several different endings, and we are not predicting any of them.

How This Affects You

If you deliver or shop through a platform app and your account is cut off, the practical question is what notice and explanation you are owed, and from which law. Under Seattle's ordinance those duties are specific and dated: 14 days advance written notice except in egregious misconduct cases, the reasons and the records relied on, an internal challenge available for 90 days, and a certified company answer within 14 days (Seattle Municipal Code sections 8.40.070 and 8.40.060). Those duties exist because of the city ordinance, and they apply only to workers and companies the ordinance covers.

If you are outside Seattle, none of that applies to you by force of this ruling. The Ninth Circuit decided an appeal about one city's ordinance in a preliminary-injunction posture. Other cities and states have taken different approaches, and courts in other circuits are not bound by this panel's reasoning.

Deactivation and discharge are also tracked by different legal systems. So are deactivation and classification. Seattle's ordinance says explicitly that it decides nothing about classification (section 8.40.240.D), and the Office of Labor Standards rule SHRR 260-070 says the same of its own rules. Whether a worker who loses platform access can claim unemployment insurance in Washington turns on that separate classification and eligibility analysis, not on Chapter 8.40, and the broader rules on ending a working relationship differ by state, as our state-by-state at-will employment overview sets out.

Timing rules are their own trap. Chapter 8.40 sets its own internal windows, a 90-day period to start a challenge under section 8.40.060.B.1 and a three-year period to pursue available relief under section 8.40.060.C. Those are ordinance-specific and separate from the general civil deadlines collected in our page on Washington filing deadlines by case type. A claim under one body of law can be timely while a claim under another is not.

What Happens Next

The order permits further petitions for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc from the superseding amended opinion, so the appellate stage is not necessarily closed. Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 40(d)(1) such a petition is due within 14 days of the October 29, 2026 judgment, so that window is open as of this writing and the appellate judgment is not yet final. Beyond that, the denial of preliminary relief leaves the merits of the First Amendment and vagueness claims undecided, to be resolved in the district court on a full record. The amended opinion records at page 11 that a stay pending final resolution of the appeals, entered on the parties' stipulation, is in place, and it does not describe that stay's scope or say when district court proceedings resume.

One dated item is on the calendar. The Office of Labor Standards gains power to enforce subsections 8.40.050.A.3 through A.6, 8.40.050.B, 8.40.050.C and 8.40.060.A on June 1, 2027 (section 8.40.130.B). The event that would turn this appeal into a completed constitutional ruling is a final merits judgment on the First Amendment and vagueness claims, or a Supreme Court grant of review, neither of which has happened.

This is general legal information, not legal advice. It covers a Ninth Circuit appeal and a City of Seattle municipal ordinance, and reflects sources verified on November 1, 2026. Laws change and this story is developing; consult a lawyer licensed in your jurisdiction about your specific situation.

Related articles

• How the IRS, DOL and ABC tests separate contractors from employees
• Washington at-will employment and the exceptions that limit it
• At-will employment state by state
• Filing for unemployment benefits in Washington
• Washington civil filing deadlines by case type

---

Last updated: 2026-11-01. This is a developing story; details verified as of 2026-11-01.

Frequently Asked Questions

Did the Ninth Circuit rule that Seattle's deactivation ordinance is constitutional?

No. In the amended opinion filed October 29, 2026, the panel affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction under an abuse-of-discretion standard, holding only that the plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits. The opinion is not a final merits ruling on the ordinance's constitutionality.

What happened to the March 4, 2026 Ninth Circuit opinion in this case?

The panel withdrew it. The October 29, 2026 order states that the panel withdraws the opinion and dissent filed on March 4, 2026, files a superseding amended opinion and dissent, and denies the pending petition for rehearing en banc as moot. The withdrawn version is no longer the court's decision.

What notice does Seattle require before a delivery app deactivates a worker?

Seattle Municipal Code section 8.40.070.A requires 14 days advance written notice plus notice on the effective date, stating the reasons, the policy violated, the specific incidents, the effective date and length, the steps to remedy it, and all records relied on. For deactivations involving egregious misconduct, section 8.40.070.C requires the notice no later than the effective date of deactivation.

Can a Seattle app-based worker challenge a deactivation, and how long do they have?

Section 8.40.060.B gives covered workers a right to an internal challenge procedure, available immediately upon notice of deactivation and for up to 90 days after receipt. The company must review and respond within 14 days, and the response must be certified by someone with authority to reinstate the worker.

Does the Seattle ordinance apply to Uber and Lyft rideshare drivers?

No. Section 8.40.020 excludes transportation network company dispatched trips, taxicabs and for-hire vehicles from the definition of an online order. The amended opinion emphasizes at pages 20 to 21 that the covered services here are delivery services, not ridesharing.

What is the Zauderer test the Ninth Circuit applied?

Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) governs compelled commercial disclosures. As the amended opinion quotes at page 16, the government may compel truthful disclosure in commercial speech if the disclosure is reasonably related to a substantial governmental interest and involves purely factual and uncontroversial information relating to the service or product, and is not unjustified or unduly burdensome.

Why did Judge Bennett dissent in part?

Judge Bennett agreed the ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague, but concluded the ordinance does compel speech rather than merely assuming it, and that the plaintiffs raised at least serious questions on the merits. He would have vacated and remanded for the district court to apply Zauderer in the first instance and reexamine the four Winter preliminary injunction factors.

Does this ruling change whether gig workers are employees or independent contractors?

No. Seattle Municipal Code section 8.40.240.D states that no provision of Chapter 8.40 is to be construed as providing a determination about the legal classification of any individual as an employee or independent contractor, and the Office of Labor Standards rule SHRR 260-070 says the same. Classification is decided under separate federal and state tests.

Is Seattle enforcing every part of the deactivation ordinance now?

Not yet. Section 8.40.130.A gave the Office of Labor Standards power to administer and enforce the chapter on or after January 1, 2025, but section 8.40.130.B withholds enforcement of subsections 8.40.050.A.3 through A.6, 8.40.050.B, 8.40.050.C and 8.40.060.A until June 1, 2027. That subsection does not limit a worker's other avenues of relief.

Does Seattle's deactivation ordinance apply outside Seattle?

No. It is a City of Seattle ordinance. Coverage under section 8.40.030.A requires either that at least 25 percent of the worker's completed offers, or offers cancelled with cause, in the previous 180 days involved services in Seattle, or that the deactivation relates to an incident while performing services in Seattle.