Stand Your Ground States: Rules in All 50 States and DC
Independently fact-checked against primary sources (last audited September 11, 2026). · 108 primary sources cited on this page. How we verify our legal content

Stand Your Ground States: Rules in All 50 States and DC
Stand your ground rules remove a retreat requirement in some self-defense situations, but the label hides major differences. As of September 11, 2026, this guide separates statutes, case law, duty-to-retreat jurisdictions, and conditional rules across all 50 states and the District of Columbia.
Information last verified on September 11, 2026. This article has not yet been reviewed by a licensed lawyer.
Jurisdiction scope: This article compares the self-defense retreat rules of all 50 states and the District of Columbia as of September 11, 2026. It does not decide whether force was justified in any individual incident. See the self-defense laws by state hub for state-level explanations.
What does stand your ground mean, and how were states classified?
A stand your ground rule generally means that a person who otherwise qualifies to use defensive force need not retreat solely because a safe avenue may exist. That proposition is narrower than a license to use force. Each jurisdiction still controls when force is necessary, whether deadly force is proportionate, how provocation or initial aggression affects the defense, and whether unlawful activity disqualifies the actor.
This guide uses no duty by statute when enacted text supplies the rule and no duty under case law when the controlling support comes from a court or official jury instruction. Duty means that the cited authority requires safe retreat subject to stated exceptions. Conditional identifies a rule that depends on fault, location, or how retreat evidence bears on necessity. Each label is limited by the conditions stated in its row.

The categories therefore answer a source and scope question, not a political one. A statute and a case-law rule can produce similar trial instructions while following different amendment paths. A home exception can coexist with a public retreat duty. A fact finder may also consider possible avoidance even where the jurisdiction does not impose retreat as a formal element.
- No duty by statute (29): Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, Wyoming.
- No duty under case law (6): California, Colorado, Illinois, New Mexico, Oregon, Washington.
- Duty to retreat with exceptions (12): Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont.
- Conditional rule (4): District of Columbia, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Wisconsin.
Retreat rule by jurisdiction
The table gives every state and the District of Columbia its own linked row, authority, and conditions. The 29 statutory no-duty jurisdictions and 6 case-law no-duty jurisdictions are kept separate because the legal source matters. The 12 duty jurisdictions each permit defensive force under their own necessity and proportionality rules and usually recognize one or more retreat exceptions. The 4 conditional jurisdictions also remain separate.
District of Columbia lets safe avoidance bear on imminent danger without imposing a categorical retreat duty. Pennsylvania's public no-duty rule depends on several statutory conditions, and Virginia distinguishes faultless from excusable self-defense. Wisconsin remains conditional here because retreat may bear on reasonable necessity outside the location-based rule in Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1m). Read the complete state row before relying on a short label.
| Jurisdiction | Retreat rule | Conditions and limits | Authority |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alabama | No duty by statute | No duty in any place the person has a right to be. Force must otherwise be justified; person must not be engaged in unlawful activity; initial-aggressor and provocation limits apply. | Ala. Code Section 13A-3-23(b) (effective until Oct. 1, 2026) |
| Alaska | No duty by statute | No duty in any place where the person has a right to be. Deadly force must otherwise be justified under AS 11.81.335; the person must have a right to be at the location; statutory aggressor and mutual-combat restrictions remain relevant. | Alaska Stat. Section 11.81.335(b)(5) |
| Arizona | No duty by statute | No duty in a place where the person may legally be. Use or threat of deadly force must otherwise be justified; the person must not be engaged in an unlawful act; the person must be in a place where the person may legally be. | Ariz. Rev. Stat. Sections 13-405(B), 13-411(B), 13-418(B) |
| Arkansas | No duty by statute | No duty when lawfully present and statutory conditions are met. Reasonable belief of imminent death or serious physical injury for deadly force; not the initial aggressor or provocateur, subject to statutory exceptions; not committing the specified firearm-possession felony, subject to the dwelling or curtilage exception; not engaged in criminal activity giving rise to the need for force; not furthering a criminal gang, organization, or enterprise. | Ark. Code Ann. Sections 5-2-606(c), 5-2-607(b), as amended by 2021 Ark. Acts 250 |
| California | No duty under case law | No duty to retreat under the state's court instructions. The defendant must reasonably believe force is needed against imminent danger; the force may not exceed what is reasonably necessary; separate withdrawal rules apply to an initial aggressor or mutual combatant; the no-retreat rule does not itself excuse unlawful firearm possession; CALCRIM 3470 separately identifies that issue. | Judicial Council of California, CALCRIM 2026, Nos. 505 and 3470 |
| Colorado | No duty under case law | No duty for a non-aggressor asserting self-defense. Force must satisfy § 18-1-704 and H:12, including reasonable belief that lesser force is inadequate and a qualifying threat; initial aggression, intentional provocation and agreed combat restrict justification; effective withdrawal and communication can restore an aggressor’s defense. | Colorado Judicial Branch, COLJI-Crim 2025, H:12 (applying Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-704) |
| Connecticut | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | Deadly force requires safe retreat when the actor knows it is available. Retreat must avoid deadly force with complete safety; no retreat in the actor's dwelling or workplace if not the initial aggressor; specified officer exception; provocation, initial aggression and agreed combat remain subject to § 53a-19(c); withdrawal and communication can restore an aggressor’s justification. | Conn. Gen. Stat. Section 53a-19(b) |
| Delaware | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | Deadly force requires safe retreat when the defendant knows it is available. Retreat must avoid deadly force with complete safety; no retreat in or from the defendant's dwelling; no retreat in or from the workplace unless the defendant was the initial aggressor; specified public-officer exception; Section 464(e)(1) separately excludes a defendant who provoked force with the purpose of causing death or serious physical injury. | 11 Del. C. Section 464(e)(2) |
| District of Columbia | Qualified or location-specific rule | No categorical retreat duty, but safe avoidance may bear on imminent danger. Fact finder may consider whether the defendant safely could have avoided the encounter; force still requires actual or apparent imminent bodily harm; rule is supplied by D.C. Court of Appeals case law. | In re Robertson, D.C. Ct. App. Nos. 00-FM-925 & 04-FM-1269, slip op. at 24-25 (Jan. 24, 2008), quoting Gillis v. United States, 400 A.2d 311, 313 (D.C. 1979) |
| Florida | No duty by statute | No duty for justified deadly force with statutory conditions. Deadly force must otherwise satisfy Section 776.012(2); person must not be engaged in criminal activity; person must be in a place where the person has a right to be; Section 776.041 restricts forcible-felony participants and initial provocateurs, with specified escape or withdrawal exceptions. | Fla. Stat. Section 776.012(1)-(2) (2026) |
| Georgia | No duty by statute | No duty when force is justified under the listed defense statutes. Force must comply with Sections 16-3-21, 16-3-23, or 16-3-24; the specific justification section's limits remain applicable. | Ga. Code Section 16-3-23.1, enacted by 2006 Ga. Laws Act 599 (SB 396) |
| Hawaii | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | Deadly force requires safe retreat when the actor knows it is available. Duty applies only where retreat avoids deadly force with complete safety; no retreat from dwelling or workplace unless the actor was the initial aggressor; workplace exception narrows when attacked by a person whose workplace the actor knows it to be. | Haw. Rev. Stat. Section 703-304(5)(b) |
| Idaho | No duty by statute | No duty in any place the person has a right to be. Force must appear necessary to a reasonable person in the same situation and with the same knowledge; exception for incarcerated people interacting with jail or prison staff acting officially. | Idaho Code Section 19-202A(3) |
| Illinois | No duty under case law | A non-aggressor has no duty to try to escape before using force. Person must not have initially provoked the force; force must otherwise satisfy Section 7-1; initial-aggressor rules are separately governed by Section 7-4; Section 7-4(c) separately restores qualifying justification after exhausting reasonable escape means in specified deadly danger, or after good-faith withdrawal clearly communicated and renewed attack. | Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions-Criminal 24-25.09X, Committee Note (citing People v. Hughes and People v. Miller) |
| Indiana | No duty by statute | No duty for justified deadly force against grave harm or a forcible felony. Reasonable belief that force is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury or a forcible felony; statutory crime, provocation, and initial-aggressor limits apply. | Ind. Code Section 35-41-3-2(c) |
| Iowa | No duty by statute | No duty from any place where lawfully present. Person is not engaged in illegal activity; force must otherwise be justified under chapter 704. | Iowa Code Section 704.1(3) |
| Kansas | No duty by statute | No duty where attacked and lawfully present. Person is not engaged in unlawful activity; person is attacked; person has a right to be there; force must otherwise be justified. | Kan. Stat. Ann. Sections 21-5222(c), 21-5230 |
| Kentucky | No duty by statute | No duty before using deadly physical force. Force must satisfy Kentucky justification law; the public-place stand-ground rule separately requires lawful presence, no unlawful activity, and an attack. | Ky. Rev. Stat. Sections 503.050(4), 503.055(3) |
| Louisiana | No duty by statute | No duty where lawfully present. Person is not engaged in unlawful activity; person has a right to be there; force must otherwise satisfy Section 14:19 or 14:20. | La. Rev. Stat. Sections 14:19(C)-(D), 14:20(C)-(D) |
| Maine | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | Deadly force requires retreat when complete safety is known. Rule applies to deadly force under Section 108(2)(A); no retreat in the person's dwelling if the person was not the initial aggressor. | 17-A Me. Rev. Stat. Section 108(2)(C)(3)(a) |
| Maryland | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | Deadly force requires retreat when safely possible. Retreat applies when an avenue is within the defendant's power and consistent with safety; no retreat in the home; nondeadly force does not carry the same retreat duty. | Shae-Von Edwards v. State, No. 0799, Sept. Term 2023 (Md. App. Ct. Oct. 31, 2025) |
| Massachusetts | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | Deadly force requires retreat unless it cannot be done safely. All proper and reasonable means to avoid combat must be used; no retreat for a lawful resident facing an unlawful intruder under the castle statute; defense of another has a different retreat rule. | Massachusetts Model Jury Instructions on Homicide III, notes 81-84 (discussing G.L. c. 278, Section 8A) |
| Michigan | No duty by statute | No duty anywhere the person has a legal right to be. Person has not committed and is not committing a crime; deadly force requires an honest and reasonable belief of imminent death, great bodily harm, or sexual assault; nondeadly force requires an honest and reasonable belief it is needed against imminent unlawful force. | Mich. Comp. Laws Section 780.972 |
| Minnesota | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | Self-defense generally requires retreat when reasonably possible. No duty in one's own home; Blevins narrowly extends the duty to felony second-degree assault-fear by brandishing a weapon designed and capable of causing death or great bodily harm; the case did not decide every other assault-fear scenario. | State v. Blevins, 10 N.W.3d 29, 35-40 (Minn. 2024) (discussing State v. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d 392, 402 (Minn. 2001)) |
| Mississippi | No duty by statute | No duty where a non-aggressor has a right to be. Person is not the initial aggressor; person is not engaged in unlawful activity; deadly force must fall under Section 97-3-15(1)(e) or (f). | Miss. Code Section 97-3-15(4) |
| Missouri | No duty by statute | No duty at any place one has a right to be. Initial-aggressor and forcible-felony limits; dwelling/residence/vehicle occupancy must not be unlawful; private-property branch applies to property owned or leased by the defender. | Mo. Rev. Stat. § 563.031.3 |
| Montana | No duty by statute | No duty where lawfully present. Threatened with bodily injury or loss of life; aggressor and forcible-felony limits in 45-3-105; force must otherwise qualify under 45-3-102 through 45-3-104. | Mont. Code Ann. § 45-3-110 |
| Nebraska | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | Retreat required if completely safe. No retreat from dwelling or workplace unless initial aggressor; workplace exception does not apply against another person whose workplace the defender knows it to be; public-officer exception. | Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1409(4)(b) |
| Nevada | No duty by statute | No duty where one has a right to be. Not the original aggressor; right to be at the location; not actively furthering criminal activity; deadly force must satisfy NRS 200.120(1). | Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.120(2) |
| New Hampshire | No duty by statute | No duty anywhere one has a right to be. Defender was not initial aggressor; deadly-force conditions in RSA 627:4 II; surrender-property and abstention rules remain. | N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 627:4 III(a) |
| New Jersey | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | Retreat required if completely safe. Dwelling exception; no dwelling exception for initial aggressor; total circumstances govern knowledge of a completely safe retreat. | N.J. Model Criminal Jury Charge, Justification - Self Defense (N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4) |
| New Mexico | No duty under case law | No duty to retreat. Force may be no more than reasonably necessary; instruction applies when retreat is at issue. | UJI 14-5190 NMRA |
| New York | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | Retreat required if completely safe. No duty in one's dwelling if not initial aggressor; specified kidnapping, forcible-sex-offense, robbery, and burglary branches operate separately; police/peace-officer exception. | N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15(2) |
| North Carolina | No duty by statute | No duty anywhere one has a lawful right to be. Reasonable belief of imminent death or great bodily harm, or circumstances under G.S. 14-51.2; felony and initial-aggressor limits in G.S. 14-51.4. | N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.3(a) |
| North Dakota | No duty by statute | No duty anywhere legally allowed. Not engaged in unlawful activity giving rise to the need for deadly force; did not provoke the target; mutual-combat/initial-aggressor limits in 12.1-05-03(2)(b). | N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-05-07(2)(b)(2) |
| Ohio | No duty by statute | No duty anywhere one lawfully has a right to be. Force must otherwise qualify as self-defense, defense of another, or defense of residence; trier of fact may not consider possible retreat. | Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.09(B)-(C) |
| Oklahoma | No duty by statute | No duty anywhere one has a right to be when attacked. Not engaged in unlawful activity; reasonable belief force is needed to prevent death or great bodily harm or a forcible felony. | Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1289.25(D) |
| Oregon | No duty under case law | No duty to retreat before using self-defense. Force must satisfy ORS 161.209; deadly force must satisfy ORS 161.219; provocation, aggressor, agreed-combat, and bias-motive limits in ORS 161.215. | State v. James, 350 Or. App. 71, 80 (2026) |
| Pennsylvania | Qualified or location-specific rule | No duty to retreat under the statutory stand-your-ground conditions. Right to be in the place; not engaged in criminal activity; not illegally possessing a firearm; belief force immediately necessary against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping, or forcible sex; attacker displays or otherwise uses a firearm, replica, or other apparently lethal weapon; exception for an on-duty peace officer whom the actor knows or reasonably should know is a peace officer. | 18 Pa.C.S. § 505(b)(2.3)-(2.4) |
| Rhode Island | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | Retreat required before deadly force when an open, safe, available avenue is consciously known. Statutory exception for an owner, tenant, or occupier confronting offenses enumerated in §§ 11-8-2 through 11-8-6; ordinary self-defense also requires proportionate force and generally excludes the initial aggressor. | State v. Urena, No. 2004-199-C.A., slip op. at 8-9 & n.4 (R.I. June 16, 2006) (quoting State v. Quarles) |
| South Carolina | No duty by statute | No duty in another place one has a right to be when attacked. Not engaged in unlawful activity; reasonable belief force is needed against death or great bodily injury or to prevent a violent crime. | S.C. Code § 16-11-440(C) |
| South Dakota | No duty by statute | No duty anywhere one has a right to be. Not engaged in criminal activity; reasonable belief deadly force is necessary against imminent death, great bodily harm, or a forcible felony. | S.D. Codified Laws § 22-18-4.1 |
| Tennessee | No duty by statute | No duty anywhere one has a right to be. Not engaged in unlawful activity; reasonable belief force is immediately necessary; deadly force requires reasonable grounds for an honest belief of imminent death or serious bodily injury. | Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-611(b), enacted by 2007 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 210 |
| Texas | No duty by statute | No duty where one has a right to be present. Did not provoke the target; not engaged in criminal activity; force must otherwise be justified under §§ 9.31 or 9.32. | Tex. Penal Code §§ 9.31(e)-(f), 9.32(c)-(d) |
| Utah | No duty by statute | No duty where one has lawfully entered or remained. Force must otherwise satisfy § 76-2-402; initial-provocation, felony, aggressor, and combat-by-agreement limits; failure to retreat is not relevant to necessity or proportionality. | Utah Code § 76-2-402(4) |
| Vermont | Duty to retreat, with exceptions | No unqualified right to stand ground; sufficient and available means of avoiding the assault must be used. Retreat or avoidance must appear sufficient and available and actually be so; no retreat when deadly force is immediately necessary and no sufficient available alternative exists. | Vermont Office of Legislative Counsel, Meaning of ‘Necessary’ When Using Force in Self-Defense (Mar. 23, 2022) (discussing State v. Tubbs and State v. Hatcher) |
| Virginia | Qualified or location-specific rule | No retreat for faultless self-defense; retreat required for excusable self-defense by an at-fault actor. Faultless defendant may stand ground and use necessary reasonable force; at-fault defendant must abandon and retreat as far as safely possible before repelling the attack. | Taylor v. Commonwealth, No. 0753-09-3, slip op. at 4 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2010) |
| Washington | No duty under case law | No duty where one has a right to be and reasonably believes an attack is occurring. Right to be at the place; reasonable grounds to believe one is being attacked; only lawful force. | State v. Courtney, No. 76108-1-I, slip op. at 22-25 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2018) (unpublished) (quoting WPIC 16.08) |
| West Virginia | No duty by statute | No duty in the home, and a conditional no-duty rule elsewhere. Outside the home, defender is not engaged in unlawful activity and has a legal right to be there; outside-home deadly force requires a reasonable belief of imminent death or serious bodily harm and that deadly force is the only means to save the defender or another. | W. Va. Code § 55-7-22(b)-(c) |
| Wisconsin | Qualified no-duty rule | No general duty to retreat, but a safe retreat may bear on necessity outside castle conditions. Force must otherwise satisfy Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1); outside § 939.48(1m), opportunity to retreat may be considered when deciding whether force was reasonably necessary. | State v. Wenger, No. 98-1739-CR, slip op. at 7 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 1999) |
| Wyoming | No duty by statute | No duty anywhere lawfully present. Not the initial aggressor; not engaged in illegal activity; only reasonable defensive force under subsection (a). | Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-602(e) |
Watch out: “No duty to retreat” answers only one part of self-defense. The person must still satisfy the jurisdiction's rules on necessity, proportionality, imminence, provocation, and unlawful activity.
What conditions and exceptions limit a no-duty rule?
Most no-duty rules begin only after the actor satisfies the underlying self-defense statute or common-law test. Recurring conditions include lawful presence, no disqualifying criminal activity, a reasonable belief in imminent death or serious injury before deadly force, and limits for an initial aggressor or provocateur. Those themes do not create a single national test. Arkansas adds detailed restrictions involving specified firearm possession and criminal enterprises.

Pennsylvania requires the attacker to display or use a firearm, replica, or other apparently lethal weapon for its public stand-ground branch. West Virginia has one rule in the home and a conditional outside-home rule. California and Oregon derive no-retreat propositions from court authorities while retaining their statutory limits on justified force. The row-specific conditions in the table are part of the classification; omitting them would make a “yes” label misleading.
Location also changes the analysis. Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and other duty jurisdictions recognize limited home or workplace exceptions. Those exceptions do not automatically extend to a sidewalk, vehicle, detached property, workplace shared with an attacker, or a person who began the confrontation. The linked state guide provides the relevant statutory definitions and authorities.
Does stand your ground create criminal or civil immunity?
No. A retreat rule, a justification defense, pretrial criminal immunity, civil immunity, and an arrest restriction are distinct legal mechanisms. A person may have a justification defense at trial without having a separate procedure that permits dismissal before trial. Likewise, a statute may restrict a civil lawsuit without changing the criminal procedure or the retreat analysis.

The scope can also depend on the place and the precise justification provision. Colorado's criminal and civil protections in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-704.5 apply to an occupant whose force satisfies that section's dwelling-intruder requirements. They should not be read as statewide public-place immunity merely because Colorado's separate self-defense law addresses retreat.
Florida's § 776.032 applies to force justified under specified provisions and separately addresses criminal prosecution, civil actions, and arrest. Kansas § 21-5231 and South Carolina § 16-11-450 also contain express immunity and arrest language, but their text and procedures differ. Alabama's current § 13A-3-23 provides a motion-triggered pretrial hearing and uses a preponderance standard; the cited official page identifies the version effective before October 1, 2026.
How does stand your ground differ from castle doctrine?
Stand your ground usually addresses retreat in a place where a person may lawfully be. Castle doctrine usually describes special self-defense treatment tied to a dwelling or another protected location. Depending on the jurisdiction, a castle rule may remove retreat, authorize force against specified unlawful entry, create a presumption about fear or necessity, or combine several of those effects.
These concepts overlap, but one does not prove the other. Oregon, for example, has a no-duty rule under case law and statutory rules for force against burglary in a dwelling, while those statutes do not contain an express reasonable-fear presumption. Wisconsin has a location-based presumption in § 939.48(1m), while its broader retreat classification remains conditional. The separate castle doctrine states comparison preserves those distinctions for every jurisdiction.
General legal information, not legal advice. Rules and effective dates vary by jurisdiction and facts. Confirm the current primary authority and consult a lawyer licensed in the relevant jurisdiction about a specific matter.
Related self-defense guides
- Self-defense laws by state
- Castle doctrine states and protected-location rules
- Alabama self-defense laws
- Wisconsin self-defense laws
Last updated: September 11, 2026. Statutes and cases cited reflect the sources verified as of September 11, 2026.
Frequently Asked Questions
How many states have stand your ground laws?
This comparison identifies 29 jurisdictions with statutory no-duty rules and 6 with no-duty rules under case law as of September 11, 2026. It keeps those categories separate; compare Ala. Code § 13A-3-23(b) with California CALCRIM 2026 instructions Nos. 505 and 3470.
Which states require a person to retreat?
Twelve jurisdictions are classified as duty-to-retreat jurisdictions with exceptions. Their rows identify home, workplace, safety, and aggressor limits, such as Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-19(b).
Is Wisconsin a stand your ground state?
This comparison treats Wisconsin as conditional. Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1) governs justification, retreat may bear on reasonable necessity, and § 939.48(1m) supplies a separate location-based presumption under its stated conditions.
Does stand your ground mean force is automatically lawful?
No. A no-duty rule removes retreat from a defined part of the analysis; necessity, proportionality, imminence, lawful presence, provocation, and other conditions can still control under statutes such as Fla. Stat. § 776.012.
Does every stand your ground state provide immunity before trial?
No. A no-retreat rule does not itself create a pretrial dismissal procedure. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5231 contains express immunity language, while Colorado § 18-1-704.5 limits its protection to force meeting that section’s dwelling requirements.
Is castle doctrine the same as stand your ground?
No. Castle doctrine focuses on protected locations and may create a presumption or special force rule, as Fla. Stat. § 776.013 illustrates; stand your ground focuses on retreat.
Updates
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources
Sources and References
- Alabama: Ala. Code Section 13A-3-23(b) (effective until Oct. 1, 2026)(alison.legislature.state.al.us).gov
- Alaska: Alaska Stat. Section 11.81.335(b)(5)(www.akleg.gov).gov
- Alaska: Alaska Stat. Section 09.65.330(a)-(b)(www.akleg.gov).gov
- Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Sections 13-405(B), 13-411(B), 13-418(B)(www.azleg.gov).gov
- Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Sections 13-411(C)-(D), 13-419(A)-(D)(www.azleg.gov).gov
- Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Section 13-205(A)(www.azleg.gov).gov
- Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Section 13-413(www.azleg.gov).gov
- Arkansas: Ark. Code Ann. Sections 5-2-606(c), 5-2-607(b), as amended by 2021 Ark. Acts 250(www.arkleg.state.ar.us).gov
- Arkansas: Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-620(arkleg.state.ar.us).gov
- Arkansas: Ark. Code Ann. Section 16-120-106, enacted by 2015 Ark. Acts 1073(www.arkleg.state.ar.us).gov
- California: Judicial Council of California, CALCRIM 2026, Nos. 505 and 3470(courts.ca.gov).gov
- California: Cal. Penal Code Section 198.5(leginfo.legislature.ca.gov).gov
- California: Cal.Civ.Code §§ 50,847(a)-(g)(leginfo.legislature.ca.gov).gov
- Colorado: Colorado Judicial Branch, COLJI-Crim 2025, H:12 (applying Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-704)(www.coloradojudicial.gov).gov
- Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. Section 18-1-704.5(2)(olls.info).gov
- Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. Section 53a-19(b)(www.cga.ct.gov).gov
- Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. Sections 53a-19(b)(1), 53a-20(www.cga.ct.gov).gov
- Delaware: 11 Del. C. Section 464(e)(2)(delcode.delaware.gov).gov
- District of Columbia: In re Robertson, D.C. Ct. App. Nos. 00-FM-925 & 04-FM-1269, slip op. at 24-25 (Jan. 24, 2008), quoting Gillis v. United States, 400 A.2d 311, 313 (D.C. 1979)(testweb.dccourts.gov).gov
- Florida: Fla. Stat. Section 776.012(1)-(2) (2026)(www.leg.state.fl.us).gov
- Florida: Fla. Stat. Section 776.013(2)-(3) (2026)(www.leg.state.fl.us).gov
- Florida: Fla. Stat. Section 776.032(1)-(2), (4) (2026)(www.leg.state.fl.us).gov
- Georgia: Ga. Code Section 16-3-23.1, enacted by 2006 Ga. Laws Act 599 (SB 396)(dlg.usg.edu).gov
- Georgia: Medina v. State, S26A0362 (Ga. Mar. 3, 2026) (applying OCGA §§ 16-3-23 and 16-3-24.1)(www.gasupreme.us).gov
- Georgia: Ga. Code Section 16-3-24.2, as amended by 2024 Ga. Laws Act 545 (SB 517)(gov.georgia.gov).gov
- Hawaii: Haw. Rev. Stat. Section 703-304(5)(b)(data.capitol.hawaii.gov).gov
- Hawaii: Haw. Rev. Stat. Section 703-301(1)(data.capitol.hawaii.gov).gov
- Idaho: Idaho Code Section 19-202A(3)(legislature.idaho.gov).gov
- Idaho: Idaho Code Section 6-808(1)-(2)(legislature.idaho.gov).gov
- Illinois: Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions-Criminal 24-25.09X, Committee Note (citing People v. Hughes and People v. Miller)(ilcourtsaudio.blob.core.windows.net).gov
- Illinois: 720 ILCS5/7-2(a),2-6(a)(ftp.ilga.gov).gov
- Illinois: 720 ILCS 5/7-1(a), 7-2(a)(www.ilga.gov).gov
- Illinois: 720 ILCS5/7-1(b),7-2(b),7-3(b)(ftp.ilga.gov).gov
- Indiana: Ind. Code Section 35-41-3-2(c)(iga.in.gov).gov
- Indiana: Ind. Code Section 35-41-3-2(www.in.gov).gov
- Indiana: Ind. Code Section 34-30-31-1; P.L. 107-2019 (HB 1284)(iga.in.gov).gov
- Iowa: Iowa Code Section 704.1(3)(www.legis.iowa.gov).gov
- Iowa: Iowa Code Section 704.2A(www.legis.iowa.gov).gov
- Iowa: Iowa Code Section 704.13(www.legis.iowa.gov).gov
- Kansas: Kan. Stat. Ann. Sections 21-5222(c), 21-5230(www.kslegislature.gov).gov
- Kansas: Kan. Stat. Ann. Sections 21-5223, 21-5224(www.kslegislature.gov).gov
- Kansas: Kan. Stat. Ann. Section 21-5231(a)-(c)(www.kslegislature.gov).gov
- Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. Sections 503.050(4), 503.055(3)(apps.legislature.ky.gov).gov
- Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. Section 503.055(apps.legislature.ky.gov).gov
- Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. Section 503.085(1)-(2)(apps.legislature.ky.gov).gov
- Louisiana: La. Rev. Stat. Sections 14:19(C)-(D), 14:20(C)-(D)(www.legis.la.gov).gov
- Louisiana: La. Rev. Stat. Section 9:2800.19(www.legis.la.gov).gov
- Maine: 17-A Me. Rev. Stat. Section 108(2)(C)(3)(a)(legislature.maine.gov).gov
- Maryland: Shae-Von Edwards v. State, No. 0799, Sept. Term 2023 (Md. App. Ct. Oct. 31, 2025)(www.mdcourts.gov).gov
- Maryland: Joiner v. State, No. 1949, Sept. Term 2023 (Md. App. Ct. May 30, 2025)(www.mdcourts.gov).gov
- Massachusetts: Massachusetts Model Jury Instructions on Homicide III, notes 81-84 (discussing G.L. c. 278, Section 8A)(www.mass.gov).gov
- Massachusetts: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, Section 8A(malegislature.gov).gov
- Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws Section 780.972(www.legislature.mi.gov).gov
- Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws Section 780.951(www.legislature.mi.gov).gov
- Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws Section 780.961(www.legislature.mi.gov).gov
- Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws Section 600.2922b(www.legislature.mi.gov).gov
- Minnesota: State v. Blevins, 10 N.W.3d 29, 35-40 (Minn. 2024) (discussing State v. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d 392, 402 (Minn. 2001))(mncourts.gov).gov
- Minnesota: Minn. Stat. Section 609.065(www.revisor.mn.gov).gov
- Minnesota: Minn. Stat. Section 609.066(3)(www.revisor.mn.gov).gov
- Mississippi: Miss. Code Section 97-3-15(4)(billstatus.ls.state.ms.us).gov
- Missouri: Mo. Rev. Stat. § 563.031.3(www.revisor.mo.gov).gov
- Missouri: Mo. Rev. Stat. § 563.074.1(www.revisor.mo.gov).gov
- Montana: Mont. Code Ann. § 45-3-110(mca.legmt.gov).gov
- Montana: Mont. Code Ann. §§ 45-3-103, 45-2-101(47)(mca.legmt.gov).gov
- Montana: Mont. Code Ann. § 45-3-112(mca.legmt.gov).gov
- Montana: Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-722(mca.legmt.gov).gov
- Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1409(4)(b)(nebraskalegislature.gov).gov
- Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1416(1)(nebraskalegislature.gov).gov
- Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.120(2)(www.leg.state.nv.us).gov
- Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.095(1)(b)(www.leg.state.nv.us).gov
- New Hampshire: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 627:4 III(a)(gc.nh.gov).gov
- New Jersey: N.J. Model Criminal Jury Charge, Justification - Self Defense (N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4)(www.njcourts.gov).gov
- New Mexico: UJI 14-5190 NMRA(supremecourt.nmcourts.gov).gov
- New Mexico: UJI 14-5170 NMRA(supremecourt.nmcourts.gov).gov
- New York: N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15(2)(www.nysenate.gov).gov
- New York: N.Y. Penal Law §§ 35.15(2)(a)(i), 35.20(3)(www.nysenate.gov).gov
- North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.3(a)(www.ncleg.gov).gov
- North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2(www.ncleg.gov).gov
- North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-05-07(2)(b)(2)(ndlegis.gov).gov
- Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.09(B)-(C)(codes.ohio.gov).gov
- Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.05(B)(2)-(4)(codes.ohio.gov).gov
- Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2305.40(B), 2307.221(B)(codes.ohio.gov).gov
- Oklahoma: Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1289.25(D)(www.oklegislature.gov).gov
- Oregon: State v. James, 350 Or. App. 71, 80 (2026)(ojd.contentdm.oclc.org).gov
- Oregon: Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 161.219, 161.225(www.oregonlegislature.gov).gov
- Pennsylvania: 18 Pa.C.S. § 505(b)(2.3)-(2.4)(www.palegis.us).gov
- Pennsylvania: 42 Pa.C.S. § 8340.2(www.palegis.us).gov
- Rhode Island: State v. Urena, No. 2004-199-C.A., slip op. at 8-9 & n.4 (R.I. June 16, 2006) (quoting State v. Quarles)(www.courts.ri.gov).gov
- Rhode Island: R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-8-8(webserver.rilegislature.gov).gov
- South Carolina: S.C. Code § 16-11-440(C)(www.scstatehouse.gov).gov
- South Dakota: S.D. Codified Laws § 22-18-4.1(sdlegislature.gov).gov
- Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-611(b), enacted by 2007 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 210(capitol.tn.gov).gov
- Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-611(c)-(d); 2008 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 1012; 2026 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 886(capitol.tn.gov).gov
- Texas: Tex. Penal Code §§ 9.31(e)-(f), 9.32(c)-(d)(statutes.capitol.texas.gov).gov
- Texas: Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 83.001(statutes.capitol.texas.gov).gov
- Utah: Utah Code § 76-2-402(4)(le.utah.gov).gov
- Vermont: Vermont Office of Legislative Counsel, Meaning of ‘Necessary’ When Using Force in Self-Defense (Mar. 23, 2022) (discussing State v. Tubbs and State v. Hatcher)(legislature.vermont.gov).gov
- Vermont: 13 V.S.A. § 2305(a)(legislature.vermont.gov).gov
- Virginia: Taylor v. Commonwealth, No. 0753-09-3, slip op. at 4 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2010)(courts.state.va.us).gov
- Virginia: Horne v. Commonwealth, No. 1267-22-1, slip op. at 10-11 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2023)(www.courts.state.va.us).gov
- Washington: State v. Courtney, No. 76108-1-I, slip op. at 22-25 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2018) (unpublished) (quoting WPIC 16.08)(www.courts.wa.gov).gov
- Washington: Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.16.050(app.leg.wa.gov).gov
- West Virginia: W. Va. Code § 55-7-22(b)-(c)(code.wvlegislature.gov).gov
- Wisconsin: State v. Wenger, No. 98-1739-CR, slip op. at 7 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 1999)(www.wicourts.gov).gov
- Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1m)(docs.legis.wisconsin.gov).gov
- Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. § 895.62(2)-(5)(docs.legis.wisconsin.gov).gov
- Wyoming: Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-602(e)(wyoleg.gov).gov
- Wyoming: Wyo. Stat. § 6-1-204(wyoleg.gov).gov