Washington Court: GAL Immune Despite Not Reporting Abuse

Washington Court: GAL Immune Despite Not Reporting Abuse

The Washington Court of Appeals, Division Three, held on September 10, 2026 that quasi-judicial immunity bars a negligence claim against a court-appointed guardian ad litem accused of failing to report suspected child abuse. The same unpublished opinion reversed a $4.5 million damages verdict.

Information last verified on September 16, 2026.

Jurisdiction scope: This article addresses Washington State law on quasi-judicial immunity for court-appointed guardians ad litem and the mandatory child-abuse reporting duty in chapter 26.44 RCW. It does not address federal claims, other states' immunity doctrines, or the separate question of when a court will appoint a guardian ad litem in the first place. For that background, see how Washington courts decide custody.

What the Court Decided

The Washington Court of Appeals, Division Three, filed Manina v. Manina, No. 40558-3-III, on September 10, 2026. Judge Murphy wrote for a panel that included Chief Judge Staab and Judge Lawrence-Berrey. The child at the center of the case appears pseudonymously as Jane Doe, and this article carries no detail about the underlying conduct beyond what the legal holdings require.

A guardian ad litem, Roecks, had been appointed in the parents' dissolution proceeding to investigate issues relating to a parenting plan. The civil suit alleged that she negligently failed to report suspected child abuse. The trial court granted her summary judgment on immunity grounds and denied reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment, and its opinion contains no separate analysis of the reconsideration ruling.

"We affirm the ruling that Roecks, in her role as GAL, was acting as an arm of the court in the dissolution proceedings and is shielded by quasi-judicial immunity."

Manina v. Manina, No. 40558-3-III, slip op. at 3 (Wash. Ct. App. Div. III Sept. 10, 2026) (unpublished)

The distinction that matters most for readers is procedural. Summary judgment on immunity asks whether the defendant can be sued at all, not whether the defendant did anything wrong. The court did not adjudicate whether a report should have been made, whether the guardian ad litem had reasonable cause to believe abuse had occurred, or whether her conduct fell below any professional standard. It held that the claim could not proceed against her in a civil damages action. An immunity ruling and a finding of no wrongdoing are different outcomes, and the opinion delivers only the first.

The court described the precise gap it was filling in careful terms.

"Although our courts have addressed applicability of quasi-judicial immunity to GALs when [they] function as an extension of the court, they have not yet addressed whether such immunity attaches when a GAL allegedly fails to comply with the statutory duty to report suspected child abuse or neglect."

Manina v. Manina, slip op. at 15

That is the court saying the question was open in Washington, not that its answer now settles it. An unpublished opinion cannot settle anything, for reasons the last section explains.

Why the Reporting Statute Did Not Override the Immunity

Quasi-judicial immunity in Washington is a common-law doctrine. The test comes from Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish County, 119 Wn.2d 91, 829 P.2d 746 (1992), and Reddy v. Karr, 102 Wn. App. 742, 9 P.3d 927 (2000), held that court-ordered investigators act as surrogates for the court when they carry out the function the court assigned them. Because the doctrine is judge-made, the legislature can displace it, but under settled Washington practice it must express that intent clearly.

The plaintiff's argument was that the mandatory-reporting statute did exactly that. RCW 26.44.030(1)(e) provides:

"The reporting requirement also applies to guardians ad litem, including court-appointed special advocates, appointed under Titles 11 and 13 RCW and this title, who in the course of their representation of children in these actions have reasonable cause to believe a child has been abused or neglected."

The court read that subsection as doing one thing: adding guardians ad litem to the class of professionals who must report. There is no reference in it to immunities or defenses of any kind, so on the court's reasoning it does not abrogate the common-law doctrine.

Here a point of statutory hygiene is worth stating plainly, because the two provisions are frequently blurred. RCW 26.44.060 is not the immunity the court applied. That statute grants civil and criminal immunity to a person who does make a good-faith report, so that mandatory reporters are not deterred by fear of being sued by the subject of the report. It addresses reporting, not the failure to report, and it played no part in the holding. The immunity in Manina is common law, developed by Washington courts, and applies to the guardian ad litem because of the court-appointed role she occupied.

The plaintiff also relied on Beggs v. Department of Social and Health Services, 171 Wn.2d 69, 247 P.3d 421 (2011), in which the Washington Supreme Court recognized an implied civil cause of action against a mandatory reporter under RCW 26.44.030. The Court of Appeals distinguished it on two grounds. The Beggs defendants were health care providers who were not acting as an arm of the court, and no immunity question was presented in that case. Recognizing that a cause of action exists is not the same as holding that it survives an immunity defense.

Finally, the court held that the reporting duty is not severable from the investigative function the appointment created. Gathering information about suspected abuse, and deciding whether, when, and how to report it, is integral to the investigation a court orders a guardian ad litem to perform, a point the court supported with Barr v. Day, 124 Wn.2d 318, 879 P.2d 912 (1994), on a guardian ad litem operating as an arm of the court. On this record, the appointing order in the Washington divorce and dissolution procedure directed the guardian ad litem to investigate and file a report on all issues related to making a parenting plan, and the court found no genuine issue of material fact that the information she gathered, from the parents, the children, a relative, and medical providers, came to her while she was performing those court-directed duties.

Where Immunity Stops

Quasi-judicial immunity is not a badge. It attaches to what the person was appointed to do, and it stops at the edge of that appointment.

Kelley v. Pierce County, 179 Wn. App. 566, 319 P.3d 74 (2014), is the case that draws the line. The guardian ad litem there, appointed in a parental termination case, was alleged to have used the authority and access of the job to stalk, prey on, assault, and sexually harass a party. Division Two held he was not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity as a matter of law: taking those allegations as true, he was not investigating or reporting facts to the court while doing the things alleged, so the immunity could not be applied at that stage and the suit was allowed to go forward. The court left the scope question open as a question of fact. What it rejected was the argument that holding the title, or using the position as the opportunity for the alleged torts, makes a guardian ad litem an arm of the court automatically.

Read together with Manina, the doctrine sorts claims by conduct rather than by defendant:

Whether particular conduct falls inside or outside the appointment is a fact-specific question decided on the record before the court, which is why the appointing order itself did so much work in Manina.

Washington courts have also been candid that absolute immunity has a cost. Quoting West v. Osborne, 108 Wn. App. 764, 34 P.3d 816 (2001), the Manina court noted that when quasi-judicial immunity applies, "it is an absolute bar to civil liability and necessarily leaves wronged claimants without a remedy." The justification the court gave is that exposing guardians ad litem to civil liability for reporting judgment calls could chill the very independence the doctrine exists to preserve.

What Accountability Washington Law Still Provides

The Manina court's answer to the objection that immunity makes the reporting duty meaningless was that other mechanisms remain. Those mechanisms are institutional and corrective rather than compensatory, which is a real difference: none of them pays damages. Described generally, Washington law provides these routes.

Removal and review under RCW 26.12.175(5). The statute governing guardian ad litem appointment and duties sets out a review process, and its scope is narrower than the Manina opinion's shorthand citation suggests. By its terms it applies where "a party in a case reasonably believes the court-appointed special advocate or volunteer guardian ad litem is inappropriate or unqualified," so the text reaches CASA appointees and volunteer guardians ad litem rather than every guardian ad litem. That party may request a review of the appointment by the program; the program must complete the review within five judicial days and remove any appointee for good cause; and a party not satisfied with the outcome may file a motion with the court for removal. Nothing in RCW 26.12.175 grants a guardian ad litem immunity from suit.

Registry grievances under GALR 7. The Washington Guardian ad Litem Rules require each court to adopt procedures for filing, investigating, and adjudicating grievances made by or against guardians ad litem under Titles 11, 13, and 26 RCW, which unlike the removal statute above is not limited to volunteers. The rule sets outer time limits for resolving a complaint of 25 days while a case is pending and 60 days after it concludes, and where a grievance results in removal from a county's registry, that county's court must notify the Office of the Administrator of the Courts, which circulates the information to superior courts statewide. That is a licensing-style consequence rather than a lawsuit, and it operates through the court system that maintains the registry.

Criminal exposure under RCW 26.44.080. The statute provides:

"Every person who is required to make, or to cause to be made, a report pursuant to RCW 26.44.030 and 26.44.040, and who knowingly fails to make, or fails to cause to be made, such report, shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor."

Because the reporting duty reaches guardians ad litem through RCW 26.44.030(1)(e), a knowing failure to report carries criminal exposure that the civil immunity does not touch. The charging decision belongs to a prosecutor, not to a private party.

Civil claims for out-of-scope conduct. Kelley confirms that quasi-judicial immunity does not reach conduct outside the statutory guardian ad litem functions, so the immunity recognized in Manina does not convert every claim against every guardian ad litem into a dead letter.

The Manina court also listed "professional discipline" among the surviving checks, but the only authority it cited for that sentence is RCW 26.12.175(5), which is the removal-review provision described above and not a discipline regime. The opinion identifies no guardian-ad-litem-specific disciplinary system, and the GALR 7 registry grievance process is the mechanism that is actually written down. Readers looking at adjacent protective mechanisms in family proceedings can see our coverage of protective orders in Washington, which operate independently of any guardian ad litem appointment.

The Other Half of the Ruling

Reporting the immunity holding alone would misdescribe the case. The father cross-appealed, and on that side of the appeal he won substantial relief.

The trial court had used his criminal convictions to establish civil liability by collateral estoppel, the doctrine that prevents relitigating an issue already necessarily decided in an earlier proceeding. The Court of Appeals split that ruling in two.

It affirmed preclusion on civil battery. The molestation convictions necessarily decided intentional contact that was harmful or offensive by an objective measure, which are the elements of the civil tort.

It reversed preclusion on civil assault. Civil assault requires that the victim be placed in apprehension of imminent contact, and the criminal charges of conviction did not require the jury to decide that element, so it was never necessarily determined. The court added that even if the issues had been identical, the injustice prong of the collateral-estoppel test would still weigh against preclusion, because the father had no similar motive to contest testimony about fear that was not an element of the crimes charged.

That reversal took the damages verdict with it.

"Because the jury here returned a single, undifferentiated $4.5 million verdict on proximate causation and damages without separation or apportionment between the battery and assault claims, the damages award cannot stand as to battery alone. The judgment on damages is reversed."

Manina v. Manina, slip op. at 32

The court remanded for a new trial limited to assault liability and apportioned damages, directing that the jury return separate liability, causation, and damages findings for each tort. A co-defendant, Cornerstone Psychologists, P.S., was not a party on appeal. The net result is a mixed disposition: the guardian ad litem is out of the case on immunity, the battery liability finding stands, the assault finding is gone, and the $4.5 million award no longer exists as a judgment. What happens on remand is for the trial court and a new jury, and this article does not speculate about it.

What Weight This Decision Carries

Manina is unpublished, and in Washington that word has a precise meaning set by court rule. GR 14.1(a) provides:

"Unpublished opinions of the Court of Appeals have no precedential value and are not binding on any court. However, unpublished opinions of the Court of Appeals filed on or after March 1, 2013, may be cited as nonbinding authorities, if identified as such by the citing party, and may be accorded such persuasive value as the court deems appropriate."

So the decision binds no Washington court. A party may cite it, must label it as nonbinding, and any judge is free to give it whatever weight seems appropriate or none at all. It is not statewide law, and it should not be described as having settled the question the court said Washington courts had not yet addressed.

The opinion was filed six days before this article's verification date. It records no petition for review of itself to the Washington Supreme Court, which is what you would expect of an opinion that new, and we take no position on whether any party will seek review or on what would happen if one did. The petition for review the opinion does discuss belonged to the earlier criminal appeal, not to this decision.

Analysis: Why This Matters

The following is analysis from the Recording Law Editorial Team.

The decision draws a line between accountability and liability, and it is worth seeing that the two are not the same thing. Washington's legislature put guardians ad litem into the mandatory-reporter class in RCW 26.44.030(1)(e) and made a knowing failure to report a gross misdemeanor in RCW 26.44.080. The duty is real and it carries a criminal sanction. What this court held is that the civil damages door is closed, because the decision whether to report is bound up with the court-ordered investigation the immunity exists to protect. A legislature that wanted a different answer could say so in the statute; the court's whole point was that the current text does not.

The honest observation for a parent reading this is that the surviving remedies are institutional rather than compensatory. Removal, a registry grievance, and a criminal referral can change who serves and can carry consequences for the person who served, but none of them produces a damages award for a family. Washington courts have long acknowledged that gap as the deliberate price of absolute immunity rather than an oversight. It is also worth noticing how thin two of those routes are on inspection: the removal statute the court cited is written for court-appointed special advocates and volunteer guardians ad litem, and "professional discipline" turns out to mean the county registry grievance process rather than anything resembling a bar.

Kelley is the part of the doctrine most likely to be misunderstood in the retelling, in both directions. It did not strip a guardian ad litem of immunity; it held that immunity could not be handed to one as a matter of law on those allegations, and sent the scope question to be decided on facts. Because immunity tracks the scope of the appointment rather than the title, the reach of any immunity ruling depends heavily on what the appointing order said and what the person actually did. In Manina the order was broad, covering all issues related to a parenting plan, and the information at issue reached the guardian ad litem while she was carrying it out. A narrower order, or conduct further from the assigned investigation, is a different analysis on a different record. Reading this decision as a general rule that guardians ad litem cannot be sued in Washington asks it for more than it says, especially since GR 14.1(a) means it says nothing binding at all. The same caution applies across our state-by-state custody coverage: immunity doctrines, reporting duties, and removal procedures differ by state, and a Washington outcome does not transfer.

Finally, the mixed disposition is what tells you how the panel was working. The same judges who closed the door on the guardian ad litem reversed a $4.5 million judgment against the father and sent the assault claim back for a new trial. That is doctrine applied issue by issue, not a court picking a side.

This is general legal information, not legal advice. It covers Washington State law on quasi-judicial immunity for guardians ad litem and mandatory child-abuse reporting under chapter 26.44 RCW, and it reflects sources verified on September 16, 2026. Laws change and this story is developing; consult a lawyer licensed in Washington about your specific situation.

Related articles

• Washington child custody laws
• Child custody laws by state
• Washington divorce and dissolution rules
• Washington restraining and protection orders
• Civil filing deadlines by state

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Last updated: 2026-09-16. This is a developing story; details verified as of 2026-09-16.

Frequently Asked Questions

Can you sue a guardian ad litem in Washington?

It depends on what the guardian ad litem is alleged to have done. Washington courts apply common-law quasi-judicial immunity to acts performed within the scope of the court appointment, which in Manina v. Manina (Div. III, Sept. 10, 2026, unpublished) covered an alleged failure to report suspected abuse discovered during a court-ordered investigation. In Kelley v. Pierce County, 179 Wn. App. 566 (2014), where the allegations described conduct outside the guardian ad litem's statutory functions, the court held the immunity could not be applied as a matter of law and let the claims proceed to be decided on the facts.

Is a guardian ad litem a mandatory reporter in Washington?

Yes. RCW 26.44.030(1)(e) extends the mandatory reporting requirement to guardians ad litem, including court-appointed special advocates, who in the course of representing children have reasonable cause to believe a child has been abused or neglected.

Did the court in Manina decide the guardian ad litem did nothing wrong?

No. The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment on quasi-judicial immunity, which asks whether the claim can proceed rather than whether the underlying allegation is true. The opinion did not decide whether a report should have been made or whether the guardian ad litem breached any standard of care.

What is the difference between RCW 26.44.060 immunity and quasi-judicial immunity?

RCW 26.44.060 is a statutory immunity for people who do make a good-faith report of suspected abuse, shielding them from suit by the subject of the report. Quasi-judicial immunity is a common-law doctrine protecting people who perform court-assigned functions as an arm of the court. The Manina holding rests on the common-law doctrine, not on RCW 26.44.060.

What does Washington law say about removing a guardian ad litem?

RCW 26.12.175(5) sets out a review route that by its terms covers a court-appointed special advocate or volunteer guardian ad litem a party reasonably believes is inappropriate or unqualified. The party may request a review of the appointment by the program; the program must complete the review within five judicial days and remove any appointee for good cause; and a party not satisfied with the outcome may file a motion with the court for removal. Separately, GALR 7 requires every Washington court to maintain a grievance procedure covering guardians ad litem under Titles 11, 13, and 26 RCW. This describes what the statute and rule say and is not advice about any particular case.

Is an unpublished Washington Court of Appeals opinion binding?

No. GR 14.1(a) states that unpublished Court of Appeals opinions have no precedential value and are not binding on any court. Opinions filed on or after March 1, 2013 may be cited as nonbinding authority if the citing party identifies them as such, and a court may give them whatever persuasive value it considers appropriate.

What happens if a mandatory reporter in Washington fails to report?

RCW 26.44.080 makes it a gross misdemeanor for a person required to report under RCW 26.44.030 and RCW 26.44.040 to knowingly fail to make or cause to be made that report. Charging decisions rest with prosecutors, and the criminal provision operates separately from any civil immunity.

How do you file a complaint against a guardian ad litem in Washington?

Guardian ad Litem Rule 7 requires each Washington court to adopt procedures for filing, investigating, and adjudicating grievances made by or against guardians ad litem under Titles 11, 13, and 26 RCW. A complaint must be resolved within 25 days if the case is pending or 60 days if it has concluded, and if a grievance results in removal from a county registry, the court sends notice to the Office of the Administrator of the Courts for circulation statewide. The specific procedure is set by the court that maintains the registry.

What happened to the $4.5 million verdict in Manina v. Manina?

The Court of Appeals reversed it. Because the jury returned a single undifferentiated $4.5 million verdict without apportioning between the battery and assault claims, and because the court reversed collateral-estoppel liability on assault, the damages judgment could not stand. The court remanded for a new trial on assault liability and apportioned damages, with separate findings required for each tort.