Washington Easement and Eminent Domain Laws (2026)

In Washington, a prescriptive easement takes 10 years of use that is open and notorious, over a uniform route, continuous and uninterrupted, and adverse to the owner. The Washington Supreme Court stated the 10-year period in Gray v. McDonald (1955); the courts borrow it by analogy from the limit on actions to recover real property, now RCW 4.16.020. On the eminent domain side, article I, section 16 of the Washington Constitution bars taking private property for private use, except for private ways of necessity and certain drains, flumes and ditches, and it makes the question whether a use is "really public" one for the courts.

This page covers both halves of Washington law: easements between private landowners first, then the government's power to take private property. For other states, see our guide to easement laws by state.

Information last verified on 2026-10-19. This article has not been reviewed by a licensed lawyer.

Jurisdiction scope: This article covers Washington state law on private easements (express, implied, necessity and prescriptive easements, and easement relocation under chapter 64.65 RCW) and on condemnation of private property (Wash. Const. art. I, sec. 16 and RCW Title 8). It does not cover adverse possession of title (see Washington squatters' rights and adverse possession), homeowners' association covenants, zoning, regulatory takings, federal condemnation (see eminent domain laws by state), or city and county ordinances.

Express Easements: Deeds and Recording

An easement created on purpose is an interest in land, so Washington's deed rules apply. RCW 64.04.010 provides that "every conveyance of real estate, or any interest therein" shall be by deed, and RCW 64.04.020 states:

"Every deed shall be in writing, signed by the party bound thereby, and acknowledged by the party before some person authorized by this act to take acknowledgments of deeds." RCW 64.04.020

Recording protects the easement against later buyers. Under RCW 65.08.070(1), "Every such conveyance not so recorded is void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee in good faith and for a valuable consideration from the same vendor, his or her heirs or devisees, of the same real property or any portion thereof whose conveyance is first duly recorded." Recorded easements show up in the county records; our guide to Washington property records explains how to find them.

How Long Does a Prescriptive Easement Take in Washington?

Ten years. A prescriptive easement is a right to keep using another person's land (a driveway, path or road, for example) that arises from long use rather than from a deed. The Washington Supreme Court listed the governing principles in Gray v. McDonald, 46 Wn.2d 574 (1955), including that "the period necessary to establish a prescriptive right is ten years" and that "the burden of proving a prescriptive right rests upon the one to be benefited." The court repeated in Gamboa v. Clark, 183 Wn.2d 38 (2015), that "the claimant bears the burden of proving the elements of a prescriptive easement" and that prescriptive rights "are not favored in the law."

The elements come from case law, not from a statute. The Court of Appeals in Drake v. Smersh, 122 Wn. App. 147 (2004), quoting earlier Washington decisions, put them this way:

"To establish a prescriptive easement, a claimant must prove 'use of the servient land that is: (1) open and notorious, (2) over a uniform route, (3) continuous and uninterrupted for 10 years, (4) adverse to the owner of the land sought to be subjected, and (5) with the knowledge of such owner at a time when he was able in law to assert and enforce his rights.'" Drake v. Smersh (Wash. Ct. App. 2004)

The same court added that "a party can establish a prescriptive right even though the owner of the servient estate and others who wanted to go on the property also used it, so long as the claimant exercises and claims his right independent of others."

No Washington statute names the prescriptive period for easements. The Washington Supreme Court has explained that the 10 years is borrowed "by analogy" from the limitation on actions to recover real property (Highline School District No. 401 v. Port of Seattle, 87 Wn.2d 6 (1976)), now RCW 4.16.020(1), which requires actions "for the recovery of real property, or for the recovery of the possession thereof" to be brought within ten years; our Washington statute of limitations guide covers that section in context. A claim to own the land outright, rather than to use it, is adverse possession, which our Washington squatters' rights page covers.

Prescription does not run against the state: RCW 4.16.160 provides that "no claim of right predicated upon the lapse of time shall ever be asserted against the state." The Court of Appeals has applied the same principle to property a city holds in its governmental capacity, including to easements (City of Edmonds v. Williams, 54 Wn. App. 632 (1989)).

Permission and Preventing a Prescriptive Easement

Permission is the dividing line in Washington case law. In 1955, in Gray v. McDonald, the Washington Supreme Court stated:

"(5) A use, at its inception, is presumed to be permissive. (6) If the user is initiated by permission, it does not ripen into a prescriptive right, unless there has been a distinct and positive assertion by the dominant owner of a right hostile to the servient estate." Gray v. McDonald, 46 Wn.2d 574 (1955)

The court set the current limits of that presumption in Gamboa v. Clark, 183 Wn.2d 38 (2015), stating that it has "limited the presumption of permissive use to three factual scenarios": unenclosed land; enclosed or developed land where "it is reasonable to infer that the use was permitted by neighborly sufferance or acquiescence"; and a road the owner created or maintained that a neighbor used in a noninterfering manner. It held that the presumption applies to developed land where neighborly sufferance or acquiescence can reasonably be inferred, rejecting a Court of Appeals line (including Drake v. Smersh) that had limited it to vacant and unenclosed land. Where a landowner actually gave permission, the use "cannot ripen into a prescriptive right, no matter how long it may continue, unless there has been a distinct and positive assertion by the dominant owner of a right hostile to the owner of the servient estate."

For land an owner opens to the public for outdoor recreation without charging a fee, RCW 4.24.210(4)(c) provides that "usage by members of the public, volunteer groups, or other users is permissive and does not support any claim of adverse possession."

Landlocked Property and Easements by Necessity

Washington case law and statutes give a landlocked owner two routes: a way of necessity over land of the person who sold or leased the landlocked parcel, which needs no condemnation, and a statutory right to condemn a private way of necessity across other land.

The Washington Supreme Court explained the policy in Hellberg v. Coffin Sheep Co., 66 Wn.2d 664 (1965):

"An easement of necessity is an expression of a public policy that will not permit property to be landlocked and rendered useless. In furtherance of that public policy, we give the owner, or one entitled to the beneficial use of landlocked property, the right to condemn a private way of necessity for ingress and egress. RCW 8.24.010. Condemnation, however, is not necessary where the private way of necessity is over the land of the grantor or lessor of the landlocked property." Hellberg v. Coffin Sheep Co. (Wash. 1965)

The same opinion described when an implied easement, by grant or by reservation, may arise: when there has been unity of title and later separation; when, during the unity of title, an apparent and continuous quasi easement existed for the benefit of one part of the estate to the detriment of the other; and when there is a certain degree of necessity that the quasi easement continue after the severance.

Condemning a private way of necessity (RCW 8.24)

Where no such easement exists, RCW 8.24.010 lets the landlocked owner go to court:

"An owner, or one entitled to the beneficial use, of land which is so situate with respect to the land of another that it is necessary for its proper use and enjoyment to have and maintain a private way of necessity or to construct and maintain any drain, flume or ditch, on, across, over or through the land of such other, for agricultural, domestic or sanitary purposes, may condemn and take lands of such other sufficient in area for the construction and maintenance of such private way of necessity ..." RCW 8.24.010

The statute defines a "private way of necessity" to include a right-of-way for ingress and egress and roads, logging roads and other structures over which timber, stone, minerals or other products may be carried. Where more than one route is possible, RCW 8.24.025 directs that nonagricultural and nonsilvicultural land be used if possible, then the least-productive agricultural land, with the benefits and burdens of each route weighed; owners of surrounding land that might contain a route may be joined as parties (RCW 8.24.015).

The landlocked owner pays. RCW 8.24.030 provides that "no private property shall be taken or damaged until the compensation to be made therefor shall have been ascertained and paid as provided in the case of condemnation by railroad companies," and that in a private way of necessity action, "reasonable attorneys' fees and expert witness costs may be allowed by the court to reimburse the condemnee." That fee award is discretionary ("may"), not automatic. Article I, section 16 of the state constitution expressly excepts "private ways of necessity" from its ban on takings for private use.

Relocating an Easement: The Uniform Easement Relocation Act

Washington adopted the Uniform Easement Relocation Act in 2023 (Laws of 2023, ch. 6, codified at chapter 64.65 RCW). It reaches most kinds of easements: under RCW 64.65.120(1), it "applies to an easement established by express grant or reservation or by prescription, implication, necessity, estoppel, or other method." Under RCW 64.65.120(2), it may not be used to relocate a public utility easement, a conservation easement or a negative easement, among other exclusions, and RCW 64.65.130 states that the chapter "applies to an easement created before, on, or after July 23, 2023."

The owner of the burdened land (the servient estate) cannot move an easement at will. RCW 64.65.020 permits relocation under the chapter "only if the relocation does not materially" lessen the utility of the easement, increase the burden on the easement holder in its reasonable use and enjoyment of the easement after the relocation, or impair an affirmative, easement-related purpose for which the easement was created, along with further conditions listed in that section. Under RCW 64.65.050, the servient estate owner "is responsible for reasonable expenses of relocation," including the cost of constructing improvements.

Relocation under the act runs through court. RCW 64.65.030 requires the servient owner to "commence a civil action" and serve the easement holder and certain other interest holders; the court "may not approve relocation" unless the owner shows the easement is eligible and the RCW 64.65.020 conditions are met, and the owner must record a certified copy of the order before relocating (RCW 64.65.040). The right cannot be waived by the easement document, even one that fixes the location or prohibits relocation (RCW 64.65.090). The act does not apply to a relocation by consent (RCW 64.65.120(3)) and does not affect other relocation methods Washington law permits (RCW 64.65.080(2)).

Blocking an Easement and How an Easement Ends

Where a right of way is established by reservation, the Washington Supreme Court has held, the land remains the property of the owner of the burdened land, who "is entitled to use it for any purpose that does not interfere with the proper enjoyment of the easement" (Thompson v. Smith, 59 Wn.2d 397 (1962)). In that case the court let a concrete slab in an unopened road strip stay, but directed its removal "when and if it interferes with the use of that strip for road purposes."

An easement can end in several ways:

• Release. RCW 64.04.010 requires every conveyance of real estate "or any interest therein" to be by deed, so a holder gives up an easement by deed; our Washington quitclaim deed guide covers the form.
• Nonuse alone does not end it. In a case involving a right of way reserved by deed, the Supreme Court adopted the rule that "mere nonuse, for no matter how long a period, would not extinguish the easement" (Thompson v. Smith), and the Court of Appeals has stated that "a permanent easement created by grant or reservation is not lost by mere nonuse" (City of Edmonds v. Williams).
• Abandonment. It takes conduct showing intent. In Barnhart v. Gold Run, Inc., 68 Wn. App. 417 (1993), the Court of Appeals found intent to abandon a platted road where the owner built a house and other permanent structures in it and built an alternate road, facts that "constitute more than 'mere nonuse'."
• Merger. When the benefited and burdened land come into common ownership, the easement ends: "One cannot have an easement in his own property" (Coast Storage Co. v. Schwartz, 55 Wn.2d 848 (1960)).
• Adverse use by the burdened owner. An easement "can be extinguished through adverse use by the owner of the servient estate," but during a period of nonuse only by a use "clearly inconsistent with the future use of the easement"; a fence across an unused express easement was not enough (City of Edmonds v. Williams, 54 Wn. App. 632 (1989)).
• Dedicated easements. Under RCW 64.04.175, easements established by dedication "cannot be extinguished or altered without the approval of the easement owner or owners," unless the plat or other creating document provides another method.

Conservation Easements

RCW 64.04.130 allows an easement or other interest less than fee simple "to protect, preserve, maintain, improve, restore, limit the future use of, or conserve for open space purposes" land or improvements, "whether the right or interest be appurtenant or in gross," to be held or acquired by a state or federal agency, county, city, town, federally recognized Indian tribe, metropolitan municipal corporation, nonprofit historic preservation corporation or nonprofit nature conservancy corporation.

Eminent Domain in Washington

Eminent domain is the government's power to take private property for public use with payment. This section covers Washington's rules; our guide to eminent domain laws by state covers federal condemnation and compares the states.

The Washington Constitution's takings clause, article I, section 16 (as amended by Amendment 9 in 1920), opens with a ban on private-use takings:

"Private property shall not be taken for private use, except for private ways of necessity, and for drains, flumes, or ditches on or across the lands of others for agricultural, domestic, or sanitary purposes." Wash. Const. art. I, sec. 16

It then provides that "no private property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation having been first made, or paid into court for the owner." The clause covers property "taken or damaged," not only property taken. Its requirement that compensation be "ascertained by a jury, unless a jury be waived" appears in the clause on rights-of-way taken by corporations other than municipal ones; in a condemnation by the state, a jury decides compensation only if one is demanded at the public use hearing (RCW 8.04.080).

Can Washington Take Property for a Private Developer?

Washington's limit on takings that benefit private parties comes from its constitution. Besides the private-use ban, article I, section 16 provides that whenever an attempt is made to take private property for a use alleged to be public, "the question whether the contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial question, and determined as such, without regard to any legislative assertion that the use is public." The same sentence adds that "the taking of private property by the state for land reclamation and settlement purposes is hereby declared to be for public use."

The general condemnation chapters of RCW Title 8 (chapters 8.04 through 8.28) contain no economic-development ban written in response to Kelo; the limit is the constitution's judicial public-use test. The condemnor must prove "that (1) the use is really public, (2) the public interest requires it, and (3) the property appropriated is necessary for that purpose." A legislative declaration of public use "is not dispositive" but "is entitled to great weight," and a declaration of necessity by a proper municipal authority "is conclusive in the absence of actual fraud or arbitrary and capricious conduct" (HTK Management, L.L.C. v. Seattle Popular Monorail Authority, 155 Wn.2d 612 (2005)).

In Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wn.2d 799 (1959), the Washington Supreme Court blocked a port's plan to acquire land. The court wrote that "the evidence conclusively shows that the Port's real purpose is to acquire these lands ... in order to provide potential industrial sites for future use by persons, firms or corporations engaged in business for profit," reversed the trial court, and directed a decree "permanently enjoining" the defendants named in the complaint "from performing any official act under the authority of Laws of 1957, chapter 265."

Blight is the main route by which condemned land can end up in private hands. RCW 35.80A.010 lets a county, city or town condemn an individual property that is a "blight on the surrounding neighborhood" (it must meet two of three statutory factors), and RCW 35.80A.020 lets it transfer the property "for residential, recreational, commercial, industrial, or other uses" at not less than fair market value. RCW 35.81.080 declares condemnation for community renewal of blighted areas "a public use," and in Miller v. City of Tacoma, 61 Wn.2d 374 (1963), the Washington Supreme Court upheld the urban renewal law, including resale of part of the cleared land to private persons with use restrictions, distinguishing Hogue.

Who can condemn: pipelines and power lines

The power is not limited to government bodies. Corporations operating common-carrier pipelines for oil, gas, gasoline and other petroleum products may condemn rights-of-way, must pay compensation before taking, and must use the property "exclusively for the purposes for which it was acquired" (RCW 81.88.020). Electric power companies may appropriate property "for right-of-way or for any corporate purpose" (RCW 80.32.060), and certificated gas companies may condemn land for gas mains and pipelines under chapter 8.20 RCW (RCW 80.28.220). For rights-of-way taken by a corporation other than a municipality, article I, section 16 requires full compensation "irrespective of any benefit from any improvement proposed by such corporation," ascertained "by a jury, unless a jury be waived."

At the federal level, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Kelo v. City of New London (2005) that because the plan at issue "unquestionably serves a public purpose, the takings challenged here satisfy the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment." The Court added that "nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power." The national eminent domain guide explains the federal rules in more detail.

Condemnation Procedure and Deadlines

Notice before the decision to condemn. Under RCW 8.25.290 (enacted 2007), before a state agency, county, city, school district, condemning corporation or similar entity takes the "final action" authorizing condemnation of a specific property, notice must be mailed by certified mail to each owner of record at the tax-roll address "at least fifteen days before the final action," and published once a week for two successive weeks. The notice gives the date, time and location of the final action. Lack of sufficient notice makes "the subsequent proceedings void as to the person improperly notified," but the condemnor may cure it with a new notice and a new final action.

Before filing. RCW 8.26.180 sets acquisition policies that every acquiring agency "shall, to the greatest extent practicable, be guided by": the property "shall be appraised before the initiation of negotiations," the agency shall give the owner "a written statement of, and summary of the basis for, the amount it established as just compensation," and the offer may "in no event" be less than "the agency's approved appraisal of the fair market value of such property." Changes in value caused by the project itself, or by the likelihood the property would be acquired for it, "will be disregarded in determining the compensation," and if a partial acquisition would leave the owner an uneconomic remnant, the agency "shall offer to acquire that remnant." No person lawfully occupying real property shall be required to move from a dwelling, business or farm operation "without at least ninety days written notice." Because the statute frames these as policies to follow "to the greatest extent practicable," they are not absolute requirements.

The public use hearing (five-day deadline). In a condemnation by the state under chapter 8.04 RCW, the court enters an order adjudicating that the contemplated use "is really a public use of the state," and RCW 8.04.070 makes that order "final unless appellate review thereof is sought within five days after entry thereof." Five days is a short window: if appellate review is not sought within it, the public use order becomes final.

Compensation in a partial taking. When the state takes part of a parcel, RCW 8.04.080 directs that compensation and damages be determined "after offsetting against any and all such compensation and damages the special benefits, if any, accruing to such remainder by reason of the appropriation," and states that "the determination shall be made within thirty days after the entry of such order, before a jury if trial by jury is demanded at the hearing either by the petitioner or by the respondents, otherwise by the court sitting without a jury." If no jury panel is available in time, the court may continue the determination to a jury called within sixty days.

Before trial. Under RCW 8.25.010, "at least thirty days prior to the date set for trial" the condemnor shall serve a written statement of the total just compensation it would pay in a settlement "on each condemnee who has made an appearance in the action." After the case is filed, the court may order the parties to exchange their appraisers' written conclusions (RCW 8.25.120).

Immediate possession and the 60-day trial demand (state condemnations). Under RCW 8.04.090 the state and the owner may stipulate to an order of immediate possession, and the state pays its offer into the court registry, which the owner may withdraw. RCW 8.04.094 then requires an owner who wants a compensation trial to "so move within sixty days from the date of entry of the order of immediate possession and use." If no timely demand is made, the court enters a decree for the deposited amount "as the total sum to which respondents are entitled," and that decree is "final and nonappealable." At the trial, the property is valued as of the date of the possession order, and if the award is less than the deposit, an owner who withdrew it owes the state the difference (RCW 8.04.092).

Owner deadlines and traps

How Just Compensation Works

The constitution requires just compensation for property "taken or damaged," paid before the taking or deposited into court. The measure is fair market value: RCW 8.25.020 describes its payment as made "in addition to the fair market value of the property." In a state condemnation where the state took immediate possession, "the date of valuation of the property shall be the date of entry of the order granting to the state immediate possession" (RCW 8.04.092). Other statutes add specific payments:

• Interest. Under RCW 8.28.040, the verdict "shall bear interest at the maximum rate of interest permitted at that time under RCW 19.52.020 from the date of its entry to the date of payment thereof," except that interest stops running while entry of final judgment is delayed "solely by the pendency of an appeal."
• Cost of evaluating the offer. RCW 8.25.020 provides for a payment of "the various expenditures actually and reasonably incurred" by those with an interest in the parcel "in the process of evaluating the condemnor's offer to buy the same, but not to exceed a total of seven hundred fifty dollars," in the circumstances that section describes.
• No home bonus. Chapters 8.04 and 8.25 RCW contain no percentage add-on above the compensation award for an owner's home.
• Relocation payments. Relocation help is separate from compensation for the land. RCW 8.26.045(1) requires an additional replacement housing payment, "not in excess of the dollar amount allowed under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 4623 as it existed on July 23, 2017, or such subsequent date as may be provided by the displacing agency by rule or regulation," for a person displaced from a dwelling "actually owned and occupied by the displaced person for not less than ninety days," subject to that section's other conditions. RCW 8.26.035 requires payment of actual reasonable moving expenses and, for a displaced farm, nonprofit organization or small business, reasonable reestablishment expenses up to $200,000 (or, until August 1, 2030, $100,000 where a state agency is the displacing agency), or the amount allowed under 42 U.S.C. 4622 if greater; those dollar caps rise 2 percent a year beginning August 1, 2025.

Attorney Fees in Washington Condemnation Cases

RCW 8.25.070(1) makes fees mandatory in two situations, subject to the conditions set out elsewhere in that section. The court "shall award the condemnee reasonable attorney's fees and reasonable expert witness fees":

"(a) If condemnor fails to make any written offer in settlement to condemnee at least thirty days prior to commencement of said trial; or (b) If the judgment awarded as a result of the trial exceeds by ten percent or more the highest written offer in settlement submitted to those condemnees appearing in the action by condemnor in effect thirty days before the trial." RCW 8.25.070

A condition can cost an owner the award. Under RCW 8.25.070(3), the fees "shall be awarded only if the condemnee stipulates, if requested to do so in writing by the condemnor, to an order of immediate possession and use" within thirty days after receiving the written request, or within fifteen days after the public use order, whichever is later, and then delivers possession once the offered amount is deposited in court. If the condemnor makes no such request before trial, the fee rule applies without it. Subsection (4) limits attorney fees to the attorney's customary trial and hourly rates and expert fees to customary county rates.

RCW 8.25.075 adds that the court "shall award the condemnee costs including reasonable attorney fees and reasonable expert witness fees" if there is "a final adjudication that the condemnor cannot acquire the real property by condemnation" or "the proceeding is abandoned by the condemnor." Subsection (3) of that section is the fee rule for inverse condemnation, described below.

In a private way of necessity case, the fee rule is different: under RCW 8.24.030, the court "may" allow the condemnee reasonable attorneys' fees and expert witness costs.

Inverse Condemnation

When a government takes or damages property without filing a condemnation case, the owner may sue for compensation, which is called inverse condemnation; it "differs from eminent domain only in that the landowner institutes the action." In Highline School District No. 401 v. Port of Seattle, 87 Wn.2d 6 (1976), the Washington Supreme Court held that inverse condemnation actions "seeking recovery for interference with the use and enjoyment of property" are governed by the 10-year prescriptive period, with recovery for loss "sustained during the 10-year period preceding the commencement of the action." Our Washington statute of limitations guide covers other filing deadlines. If the owner wins at trial, RCW 8.25.075(3) requires costs, attorney fees and expert witness fees, "but only if" the judgment exceeds by 10 percent or more the agency's highest written settlement offer made at least thirty days before trial.

Repurchase Rights After a School District Taking

RCW 8.16.170, added by chapter 224, Laws of 2025 (the "Houston eminent domain fairness act"), gives former owners a first chance to reacquire land a school district took. Before real estate "acquired in a condemnation action brought under this chapter, or acquired under threat of condemnation, may be sold, transferred, or put to a use other than as a site for school facilities," the school district "shall send a written offer by certified mail to the previous owner or owners," subject to the conditions in that section. The previous owners, or their heirs, assigns or successors in interest, "shall have 60 days after receipt of such written offer to provide written acceptance to the school district." The 60 days run from receipt of the offer. The price is the amount the district paid, the duty arises in the situations subsection (4) lists (for example, the public use is canceled or no actual progress is made within 10 years), the rights end 15 years after the district acquired the land, and an owner can waive them in writing.

Recent Changes in Washington Easement and Eminent Domain Law

• 2025: school district repurchase offers. Chapter 224, Laws of 2025 (ESSB 5142), effective July 27, 2025, added RCW 8.16.170, the school district repurchase-offer section described above.
• 2025: higher reestablishment caps for displaced businesses. Chapter 297, Laws of 2025 (SHB 1733), effective July 27, 2025, amended RCW 8.26.035, setting the reestablishment-expense cap for a displaced farm, nonprofit or small business at $200,000 ($100,000 for state-agency displacements until August 1, 2030), adjusted upward 2 percent a year.
• 2023: Uniform Easement Relocation Act. Laws of 2023, ch. 6 enacted chapter 64.65 RCW, which applies to easements created before, on or after July 23, 2023.

Washington Easement and Eminent Domain Laws at a Glance

Related Washington Property Guides

• Easement laws by state
• Eminent domain laws by state
• Washington squatters' rights and adverse possession
• Washington property records
• Washington statute of limitations
• Washington quitclaim deeds

This article provides general legal information about Washington easement and eminent domain law. It is not legal advice. For advice about a specific property or condemnation, contact a lawyer licensed in Washington.

Last updated: 2026-10-19.

Frequently Asked Questions

How long does it take to get a prescriptive easement in Washington?

Ten years. The Washington Supreme Court stated in Gray v. McDonald (1955) that the period necessary to establish a prescriptive right is ten years, and the use must be open and notorious, over a uniform route, continuous and uninterrupted, adverse, and known to an owner able to enforce their rights (Drake v. Smersh, 2004). A use that starts with permission does not count unless the user later makes a distinct and positive hostile assertion.

What can the owner of landlocked property do in Washington?

RCW 8.24.010 lets the owner of land that needs a private way of necessity condemn a way across another's land, paying compensation that must be determined and paid first (RCW 8.24.030). Where the way crosses land of the person who sold or leased the landlocked parcel, the Washington Supreme Court held in Hellberg v. Coffin Sheep Co. (1965) that condemnation is not necessary.

Does a landlocked owner have to pay for a way of necessity in Washington?

Yes. RCW 8.24.030 says no private property shall be taken or damaged until compensation has been ascertained and paid, and the court may allow the condemnee reasonable attorneys' fees and expert witness costs in a private way of necessity action.

Can Washington take private property for a private developer?

Article I, section 16 of the Washington Constitution bars taking private property for private use, except for private ways of necessity and certain drains, flumes and ditches, and makes whether a contemplated use is really public a judicial question decided without regard to any legislative assertion. In Hogue v. Port of Seattle (1959), the Washington Supreme Court ordered an injunction against a port's plan to acquire land for future industrial sites for businesses operating for profit. Blight is the main exception in practice: a county, city or town may condemn a blighted property and transfer it for private uses at not less than fair market value (RCW 35.80A.010, 35.80A.020).

How long is the deadline to appeal a public use ruling in a Washington condemnation?

In a condemnation by the state under chapter 8.04 RCW, the order adjudicating public use is final unless appellate review is sought within five days after the order is entered (RCW 8.04.070).

Does the government pay attorney fees in a Washington eminent domain case?

Under RCW 8.25.070, the court shall award the condemnee reasonable attorney and expert witness fees if the condemnor made no written settlement offer at least 30 days before trial, or the judgment exceeds the highest written offer in effect 30 days before trial by 10 percent or more. The fees are awarded only if the owner, when asked in writing, stipulates to immediate possession within the statute's time limits and delivers possession once the offered amount is deposited (RCW 8.25.070(3)). RCW 8.25.075 also requires costs, including those fees, when a final adjudication holds that the condemnor cannot acquire the property by condemnation or the condemnor abandons the proceeding.

Do Washington homeowners get extra compensation in eminent domain?

Chapters 8.04 and 8.25 RCW contain no percentage add-on for a home. Relocation payments are separate: RCW 8.26.045 provides an additional payment, capped by reference to 42 U.S.C. 4623, for a displaced person who owned and occupied the dwelling for at least ninety days, subject to that section's conditions, and RCW 8.26.035 covers moving expenses.

Can an easement be moved in Washington?

Under the Uniform Easement Relocation Act (chapter 64.65 RCW), the owner of the burdened land may relocate an easement only by filing a civil action and obtaining a court order (RCW 64.65.030, 64.65.040), and only if the relocation does not materially lessen its utility, increase the holder's burden or impair its purpose, among other conditions (RCW 64.65.020); the owner must pay reasonable relocation expenses (RCW 64.65.050). Parties may also agree to move an easement outside the act. The act cannot be used to relocate public utility, conservation or negative easements (RCW 64.65.120).