ITS Logistics to Pay $396,135 in EEOC Religious Harassment Case

ITS Logistics to Pay $396,135 to Resolve EEOC Religious Harassment Charge

The EEOC announced on October 26, 2026 that ITS Logistics, a third-party logistics company based in Reno, Nevada, agreed to pay $396,135.54 and overhaul its harassment procedures to resolve a 2025 religious harassment charge through conciliation, a voluntary pre-suit process rather than a court judgment.

Information last verified on October 29, 2026. This is a developing story; we update it as the record changes.

Status: The EEOC announced the resolution in a press release dated October 26, 2026. This was a conciliation agreement, which is a pre-suit administrative resolution under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b). The agency filed no lawsuit, no court entered a judgment, and no court made a finding of liability. The release states that the EEOC's investigation found reasonable cause, which is an administrative determination by the agency, not an adjudication. The compliance reporting obligation runs for three years.

Jurisdiction scope: This article covers federal law under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, one EEOC conciliation agreement involving a Nevada employer, and the Nevada state employment discrimination statute at NRS Chapter 613. It does not address criminal law, Nevada public-employee grievance procedures, or the separate Title VII rules on religious accommodation, which turn on a different legal test. For how harassment law varies across the country, see our 50-state workplace harassment guide.

What Happened

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission announced on October 26, 2026 that a third-party logistics company based in Reno, Nevada agreed to pay more than $396,000 to settle a 2025 charge alleging religious harassment. The company is ITS Logistics. The matter was resolved through conciliation, the negotiation stage the EEOC is required to attempt after it finds reasonable cause, and before any decision about litigation.

The EEOC's release describes what its investigation found reasonable cause to believe. Soon after the employee was hired, the release says, he faced harassment based on his Jewish identity from co-workers and managers. That included frequent comments drawing on offensive stereotypes about Jewish people, as well as antisemitic postings that both co-workers and managers received and participated in. The release's subheading describes the conduct as including antisemitic posts to a work group chat.

The release then describes how the employment ended:

"Given management's involvement in the harassment, the employee's reports to managers, and the absence of any corrective response, the employee concluded that further reporting of the harassment would be futile and resigned." Source: EEOC press release, "Nevada Logistics Company to Pay Over $396,000 to Resolve EEOC Religious Harassment Charge," October 26, 2026, second body paragraph.

That sentence is worth reading precisely. The EEOC says the employee resigned. It does not say the employee was constructively discharged, and no court or agency adjudicator has made that finding. The distinction is legally meaningful, and we explain it below.

The money

The agreement splits the payment into two components:

• $96,135.54 in back pay. Back pay is equitable relief authorized by 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g).
• $300,000 in compensatory damages. Compensatory damages for intentional discrimination under Title VII come from 42 U.S.C. 1981a.

Those two figures total $396,135.54, which is the "over $396,000" in the agency's headline.

The non-monetary relief

Under the agreement, ITS Logistics also agreed to what the EEOC calls strong injunctive relief:

• Updating its anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies and procedures.
• Creating a recordkeeping mechanism to track complaints.
• Providing extensive training to employees, supervisors, managers and HR personnel.
• Providing regular reporting to the EEOC on its compliance with the agreement for a period of three years.

EEOC Chair Andrea Lucas said in the release that the case "underscores the importance of employers taking swift action to address religious harassment." Christopher Green, director of the EEOC's San Francisco District, which has jurisdiction over Northern Nevada along with Northern California, Oregon, Washington, Alaska, Idaho and Montana, framed the outcome around the process itself:

"By participating in the conciliation process, this employer worked with us to reach an appropriate remedy for the worker and demonstrated a strong commitment to fostering a positive and equitable workplace for current and future employees." Source: EEOC press release, October 26, 2026, quoting Christopher Green, director of the EEOC's San Francisco District.

A company representative, Scott Pruneau, said in the release that discriminatory comments or harassment based on religious beliefs are "not tolerated in our workplace" and that the company appreciated the EEOC's involvement.

The EEOC also states that since January 2025 it has taken more than 40 public actions involving employees' religious liberty, including filing lawsuits, resolving lawsuits by consent decree, and resolving charges through public conciliations and other pre-litigation settlements.

How an EEOC Charge Actually Gets Resolved

Most readers who land on a story like this one are not looking for the dollar figure. They want the map: what actually happens between someone reporting harassment and anything being resolved. Here is that map, drawn from the statute and from the EEOC's own description of its process.

1. Someone files a charge. Under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)(1), a charge must be filed within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. That window extends to 300 days where the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a state or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief, or to thirty days after receiving notice that the state or local agency has terminated those proceedings, whichever of the two is earlier. The EEOC states the practical version of this rule plainly: the 180-day deadline "is extended to 300 calendar days if a state or local agency enforces a law that prohibits employment discrimination on the same basis." For ongoing harassment, the EEOC says the charge must be filed within 180 or 300 days of the last incident, although it will look at all incidents when investigating.

2. The EEOC notifies the employer and investigates. Section 2000e-5(b) requires the Commission to serve notice of the charge on the respondent within ten days and to investigate. Charges themselves are not made public by the Commission.

3. The charge may be resolved voluntarily at any point. The EEOC offers mediation before investigation and settlement during investigation. The agency states that settlement agreements involve "no admission of liability."

4. The EEOC makes a cause determination. If the Commission determines there is not reasonable cause to believe the charge is true, section 2000e-5(b) requires it to dismiss the charge and notify both parties. If it determines there is reasonable cause, the statute directs it to "endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion."

5. Conciliation. This is the stage ITS Logistics resolved at. The EEOC describes conciliation as a statutorily required attempt, a voluntary process, and a negotiation in which counter-offers may be presented. It is, in the agency's own framing, the final opportunity to resolve the charge informally after an investigation but before a litigation decision. Section 2000e-5(b) also bars the Commission from making public anything said or done during those informal endeavors "without the written consent of the persons concerned," which is why a conciliation ordinarily leaves no public record and why the EEOC labels the ones it does announce as public conciliations.

6. Litigation, or a right to sue. Under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1), if the Commission has been unable to secure a conciliation agreement acceptable to it, the Commission may bring a civil action against a private respondent. The same subsection sets out when the charging party gets a notice of right to sue: among the triggers are dismissal of the charge, or the passage of 180 days from filing without the Commission filing suit and without the Commission having "entered into a conciliation agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party." Once that notice issues, a civil action may be brought within 90 days.

Two consequences follow from step 6 that are easy to miss. First, conciliation is the off-ramp from litigation, not a judgment at the end of it. Second, a conciliation agreement to which the charging party is a party is one of the circumstances the statute treats as a resolution rather than a trigger for a right-to-sue notice.

What the Law Actually Says

Religious harassment under Title VII

Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." That is 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), and "religion" sits in the same list as race and sex.

Harassment is not a separate statutory cause of action. It is a theory of how an employer discriminates in the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that when a workplace is permeated with "discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult" that is "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment," Title VII is violated (510 U.S. at 21).

Harris is also where the practical test lives. The Court held that whether an environment is hostile or abusive "can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances," and listed factors including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating or a mere offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance (510 U.S. at 23). No single factor is required, and the Court expressly rejected any requirement of tangible psychological injury. The standard is both objective and subjective: the environment must reasonably be perceived as hostile or abusive, and must actually be perceived that way by the employee (510 U.S. at 21 to 22).

The EEOC's public guidance tracks this. The agency describes harassment as unwelcome conduct based on a protected characteristic that becomes unlawful where enduring it becomes a condition of continued employment, or where the conduct is "severe or pervasive enough to create a work environment that a reasonable person would consider intimidating, hostile, or abusive." On religion specifically, the EEOC says harassment "can include, for example, offensive remarks about a person's religious beliefs or practices," and that the law does not reach "simple teasing, offhand comments, or isolated incidents that aren't very serious."

Who the harasser was changes the employer's exposure

This is the part of harassment law that surprises people, and it matters here because the EEOC's findings describe both co-workers and managers.

The Supreme Court set out the framework in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). In Faragher, the Court held that an employer "is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee." Where no tangible employment action was taken, the employer may raise an affirmative defense with two necessary elements: that the employer "exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior," and that the employee "unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise" (524 U.S. at 807). The Court then added the limit that does most of the work in practice: "No affirmative defense is available, however, when the supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment."

Faragher also noted that while a written anti-harassment policy with a complaint procedure is not legally required in every instance, the need for a policy suited to the employment circumstances may be litigated as part of the first element of the defense.

The co-worker rule is different and more forgiving to employers. As the Supreme Court summarized in Vance v. Ball State University, 570 U.S. 421 (2013), if the harassing employee is the victim's co-worker, "the employer is liable only if it was negligent in controlling working conditions." Vance also narrowed who counts as a supervisor: an employee is a supervisor for vicarious liability purposes "only if he or she is empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim." Vance describes a tangible employment action, quoting Ellerth, as "a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits" (570 U.S. at 429, quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761).

So in a case where both co-workers and managers are alleged to have participated, the legal analysis is not one question but several: which individuals had the authority Vance describes, whether the employer was negligent as to the rest, and whether any corrective response was made at all.

Constructive discharge, as a doctrine

Because the EEOC release says the employee resigned, it is worth separating the legal doctrine from this particular record.

Constructive discharge is the rule that treats some resignations as discharges. In Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004), the Supreme Court held that to establish constructive discharge, a plaintiff alleging harassment must show that the abusive working environment became so intolerable that the resignation qualified as a fitting response (542 U.S. at 134). The Court also held that an employer may assert the Faragher and Ellerth affirmative defense against such a claim unless the employee quit in reasonable response to an adverse action officially changing employment status or situation, giving examples such as a humiliating demotion, an extreme cut in pay, or a transfer to a position with unbearable working conditions.

Nothing in the EEOC's October 26, 2026 release applies that doctrine to this charge. The release says the employee concluded further reporting would be futile and resigned. It does not characterize the departure as a constructive discharge, and because the matter resolved in conciliation, no adjudicator ever reached the question. Readers should not infer one from the other.

How the money fits the statute

Title VII's remedial structure explains the shape of the payment, even though a negotiated conciliation payment is not a damages award.

Back pay is equitable relief under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g). Compensatory and punitive damages for intentional discrimination come from 42 U.S.C. 1981a, added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Two features of section 1981a are relevant.

First, section 1981a(b)(2) expressly excludes back pay from compensatory damages: compensatory damages "shall not include backpay, interest on backpay, or any other type of relief authorized under section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." That is why the two components of this agreement are reported separately rather than as one lump sum.

Second, section 1981a(b)(3) caps the combined total of punitive damages and compensatory damages for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life and other non-pecuniary losses, per complaining party, on a sliding scale by employer size: $50,000 for respondents with more than 14 and fewer than 101 employees, $100,000 for more than 100 and fewer than 201, $200,000 for more than 200 and fewer than 501, and $300,000 for respondents with more than 500 employees. Jurors are not told these limits; section 1981a(c)(2) directs that the court "shall not inform the jury of the limitations."

The $300,000 compensatory figure in this agreement equals the highest tier of that statutory ceiling. The EEOC release does not state ITS Logistics's headcount, and conciliation is a negotiation rather than a verdict subject to the cap, so the release does not explain the match. It is an observation about the numbers, not a finding.

The Nevada Layer

Nevada has its own employment discrimination statute, and it runs partly in parallel with Title VII and partly on different terms.

The prohibition. NRS 613.330(1)(a) makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire, to discharge, or otherwise to discriminate against any person with respect to compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment "because of his or her race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, age, disability or national origin." The protected list is broader than Title VII's on its face, and religion is on it.

Coverage threshold. NRS 613.310(2) defines "employer" as a person with 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. That mirrors Title VII's threshold, so a very small Nevada employer is outside both statutes. NRS 613.320(1)(b) also exempts religious corporations, associations and societies with respect to employing individuals of a particular religion for work connected with their religious activities.

The state agency. NRS 613.405(1) lets a person injured by an unlawful employment practice file a complaint with the Nevada Equal Rights Commission, including on the basis of religion. That matters for federal deadlines. The EEOC's rule is that the 180-day window extends to 300 days where a state or local agency enforces a law prohibiting employment discrimination on the same basis. Nevada law prohibits religious discrimination in employment and the Nevada Equal Rights Commission takes those complaints, so the 300-day window is the one in play for a religious discrimination charge arising in Nevada. The EEOC's own regulation says so directly: 29 C.F.R. 1601.74(a) lists the Nevada commission among the designated fair employment practices agencies, under the older statutory name it carried when the list was written. The extension is basis-specific, so it does not follow automatically for every protected characteristic in every state.

Right-to-sue notices and timing. The state route has its own notices. Under NRS 613.412, the Nevada Equal Rights Commission must issue a right-to-sue notice on request once at least 180 days have passed since the complaint was filed, and the notice must state that a civil action may be brought in district court within 90 days of receipt. NRS 613.420 requires a letter and a right-to-sue notice where the Commission does not conclude that an unfair employment practice occurred.

The Nevada limitations provision. NRS 613.430 is the one most likely to catch a reader off guard. "To the extent consistent with federal law," no action authorized by NRS 613.420 or by Title VII may be brought more than 180 days after the date of the act complained of, or more than 90 days after issuance of the NRS 613.420 letter or receipt of a right-to-sue notice from either the Nevada Equal Rights Commission or the EEOC, whichever is later. Critically, subsection 2 provides that when a complaint is filed with either the Nevada Equal Rights Commission or the EEOC, that limitation is tolled during the pendency of the complaint. The administrative filing is what preserves the clock.

Relief available in state court. NRS 613.432 provides that where a court finds an employee has been injured by an unlawful employment practice within the statute's scope, the court may award the same legal or equitable relief available under Title VII. Nevada law borrows the federal remedy set rather than writing its own.

For the state-level picture in more depth, see our page on Nevada workplace harassment laws, and for how termination rules interact with it, Nevada's at-will employment framework.

Analysis: Why This Matters

The following is analysis from the Recording Law Editorial Team.

The most useful thing about this announcement is not the dollar figure. It is that a charge resolved at the conciliation stage, and the EEOC chose to say so publicly.

Conciliation is the least visible part of the federal enforcement system. Section 2000e-5(b) forbids the Commission from making public anything said or done during those informal endeavors without the written consent of the persons concerned, which means the ordinary conciliation leaves no public record of what was negotiated. The cases the public reads about are the ones that failed at this stage and became lawsuits. That creates a skewed picture in which federal harassment enforcement looks like litigation, when the statute is built to try negotiation first. A published conciliation is a rare look at the step the statute actually prioritizes.

That visibility cuts both ways, and it is why the "no finding of liability" point is not a formality. A reasonable-cause determination is the investigating agency's own assessment that there is reason to believe the charge is true. It is not a verdict, it is not reviewed by a judge, and the employer did not concede it. The EEOC's own description of voluntary resolution says settlement involves no admission of liability. Anyone reading this story as a determination that ITS Logistics broke the law is reading more into it than the document supports.

The structure of the non-monetary relief is the part worth studying. Rewriting anti-harassment policies, building a mechanism to track complaints, and training supervisors and HR are not generic good-governance items. They map directly onto the first element of the Faragher and Ellerth affirmative defense, which asks whether the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct harassing behavior. Faragher noted that the need for a stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances may be litigated as part of that element. An employer that emerges from a charge with documented policies, a complaint log and a training record is in a different evidentiary position on that element than one that does not, in any future matter.

The complaint-tracking requirement deserves particular attention. The EEOC's findings describe reports made to managers and the absence of any corrective response, and the employee concluding further reporting was futile. A tracking mechanism attacks exactly that failure mode: it creates a record that a complaint was made, independent of whether the manager who received it chose to act. Courts applying the co-worker standard from Vance ask whether the employer was negligent in controlling working conditions, and that inquiry generally turns on what the employer knew and what it did. A log is evidence of knowledge. It also removes the usual defense that nobody ever reported anything.

The three-year reporting term is the enforcement teeth. The agreement does not merely require changes; it requires the company to tell the agency how it is complying, repeatedly, for three years. That is closer to the supervision a consent decree provides than to the one-time payment people usually imagine a settlement to be, and it is achieved without a court.

One more structural point. Where harassment is alleged against both co-workers and managers, the liability analysis fractures rather than consolidating. Vance limits "supervisor" status to those empowered to take tangible employment actions, so a person with the title of manager is not automatically a supervisor for vicarious liability purposes. The practical effect is that an employer facing mixed allegations may be strictly liable as to some individuals, subject to the affirmative defense as to others, and judged on a negligence standard as to the rest. That fragmentation is a real source of litigation risk and uncertainty for both sides, and it is one reason the statute's negotiation-first design has staying power. For a contrasting posture, our coverage of the $3 million resolution of the EEOC's Il Fornaio harassment lawsuit shows what the same statute looks like once the agency has gone to court, and the EEOC's hijab accommodation suit against Design Cuisine and Elior North America shows the separate religious accommodation track.

How This Affects You

These are general implications, not advice about any individual situation.

The administrative filing is what preserves the clock. Section 2000e-5(e)(1) sets the federal charge window, and NRS 613.430(2) tolls Nevada's limitations period only once a complaint is actually pending before the Nevada Equal Rights Commission or the EEOC. Neither statute's text contains any other tolling provision.

A resolution like this sets no rule. A conciliation agreement is an agreement. It is not precedent, it does not bind any other employer, and it establishes no legal standard. Its value to a reader is as a window into how the process works and what the EEOC asks for when it asks for relief.

For employers, the relief list reads as an inventory. What the agency accepted here was a current written policy, a complaint channel that generates a durable record, training reaching supervisors and HR rather than only line employees, and a mechanism to verify compliance over time.

This is general legal information, not legal advice. It covers federal law under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Nevada law under NRS Chapter 613, and reflects sources verified on October 29, 2026. Laws change and this story is developing; consult a lawyer licensed in your jurisdiction about your specific situation.

Related articles

• Workplace Harassment Laws by State: 50-State Guide (2026)
• Nevada Workplace Harassment Laws: 15-Employee Rule, 300-Day Deadline
• At-Will Employment by State: Exceptions and Your Rights (2026)
• Nevada At-Will Employment Laws: Exceptions and Your Rights
• EEOC Says Il Fornaio Will Pay $3 Million to Settle Harassment Suit

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Last updated: 2026-10-29. This is a developing story; details verified as of 2026-10-29.

Frequently Asked Questions

Does an EEOC conciliation agreement mean the employer was found to have broken the law?

No. Conciliation is a voluntary pre-suit negotiation under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b). No court enters a judgment and no court makes a finding of liability. The EEOC's reasonable-cause determination that precedes conciliation is the investigating agency's own assessment that there is reason to believe the charge is true, and the EEOC states that where a charge is resolved by settlement there is no admission of liability.

What is conciliation and where does it sit in the EEOC process?

Conciliation is the stage after investigation and a reasonable-cause finding, and before any decision about litigation. Section 2000e-5(b) directs the Commission, once it finds reasonable cause, to try to eliminate the alleged practice through informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion. The EEOC describes it as a statutorily required attempt, a voluntary process, and the final chance to resolve a charge informally. If no agreement acceptable to the Commission is reached, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1) allows the Commission to sue a private employer.

How much is ITS Logistics paying and what is it for?

The EEOC release dated October 26, 2026 states $96,135.54 in back pay and $300,000 in compensatory damages to the former employee, a total of $396,135.54. Back pay is equitable relief under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g); compensatory damages for intentional discrimination come from 42 U.S.C. 1981a, which expressly excludes back pay from compensatory damages.

Did the EEOC say the employee was constructively discharged?

No. The release says that given management's involvement, the employee's reports to managers and the absence of any corrective response, the employee concluded further reporting would be futile and resigned. The release does not use the term constructive discharge, and because the charge resolved in conciliation, no adjudicator reached the question.

What is the legal standard for religious harassment under Title VII?

Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), bars discrimination in the terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of religion. Under Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993), conduct must be severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment, judged by all the circumstances, including frequency, severity, whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating, and whether it unreasonably interferes with work performance (510 U.S. at 23). The test is both objective and subjective.

Does it matter whether the harasser was a co-worker or a manager?

Yes. Vance v. Ball State University, 570 U.S. 421 (2013), holds that where the harasser is a co-worker the employer is liable only if it was negligent in controlling working conditions, and that an employee counts as a supervisor for vicarious liability only if empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions. Where a supervisor creates a hostile environment, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-808 (1998), makes the employer vicariously liable subject to a two-element affirmative defense, and no affirmative defense is available when the supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible employment action such as discharge or demotion.

What is the deadline to file an EEOC charge for harassment in Nevada?

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) sets 180 days after the alleged unlawful practice, extended to 300 days where the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a state or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief. The EEOC states the extension applies where a state or local agency enforces a law prohibiting employment discrimination on the same basis. Nevada prohibits religious discrimination in employment under NRS 613.330(1)(a) and the Nevada Equal Rights Commission takes those complaints under NRS 613.405(1), so the 300-day window applies to a Nevada religious discrimination charge. Deadlines are fact-specific, and anyone with a live dispute should confirm the applicable date with the EEOC or the Nevada Equal Rights Commission.

Does Nevada state law add anything beyond Title VII here?

NRS 613.330(1)(a) prohibits employment discrimination because of religion and several bases Title VII does not list, and NRS 613.310(2) uses the same 15-employee coverage threshold as federal law. NRS 613.432 lets a court award the same relief available under Title VII. NRS 613.430 limits actions to 180 days after the act complained of, or 90 days after a right-to-sue notice, whichever is later, and tolls that limitation while a complaint is pending before the Nevada Equal Rights Commission or the EEOC.

Is there a cap on Title VII damages?

Yes, on part of them. Section 1981a(b)(3) caps the combined total of compensatory damages for non-pecuniary losses and punitive damages, per complaining party, at $50,000 for employers with more than 14 and fewer than 101 employees, $100,000 for more than 100 and fewer than 201, $200,000 for more than 200 and fewer than 501, and $300,000 for employers with more than 500 employees. Back pay is excluded from that cap by section 1981a(b)(2), and section 1981a(c)(2) bars informing the jury of the limits. A negotiated conciliation payment is not a damages award subject to the cap.