Castle Doctrine States: Rules in All 50 States and DC
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Castle Doctrine States: Rules in All 50 States and DC
Castle doctrine is not one nationwide rule. As of September 11, 2026, this guide compares each state and the District of Columbia and separates protected-location defenses from fear presumptions. Where the cited authority establishes a home-defense rule but does not settle the broader presumption question, the row says so directly.
Information last verified on September 11, 2026. This article has not yet been reviewed by a licensed lawyer.
Jurisdiction scope: This article compares castle-related self-defense rules in all 50 states and the District of Columbia as of September 11, 2026. It tracks protected locations and whether the cited authority establishes a specific presumption. It does not determine whether force was justified in a particular event.
What does castle doctrine mean, and how is it classified?
“Castle doctrine” is a shorthand label for special self-defense rules tied to a dwelling or another protected place. The label can describe different legal effects.
One jurisdiction may remove a duty to retreat in the home. Another may authorize force to prevent burglary. Another may presume that a defender reasonably feared death or serious injury when an intruder forcibly entered.

Some statutes combine these features and extend them to occupied vehicles, workplaces, businesses, curtilage, or places of worship. This guide classifies a specific presumption, not every form of home defense.
Entry or removal presumption means that the cited authority creates the presumption under stated triggers. Limited statutory presumption identifies a narrower burden rule. Defense rule; no presumption established is used only for Oregon’s complete statutory chapter. Presumption unresolved means the cited home-defense authority does not settle whether another authority supplies a presumption; it does not mean that home defense is unavailable.
That taxonomy prevents a common error: calling every home-defense rule a presumption. A no-retreat exception can help a defender without changing the burden or directing a court to presume reasonable fear. A burglary-defense statute can authorize force without extending to a parked vehicle. The state row states the verified locations and conditions.
- Verified presumption (26): Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin, Wyoming.
- Limited presumption (1): Missouri.
- No verified statutory presumption (1): Oregon.
- Presumption unresolved: Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia.
Protected locations and presumptions by jurisdiction
The table covers every state and the District of Columbia. Each row links to the state guide and identifies only the locations supported by the cited authority. “Dwelling” and “residence” may have different statutory definitions, and “curtilage” generally refers to land closely associated with a home under a jurisdiction-specific definition. “Occupied vehicle” does not necessarily include an empty car.
Business and workplace coverage may depend on ownership, control, employment, occupancy, or whether the premises are open to the public. The scope column keeps trigger and exception details attached where a presumption is established. Other rows state the affirmative defense rule that the cited authority does establish and tell the reader when the broader presumption question requires further state-specific authority.
| Jurisdiction | Classification | Verified locations | Scope, triggers, and limits | Authority |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alabama | Entry or removal presumption | dwelling, residence, occupied vehicle, business, other specified place | The current presumption includes specified force against a person on business property while the business is closed to the public, and unlawful forcible entry or removal involving a dwelling, residence, business property, occupied vehicle, or federally licensed nuclear power facility. Trigger: A qualifying violent crime against a person on closed business property, or known or reasonably perceived unlawful forcible entry or removal within another listed location. Limits or exceptions: lawful resident or person with a right to be there, absent a qualifying protective or no-contact order; lawful custody or guardianship situations; defender's unlawful activity or use of the location to further unlawful activity; identified law-enforcement officer performing official duties. | Ala. Code Section 13A-3-23(a)(4)-(5) (effective until Oct. 1, 2026) |
| Alaska | Presumption unresolved | dwelling, workplace, other specified place | AS11.81.335(b) includes owned or leased premises, residence or guest/agent status, a work building, and any other place where the person has a right to be. Aggressor and mutual-combat restrictions remain under AS11.81.330. | Alaska Stat. Section 11.81.335(b)(1), (3), (5) |
| Arizona | Entry or removal presumption | dwelling, residence, occupied vehicle, business, other specified place | Section 13-419 creates a residential-structure and occupied-vehicle imminent-peril presumption. Section 13-411 adds a reasonable-action presumption when force prevents listed crimes and applies in any lawful place, including home, business, land, and conveyances. Trigger: The other person unlawfully or forcefully enters a residential structure or occupied vehicle, remains present, and the defender knows or reasonably believes that entry occurred. Limits or exceptions: person against whom force is used has a right to be there and no qualifying protective order exists; child or grandchild custody or guardianship situations; defender is engaged in unlawful activity or uses the location to further unlawful activity; law-enforcement officer performing official duties. | Ariz. Rev. Stat. Sections 13-411(C)-(D), 13-419(A)-(D) |
| Arkansas | Entry or removal presumption | home | Arkansas reaffirms defense of persons and property within the home and creates a legal presumption that force used for that purpose was lawful and necessary, rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence. Trigger: Force used to defend self, another person, or property in the home against harm, injury, or loss by someone unlawfully entering, attempting to enter, or intruding. Limits or exceptions: The presumption may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. | Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-620 |
| California | Entry or removal presumption | residence | Penal Code Section 198.5 creates a residence-only fear presumption. Penal Code Section 197 separately permits justified homicide in defense of habitation, property, or person, but does not create the same presumption. Trigger: The resident uses force intended or likely to cause death or great bodily injury against a non-household intruder who unlawfully and forcibly enters, with knowledge or reason to believe the entry occurred. Limits or exceptions: the target is a member of the family or household; the entry is not both unlawful and forcible; the defender lacks knowledge or reason to believe the entry occurred. | Cal. Penal Code Section 198.5 |
| Colorado | Presumption unresolved | dwelling | An occupant may use any degree of force against an unlawful entrant only when the occupant also reasonably believes the entrant committed, is committing, or intends an additional crime and might use any physical force against an occupant. Dwelling excludes habitation in a detention facility under subsection (5). | Colo. Rev. Stat. Section 18-1-704.5(2) |
| Connecticut | Presumption unresolved | dwelling, workplace | A non-aggressor need not retreat from the actor’s dwelling or workplace. Section 53a-20 separately permits necessary deadly force to prevent an attempted arson or crime of violence, or solely to prevent or terminate unlawful forcible entry into the actor’s dwelling or workplace; criminal trespass alone is insufficient. | Conn. Gen. Stat. Sections 53a-19(b)(1), 53a-20 |
| Delaware | Presumption unresolved | dwelling, workplace | Section 469 supplies a defense for an occupant facing an unlawful intruder in the occupant's own dwelling under three alternative conditions. The workplace appears only as a retreat exception; property-defense rules have separate limits. | 11 Del. C. Sections 464(e)(2), 466(c), 469 |
| District of Columbia | Presumption unresolved | No location classified | In re Robertson permits consideration of whether the defender safely could have avoided the encounter when evaluating imminent danger. The broader protected-location and presumption questions require separate District of Columbia authority. | In re Robertson, D.C. Ct. App. Nos. 00-FM-925 & 04-FM-1269, slip op. at 24-25 (Jan. 24, 2008), quoting Gillis v. United States, 400 A.2d 311, 313 (D.C. 1979) |
| Florida | Entry or removal presumption | dwelling, residence, occupied vehicle | The presumption covers qualifying unlawful forcible entry or removal involving a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle, subject to four statutory exception groups. Dwelling includes qualifying roofed lodging structures and attached porches; residence includes an invited guest’s dwelling. Section 776.013(1) separately supplies a retreat exception for a person entitled to be in a dwelling or residence. Trigger: Defensive force intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm against an unlawful forcible entrant, or a person removing or attempting to remove another against their will from a dwelling, residence or occupied vehicle, with the defender’s statutory knowledge or reason to believe. Limits or exceptions: lawful resident or right-holder without a qualifying injunction or no-contact order; specified child or grandchild custody or guardianship circumstances; defender's criminal activity or use of the location to further it; identified or known law-enforcement officer performing official duties. | Fla. Stat. Section 776.013(2)-(3) (2026) |
| Georgia | Presumption unresolved | dwelling, motor vehicle, place of business | Reasonable force may be used to prevent or terminate unlawful entry into or attack on a habitation. Subsection (2) can apply after an unlawful and forcible entry has occurred, subject to its non-family/household limitation. | Medina v. State, S26A0362 (Ga. Mar. 3, 2026) (applying OCGA §§ 16-3-23 and 16-3-24.1) |
| Hawaii | Presumption unresolved | dwelling, workplace | Dwelling and workplace are retreat exceptions, subject to the initial-aggressor and shared-workplace limits stated in Section 703-304(5)(b)(i). Section 703-306(3) separately permits qualifying deadly force against dispossession of a dwelling without a claim of right or specified property crimes plus additional deadly-force danger; trespass alone is insufficient. | Haw. Rev. Stat. Section 703-304(5)(b)(i) |
| Idaho | Entry or removal presumption | other specified place, business, occupied vehicle | Statutory habitation includes qualifying lodging structures or conveyances, invited-guest dwellings and dwelling curtilage. Place of business or employment includes interior and exterior premises under the specified ownership/control conditions. The vehicle must be occupied and meet 18-4009(3)(c)’s motorized public-highway definition. Trigger: Unlawful entry or attempted entry made or attempted by force, violently and tumultuously, surreptitiously, by stealth, or to commit a felony. | Idaho Code§§ 19-202A(5),18-4009(2)-(3) |
| Illinois | Presumption unresolved | dwelling | Section 7-2 permits qualifying deadly force for violent, riotous or tumultuous entry plus reasonably necessary prevention of personal violence, or reasonably necessary prevention of a felony in the dwelling. Section 2-6(a) includes a building, tent, vehicle or other enclosed space used or intended as human habitation; the narrower residential-burglary definition in 2-6(b) is not the general rule. | 720 ILCS5/7-2(a),2-6(a) |
| Indiana | Presumption unresolved | dwelling, curtilage, occupied vehicle | The official code text permits reasonable force, including deadly force, without retreat to prevent or terminate unlawful entry of or attack on a dwelling, curtilage, or occupied motor vehicle. | Ind. Code Section 35-41-3-2(d) |
| Iowa | Entry or removal presumption | dwelling, business, workplace, occupied vehicle | A reasonable-belief presumption applies to force-or-stealth entry, remaining after such entry, or nonconsensual removal at the listed locations. Trigger: The target is unlawfully entering by force or stealth, remains after such entry, or unlawfully removes or attempts to remove another, and the defender knows or has reason to believe it. Limits or exceptions: defender engaged in a criminal offense or using the location to further one; child/custody removal; peace officer performing lawful duties; person with right to be there absent a protective or no-contact order. | Iowa Code Section 704.2A |
| Kansas | Entry or removal presumption | dwelling, workplace, occupied vehicle | The locations have a separate defensive-force rule and no retreat; a deadly-force necessity presumption applies to specified entry or removal events. Trigger: Unlawful or forceful entry/presence, or nonconsensual removal, plus the defender's knowledge or reason to believe it occurred. Limits or exceptions: target has a right to be there absent a listed order; child/custody removal; defender committing or furthering a crime; identified law-enforcement officer. | Kan. Stat. Ann. Sections 21-5223, 21-5224 |
| Kentucky | Entry or removal presumption | dwelling, residence, occupied vehicle | A reasonable-fear presumption applies to specified forcible entry or nonconsensual removal from a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle. Trigger: Unlawful and forcible entry, or removal/attempted removal, plus defender knowledge or reason to believe it occurred. Limits or exceptions: target has a right to be there absent a qualifying no-contact order; child/custody removal; defender engaged in or furthering unlawful activity; identified peace officer performing duties. | Ky. Rev. Stat. Section 503.055 |
| Louisiana | Entry or removal presumption | dwelling, business, occupied vehicle, other specified place | Sections 14:19 and 14:20 presume necessity for specified unlawful and forcible entry into a dwelling, business, or motor vehicle. Current Section 14:19 also includes a church or other place of worship for non-homicidal force. Trigger: The defender is lawfully inside; the target unlawfully and forcibly enters or has entered; the defender knows or has reason to believe it. Limits or exceptions: Section 14:20(4)(b) excludes a defender then engaged in specified controlled-substance conduct. | La. Rev. Stat. Sections 14:19(B), 14:20(B) |
| Maine | Presumption unresolved | dwelling | Deadly force can be justified against an unlicensed entrant or person surreptitiously remaining when the defender reasonably believes force is needed to prevent bodily injury to someone in the dwelling. | 17-A Me. Rev. Stat. Section 108(2)(B) |
| Maryland | Presumption unresolved | dwelling | Defense of habitation covers a reasonable belief that the victim intended a felony in the home or serious bodily harm or death to an inhabitant; home self-defense has no duty to retreat. | Joiner v. State, No. 1949, Sept. Term 2023 (Md. App. Ct. May 30, 2025) |
| Massachusetts | Presumption unresolved | dwelling | A lawful resident need not retreat from an unlawful intruder if the resident reasonably believes the intruder is about to kill or seriously injure a lawful occupant and reasonably believes the force is necessary. | Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, Section 8A |
| Michigan | Entry or removal presumption | dwelling, business, occupied vehicle | The rebuttable presumption covers breaking and entering a dwelling or business premises, home invasion, and nonconsensual removal from a dwelling, business premises, or occupied vehicle. Vehicle intrusion by itself is not listed in the trigger. Trigger: Specified breaking and entering/home invasion or unlawful removal, plus the defender's honest and reasonable belief that the target is engaging in that conduct. Limits or exceptions: target has a legal right to be there absent a qualifying order; child/custody removal; defender committing or furthering a crime; peace officer performing duties; listed domestic relationship plus defender's prior domestic-violence history as aggressor. | Mich. Comp. Laws Section 780.951 |
| Minnesota | Presumption unresolved | dwelling | Section 609.065 authorizes deadly force to prevent a felony in the actor's place of abode. The cited statute does not establish a fear presumption. | Minn. Stat. Section 609.065 |
| Mississippi | Entry or removal presumption | dwelling, occupied vehicle, business, workplace, other specified place | The fear presumption covers unlawful forcible entry or nonconsensual removal involving a dwelling, occupied vehicle, business, place of employment, or the immediate premises of the business or employment. Trigger: Unlawful forcible entry/presence or nonconsensual removal, plus defender knowledge or reason to believe it occurred. Limits or exceptions: target has a right to be or is a lawful resident/owner; defender engaged in unlawful activity; law-enforcement officer performing official duties. | Miss. Code Section 97-3-15(2)(c), (3) |
| Missouri | Limited statutory presumption | dwelling, residence, occupied vehicle, other specified place | Deadly force may be justified against unlawful entry, remaining, or attempted entry into an occupied dwelling, residence, or vehicle, and a separate branch reaches qualifying privately owned or leased real property. Trigger: When the defendant invokes the occupied dwelling/residence/vehicle entry branch, the state must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's reasonable belief that force was necessary. Limits or exceptions: The section states a burden shift, not a rebuttable-presumption label; Initial-aggressor and forcible-felony restrictions remain. | Mo. Rev. Stat. § 563.031.2-.5 |
| Montana | Presumption unresolved | dwelling, occupied vehicle, business, other specified place | The occupied-structure rule reaches buildings, vehicles, places suitable for occupancy or night lodging, business locations, and specified nearby outbuildings; deadly force additionally requires preventing an assault inside or a forcible felony. | Mont. Code Ann. §§ 45-3-103, 45-2-101(47) |
| Nebraska | Presumption unresolved | dwelling, workplace | Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1409 creates dwelling and workplace exceptions to the retreat duty; the broader presumption question requires separate state-specific authority. | Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1409(4)(b)(i) |
| Nevada | Entry or removal presumption | dwelling, residence, occupied vehicle | The homicide rule covers an occupied habitation or occupied motor vehicle; a rebuttable fear presumption requires forcible unlawful entry or attempted entry, a crime of violence, and no provocation. Trigger: The defender knew or reasonably believed the target was forcibly and unlawfully entering or attempting to enter an occupied habitation or occupied motor vehicle and was committing or attempting a crime of violence. Limits or exceptions: defender provoked the person killed. | Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 200.120-.130 |
| New Hampshire | Presumption unresolved | dwelling, curtilage | In the dwelling/curtilage branch in force on the as-of date, deadly force may be justified against likely unlawful force during a felony against the actor. Separate branches address burglary, kidnapping, and forcible sex offenses. | N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 627:4 II |
| New Jersey | Presumption unresolved | dwelling | The official model instruction treats one's dwelling, including a porch, as the exception to the public retreat rule; the source is a jury instruction tied to N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4 and 2C:3-11(c). | N.J. Model Criminal Jury Charge, Justification - Self Defense |
| New Mexico | Presumption unresolved | dwelling | Defense of habitation requires a dwelling, a violent felony immediately at hand, apparent necessity to kill to prevent it, and objective reasonableness. | UJI 14-5170 NMRA |
| New York | Presumption unresolved | dwelling, other specified place | A person in possession or control of, or licensed or privileged to be in, a dwelling or occupied building may use deadly force reasonably believed necessary to prevent or terminate a burglary or attempted burglary. | N.Y. Penal Law §§ 35.15(2)(a)(i), 35.20(3) |
| North Carolina | Entry or removal presumption | dwelling, curtilage, occupied vehicle, workplace | A rebuttable reasonable-fear presumption covers qualifying forcible entry, remaining, or removal at a statutorily defined home, motor vehicle, or workplace; home includes curtilage. Trigger: The lawful occupant knows or has reason to believe the target is unlawfully and forcibly entering or has entered, or is removing or attempting to remove another against that person's will. Limits or exceptions: target has a lawful right/residency and no qualifying protective/no-contact order; custody/guardianship removal; defender's specified criminal conduct; identified law-enforcement officer or bail bondsman acting lawfully; entry efforts discontinued and target exited. | N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2 |
| North Dakota | Entry or removal presumption | dwelling, workplace, occupied vehicle | Deadly force may protect a dwelling, workplace, motor vehicle, or occupied motor home/travel trailer against specified violent crimes; the fear presumption is narrower and covers forcible entry/removal at a dwelling, workplace, or occupied motor home/travel trailer. Trigger: Forcible unlawful entry, remaining, or removal at a covered location, with knowledge or reason to believe it occurred. Limits or exceptions: target has right/lawful residency absent qualifying protection/no-contact order; child or lawful-custody removal; defender committing a crime or using location to further one; identified law-enforcement officer acting officially. | N.D. Cent. Code §§ 12.1-05-07(2)(c), 12.1-05-07.1 |
| Ohio | Entry or removal presumption | residence, occupied vehicle | A rebuttable presumption of self-defense or defense of another applies to deadly or great-bodily-harm force against an unprivileged unlawful entrant into the defender-occupied residence or vehicle. Trigger: The target is unlawfully and without privilege entering, or has so entered, the residence or vehicle occupied by the defender. Limits or exceptions: target has a right to be in or is a lawful resident of the residence or vehicle; defender is unlawfully and without privilege in the residence or vehicle. | Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.05(B)(2)-(4) |
| Oklahoma | Entry or removal presumption | dwelling, residence, occupied vehicle, business, other specified place | The presumption text lists a dwelling, residence, occupied vehicle, place of business, occupied premises, and place of worship; subsection B's opening language expressly addresses people within worship and owners, managers, or employees of a business. Trigger: Qualifying unlawful forcible entry, completed entry, removal, or entry to commit a forcible felony, with the defender's knowledge or reasonable belief. Limits or exceptions: target has a right to be in or is a lawful resident and no qualifying protective/no-contact order applies; lawful-custody or guardianship removal; defender is engaged in unlawful activity or uses the listed location to further it. | Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1289.25(B)-(C) |
| Oregon | Defense rule; no presumption established | dwelling, other specified place | ORS 161.219 specifically permits qualifying deadly force against burglary in a dwelling; ORS 161.225 separately authorizes reasonable force for premises and narrows deadly force to personal defense, arson, or a felony by force and violence. The cited statutory chapter contains no express reasonable-fear presumption; other evidentiary rules require a separate analysis. | Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 161.219, 161.225 |
| Pennsylvania | Entry or removal presumption | dwelling, residence, occupied vehicle, workplace | The fear presumption covers forcible entry, presence, or removal at a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle. The separate retreat exception covers the defender's dwelling or workplace, with aggressor and shared-workplace limits. Trigger: Unlawful forcible entry or presence, or forcible removal, at a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle, known or reasonably known to the defender. Limits or exceptions: target is a rightful owner/resident and no qualifying protection order applies; lawful-custody removal; defender criminal activity or use of the location to further it; known peace officer acting officially. | 18 Pa.C.S. § 505(b)(2)-(2.5) |
| Rhode Island | Entry or removal presumption | dwelling, other specified place | The statute applies only while the injured or killed person is committing one of the burglary or breaking-and-entering offenses enumerated in §§ 11-8-2 through 11-8-6, at the place occupied by the owner, tenant, or occupier. Trigger: The target dies or is injured while committing an offense enumerated in §§ 11-8-2 through 11-8-6. Limits or exceptions: rebuttable presumption; limited to the enumerated offenses. | R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-8-8 |
| South Carolina | Entry or removal presumption | dwelling, residence, occupied vehicle | The operative presumption covers a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle. The section heading mentions business, but the presumption's enacted operative list does not; business appears in the separate no-duty subsection. Trigger: Qualifying unlawful forcible entry, completed entry, or forcible removal, known or reasonably known to the defender. Limits or exceptions: rightful owner/resident absent qualifying protection/no-contact order; lawful-custody removal; defender unlawful activity or use of location to further it; identified or known officer acting officially. | S.C. Code § 16-11-440(A)-(B) |
| South Dakota | Entry or removal presumption | dwelling, residence, occupied vehicle | The reasonable-fear presumption covers unlawful entry, completed entry, or forcible removal at a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle. Trigger: The target is unlawfully entering or has unlawfully entered a covered place, or removes or attempts forcible removal, and the defender knows or has reason to believe the act occurred. Limits or exceptions: rightful resident and no protection order; lawful-custody or guardianship removal; defender criminal activity or use of location to further it; identified or known officer acting officially. | S.D. Codified Laws §§ 22-18-4.3 to -4.4 |
| Tennessee | Entry or removal presumption | residence, business, dwelling, occupied vehicle | The core entry presumption covers residence, business, dwelling, or vehicle. A separate 2026 presumption covers a human-trafficking victim's qualifying force against the perpetrator and requires clear-and-convincing proof of victim status. Trigger: For the location rule, unlawful forcible entry with knowledge or reason to believe it occurred; the 2026 branch has different human-trafficking conditions. Limits or exceptions: rightful owner/resident absent qualifying protective/no-contact order; lawful-custody removal; defender unlawful activity or use of location to further it; identified or known officer acting officially. | Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-611(c)-(d); 2008 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 1012; 2026 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 886 |
| Texas | Entry or removal presumption | dwelling, occupied vehicle, business, workplace | The deadly-force presumption covers occupied habitation, vehicle, or place of business or employment and also specified violent felonies. Trigger: Qualifying unlawful forcible entry, removal, or listed violent offense, plus no provocation and no criminal activity other than a traffic Class C misdemeanor. Limits or exceptions: defender provoked the target; defender engaged in disqualifying criminal activity. | Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(b) |
| Utah | Entry or removal presumption | dwelling, occupied vehicle, business, workplace, other specified place | Section 76-2-405 provides separate presumptions for habitation and for occupied vehicle or place of business/employment; § 76-2-407 provides another presumption for qualifying deadly force defending people on other real property. Trigger: For habitation, qualifying unlawful entry; for vehicle/business/employment, known forcible unlawful entry or removal plus no provocation or disqualifying criminal activity; § 76-2-407 has its own real-property conditions. Limits or exceptions: different trigger rules apply by location; vehicle/business branch excludes provocation and nontraffic criminal activity. | Utah Code §§ 76-2-405(3), 76-2-407(3) |
| Vermont | Presumption unresolved | dwelling | Section 2305 makes a person guiltless for just and necessary defense and separately permits deadly force reasonably believed necessary to suppress an attempted burglary. The broader presumption question requires separate state-specific authority. | 13 V.S.A. § 2305(a) |
| Virginia | Presumption unresolved | dwelling, curtilage | Virginia's common-law castle doctrine covers persons within the home or curtilage. It distinguishes force against a trespasser to prevent felonious destruction or a felony from faultless self-defense against an attacker in the home. | Horne v. Commonwealth, No. 1267-22-1, slip op. at 10-11 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2023) |
| Washington | Presumption unresolved | dwelling, other specified place | RCW 9A.16.050 justifies homicide in actual resistance to an attempted felony upon the defender or upon or in a dwelling or other place of abode in which the defender is present; the broader presumption question requires separate state-specific authority. | Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.16.050 |
| West Virginia | Presumption unresolved | dwelling, residence | A lawful occupant may use reasonable and proportionate force, including qualifying deadly force, to prevent or terminate forcible entry into a home or residence, without a duty to retreat. | W. Va. Code § 55-7-22(a)-(b) |
| Wisconsin | Entry or removal presumption | dwelling, occupied vehicle, business | For force intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm, the court may not consider retreat and must apply a reasonable-belief presumption when the forcible-entry conditions for a dwelling, motor vehicle, or defender-owned/operated business are met. Trigger: Unlawful forcible entry in progress or completed, defender present and knows or reasonably believes entry occurred. Limits or exceptions: defender criminal activity or use of location to further it; identified or known public-safety worker acting officially. | Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1m) |
| Wyoming | Entry or removal presumption | dwelling, residence | The presumption covers a statutorily defined home or habitation when an intruder unlawfully and forcibly enters or removes another and the defender knows or has reason to believe the act is occurring. Trigger: Unlawful forcible entry or completed entry into another's home or habitation, or forcible removal, with defender knowledge or reason to believe it occurred. Limits or exceptions: rightful resident absent a qualifying domestic-violence injunction or pretrial no-contact order; lawful-custody removal; peace officer or corrections employee acting officially. | Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-602(b)-(c) |
Watch out: A protected-location label does not answer who may invoke the rule. Owner, tenant, resident, employee, guest, and unlawful occupant may receive different treatment under statutory definitions and exceptions.
When does a presumption of reasonable fear apply?
A presumption applies only when its statutory trigger is satisfied. Common triggers include an unlawful and forcible entry into an occupied dwelling, an attempt to enter, remaining after such an entry, or an attempt to remove someone against that person's will. Many statutes require the defender to know or reasonably believe that the entry or removal occurred.

Some add listed violent crimes, occupancy requirements, or location-specific definitions. Exceptions often cover a lawful resident or owner, a parent or guardian removing a child, an identified law-enforcement officer performing official duties, or a defender who is committing or furthering a crime. These patterns are not interchangeable.
South Carolina's operative presumption list covers a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle even though a section heading mentions business. Michigan lists vehicle removal but not vehicle intrusion in the tracked trigger. Utah uses separate presumptions with different conditions for habitation, vehicle or work, and other real property.
Missouri is separately labeled limited because its statute shifts the state's burden concerning reasonable belief in the occupied dwelling, residence, or vehicle branch without using the general rebuttable-presumption formulation tracked elsewhere. Oregon's current justification chapter contains defense rules for burglary in a dwelling and for premises, but it does not contain an express reasonable-fear presumption. That statutory conclusion does not decide whether a separate evidentiary rule might apply.
Do vehicles, workplaces, curtilage, and guests qualify?
Sometimes, but the coverage must come from the jurisdiction's definitions and operative text. Occupied-vehicle coverage appears in statutes including those of Florida, Arizona, Kentucky, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin. Wyoming's listed home-or-habitation framework does not use the same vehicle category.

Business or workplace coverage appears in several states but with materially different conditions. Alabama includes specified conduct on closed business property and other listed locations.
Oklahoma expressly includes a place of business, occupied premises, and place of worship, while Mississippi reaches the immediate premises of a business or place of employment. Curtilage appears expressly in a smaller group, including Arkansas, Idaho, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Virginia's common-law rule. Guest status, shared occupancy, protective orders, and lawful custody can further narrow who receives a location-based protection.
Guest status is equally specific. Alaska's no-retreat text includes certain residence, guest, and agent status, while Idaho's habitation definition reaches an invited guest's dwelling in specified circumstances.
A visitor does not acquire every right of an owner merely by being invited. Shared residence, custody, protective orders, and the target's lawful right to be present frequently appear in exceptions. The full state row and linked guide are necessary before applying a short location label.
How do castle doctrine and retreat rules interact?
A castle rule may create an exception to retreat at home even where public self-defense requires safe retreat. Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island illustrate that structure in different forms. Conversely, a statewide no-duty rule can coexist with a narrower location presumption that activates only after forcible entry or removal.
Florida and several other states fit that pattern. The concepts therefore answer different questions: retreat asks whether safe avoidance is required before force, while a presumption affects how specified fear or necessity is treated once the location trigger is met. Criminal immunity asks whether a qualifying claim can bar prosecution before trial, and civil immunity asks whether a civil action is barred or limited. None of those effects follows automatically from the popular castle-doctrine label, so each field needs its own authority.
The companion stand your ground states table identifies 29 statutory no-duty jurisdictions, 6 case-law no-duty jurisdictions, 12 duty jurisdictions, and 4 conditional jurisdictions. Its separate immunity discussion explains why those protections need their own authority. Wisconsin shows the distinction: § 939.48(1m) provides a location presumption, while the broader retreat classification remains conditional.
Does castle doctrine provide criminal or civil immunity?
Not automatically. A presumption can guide the evaluation of fear or necessity without granting immunity from prosecution or suit. Pretrial criminal immunity can authorize a hearing and dismissal before trial, while an ordinary justification defense is litigated in the criminal case without that separate mechanism. Civil immunity may bar or narrow a damages action, and a fee rule or defense to liability may offer a different form of protection.
Colorado shows why location matters: the criminal and civil protections in § 18-1-704.5 apply only when an occupant's force satisfies all dwelling-intruder conditions in subsection (2). Florida § 776.032 reaches justified force under specified provisions and separately regulates prosecution, civil actions, and arrest. Alabama § 13A-3-23 also addresses criminal immunity, civil action, and arrest in separate subsections. The stand your ground comparison explains these distinctions without treating an unclassified procedure as absent.
General legal information, not legal advice. Rules and effective dates vary by jurisdiction and facts. Confirm the current primary authority and consult a lawyer licensed in the relevant jurisdiction about a specific matter.
Related self-defense guides
- Self-defense laws by state
- Stand your ground states and retreat rules
- Florida self-defense laws
- Oregon self-defense laws
Last updated: September 11, 2026. Statutes and cases cited reflect the sources verified as of September 11, 2026.
Frequently Asked Questions
Which states have castle doctrine?
Every jurisdiction row identifies the home-defense rule established by its cited authority. Some statutes create entry or removal presumptions, while others provide a retreat exception or authorize force against specified intrusion; compare Ala. Code § 13A-3-23 with ORS 161.219 and 161.225.
Does castle doctrine cover a vehicle or workplace?
Some statutes expressly cover occupied vehicles, businesses, workplaces, or related premises, while others cover only a dwelling or residence. Fla. Stat. § 776.013, for example, defines a dwelling, residence, and occupied vehicle.
Does castle doctrine remove the duty to retreat?
It can create a home or workplace retreat exception, but a presumption and a retreat rule are separate. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-19(b) illustrates a duty rule with dwelling and workplace exceptions.
When does a presumption of reasonable fear apply?
Usually only after a defined event such as unlawful forcible entry, remaining after entry, or nonconsensual removal, combined with the defender’s knowledge. Fla. Stat. § 776.013(2)-(3) also lists exceptions.
Can an invited guest rely on castle doctrine?
Guest coverage depends on statutory definitions and legal status. Alaska Stat. § 11.81.335 and Idaho Code § 19-202A contain verified guest-related language, but an invitation does not supply every owner protection.
Does castle doctrine prevent an arrest or lawsuit?
Not by itself. Alabama’s current § 13A-3-23(d)-(e) separately addresses criminal and civil immunity and an arrest limit; other jurisdictions use different mechanisms.
Updates
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources
Sources and References
- Alabama: Ala. Code Section 13A-3-23(a)(4)-(5) (effective until Oct. 1, 2026)(alison.legislature.state.al.us).gov
- Alaska: Alaska Stat. Section 11.81.335(b)(1), (3), (5)(www.akleg.gov).gov
- Alaska: Alaska Stat. Section 09.65.330(a)-(b)(www.akleg.gov).gov
- Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Sections 13-411(C)-(D), 13-419(A)-(D)(www.azleg.gov).gov
- Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Sections 13-405(B), 13-411(B), 13-418(B)(www.azleg.gov).gov
- Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Section 13-205(A)(www.azleg.gov).gov
- Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Section 13-413(www.azleg.gov).gov
- Arkansas: Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-620(arkleg.state.ar.us).gov
- Arkansas: Ark. Code Ann. Sections 5-2-606(c), 5-2-607(b), as amended by 2021 Ark. Acts 250(www.arkleg.state.ar.us).gov
- Arkansas: Ark. Code Ann. Section 16-120-106, enacted by 2015 Ark. Acts 1073(www.arkleg.state.ar.us).gov
- California: Cal. Penal Code Section 198.5(leginfo.legislature.ca.gov).gov
- California: Judicial Council of California, CALCRIM 2026, Nos. 505 and 3470(courts.ca.gov).gov
- California: Cal.Civ.Code §§ 50,847(a)-(g)(leginfo.legislature.ca.gov).gov
- Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. Section 18-1-704.5(2)(olls.info).gov
- Colorado: Colorado Judicial Branch, COLJI-Crim 2025, H:12 (applying Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-704)(www.coloradojudicial.gov).gov
- Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. Sections 53a-19(b)(1), 53a-20(www.cga.ct.gov).gov
- Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. Section 53a-19(b)(www.cga.ct.gov).gov
- Delaware: 11 Del. C. Sections 464(e)(2), 466(c), 469(delcode.delaware.gov).gov
- District of Columbia: In re Robertson, D.C. Ct. App. Nos. 00-FM-925 & 04-FM-1269, slip op. at 24-25 (Jan. 24, 2008), quoting Gillis v. United States, 400 A.2d 311, 313 (D.C. 1979)(testweb.dccourts.gov).gov
- Florida: Fla. Stat. Section 776.013(2)-(3) (2026)(www.leg.state.fl.us).gov
- Florida: Fla. Stat. Section 776.012(1)-(2) (2026)(www.leg.state.fl.us).gov
- Florida: Fla. Stat. Section 776.032(1)-(2), (4) (2026)(www.leg.state.fl.us).gov
- Georgia: Medina v. State, S26A0362 (Ga. Mar. 3, 2026) (applying OCGA §§ 16-3-23 and 16-3-24.1)(www.gasupreme.us).gov
- Georgia: Ga. Code Section 16-3-23.1, enacted by 2006 Ga. Laws Act 599 (SB 396)(dlg.usg.edu).gov
- Georgia: Ga. Code Section 16-3-24.2, as amended by 2024 Ga. Laws Act 545 (SB 517)(gov.georgia.gov).gov
- Hawaii: Haw. Rev. Stat. Section 703-304(5)(b)(i)(data.capitol.hawaii.gov).gov
- Hawaii: Haw. Rev. Stat. Section 703-301(1)(data.capitol.hawaii.gov).gov
- Idaho: Idaho Code§§ 19-202A(5),18-4009(2)-(3)(legislature.idaho.gov).gov
- Idaho: Idaho Code Section 6-808(1)-(2)(legislature.idaho.gov).gov
- Illinois: 720 ILCS5/7-2(a),2-6(a)(ftp.ilga.gov).gov
- Illinois: Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions-Criminal 24-25.09X, Committee Note (citing People v. Hughes and People v. Miller)(ilcourtsaudio.blob.core.windows.net).gov
- Illinois: 720 ILCS 5/7-1(a), 7-2(a)(www.ilga.gov).gov
- Illinois: 720 ILCS5/7-1(b),7-2(b),7-3(b)(ftp.ilga.gov).gov
- Indiana: Ind. Code Section 35-41-3-2(d)(iga.in.gov).gov
- Indiana: Ind. Code Section 35-41-3-2(www.in.gov).gov
- Indiana: Ind. Code Section 34-30-31-1; P.L. 107-2019 (HB 1284)(iga.in.gov).gov
- Iowa: Iowa Code Section 704.2A(www.legis.iowa.gov).gov
- Iowa: Iowa Code Section 704.1(3)(www.legis.iowa.gov).gov
- Iowa: Iowa Code Section 704.13(www.legis.iowa.gov).gov
- Kansas: Kan. Stat. Ann. Sections 21-5223, 21-5224(www.kslegislature.gov).gov
- Kansas: Kan. Stat. Ann. Sections 21-5222(c), 21-5230(www.kslegislature.gov).gov
- Kansas: Kan. Stat. Ann. Section 21-5231(a)-(c)(www.kslegislature.gov).gov
- Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. Section 503.055(apps.legislature.ky.gov).gov
- Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. Sections 503.050(4), 503.055(3)(apps.legislature.ky.gov).gov
- Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. Section 503.085(1)-(2)(apps.legislature.ky.gov).gov
- Louisiana: La. Rev. Stat. Sections 14:19(B), 14:20(B)(www.legis.la.gov).gov
- Louisiana: La. Rev. Stat. Section 9:2800.19(www.legis.la.gov).gov
- Maine: 17-A Me. Rev. Stat. Section 108(2)(B)(legislature.maine.gov).gov
- Maryland: Joiner v. State, No. 1949, Sept. Term 2023 (Md. App. Ct. May 30, 2025)(www.mdcourts.gov).gov
- Maryland: Shae-Von Edwards v. State, No. 0799, Sept. Term 2023 (Md. App. Ct. Oct. 31, 2025)(www.mdcourts.gov).gov
- Massachusetts: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, Section 8A(malegislature.gov).gov
- Massachusetts: Massachusetts Model Jury Instructions on Homicide III, notes 81-84 (discussing G.L. c. 278, Section 8A)(www.mass.gov).gov
- Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws Section 780.951(www.legislature.mi.gov).gov
- Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws Section 780.972(www.legislature.mi.gov).gov
- Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws Section 780.961(www.legislature.mi.gov).gov
- Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws Section 600.2922b(www.legislature.mi.gov).gov
- Minnesota: Minn. Stat. Section 609.065(www.revisor.mn.gov).gov
- Minnesota: State v. Blevins, 10 N.W.3d 29, 35-40 (Minn. 2024) (discussing State v. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d 392, 402 (Minn. 2001))(mncourts.gov).gov
- Minnesota: Minn. Stat. Section 609.066(3)(www.revisor.mn.gov).gov
- Mississippi: Miss. Code Section 97-3-15(2)(c), (3)(billstatus.ls.state.ms.us).gov
- Missouri: Mo. Rev. Stat. § 563.031.2-.5(www.revisor.mo.gov).gov
- Missouri: Mo. Rev. Stat. § 563.074.1(www.revisor.mo.gov).gov
- Montana: Mont. Code Ann. §§ 45-3-103, 45-2-101(47)(mca.legmt.gov).gov
- Montana: Mont. Code Ann. § 45-3-110(mca.legmt.gov).gov
- Montana: Mont. Code Ann. § 45-3-112(mca.legmt.gov).gov
- Montana: Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-722(mca.legmt.gov).gov
- Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1409(4)(b)(i)(nebraskalegislature.gov).gov
- Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1416(1)(nebraskalegislature.gov).gov
- Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 200.120-.130(www.leg.state.nv.us).gov
- Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.095(1)(b)(www.leg.state.nv.us).gov
- New Hampshire: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 627:4 II(gc.nh.gov).gov
- New Jersey: N.J. Model Criminal Jury Charge, Justification - Self Defense(www.njcourts.gov).gov
- New Mexico: UJI 14-5170 NMRA(supremecourt.nmcourts.gov).gov
- New Mexico: UJI 14-5190 NMRA(supremecourt.nmcourts.gov).gov
- New York: N.Y. Penal Law §§ 35.15(2)(a)(i), 35.20(3)(www.nysenate.gov).gov
- New York: N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15(2)(www.nysenate.gov).gov
- North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2(www.ncleg.gov).gov
- North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.3(a)(www.ncleg.gov).gov
- North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code §§ 12.1-05-07(2)(c), 12.1-05-07.1(ndlegis.gov).gov
- Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.05(B)(2)-(4)(codes.ohio.gov).gov
- Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.09(B)-(C)(codes.ohio.gov).gov
- Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2305.40(B), 2307.221(B)(codes.ohio.gov).gov
- Oklahoma: Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1289.25(B)-(C)(www.oklegislature.gov).gov
- Oregon: Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 161.219, 161.225(www.oregonlegislature.gov).gov
- Oregon: State v. James, 350 Or. App. 71, 80 (2026)(ojd.contentdm.oclc.org).gov
- Pennsylvania: 18 Pa.C.S. § 505(b)(2)-(2.5)(www.palegis.us).gov
- Pennsylvania: 42 Pa.C.S. § 8340.2(www.palegis.us).gov
- Rhode Island: R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-8-8(webserver.rilegislature.gov).gov
- Rhode Island: State v. Urena, No. 2004-199-C.A., slip op. at 8-9 & n.4 (R.I. June 16, 2006) (quoting State v. Quarles)(www.courts.ri.gov).gov
- South Carolina: S.C. Code § 16-11-440(A)-(B)(www.scstatehouse.gov).gov
- South Dakota: S.D. Codified Laws §§ 22-18-4.3 to -4.4(sdlegislature.gov).gov
- Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-611(c)-(d); 2008 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 1012; 2026 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 886(capitol.tn.gov).gov
- Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-611(b), enacted by 2007 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 210(capitol.tn.gov).gov
- Texas: Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(b)(statutes.capitol.texas.gov).gov
- Texas: Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 83.001(statutes.capitol.texas.gov).gov
- Utah: Utah Code §§ 76-2-405(3), 76-2-407(3)(le.utah.gov).gov
- Vermont: 13 V.S.A. § 2305(a)(legislature.vermont.gov).gov
- Vermont: Vermont Office of Legislative Counsel, Meaning of ‘Necessary’ When Using Force in Self-Defense (Mar. 23, 2022) (discussing State v. Tubbs and State v. Hatcher)(legislature.vermont.gov).gov
- Virginia: Horne v. Commonwealth, No. 1267-22-1, slip op. at 10-11 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2023)(www.courts.state.va.us).gov
- Virginia: Taylor v. Commonwealth, No. 0753-09-3, slip op. at 4 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2010)(courts.state.va.us).gov
- Washington: Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.16.050(app.leg.wa.gov).gov
- Washington: State v. Courtney, No. 76108-1-I, slip op. at 22-25 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2018) (unpublished) (quoting WPIC 16.08)(www.courts.wa.gov).gov
- West Virginia: W. Va. Code § 55-7-22(a)-(b)(code.wvlegislature.gov).gov
- Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1m)(docs.legis.wisconsin.gov).gov
- Wisconsin: State v. Wenger, No. 98-1739-CR, slip op. at 7 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 1999)(www.wicourts.gov).gov
- Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. § 895.62(2)-(5)(docs.legis.wisconsin.gov).gov
- Wyoming: Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-602(b)-(c)(wyoleg.gov).gov
- Wyoming: Wyo. Stat. § 6-1-204(wyoleg.gov).gov