District of Columbia
DC Manslaughter Laws: Voluntary, Involuntary and Negligent Homicide
Independently fact-checked against primary sources (last audited October 18, 2026). · 32 primary sources cited on this page. How we verify our legal content

The District of Columbia punishes manslaughter under D.C. Code 22-2105, which provides that "Whoever is guilty of manslaughter shall be sentenced to a period of imprisonment not exceeding 30 years." The Code does not define manslaughter: its voluntary and involuntary forms come from the common law as applied by the D.C. Court of Appeals, while deaths caused by careless, reckless or negligent driving short of wilful or wanton conduct are the separate felony of negligent homicide (50-2203.01), punishable by up to 5 years.
For the rules in the states, see our guide to manslaughter laws by state.
Information last verified on 2026-10-18. This article has not been reviewed by a licensed lawyer.
Jurisdiction scope: This article covers District of Columbia law on homicide below murder: the manslaughter penalty in D.C. Code 22-2105 and the common-law elements the D.C. Court of Appeals applies, negligent homicide by vehicle (50-2203.01 and 50-2203.02), the panic-defense provision in 23-115, and related sentencing and traffic statutes. It does not cover murder (see our overview of murder sentencing guidelines), self-defense (see District of Columbia self-defense laws), civil lawsuits by surviving family (see District of Columbia wrongful death law), or federal offenses, which the manslaughter laws hub covers.
What is manslaughter in DC?
The whole statutory text on manslaughter is the penalty section:
"Whoever is guilty of manslaughter shall be sentenced to a period of imprisonment not exceeding 30 years. In addition to any other penalty provided under this section, a person may be fined an amount not more than the amount set forth in § 22-3571.01." D.C. Code 22-2105
Chapter 21 of Title 22 (22-2101 through 22-2107) contains the murder offenses and their penalties, the manslaughter penalty and a solicitation section, but no section defining manslaughter or its forms. Second-degree murder, the next offense up, is defined by malice: "Whoever with malice aforethought, except as provided in §§ 22-2101, 22-2102, kills another, is guilty of murder in the second degree" (22-2103).
The definition of manslaughter therefore comes from case law. The leading decision is Comber v. United States, 584 A.2d 26 (D.C. 1990), decided by the full D.C. Court of Appeals sitting en banc. It quoted the trial court's instruction that "Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice," and divided the offense into voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.
D.C. law has no degrees of manslaughter. The offenses below murder are manslaughter, in its voluntary and involuntary forms, and negligent homicide by vehicle.
DC manslaughter and homicide offenses at a glance
| Offense | Statute | What it requires | Grade | Statutory penalty |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Voluntary manslaughter | D.C. Code 22-2105 (common-law elements, Comber) | A killing with intent to kill or do serious bodily injury, or with conscious disregard of an extreme risk of death or serious bodily injury, where mitigating factors such as a sudden heat of passion caused by adequate provocation preclude malice | Felony; listed as a crime of violence (23-1331(4)) | Up to 30 years (more with listed enhancements); fine up to the 22-3571.01 amount |
| Involuntary manslaughter | 22-2105 (common-law elements, Comber) | An unintentional killing through conduct that creates extreme danger to life or of serious bodily injury and is a gross deviation from a reasonable standard of care, or in the course of a misdemeanor dangerous in and of itself, committed in a manner that made appreciable bodily injury reasonably foreseeable | Felony; listed as a crime of violence (23-1331(4)) | Up to 30 years (more with listed enhancements); fine up to the 22-3571.01 amount |
| Manslaughter committed in the operation of a vehicle | 22-2105; 50-2203.02 | Manslaughter charged where the death results from operating a vehicle; negligent homicide is a lesser included offense | Felony | Up to 30 years |
| Negligent homicide | 50-2203.01 | Causing a death by operating any vehicle in a careless, reckless or negligent manner, but not wilfully or wantonly | Felony (the statute says so) | Up to 5 years; fine up to the 22-3571.01 amount; or both |
| Manslaughter that constitutes an act of terrorism | 22-3153(d) | Manslaughter that constitutes an act of terrorism | Enhanced penalty | Up to life |
D.C. does not sort felonies into letter classes; each offense carries its own maximum. Fines come from the general fine statute, 22-3571.01(b), which ties the ceiling to the maximum prison term: "$75,000 if the offense is punishable by imprisonment for 30 years or less but more than 20 years," "$12,500 if the offense is punishable by imprisonment for 5 years or less but more than one year," and "$250,000 if the offense resulted in death." For how D.C. grades crimes generally, see District of Columbia felony and misdemeanor classes.

Voluntary manslaughter and adequate provocation
No D.C. statute states a heat-of-passion rule. In Comber, the Court of Appeals described voluntary manslaughter this way:
"voluntary manslaughter is a killing committed with an intent to kill or do serious bodily injury, or with a conscious disregard of an extreme risk of death or serious bodily injury, where the presence of mitigating factors precludes a determination that the killing was malicious. The absence of malice under these circumstances thus reduces the offense to one form of manslaughter." Comber v. United States, 584 A.2d 26 (D.C. 1990) (en banc)
The opinion also quoted the instruction that "Manslaughter is committed when a human being is killed unlawfully in the sudden heat of passion caused by adequate provocation." The mitigating factor is what separates voluntary manslaughter from murder, which requires malice aforethought (22-2103).
DC's panic-defense prohibition
The Council limited what counts as adequate provocation in D.C. Law 23-283, the Bella Evangelista and Tony Hunter Panic Defense Prohibition and Hate Crimes Response Amendment Act of 2020, effective May 15, 2021. The provision sits in Title 23 (criminal procedure), not in the homicide chapter:
"(a) In any prosecution, criminal proceeding, or criminal trial, when applicable to the offense charged, for the purposes of proving: (1) Heat of passion caused by adequate provocation, a defendant's provocation was not objectively adequate if it was based on discovery of, knowledge about, or the potential disclosure of the victim's actual or perceived gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation;" D.C. Code 23-115(a)(1)
Section 23-115(a) applies the same limit to the insanity defense and to self-defense, defense of others and defense of property. Subsection (b) keeps one door open: "the defense may present evidence of prior trauma to the defendant for the purposes of excusing or justifying the defendant's conduct or mitigating the severity of the offense."
Self-defense itself is a separate question; see District of Columbia self-defense laws.
Involuntary manslaughter in DC
As with voluntary manslaughter, Comber supplies the standard. The court explained that two categories of unintentional killings "were not excused and thus were manslaughter: killings in the course of lawful acts carried out in an unlawful, i.e., criminally negligent, fashion, and killings in the course of unlawful, i.e., criminal, acts."
The court limited the second category. A killing in the course of a misdemeanor is involuntary manslaughter only "if it is a misdemeanor dangerous in and of itself which is committed in a manner such that appreciable bodily injury to the victim was a reasonably foreseeable result."
For the first category, the court set a two-part test:
"Under current law in the District of Columbia, one who unintentionally causes the death of another as the result of non-criminal conduct is guilty of involuntary manslaughter only where that conduct both creates 'extreme danger to life or of serious bodily injury,' and amounts to 'a gross deviation from a reasonable standard of care.'" Comber v. United States, 584 A.2d 26 (D.C. 1990) (en banc), quoting Faunteroy v. United States, 413 A.2d 1294 (D.C. 1980)
Both elements are required. Conduct that is careless but does not create an extreme danger to life, or that creates a danger without a gross deviation from reasonable care, does not meet the test the court stated.
Vehicular manslaughter, DUI deaths and negligent homicide in DC
A death caused by driving in D.C. can fall under two statutes: common-law manslaughter under 22-2105, charged as "manslaughter committed in the operation of a vehicle," or the statutory felony of negligent homicide. The Code has no offense named vehicular manslaughter or DUI manslaughter.
Negligent homicide (50-2203.01)
"Any person who, by the operation of any vehicle in a careless, reckless, or negligent manner, but not wilfully or wantonly, shall cause the death of another, including a pedestrian in a marked crosswalk, or unmarked crosswalk at an intersection, shall be guilty of a felony, and shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than 5 years or by a fine of not more than the amount set forth in § 22-3571.01 or both." D.C. Code 50-2203.01
The words "but not wilfully or wantonly" mark the boundary with manslaughter: negligent homicide covers careless, reckless or negligent driving that falls short of wilful or wanton conduct.
The two offenses are linked by statute. Under 50-2203.02, negligent homicide "shall be deemed to be included within every crime of manslaughter charged to have been committed in the operation of any vehicle," and if the jury finds the defendant not guilty of manslaughter, it "may, in its discretion, render a verdict of guilty of negligent homicide."
Scheduled change. D.C. Law 25-161 (the STEER Act), effective April 20, 2024, amends 50-2203.01 by striking "a pedestrian" and inserting "any person." The Code notes that this amendment was made subject to funding in an approved budget and "has not been implemented." The temporary D.C. Law 26-122, effective May 21, 2026, provides that the amendment "shall apply as of January 1, 2027." The change does not alter the felony grade or the 5-year maximum.
Impaired driving
D.C.'s DUI penalty section has no tier for a death or serious injury: a first violation of 50-2206.11 or 50-2206.12 carries a fine of $1,000, up to 180 days, or both (50-2206.13(a)). A death caused by an impaired driver can be charged as manslaughter or negligent homicide.
For those trials, 50-2206.51(a) sets the blood-alcohol evidence rules. They apply when a person is tried for impaired operation, "negligent homicide in violation of § 50-2203.01, or manslaughter committed in the operation of a vehicle in violation of § 22-2105," and chemical-test evidence of alcohol is received. If the alcohol concentration at testing "was less than 0.05," the evidence establishes "a rebuttable presumption that the person was not, at the time, under the influence of alcohol." A concentration of 0.05 or more but less than 0.08 grams (blood or breath) is "prima facie proof that the person was, at the time, under the influence of alcohol" (50-2206.51(a)(2)). The section also covers watercraft.
For DUI penalties where no one dies, see District of Columbia DUI laws.
Leaving the scene and fleeing police
- Leaving after colliding. Under 50-2201.05c, a first violation of subsection (a)(1), which covers a collision where another person is injured, carries up to 180 days, a fine up to the 22-3571.01 amount, or both; with a prior offense, up to one year (50-2201.05c(d)(1)). The section has no separate tier for a death. See District of Columbia hit-and-run laws.
- Fleeing a law enforcement officer. Fleeing or attempting to elude after an officer's signal to stop carries up to 180 days (50-2201.05b(b)(1)). If the driver also drives in a manner that would be reckless driving under 50-2201.04(b), or "causes property damage or bodily injury," the maximum is 5 years (50-2201.05b(b)(2)). The section has no separate tier for a death.
- Reckless and aggravated reckless driving. Aggravated reckless driving carries up to 180 days for a first or second conviction and up to 2 years for a third or later conviction within a 2-year period (50-2201.04(e)). The section has no death tier.
License and registration suspension
For "Any homicide resulting from a person being struck by a motor vehicle," D.C. Code 50-1301.37(a)(4) lists murder in the first and second degree, "Manslaughter," and "Negligent homicide, as described in § 50-2203.01" among the convictions for which the license and registration are suspended. The paragraph was added by D.C. Law 25-161, and the Code notes that D.C. Law 26-122 made it apply as of March 4, 2026. By its terms it reaches homicides in which a person was struck by a motor vehicle, not every manslaughter.
Other homicide questions: drug deaths and unborn victims
Drug deaths. Neither the homicide chapter (22-2101 through 22-2107) nor the main controlled-substance offense sections (48-904.01, 48-904.07, 48-904.07a, 48-904.08 and 48-904.09) contain an offense for distributing a drug that results in death.
Unborn victims. The homicide chapter contains no provision on the death of an unborn child, and D.C. has no fetal-homicide ladder in that chapter.
Railroad obstruction. Obstructing a railroad or acting with intent to endanger a locomotive or car "and thereby occasions the death of another" is first-degree murder under 22-2102, not manslaughter; see murder sentencing guidelines.
Sentencing: armed offenses, enhancements, repeat offenders and supervised release
Crime of violence. Manslaughter is on the list of crimes of violence in 23-1331(4), and 22-4501(1B) imports that definition into the weapons and repeat-offender statutes.
Armed with a weapon. Under 22-4502(a)(1), a person who commits a crime of violence "when armed with or having readily available any pistol or other firearm (or imitation thereof) or other dangerous or deadly weapon" may, on a first such conviction, be sentenced "in addition to the penalty provided for such crime, to a period of imprisonment which may be up to, and including, 30 years." If the weapon was a pistol or firearm, the person must serve a mandatory-minimum term of 5 years and "shall not be released, granted probation, or granted suspension of sentence, prior to serving such mandatory-minimum sentence" (22-4502(c)). On a second or later armed crime-of-violence conviction, the added term is not less than 5 years and not more than 30 years, with a 10-year mandatory minimum if a pistol or firearm was used, and that term may not be suspended or probated (22-4502(a)(2), (c), (e)(2)).
Repeat offenders. Under 22-1804a(a)(1), a person convicted of a felony after two prior felonies not committed on the same occasion may receive a greater term "up to, and including, 30 years." Under 22-1804a(a)(2), a person convicted of a crime of violence after two prior crimes of violence not committed on the same occasion must receive "a term of imprisonment of not less than 15 years" and may receive up to "life without possibility of release."
Enhanced penalties. Because manslaughter is a crime of violence under 23-1331(4), the maximum prison term and fine may be raised to 1 1/2 times the usual maximum (for manslaughter, up to 45 years) when the victim was 65 or older (22-3601), when an adult at least 2 years older than a minor commits it against that minor (22-3611), or when the victim was a transportation provider (22-3751) or a transit operator, Metrorail station manager or employee on duty, or mass transit passenger (22-3751.01). The same 1 1/2 times cap applies to voluntary manslaughter of a citizen patrol member while patrolling or because of that participation (22-3602), and to a bias-related crime, where manslaughter is a listed designated act (22-3703; 22-3701).
Supervised release. When the court imposes a sentence of more than one year, it must add supervised release: five years "if the maximum term of imprisonment authorized for the offense is 25 years or more," and three years if the maximum is more than one year but less than 25 years (24-403.01(b)(2)). Manslaughter's 30-year maximum falls in the first group; negligent homicide's 5-year maximum falls in the second. For felonies committed on or after August 5, 2000, a prison term may be reduced by good time credit "only as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)" (24-403.01(d)), and release is followed by the supervised release term.
Registration. D.C.'s Sex Offender Registration Act (22-4001 and following) lists murder or manslaughter as a lifetime registration offense only where it was committed before, during or after engaging in or attempting to engage in a sexual act or sexual contact (22-4001(6)(C)). An ordinary manslaughter conviction is not on that list.
Recent changes to DC manslaughter law
- D.C. Law 26-122 (temporary), effective May 21, 2026: set January 1, 2027 as the date the STEER Act change to negligent homicide ("a pedestrian" to "any person") applies, and made the license and registration suspension for pedestrian-strike homicides in 50-1301.37(a)(4) apply as of March 4, 2026. The temporary law expires after 225 days.
- D.C. Law 25-161 (STEER Act), effective April 20, 2024: amended 50-2203.01 and added 50-1301.37(a)(4), with those changes made subject to budget funding.
- D.C. Law 23-283, effective May 15, 2021: enacted the panic-defense prohibition in 23-115.
- D.C. Law 19-317, effective June 11, 2013: last amended the manslaughter penalty section, 22-2105, which now refers to the general fine statute.
Federal law
Federal law, 18 U.S.C. 1112, separately defines and punishes manslaughter "Within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States"; our manslaughter laws hub explains the federal layer.
Related
- Manslaughter laws by state
- District of Columbia felony and misdemeanor classes
- District of Columbia DUI laws
- District of Columbia hit-and-run laws
- The difference between murder, homicide and manslaughter
- Maryland manslaughter laws
- Virginia manslaughter laws
This article provides general legal information about District of Columbia law as of 2026-10-18. It is not legal advice. For a specific situation, contact a lawyer licensed in the District of Columbia.
Last updated: 2026-10-18.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is manslaughter a felony in Washington, DC?
Yes. Manslaughter carries up to 30 years in prison under D.C. Code 22-2105, and the Code lists it as a crime of violence (23-1331(4)). Negligent homicide by vehicle is also a felony under the express terms of 50-2203.01, with a maximum of 5 years.
What is the sentence for manslaughter in DC?
Imprisonment of not more than 30 years (22-2105), plus a fine up to the amount in 22-3571.01, which lists $75,000 for offenses punishable by more than 20 and up to 30 years and $250,000 if the offense resulted in death. A sentence of more than one year for an offense with a maximum of 25 years or more carries five years of supervised release (24-403.01(b)(2)). The maximum can rise to 1 1/2 times the usual term in listed circumstances, such as a victim 65 or older (22-3601), and an armed offense adds the 22-4502 penalties.
What is the difference between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter in DC?
Both are common-law offenses punished under 22-2105. In Comber v. United States, 584 A.2d 26 (D.C. 1990) (en banc), the Court of Appeals described voluntary manslaughter as an intentional or extremely reckless killing where mitigating factors such as a sudden heat of passion caused by adequate provocation preclude malice, and involuntary manslaughter as an unintentional killing through criminally negligent conduct or in the course of a misdemeanor that is dangerous in itself and committed in a manner that made appreciable bodily injury reasonably foreseeable.
What is the charge for a DUI death in DC?
The D.C. Code has no separate DUI-manslaughter offense, and the DUI penalty section (50-2206.13) has no death tier. A death caused by an impaired driver can be charged as manslaughter committed in the operation of a vehicle (22-2105) or as negligent homicide (50-2203.01), and 50-2206.51 sets the blood-alcohol evidence rules for those trials.
What is negligent homicide in DC?
Under 50-2203.01, it is causing the death of another by operating any vehicle in a careless, reckless or negligent manner, but not wilfully or wantonly. It is a felony punishable by up to 5 years, a fine up to the amount in 22-3571.01, or both.
Does DC ban the gay or trans panic defense?
Yes. D.C. Code 23-115(a)(1), effective May 15, 2021 (D.C. Law 23-283), provides that provocation is not objectively adequate for proving heat of passion if it was based on discovery of, knowledge about, or the potential disclosure of the victim's actual or perceived gender identity, gender expression or sexual orientation. Subsection (b) still allows evidence of prior trauma to the defendant.
Does a manslaughter conviction affect a DC driver's license?
For a homicide resulting from a person being struck by a motor vehicle, D.C. Code 50-1301.37(a)(4) lists manslaughter and negligent homicide among the convictions requiring suspension of the license and registration. The Code notes that this paragraph applies as of March 4, 2026 under a temporary law.
Updates
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources
The Law Behind This Article
This article rests on the statutory provisions below, held in our own legal record and retrieved from the official source. Tap a section to read the operative text.
Code of the District of Columbia, Title 22: Criminal Offenses and Penalties. - Chapter 21: Murder; Manslaughter.
§ 22-2105Penalty for manslaughter.In force
Whoever is guilty of manslaughter shall be sentenced to a period of imprisonment not exceeding 30 years. In addition to any other penalty provided under this section, a person may be fined an amount not more than the amount set forth in § 22-3571.01.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-30 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at github.com
Code of the District of Columbia, Title 50: Motor and Non-Motor Vehicles and Traffic. - Chapter 22: Regulation of Traffic. - Subchapter II: Negligent Homicide.
§ 50-2203.01Negligent homicide.In forcecited in 2 of our articles
Any person who, by the operation of any vehicle in a careless, reckless, or negligent manner, but not wilfully or wantonly, shall cause the death of another, including a pedestrian in a marked crosswalk, or unmarked crosswalk at an intersection, shall be guilty of a felony, and shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than 5 years or by a fine of not more than the amount set forth in § 22-3571.01 or both.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-30 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at github.com
Cited in 1 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2008
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- United States v. Gomez-Leon (Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 2008)“…homicide” and requires criminal negli- gence). 15 D.C. Code § 50-2203.01 (offense called “negligent homicide,” a…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Washington DC DUI Laws: Penalties, BAC & License (2026)
§ 50-2203.02Negligent homicide included in manslaughter where death due to operation of vehicle.In force
The crime of negligent homicide defined in § 50-2203.01 shall be deemed to be included within every crime of manslaughter charged to have been committed in the operation of any vehicle, and in any case where a defendant is charged with manslaughter committed in the operation of any vehicle, if the jury shall find the defendant not guilty of the crime of manslaughter such jury may, in its discretion, render a verdict of guilty of negligent homicide.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-30 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at github.com
Code of the District of Columbia, Title 23: Criminal Procedure. - Chapter 1: General Provisions.
§ 23-115Limits on defenses that justify, excuse, or mitigate a defendant's conduct on the basis of a victim's gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation.In forcecited in 2 of our articles
(a) In any prosecution, criminal proceeding, or criminal trial, when applicable to the offense charged, for the purposes of proving: (1) Heat of passion caused by adequate provocation, a defendant's provocation was not objectively adequate if it was based on discovery of, knowledge about, or the potential disclosure of the victim's actual or perceived gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation; (2) Insanity, the defendant did not lack substantial capacity if the mental disease or defect at issue was based on discovery of, knowledge about, or the potential disclosure of the victim's actual or perceived gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation; or (3) Self-defense, defense of others, or defense of property, the defendant was not justified in using force if the basis for their belief in imminent danger was based on discovery of, knowledge about, or the potential disclosure of the victim's actual or perceived gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-30 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at github.com
Also relied on in: Washington, D.C. Self-Defense Laws: Stand Your Ground & Castle Doctrine (2026)
Code of the District of Columbia, Title 22: Criminal Offenses and Penalties. - Chapter 35B: Fines for Criminal Offenses.
§ 22-3571.01Fines for criminal offenses.In forcecited in 19 of our articles
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, and except as provided in § 22-3571.02, a defendant who has been found guilty of an offense under the District of Columbia Official Code punishable by imprisonment may be sentenced to pay a fine as provided in this section. (b) An individual who has been found guilty of such an offense may be fined not more than the greatest of: (1) $100 if the offense is punishable by imprisonment for 10 days or less; (2) $250 if the offense is punishable by imprisonment for 30 days, or one month, or less but more than 10 days; (3) $500 if the offense is punishable by imprisonment for 90 days, or 3 months, or less but more than 30 days; (4) $1,000 if the offense is punishable by imprisonment for 180 days, or 6 months, or less but more than 90 days; (5) $2,500 if the offense is punishable by imprisonment for one year or less but more than 180 days; (6) $12,500 if the offense is punishable by imprisonment for 5 years or less but more than one year; (7) $25,000 if the offense is punishable by imprisonment for 10 years or less but more than 5 years; (8) $37,500 if the offense is punishable by imprisonment for 15 years or less but more than…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-30 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at github.com
Cited in 5 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Gilberto Lopez-Ramirez v. United States (District of Columbia Court of Appeals 2017, 171 A.3d 169)“…dardized the maximum fine for 180-day crimes at 31,000. See D.C. Code § 22-3571.01 ibi (2012 Repi. a supp. 2014); 60 D.C.R…”
- Mario Giovani Valendzuela-Castillo v. United States (District of Columbia Court of Appeals 2018, 180 A.3d 74)“…eamlining Act set maximum fines for misdemeanors at $1000); D.C. Code § 22-3571.01 (2013 Repl.) (standardizing $1000 as th…”
- Tornero v. United States (District of Columbia Court of Appeals 2025)“…onment may be sentenced to pay a fine as provided” therein. D.C. Code § 22-3571.01(a). The provision also enumerates the s…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: District of Columbia Audio Recording Laws: Complete Legal Guide, District of Columbia Phone Call Recording Laws: Consent Rules and Interstate Calls, District of Columbia Recording Laws (2026): One-Party Consent Rules
Code of the District of Columbia, Title 50: Motor and Non-Motor Vehicles and Traffic. - Chapter 22: Regulation of Traffic. - Subchapter III-A: Impaired Operating or Driving. - Part D: Enforcement.
§ 50-2206.51Evidence of impairment.In force
(a) If as a result of the operation or the physical control of a vehicle, or a watercraft, a person is tried in any court of competent jurisdiction within the District of Columbia for operating or being in physical control of a vehicle, or a watercraft, while under the influence of alcohol in violation of § 50-2206.11, § 50-2206.12, or § 50-2206.31, negligent homicide in violation of § 50-2203.01, or manslaughter committed in the operation of a vehicle in violation of § 22-2105, and in the course of the trial there is received, based upon chemical tests, evidence of alcohol in the defendant’s blood, breath, or urine, such evidence shall: (1) If the defendant’s alcohol concentration at the time of testing was less than 0.05 grams per 100 milliliters of blood or per 210 liters of breath or 0.06 grams or less per 100 milliliters of urine, establish a rebuttable presumption that the person was not, at the time, under the influence of alcohol. (2) If the defendant’s alcohol concentration at the time of testing was 0.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-30 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at github.com
Code of the District of Columbia, Title 23: Criminal Procedure. - Chapter 13: Bail Agency [Pretrial Services Agency] and Pretrial Detention. - Subchapter II: Release and Pretrial Detention.
§ 23-1331Definitions.In force
*NOTE: The amendments to this section by section 30(k) of D.C. Law 25-175 shall expire on December 31, 2026.* *NOTE: The amendments to this section by section 30(k) of D.C. Law 25-175 shall expire on December 31, 2026.* As used in this subchapter: (1) The term “judicial officer” means, unless otherwise indicated, any person or court in the District of Columbia authorized pursuant to section 3041 of Title 18, United States Code, or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to bail or otherwise release a person before trial or sentencing or pending appeal in a court of the United States, and any judge of the Superior Court. (2) The term “offense” means any criminal offense committed in the District of Columbia, other than an offense triable by court-martial, military commission, provost court, or other military tribunal, which is in violation of an Act of Congress.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-30 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at github.com
Code of the District of Columbia, Title 24: Prisoners and Their Treatment. - Chapter 4: Indeterminate Sentences and Paroles. - Subchapter I: General Provisions.
§ 24-403.01Sentencing, supervised release, and good time credit for felonies committed on or after August 5, 2000.In forcecited in 2 of our articles
(a) For any felony committed on or after August 5, 2000, the court shall impose a sentence that: (1) Reflects the seriousness of the offense and the criminal history of the offender; (2) Provides for just punishment and affords adequate deterrence to potential criminal conduct of the offender and others; and (3) Provides the offender with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, and other correctional treatment. (1) If an offender is sentenced to imprisonment, or to commitment pursuant to § 24-903, under this section, the court shall impose a period of supervision (“supervised release”) to follow release from the imprisonment or commitment. (2) If the court imposes a sentence of more than one year, the court shall impose a term of supervised release of: (A) Five years, if the maximum term of imprisonment authorized for the offense is 25 years or more; or (B) Three years, if the maximum term of imprisonment authorized for the offense is more than one year, but less than 25 years.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-30 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at github.com
Also relied on in: Felony vs Misdemeanor in D.C.: Sentences, Fines and Probation
Search our full record of US law — 2.1 million sections, every state + federal →
Sources and References
- D.C. Code 22-2105, Penalty for manslaughter(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Code 50-2203.01, Negligent homicide(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- Comber v. United States, 584 A.2d 26 (D.C. 1990) (en banc)(www.courtlistener.com)
- D.C. Code 23-115, Panic defense prohibition(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Code 50-2203.02, Negligent homicide included in vehicular manslaughter(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Code 22-3571.01, Fines for criminal offenses(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Code 50-2201.05c, Leaving after colliding(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Code 50-2201.05b, Fleeing a law enforcement officer in a motor vehicle(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Law 25-161 (Strengthening Traffic Enforcement, Education, and Responsibility Act)(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Law 26-122 (STEER Clarification Temporary Amendment Act of 2026)(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Code 23-1331, Definitions (crime of violence)(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Code 24-403.01, Sentencing and supervised release(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Code 22-2103, Murder in the second degree(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Code Title 22, Chapter 21, Murder; Manslaughter(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Code 22-3153, Acts of terrorism(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Law 23-283, Panic Defense Prohibition and Hate Crimes Response Amendment Act of 2020(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Code 50-2206.13, Penalties for impaired driving(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Code 50-2206.51, Chemical test evidence(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Code 50-2201.04, Reckless and aggravated reckless driving(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Code 50-1301.37, Suspension of license and registration(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Code 22-2102, Murder in the first degree, obstructing railroad(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Code 22-4501, Definitions (weapons)(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Code 22-4502, Additional penalty for committing crime when armed(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Code 22-1804a, Repeat felony and violent crime offenders(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Code 22-4001, Sex offender registration definitions(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- 18 U.S.C. 1112, Manslaughter(www.govinfo.gov).gov
- D.C. Code 22-3601, Enhanced penalty for crimes against senior citizens(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Code 22-3611, Enhanced penalty for crimes of violence against minors(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Code 22-3751, Enhanced penalty for crimes against transportation providers(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Code 22-3751.01, Enhanced penalty for crimes against transit operators, Metrorail employees and passengers(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Code 22-3602, Enhanced penalty for crimes against citizen patrol members(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Code 22-3703, Bias-related crime(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
- D.C. Code 22-3701, Bias-related crime definitions(code.dccouncil.gov).gov
Paid attorney referral. RecordingLaw may receive compensation when you use an attorney-help link. RecordingLaw is not a law firm. Submitting a request does not guarantee that an attorney will accept your case and does not create an attorney-client relationship.