AMR to Pay $2.2M in EEOC No-Beard Accommodation Decree
Independently fact-checked against primary sources (last audited November 20, 2026). · 11 primary sources cited on this page. How we verify our legal content

The EEOC announced on November 16, 2026 that American Medical Response and its parent Global Medical Response will pay $2,200,000 to a nationwide class to settle religious and disability accommodation claims over a blanket "no beard" policy for EMTs and paramedics, under a consent decree in EEOC v. Global Medical Response, Inc., No. 1:22-cv-02544-DDD-SBP (D. Colo.).
Information last verified on November 20, 2026. This is a developing story; we update it as the record changes.
Jurisdiction scope: This article addresses a federal consent decree in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado and the federal statutes it rests on, Title VII and the ADA, which apply nationwide to covered employers. It does not address state fair-employment statutes, state disability laws, union grievance procedures, or workers' compensation. For the baseline employment rule federal discrimination law carves into, see our guide to at-will employment.
What Happened
The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission announced on November 16, 2026 that Lewisville, Texas-based Global Medical Response, Inc., American Medical Response, Inc. and their subsidiaries, collectively AMR, will pay $2,200,000 and provide other relief to settle a religious and disability accommodation lawsuit. The agency issued the release through its Atlanta District Office.
The underlying case is Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Global Medical Response, Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-02544-DDD-SBP, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The docket shows the EEOC filed its complaint on September 29, 2022, naming well over one hundred AMR-affiliated entities as defendants. Chief Judge Daniel D. Domenico is assigned to the case, with Magistrate Judge Susan Prose as the referral judge.
The parties filed a joint motion for entry of the consent decree on November 3, 2026, attaching the decree as Exhibit A. That motion states that the decree has been signed by all parties, that the parties believe it resolves all issues in the case including all of the EEOC's claims for monetary, injunctive and equitable relief, and that each party bears its own attorney fees and costs. It also records the decree's duration:
"Upon entry of the Consent Decree as an Order of the Court, the Parties move for the administrative closure of this case pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 41.2, subject to the terms of the Consent Decree, which include this Court retaining jurisdiction during the three-year term of the Consent Decree." Source: Joint Motion for Entry of Consent Decree, EEOC v. Global Medical Response, Inc., No. 1:22-cv-02544-DDD-SBP, Doc. 201, at 2 (D. Colo. Nov. 3, 2026)
The docket then shows two entries dated November 10, 2026: an order on the motion, and the consent decree itself at Document 203. Neither of those two documents was available to read as of November 20, 2026, so everything below about what the decree requires comes from the EEOC's public description of it and from the parties' joint motion, not from the decree's own text. That distinction matters, because an agency summary of a decree is not the decree.
As the EEOC describes the relief, AMR will pay $2,200,000 to a nationwide class of harmed individuals. AMR also created new EMT and paramedic positions for which it will provide an alternative respirator as an accommodation, and in conjunction with creating the new position it will participate in an independent study to explore safely expanding that accommodation to all EMT and paramedic positions.
EEOC Chair Andrea Lucas framed the case around blanket rules:
"Employers cannot enforce blanket policies without considering their legal obligations to provide reasonable accommodations for religious beliefs and disabilities." Source: EEOC Press Release, American Medical Response to Pay $2.2 Million in Nationwide Settlement of EEOC Religion and Disability Discrimination Suit (Nov. 16, 2026)
Marcus G. Keegan, regional attorney for the EEOC's Atlanta District, said the workers the agency represented practiced more than ten different religions, "including Christianity, Judaism, Sikhism and Islam," and said he hoped the study AMR will conduct "can one day lead to a further expansion of AMR's new respirator program." Darrell E. Graham, director of the Atlanta District, said employees needing a disability accommodation "should not have to choose between working in pain and quitting."
Two individuals, Ravinder Singh and Inder Dhanota, appear on the docket as plaintiff-intervenors with their own counsel, Radford Scott LLP of Atlanta, Georgia. They signed the joint motion alongside the EEOC and AMR.

What the Complaint Alleged
The following describes accusations in the EEOC's 2022 complaint. The case ended by agreement, so no court found these allegations proven.
According to the complaint, GMR and AMR maintained two interlocking rules. One, which the EEOC called the N95 Policy, allowed EMTs and paramedics to use only tight-fitting respirators such as N95s. The other, the No Facial Hair Policy, followed from it, because a tight-fitting respirator cannot be worn over facial hair that breaks the seal. The complaint alleged that the companies allowed no exceptions to either policy for medical or religious reasons and required their subsidiaries to follow both.
The complaint alleged that OSHA regulations do not require tight-fitting respirators and do permit positive-pressure respirators, including powered air-purifying respirators, or PAPRs. Because a PAPR does not depend on a seal against the skin, the EEOC alleged it can be worn safely by users with facial hair, including full beards, and that providing one would not have been an undue burden. The complaint alleged the policies did not permit PAPRs at all, so applicants and employees who had to keep facial hair for medical or religious reasons were not hired, or were discharged if they refused to shave.
On the religious side, the complaint identified claimants whose beliefs required facial hair and named their faiths individually: Sikh, Nordic Pagan, Jewish, Baptist and Hebrew Israelite. In one episode the complaint describes, an applicant who is an observant Sikh accepted an EMT Basic offer from an AMR entity in Connecticut in November 2020, provided information about his faith, and asked to use a PAPR instead of an N95. The complaint alleged the company denied the request and told him he would be separated from employment, and that a later denial letter addressed only the N95 and never addressed the PAPR request.
On the disability side, the complaint alleged that claimants had pseudofolliculitis barbae, a physical impairment that substantially limits major bodily functions including skin and immune function as well as major life activities including grooming and self-care, making them qualified individuals with a disability under 42 U.S.C. 12102 and 12111(8). One doctor's note quoted in the complaint described "severe pseudofolliculitis barbae of his beard and secondary to shaving and resulting in ingrown hairs," called it very painful, and advised that the worker should not shave. The complaint alleged that some employees shaved anyway and suffered pain and impaired self-care, while others refused and were discharged.
The EEOC brought the action under Section 706(f)(1) and (3) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3), and Section 107(a) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12117(a), and sought a permanent injunction, back pay, compensatory damages and punitive damages. It pleaded that on February 23, 2022 it had issued Letters of Determination inviting the companies to conciliate, that the companies declined to participate in conciliation, that it issued a Notice of Failure of Conciliation on March 8, 2022, and that all conditions precedent to the suit had been fulfilled.

What the Law Actually Says
Three separate federal duties converge on a no-beard rule. They are often discussed as if they were one, and they are not.
The Title VII religious accommodation duty, and what Groff changed
Title VII does not have a freestanding "religious accommodation" section. The duty sits inside the statute's definition of religion at 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j), which provides that religion "includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business."
For decades lower courts read Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), to mean that anything costing an employer more than a de minimis amount was an undue hardship. In Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447 (2023), a unanimous Court rejected that shorthand. The Court said it was "enough to say that an employer must show that the burden of granting an accommodation would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business." 600 U.S. at 470. The syllabus states the holding in the same terms at 600 U.S. 447.
Groff also made two clarifications that matter directly to a safety-justified grooming rule. First, the Court said the inquiry looks to the effect on "the conduct of the employer's business," and that impacts on co-workers count only to the extent they go on to affect the conduct of the business, a step a court must actually analyze. Second, the Court said Title VII requires an employer to reasonably accommodate the practice of religion, not merely to assess the reasonableness of one proposed accommodation: "Consideration of other options, such as voluntary shift swapping, would also be necessary." 600 U.S. at 473. The Court then left the context-specific application of the clarified standard to the lower courts. That is the entire holding. The Court did not rule on beards, respirators, or any safety standard.
The EEOC's own Compliance Manual Section 12 on religious discrimination now carries a notice at the top stating that it was issued before Groff and that Groff supersedes any contrary information on the page, because the body of that guidance still describes the old de minimis test. Section 12-IV sets out the basic sequence: an employer must reasonably accommodate a sincerely held religious belief that conflicts with a work requirement once it is on notice, absent undue hardship, and an applicant or employee need not use any "magic words" to put the employer on notice. The guidance adds that if the employer reasonably needs more information, the employer and the worker should discuss the request.
The ADA reasonable accommodation duty
The ADA's duty is textual and separate. Under 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(5)(A), discrimination includes "not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity." Subparagraph (B) separately covers denying employment opportunities because of the need to accommodate.
Two definitions do the work. "Reasonable accommodation" is defined at 42 U.S.C. 12111(9) to include "acquisition or modification of equipment or devices," which is the category a different respirator would fall into. "Undue hardship" is defined at 42 U.S.C. 12111(10) as "an action requiring significant difficulty or expense," judged against listed factors including the cost of the accommodation and the overall financial resources and size of the employer. That is a harder standard for an employer to satisfy than the pre-Groff Title VII gloss ever was, which is why the EEOC's religious-accommodation guidance historically flagged the two as different.
Pseudofolliculitis barbae is a skin condition caused by shaving. The EEOC's Compliance Manual Section 15 describes it as "an inflammatory skin condition that occurs primarily in Black men and that is caused by shaving," and notes that severity varies, with many of those affected effectively unable to shave at all. Whether any particular person's case meets the ADA definition of disability is an individualized question about substantial limitation, not a label that attaches automatically to a diagnosis.
On process, the EEOC's enforcement guidance on ADA reasonable accommodation describes a request as "the first step in an informal, interactive process between the individual and the employer," states that the employer may choose among effective accommodations, and warns that unnecessary delay in responding can itself violate the ADA. Courts have applied a comparable cooperative-dialogue expectation to religious accommodation requests, and the EEOC's Section 12 guidance collects those cases, citing Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 (1986), for the proposition that "bilateral cooperation is appropriate in the search for an acceptable reconciliation of the needs of the employee's religion and the exigencies of the employer's business."
The race disparate-impact theory, which was not pleaded here
There is a third route that this complaint did not travel. Because PFB occurs primarily in Black men, an inflexible no-beard rule can be challenged as having a disparate impact on race under Title VII, in which case the employer must show the rule is job-related and consistent with business necessity. The EEOC's Section 15 guidance states the point directly in its grooming-standards discussion at 15-VII.B.5: employers generally can require employees to be clean-shaven, but Title VII requires an exception to a no-beard policy for men with PFB unless being clean-shaven is job-related and consistent with business necessity. The case it cites is Bradley v. Pizzaco of Nebraska, 7 F.3d 797 (8th Cir. 1993). The EEOC's suit against AMR pleaded Title VII religion and the ADA, not race disparate impact, so nothing here tested that theory.
How a respirator rule actually interacts with all three
The safety premise in these cases is real, and it is narrower than it looks. OSHA's respiratory protection standard, 29 C.F.R. 1910.134(g)(1)(i)(A), provides that an employer "shall not permit respirators with tight-fitting facepieces to be worn by employees who have facial hair that comes between the sealing surface of the facepiece and the face or that interferes with valve function." That rule is absolute as to tight-fitting facepieces.
But the standard defines a "tight-fitting facepiece" as one "that forms a complete seal with the face" and a "loose-fitting facepiece" as one "designed to form a partial seal with the face," and it separately defines a powered air-purifying respirator as "an air-purifying respirator that uses a blower to force the ambient air through air-purifying elements to the inlet covering." The fit-testing requirement in 29 C.F.R. 1910.134(f) applies to employees "using a tight-fitting facepiece respirator." In other words, the facial-hair prohibition is a constraint on one category of respirator, not a federal mandate to be clean-shaven.
That is why the accommodation analysis does not stop at the safety rule. The EEOC's Section 12 guidance states that an employer "should not assume that it would pose an undue hardship to accommodate a religious practice that appears to conflict with a generally applicable safety requirement, but rather should assess whether an undue hardship is actually posed." Section 15's footnote on beards makes the flip side explicit: a no-beard policy could be lawful where beards were shown to interfere with safely using a respirator and no viable alternative existed under the circumstances. The operative words in both are the same. Assess, and alternative.
Analysis: Why This Matters
The following is analysis from the Recording Law Editorial Team.
The notable feature of this resolution is not the dollar figure. It is that the relief the EEOC describes is structural rather than purely monetary: new EMT and paramedic positions that come with an alternative respirator, plus an independent study on extending that accommodation to all such positions. A payment compensates people who were already harmed. A new job classification with different equipment changes what the next applicant encounters.
The case also sits squarely on the fault line Groff exposed. Under the pre-2023 de minimis reading, an employer with a safety-flavored rule had an easy argument, because almost any added cost or administrative friction cleared the bar. Groff did not create any right to a beard and did not address respirators. What it did was require the employer to show substantial increased costs in the context of its particular business, and to consider options rather than stopping at the first one it rejected. A case built on the allegation that an employer's policy forbade an alternative outright, and that a denial letter answered a question about one respirator while never addressing the request about another, is the kind of factual record that standard was clarified to reach.
It is also worth being precise about what a consent decree is and is not. It ends the dispute by agreement. The parties' joint motion records that they stipulate the decree is fair, reasonable and equitable, is not a product of collusion, and does not violate the public interest, and that it was reached after arms-length negotiations. That is a statement by the parties, not a finding that AMR violated Title VII or the ADA. No court adjudicated the EEOC's allegations, this decree binds only these defendants, and it creates no precedent any other employer or employee can cite as law. We could not read the decree itself as of November 20, 2026, so we cannot describe whatever liability language it contains in either direction.
The one structural detail we can state from a filed court document is the three-year term, with the court retaining jurisdiction throughout. That is the enforcement mechanism. A decree with a live retention of jurisdiction means the EEOC can return to the same judge rather than start a new case, which is the practical difference between a settlement agreement and a court order.
Finally, the EEOC's own framing is worth noting as an enforcement signal rather than a legal conclusion. Chair Lucas emphasized blanket policies and the breadth of faiths involved, and the Atlanta District's regional attorney counted more than ten religions among the workers represented. Religious accommodation enforcement is often discussed as though it concerned a single tradition. On the EEOC's account, this one did not.
How This Affects You
Nothing in this consent decree changes any statute, regulation or published court holding. Title VII and the ADA read the same on November 20, 2026 as they did before it was entered, and OSHA's respiratory protection standard is unchanged.
For workers generally, the durable law here is the two accommodation duties and the sequence they follow. Employees typically begin by notifying the employer that a work requirement conflicts with a religious practice or a medical condition and requesting an accommodation, and the employer is then expected to engage in a cooperative or interactive exchange to see whether an accommodation is available. The EEOC's guidance says no particular wording is required to put an employer on notice, and that a worker asked for reasonable additional information should provide it.
These duties are also the clearest illustration of how federal discrimination law limits an otherwise broad default. Most American employment is at will, and the practical question in any dispute is which statutory or common-law exception applies; our overview of how Colorado applies the at-will default walks through that structure in the state where this case was filed. Where a discharge rests on a protected characteristic or on the denial of an accommodation, it falls outside the default, which is the territory covered in our guide to the federal and state limits on firing an employee.
For employers, the legally significant word in both Groff and the EEOC guidance is "assess." A rule that forecloses alternatives by its own terms gives an employer nothing to point to later, because the undue-hardship defense is evidentiary. An employer that denies an accommodation has to be able to show what the alternative would actually have cost in the conduct of its particular business.
None of this is advice about any specific situation, and the rules differ by state, by employer size and by the exact nature of the condition or belief at issue. If you are in a dispute about one, the applicable deadlines are short, and Colorado wrongful termination claims are a useful illustration of how federal and state timelines interact.
What Happens Next
As of November 20, 2026, the procedural posture is this. The consent decree appears on the docket as entered on November 10, 2026, together with an order on the parties' joint motion. The parties asked the court to administratively close the case under D.C.COLO.LCivR 41.2 subject to the decree's terms, and asked that the court retain jurisdiction for the decree's three-year term.
Three events would make the picture settled rather than developing. The decree's own text becoming publicly readable, which would allow its claim-distribution mechanics, reporting obligations and compliance terms to be reported from the document instead of from the agency's summary. Confirmation of how the nationwide class is identified and paid, which the EEOC's release does not describe. And the independent study on expanding the respirator accommodation, whose scope, timing and outcome the release does not state.
We make no prediction about any of those. We will update this article if the decree becomes available or if the docket reflects a further order.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. It covers federal law under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act, a consent decree in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, and the federal OSHA respiratory protection standard, and reflects sources verified on November 20, 2026. Laws change and this story is developing; consult a lawyer licensed in your jurisdiction about your specific situation.
Related articles
- At-will employment across the states
- How Colorado applies the at-will default
- Limits on firing an employee
- Colorado wrongful termination claims
Last updated: 2026-11-20. This is a developing story; details verified as of 2026-11-20.
Frequently Asked Questions
What did American Medical Response agree to pay, and when?
The EEOC announced on November 16, 2026 that Global Medical Response, Inc., American Medical Response, Inc. and their subsidiaries will pay $2,200,000 to a nationwide class of harmed individuals under a consent decree in EEOC v. Global Medical Response, Inc., No. 1:22-cv-02544-DDD-SBP, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The docket shows the decree entered on November 10, 2026.
Did a court find that AMR broke the law?
No. The case ended in a consent decree, which resolves claims by agreement of the parties rather than by adjudication. The parties' joint motion states they stipulate the decree is fair, reasonable and equitable and was reached after arms-length negotiations. That is the parties' stipulation, not a judicial finding of liability, and the decree binds only these defendants.
What is a 'no beard' policy case actually about legally?
Three distinct federal duties can be in play. Title VII requires reasonable accommodation of a sincerely held religious practice absent undue hardship, under 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j). The ADA separately requires reasonable accommodation of a disability absent undue hardship, under 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(5). And because pseudofolliculitis barbae occurs primarily in Black men, an inflexible no-beard rule can also be challenged as having a race disparate impact under Title VII. The EEOC's suit against AMR pleaded the first two, not the third.
What is pseudofolliculitis barbae?
The EEOC's Compliance Manual Section 15 describes it as an inflammatory skin condition that occurs primarily in Black men and that is caused by shaving, and notes that severity varies, with many of those affected effectively unable to shave at all. Whether a particular person's case meets the ADA definition of disability depends on whether it substantially limits a major life activity or major bodily function, which is an individualized question.
Does OSHA require EMTs and paramedics to be clean-shaven?
No. OSHA's respiratory protection standard at 29 C.F.R. 1910.134(g)(1)(i)(A) prohibits an employer from permitting respirators with tight-fitting facepieces to be worn by employees with facial hair that comes between the sealing surface and the face or that interferes with valve function. That is a restriction on one category of respirator. The same standard defines loose-fitting facepieces and powered air-purifying respirators, and its fit-testing requirement in paragraph (f) applies to tight-fitting facepiece respirators.
How did Groff v. DeJoy change religious accommodation law?
In Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447 (2023), a unanimous Supreme Court held that Title VII requires an employer that denies a religious accommodation to show that the burden of granting it would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business. The Court rejected the lower-court shorthand that anything more than a de minimis cost is an undue hardship, said impacts on co-workers matter only insofar as they affect the conduct of the business, and said an employer must consider other options rather than assess only one proposed accommodation.
Can an employer still enforce a safety rule that conflicts with a religious practice?
A safety justification is not automatically an undue hardship and not automatically invalid. The EEOC's Section 12 guidance states that an employer should not assume undue hardship where a religious practice appears to conflict with a generally applicable safety requirement, but should assess whether an undue hardship is actually posed. Its Section 15 footnote on beards says a no-beard policy could be lawful where beards were shown to interfere with safely using a respirator and no viable alternative existed. Both turn on the specific evidence.
How long does the AMR consent decree last?
The parties' joint motion for entry of the decree, filed November 3, 2026 as Document 201, states that the decree's terms include the court retaining jurisdiction during its three-year term. We take that term from the joint motion because the decree itself was not publicly readable as of November 20, 2026.
What non-monetary relief did the EEOC describe?
According to the EEOC's November 16, 2026 release, AMR created new EMT and paramedic positions for which it will provide an alternative respirator as an accommodation, and in conjunction with creating the new position will participate in an independent study to explore safely expanding that accommodation to all EMT and paramedic positions. The release does not state the study's scope or timetable.
Is this decree binding on other ambulance companies or other employers?
No. A consent decree is a court order enforceable against the parties who agreed to it. It establishes no precedent and makes no law. The binding authority in this area remains the statutes, the implementing regulations, and published court decisions such as Groff v. DeJoy.
Updates
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources
Sources and References
- EEOC Press Release, American Medical Response to Pay $2.2 Million in Nationwide Settlement of EEOC Religion and Disability Discrimination Suit (Nov. 16, 2026) (release date shown on page as 11-16-2026; $2,200,000 payment, nationwide class, new EMT and paramedic positions with an alternative respirator, independent study, quotes from Chair Andrea Lucas, Regional Attorney Marcus G. Keegan and Atlanta District Director Darrell E. Graham)(eeoc.gov).gov
- EEOC Newsroom listing, press releases (entry for the American Medical Response release dated November 16, 2026), U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission(eeoc.gov).gov
- Joint Motion for Entry of Consent Decree, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Global Medical Response, Inc., No. 1:22-cv-02544-DDD-SBP, Doc. 201, at 1 to 3 (D. Colo. Nov. 3, 2026) (decree signed by all parties; resolves all EEOC claims for monetary, injunctive and equitable relief; each party bears its own fees and costs; administrative closure under D.C.COLO.LCivR 41.2; court retains jurisdiction during the three-year term)(storage.courtlistener.com)
- Complaint, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Global Medical Response, Inc., No. 1:22-cv-02544, Doc. 1, paras. 1 to 2, 29 to 70, 111, 152 to 161 and Prayer for Relief (D. Colo. filed Sept. 29, 2022) (N95 Policy and No Facial Hair Policy; PAPR allegations; claimants' faiths; pseudofolliculitis barbae as alleged ADA disability; statutory bases 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3) and 42 U.S.C. 12117(a))(storage.courtlistener.com)
- Docket, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Global Medical Response, Inc., No. 1:22-cv-02544 (D. Colo.) (filed Sept. 29, 2022; assigned to Judge Daniel D. Domenico, referred to Magistrate Judge Susan Prose; Doc. 201 joint motion filed Nov. 3, 2026; Doc. 202 order and Doc. 203 Consent Decree both dated Nov. 10, 2026; Ravinder Singh and Inder Dhanota as intervenor plaintiffs)(courtlistener.com)
- GovInfo package metadata, USCOURTS-cod-1_22-cv-02544, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Global Medical Response, Inc. et al (U.S. District Court, District of Colorado, 10th Circuit, Denver; Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment; full party list)(govinfo.gov).gov
- 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j) (definition of religion and the undue-hardship limit on the Title VII accommodation duty), United States Code, 2023 edition, Title 42, Chapter 21, Subchapter VI(govinfo.gov).gov
- 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(5)(A) and (B) (ADA reasonable accommodation and denial of employment opportunities), United States Code, 2023 edition, Title 42, Chapter 126, Subchapter I(govinfo.gov).gov
- 42 U.S.C. 12111(9) (definition of reasonable accommodation, including acquisition or modification of equipment or devices) and 12111(10) (undue hardship defined as significant difficulty or expense, with factors), United States Code, 2023 edition(govinfo.gov).gov
- Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447 (2023), No. 22-174, decided June 29, 2023, preliminary print (syllabus Held at 447, cross-referencing Pp. 456 to 473; the Court's substantial-increased-costs sentence at 470; de minimis shorthand rejected at 470; impacts on co-workers at 472; consideration of other options at 473; context-specific application left to the lower courts at 473)(supremecourt.gov).gov
- EEOC Compliance Manual Section 12, Religious Discrimination, Groff supersession notice and section 12-IV (Reasonable Accommodation), including notice requirements, no magic words, discussion of the request, footnote 221 (interactive process analogy, citing Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 (1986)) and footnote 254 (employer should not assume undue hardship where a religious practice appears to conflict with a generally applicable safety requirement)(eeoc.gov).gov
- EEOC Compliance Manual Section 15, Race and Color Discrimination, section 15-VII.B.5 (Appearance and Grooming Standards: Beards), Example 9 (no-beard policy and pseudofolliculitis barbae) and footnote 79 (citing Bradley v. Pizzaco of Nebraska, 7 F.3d 797 (8th Cir. 1993) and noting a no-beard policy could be lawful where beards interfere with safely using a respirator and no viable alternative existed)(eeoc.gov).gov
- EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the ADA (request as the first step in an informal, interactive process; employer may choose among effective accommodations; unnecessary delay can violate the ADA)(eeoc.gov).gov
- 29 C.F.R. 1910.134, OSHA Respiratory Protection standard: paragraph (b) definitions of tight-fitting facepiece, loose-fitting facepiece and powered air-purifying respirator; paragraph (f)(1) and (f)(2) fit testing for tight-fitting facepiece respirators; paragraph (g)(1)(i)(A) facial hair and facepiece seal protection(osha.gov).gov