Ninth Circuit Affirms Classmates.com Yearbook Class Certification

Ninth Circuit Affirms Class Certification in Classmates.com Yearbook Case

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on September 24, 2026 affirmed a district court order certifying damages and injunctive classes against PeopleConnect, Inc., which operates Classmates.com, in a California right of publicity case. The published decision resolves class certification only, not liability.

Information last verified on September 28, 2026. This is a developing story; we update it as the record changes.

Status: The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's class certification order in Nolen v. PeopleConnect, Inc., No. 24-3894, on September 24, 2026 (slip op. at 50). The underlying claim under California Civil Code section 3344 has not been adjudicated. There is no judgment, no finding of liability, no damages award, no settlement and no claim process as of September 28, 2026.

Jurisdiction scope: This is a federal appellate ruling from the Ninth Circuit applying a California statute, Cal. Civ. Code section 3344, to a class defined as California residents (slip op. at 10 to 11). It does not change the law of any other state, and state right of publicity statutes differ substantially in what they cover and what they allow. For the state specific rules that sit alongside section 3344, see our guide to California background check laws.

What Happened

The Ninth Circuit issued Nolen v. PeopleConnect, Inc., No. 24-3894, on September 24, 2026, designated FOR PUBLICATION. The appeal came from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, D.C. No. 3:20-cv-09203-EMC, Edward M. Chen, District Judge, Presiding. The panel was Circuit Judges Marsha S. Berzon, Michelle T. Friedland and Salvador Mendoza, Jr. Judge Berzon wrote for the panel. There is no concurrence and no dissent.

The procedural timeline is unusual. The case was argued and submitted on May 23, 2025 in San Francisco. Submission was then withdrawn on July 18, 2025, and the case was resubmitted on September 24, 2026, the same day the opinion issued. The opinion does not state why submission was withdrawn.

PeopleConnect owns and operates Classmates.com, described by the panel as "an online website containing a library of more than 450,000 yearbooks" that lets users search those yearbooks and contact former schoolmates (slip op. at 5). The company buys yearbooks and accepts donated copies, scans them, runs text recognition so each page becomes searchable, and uploads the pages (slip op. at 5).

Access comes in three tiers. Visitors browse and search without registering. Free members register, agree to the terms of service, and can view every yearbook page in full resolution. Paid subscribers, called Classmates+ members, get messaging and other extras and see no subscription advertising (slip op. at 6 to 8). The panel wrote that "Classmates+ subscription advertisements are at the core of the substantive claims in this case" (slip op. at 7).

Two theories of how names connect to those advertisements are in the record. Under what the parties called the sequence theory, a visitor who searches a name and clicks a thumbnail is prompted to register, then immediately receives a subscription advertisement (slip op. at 7). Under the banner theory, a free member searching for an individual sees a subscription banner advertisement alongside the search results page (slip op. at 7 to 8).

Alicia Nolen is a California resident who graduated from Tulare Union High School in 2019 and whose name and photo appear in at least one yearbook on the site (slip op. at 8). She is now the sole named plaintiff; the opinion records in a footnote that four earlier named plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed after it emerged that they had registered accounts and thereby consented under the terms of service, one was dismissed as time barred, and one dismissed after being served with discovery (slip op. at 8 n.1).

Her theory is that PeopleConnect violated section 3344 the moment it made a student's name searchable, whether or not anyone ever ran that search. The panel put her position as the contention that making individuals' "identities searchable within [PeopleConnect's] advertising flow is a commercial use requiring consent under the statute" (slip op. at 10).

Nolen moved to certify injunctive and damages classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) (slip op. at 10). The district court conditionally certified in December 2023 and in May 2024 approved one definition for both classes (slip op. at 10). PeopleConnect then "sought, and we granted, permission to appeal the district court's certification orders under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f)" (slip op. at 11). This was therefore an interlocutory appeal of a certification order, not an appeal from a final judgment.

The certified class definition

The definition the district court approved for both the damages class and the injunctive class reads:

All persons residing in the State of California: (1) who are not, and have never been, registered users of Classmates.com; (2) who have never donated a yearbook to Classmates.com; and (3) for whom a search of their name, using the search bar to search a California yearbook made available for viewing on the Classmates.com website, yields at least one record corresponding to the class member from a California yearbook that Classmates.com first made publicly available on or after December 18, 2018.

(slip op. at 10 to 11.) The panel referred to "the estimated 100,000 putative class members" when weighing PeopleConnect's identifiability argument (slip op. at 31).

What the panel decided

PeopleConnect attacked certification on two Rule 23 requirements: predominance under Rule 23(b)(3) and adequacy of the named plaintiff under Rule 23(a)(4) (slip op. at 5). The panel set out the standard of review: "we review legal questions de novo, factual questions for clear error, and the district court's ultimate decision to certify a class for abuse of discretion" (slip op. at 11, citing Olean Wholesale Grocery Coop., Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, 31 F.4th 651, 663 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc)).

On predominance, PeopleConnect argued first that no class member has a viable section 3344 claim without proof that someone actually searched her name. The panel declined to reach it: "We reject this predominance challenge because it goes to the merits of the class's section 3344 claims, not to whether the class can be certified" (slip op. at 14). Because section 3344(e) makes the direct connection issue a question of fact, the panel said PeopleConnect was effectively asking the court to make that factual finding in the first instance, which is the jury's role (slip op. at 17 to 18). The panel added that PeopleConnect "may eventually be proven right that the class's claims fail on the merits if they rest on evidence of searchability alone" (slip op. at 16), and that either way "the class is entirely cohesive: It will prevail or fail in unison" (slip op. at 19, quoting Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 460 (2013)).

Second, PeopleConnect argued that section 3344 requires individualized proof of injury. The panel held the mental anguish version of that argument was not properly raised below, because at the certification stage PeopleConnect had accepted that injury could take either of two forms, so the district court could not have abused its discretion by failing to consider it (slip op. at 21 to 22). The panel did reach and reject the economic injury version. It upheld as a permissible inference the district court's reasoning that if the company used a class member's name in direct connection with advertising, then the name "has some economic value, even if small" (slip op. at 22). It quoted its own 1974 decision that "the appropriation of the identity of a relatively unknown person may result in economic injury or may itself create economic value in what was previously valueless" (slip op. at 23, quoting Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824 n.11 (9th Cir. 1974)).

The passage on the value of an ordinary person's name is the heart of that analysis:

Although a Joe Schmoe could not command the kind of multi-million-dollar endorsement deal that might be offered to a celebrity, it is reasonable to infer that even an average person whose likeness a company seeks to use in connection with advertising could negotiate at least a nominal licensing fee for such use. A plaintiff deprived of such compensation has suffered a cognizable economic injury under the statute, even if a small one.

(slip op. at 24.) The district court also pointed to classwide evidence that PeopleConnect buys yearbooks and licenses them to third parties, evidence whose probative value PeopleConnect did not challenge on appeal, and the panel held that relying on it was not an abuse of discretion (slip op. at 24 to 25). It closed the section with a caution: "But with respect to certification, Nolen has shown that the injury element can be adjudicated without undermining predominance" (slip op. at 25), having just noted that a jury may ultimately find the same evidence unpersuasive.

Third, PeopleConnect argued the district court identified no workable winnowing plan to screen out four categories of people: those who signed school release forms, those not reasonably identifiable from a search result, those who consented by registering or donating, and those whose names are not searchable. The panel found no abuse of discretion on any of the four (slip op. at 28). On the release forms, only three of seven sample forms reached entities beyond the school district, and the company offered no evidence it was an assignee, transferee or successor of those districts, so "we will not vacate certification based on the possibility that such forms may exist" (slip op. at 28 to 29). On identifiability, the district court permissibly found nine same name and twenty similar name instances within the same yearbook insufficient to require an inquiry into every class member (slip op. at 30). On registered users and donors, the panel noted the class definition already excludes them, and that Rule 23 does not require an administratively feasible method of identifying class members as a precondition to certification (slip op. at 31 to 34, applying Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2017)). On searchability, it approved deferring those disputes, quoting the district court: "If one's identity is not searchable, that person would not be part of the class, an issue that, if necessary, could be determined at a later prove-up stage" (slip op. at 39).

The predominance discussion ends: "In sum, on this record, we find no basis to reverse certification of the damages class on predominance or manageability grounds" (slip op. at 40). The panel added that PeopleConnect may move to decertify if circumstances change or later evidence reveals obstacles to classwide adjudication (slip op. at 40).

On adequacy, PeopleConnect raised two arguments. The first, that Nolen creates an intraclass conflict by proceeding solely on a searchable theory and sacrificing stronger claims held by people whose names were actually searched, was not raised in the district court and not raised in the opening appellate briefs. The panel declined to rule on it, citing the party presentation principle, and instead offered guidance because the issue "appears to raise a matter of first impression in this circuit concerning Rule 23's adequacy prong" (slip op. at 42). The second argument, that Nolen cannot adequately represent the Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive class because her name is no longer searchable, failed on two grounds: her theory requires only searchability, and in any event "that is only because PeopleConnect suppressed her name from its site after she filed suit" (slip op. at 49), which the panel treated as voluntary cessation that cannot be used to disqualify her.

The disposition is one sentence: "For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's certification of the class" (slip op. at 50).

What the Law Actually Says

California's right of publicity statute, Cal. Civ. Code section 3344, is the claim at issue. Subdivision (a)(1) reaches any person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services, without that person's prior consent (Cal. Civ. Code section 3344(a)(1)). The remedy provision makes a violator liable "in an amount equal to the greater of seven hundred fifty dollars ($750) or the actual damages suffered by them as a result of the unauthorized use," plus attributable profits not already counted in actual damages (section 3344(a)(1), quoted at slip op. at 8 to 9).

That $750 figure is why the individualized damages argument mattered. The panel explained in a footnote that section 3344 does not require a plaintiff seeking statutory damages to prove the value of her economic injury, quoting California authority that "[s]ection 3344 provides for minimum damages of $750, even if no actual damages are proven" (slip op. at 22 n.6, quoting KNB Enterprises v. Matthews, 78 Cal. App. 4th 362, 367 (2000)). Later, giving guidance on the conflict question, the panel observed that for a claimant unable to prove substantial actual damages, "the only recovery would be $750 in statutory damages" (slip op. at 47).

The panel took the elements of a section 3344 claim as settled and not in dispute, listing them as: use of the plaintiff's identity; appropriation of the plaintiff's name or likeness to the defendant's advantage, commercially or otherwise; lack of consent; resulting injury; a knowing use for purposes of advertising or solicitation of purchases; and a direct connection between the use and the commercial purpose (slip op. at 15, quoting Maloney v. T3Media, Inc., 853 F.3d 1004, 1008 n.2 (9th Cir. 2017)).

The sixth element is where this case lives. Subdivision (e) provides that use in a commercial medium is not automatically a use requiring consent just because the surrounding material is commercially sponsored or carries paid advertising. Instead, the statute says, "it shall be a question of fact whether or not the use of the person's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness was so directly connected with the commercial sponsorship or with the paid advertising as to constitute a use for which consent is required under subdivision (a)" (Cal. Civ. Code section 3344(e), quoted at slip op. at 9). Because the legislature labeled that inquiry a question of fact, the panel held it could not resolve it at certification (slip op. at 20).

Consent appears in the record in three distinct forms, and each one is worth separating. The site's terms of service state that users who search for themselves consent to PeopleConnect's use and display of information about them (slip op. at 6), and that provision is what ended the claims of four earlier named plaintiffs (slip op. at 8 n.1). Yearbook donors sign a form authorizing use of their likenesses (slip op. at 5). School release forms signed by students are a third category, and the panel found PeopleConnect had produced no evidence that any of them authorized the company itself (slip op. at 28 to 29). The certified class definition writes the first two categories out of the class entirely (slip op. at 10 to 11).

Section 3344 also contains a news and public affairs limit the panel had no occasion to discuss. Subdivision (d) provides that a use in connection with "any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or any political campaign, shall not constitute a use for which consent is required" (Cal. Civ. Code section 3344(d)). The opinion does not address subdivision (d), and it does not address the First Amendment, although law professors filed an amicus brief on intellectual property and First Amendment issues (slip op. at 4).

Finally, what a Rule 23 certification order does and does not decide. Certification determines whether a case may be litigated as a class action; it does not determine whether the defendant broke the law. The panel said so repeatedly, holding that a district court at certification "is merely to decide a suitable method of adjudicating the case and should not turn class certification into a mini-trial on the merits" (slip op. at 14, quoting Noohi v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc., 146 F.4th 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2025)), and that a court cannot refuse certification just because it thinks the plaintiff's common evidence is weak (slip op. at 16 to 17). Rule 23(c)(1)(C) and the panel's own closing note leave the order open to revision, including decertification (slip op. at 40).

What Happens Next

The case returns to Judge Chen in the Northern District of California. Nothing in the opinion resolves whether PeopleConnect violated section 3344, and the panel said the direct connection element will be decided by a factfinder or, if there is no genuine dispute, on summary judgment (slip op. at 17).

Three specific items are queued for the district court. First, PeopleConnect is free to raise its intraclass conflict adequacy argument there, and the panel supplied a framework for it, drawing on Slade v. Progressive Security Insurance Co., 856 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 2017), and Murray v. GMAC Mortgage Corp., 434 F.3d 948 (7th Cir. 2006). The court would have to decide whether the conflict is actual rather than speculative (slip op. at 47), and whether virtually every class member would have a negligible chance of recovering more than the statutory minimum of $750 (slip op. at 48).

Second, the mechanics of identifying class members are deferred rather than resolved. The district court's two step plan has claimants self certify that they are neither registered users nor donors and list every name they have used, after which PeopleConnect cross checks the claimant against its registration database and donation forms, with sampling available to test accuracy and a decertification motion available if the company detects significant fraud (slip op. at 32). Searchability disputes go to a later prove-up stage (slip op. at 39).

Third, class notice. The opinion notes that notice had begun and was paused when the Rule 23(f) petition was granted, that the propriety of the approved notice is not before the panel, and that either party may move in the district court to revise it (slip op. at 48 n.17).

PeopleConnect's remaining appellate options after a published panel decision are the ordinary ones, and the opinion says nothing about whether the company will pursue any of them. We are not predicting how the case resolves.

Analysis: Why This Matters

The following is analysis from the Recording Law Editorial Team.

The legally interesting move in this opinion is not about yearbooks at all. It is the panel's decision to treat a defendant's strongest merits argument as a merits argument, even when that argument is also the whole ballgame for manageability. PeopleConnect's position was that if section 3344 requires an actual search, individual liability questions explode; the panel's answer was that the statute itself calls the direct connection question one of fact (Cal. Civ. Code section 3344(e)), so resolving it at certification would collapse certification into summary judgment (slip op. at 14, 17). That is a durable procedural point for any class action built on a statute that expressly assigns an element to the factfinder.

The second point with reach beyond this record is the economic injury inference. The panel accepted that a company's decision to use an ordinary person's name in connection with advertising is itself evidence that the name has value, resting on Motschenbacher and on the observation that even an average person could negotiate a nominal licensing fee (slip op. at 23 to 24). Read narrowly, that is an evidentiary permission for classwide proof. Read in the context of a business model that monetizes large volumes of ordinary people's records, it lowers a barrier that has historically made non celebrity publicity claims hard to aggregate. We note that the panel paired the holding with an express warning that a jury may still find the same evidence unpersuasive (slip op. at 25).

Third, the consent architecture in this record is a useful map of how these services acquire permission. The terms of service turn the act of searching for yourself into consent (slip op. at 6), which is the provision that removed four named plaintiffs from the case (slip op. at 8 n.1). Donation forms secure consent from the donor (slip op. at 5). School release forms did not, on this record, reach PeopleConnect at all (slip op. at 28 to 29). Anyone reading this opinion to understand the people-search and background-check industry should notice that the single most effective consent mechanism in the file was the one triggered by the subject's own curiosity. Our background check and people-search overview covers how these sites assemble and surface records, and California's separate statutory privacy regime is treated in our guide to California data privacy laws.

Finally, the adequacy discussion is the part practitioners will cite first. The panel called the question a matter of first impression in the circuit (slip op. at 42), declined to decide it on party presentation grounds, and then wrote several pages of guidance drawing on the Fifth and Seventh Circuits (slip op. at 43 to 48). That is a deliberate signal, and it is guidance rather than holding. We are not predicting what the district court will do with it.

How This Affects You

There is nothing to claim at this stage. No court has found PeopleConnect liable, no fund exists, no claim form exists, and no court approved claims process exists. The opinion notes only that class notice had begun and was paused when the Rule 23(f) appeal was permitted (slip op. at 48 n.17). Any website inviting you to file a claim or collect a payment in this matter should be treated with suspicion. If and when a court approves a claims process, it would be run by a court appointed administrator, not by us.

We are not going to tell you whether you are a class member, because that is determined by the class definition and the record, not by a news article. The definition the district court approved and the Ninth Circuit affirmed covers California residents who have never been registered Classmates.com users, never donated a yearbook to the site, and whose name, when searched in the site's search bar against a California yearbook, returns at least one record from a California yearbook the site first made publicly available on or after December 18, 2018 (slip op. at 10 to 11). Read that definition yourself, in the opinion, before drawing any conclusion.

In its guidance to the district court, the panel also noted that a Rule 23(b)(3) damages class carries opt out rights, and that a class member who believes she can prove actual damages above the statutory minimum could opt out and litigate individually (slip op. at 48). Whether that makes sense for any particular person is a question for a lawyer looking at that person's facts.

More broadly, this opinion is a reminder of what a search result about you can contain. The record here describes results that surface a person's name, high school, city and yearbook publication year (slip op. at 29). If you are thinking about what your own historical records expose, our overview of identity theft law and remedies is a reasonable starting point for the protective steps that exist independently of any lawsuit.

This is general legal information, not legal advice. It describes a published Ninth Circuit decision applying California Civil Code section 3344, verified against the opinion and the statute on September 28, 2026. Class certification is not a finding of liability, and nothing here tells you whether you are a member of any class or what you should do. For advice about your situation, consult a licensed attorney in your jurisdiction.

Related articles

• Background check and people-search laws
• California background check laws
• California data privacy laws
• Identity theft law and remedies

Last updated: 2026-09-28. This is a developing story; details verified as of 2026-09-28.

Frequently Asked Questions

Did the Ninth Circuit find PeopleConnect liable or order it to pay anyone?

No. The September 24, 2026 decision affirmed only the district court's order certifying classes, meaning the case may proceed as a class action (slip op. at 50). The panel did not decide whether PeopleConnect violated California Civil Code section 3344, and it said expressly that the class may still lose on the merits (slip op. at 16). There is no judgment and no damages award as of September 28, 2026.

Is there a Classmates.com settlement or payout to claim?

No. As of September 28, 2026 there is no settlement, no settlement fund, no claim form and no court appointed claims administrator in this case. The opinion notes that class notice had begun and was paused when the appeal was permitted, and that the district court may still be asked to revise that notice (slip op. at 48 n.17). Treat any site offering to file a claim for you in this matter as suspect.

What exactly did the Ninth Circuit hold?

It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying a Rule 23(b)(3) damages class and a Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive class (slip op. at 5, 50). Specifically, it held that PeopleConnect's argument that class members must prove they were actually searched goes to the merits rather than to certification (slip op. at 14), that economic injury can be adjudicated on classwide evidence (slip op. at 25), and that none of the company's four winnowing plan arguments defeated certification (slip op. at 28).

Who is in the certified class?

The district court approved one definition for both classes: California residents who are not and have never been registered Classmates.com users, who have never donated a yearbook to the site, and for whom searching their name against a California yearbook on the site yields at least one record from a California yearbook first made publicly available on or after December 18, 2018 (slip op. at 10 to 11). The panel referred to an estimated 100,000 putative class members (slip op. at 31).

What is California Civil Code section 3344 and what does it award?

It is California's right of publicity statute. Subdivision (a)(1) covers the knowing use of another person's name, voice, signature, photograph or likeness for advertising or solicitation purposes without prior consent. A violator is liable for the greater of $750 or actual damages, plus attributable profits. The panel noted that a plaintiff seeking the $750 statutory minimum need not prove the value of her economic injury (slip op. at 22 n.6).

Does this ruling mean making a name searchable violates the statute?

No. That is the central merits question and the panel refused to answer it, holding that the argument goes to the merits of the section 3344 claims, not to certification (slip op. at 14). Subdivision (e) of the statute makes it a question of fact whether a use was so directly connected with paid advertising as to require consent, and the panel said factfinding is not its role at this stage (slip op. at 17 to 18).

Did any judge dissent?

No. The opinion was written by Circuit Judge Marsha S. Berzon for a panel that also included Circuit Judges Michelle T. Friedland and Salvador Mendoza, Jr. There is no concurrence and no dissent in the 50 page published opinion.

What did the panel decline to decide?

Several things. Whether searchability alone can sustain a section 3344 claim (slip op. at 14 to 20). Whether the statute requires proof of mental anguish, because that argument was not properly raised below (slip op. at 21 to 22). PeopleConnect's intraclass conflict adequacy theory, on which it gave guidance without ruling (slip op. at 42, 48). Whether the company has a Seventh Amendment right to contest class membership affidavits before a jury (slip op. at 35 n.12). Whether a decertification motion on the present record would be procedurally proper (slip op. at 48 n.18). The opinion also does not contain any Article III standing analysis.

Why was the appeal decided so long after argument?

The case was argued and submitted on May 23, 2025, submission was withdrawn on July 18, 2025, and it was resubmitted on September 24, 2026, the day the opinion was filed. The opinion does not state the reason for the withdrawal.

Does this decision apply outside California?

The holding is a Ninth Circuit ruling on federal class certification procedure, which binds district courts in the Ninth Circuit, but the underlying claim is under a California statute and the certified class is limited to California residents (slip op. at 10 to 11). Other states' right of publicity statutes differ in scope, remedies and exemptions, so this opinion does not establish what any other state's law requires.