Trump v. New York Times: Judge Dismisses 2 of 6 Libel Counts
Independently fact-checked against primary sources (last audited November 20, 2026). · 5 primary sources cited on this page. How we verify our legal content

A federal judge in Tampa narrowed President Donald J. Trump's libel suit against the New York Times on November 19, 2026, dismissing two of six counts, holding 27 challenged statements not actionable, and letting seven statements proceed toward an answer.
Information last verified on November 20, 2026. This is a developing story; we update it as the record changes.
Jurisdiction scope: This article addresses one federal district court order applying the First Amendment actual-malice standard to state-law defamation claims brought in the Middle District of Florida. It does not address state anti-SLAPP procedure, retraction demands, or defamation claims by private individuals. For the general framework, see our state-by-state defamation coverage.
What Happened
On November 19, 2026, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, entered a 12-page order on the defendants' motions to dismiss in Trump v. New York Times Company, Case No. 8:25-cv-2487-SDM-NHA. The order (Doc. 109) closes "ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on November 19, 2026." Its signature block is an image and the order does not print the judge's name anywhere in its text; the SDM initials in the case number and the PDF's own author metadata identify District Judge Steven D. Merryday.
The order resolved motions at Docs. 44, 103 and 107 against the plaintiff's second amended complaint, Doc. 99, filed August 27, 2026. That complaint names five defendants: the New York Times Company, reporters Susanne Craig and Russ Buettner, reporter Peter Baker, and Penguin Random House LLC. It pleads six counts of defamation, paired as defamation per se and defamation per quod across three publications: a September 14, 2024 Times article (Counts III and IV), the Craig and Buettner book Lucky Loser, published September 17, 2024 (Counts I and II), and an October 20, 2024 Times article by Baker (Counts V and VI). The complaint seeks compensatory damages of not less than $15,000,000,000 plus punitive damages and a retraction (Doc. 99 at 59). The court sits in diversity under 28 U.S.C. section 1332(a) (Doc. 99 at 3).
The conclusion of the order is split. The motion to dismiss Counts III and IV, the two counts tied to the September 2024 article, was granted. The motion was denied as to Counts I, II, V and VI, the counts tied to the book and to the October 2024 article.
The arithmetic underneath that split is the substance of the order. The complaint identified 34 allegedly defamatory statements, each pleaded in its own numbered paragraph: 22 from the book, nine from the September 2024 article and three from the October 2024 article (Doc. 99 at paragraphs 32 to 170). The court listed 27 of those paragraph numbers and held that none of those 27 statements is actionable, writing that even if the statements were untrue, published with ill will, insulting or insufficiently investigated, they fail under the actual-malice standard for the reasons the defendants advanced (Doc. 109 at 8, 12).
Seven statements fared differently. Six are quoted from Lucky Loser and one from the second article. All seven accuse the plaintiff of crime. The first, as quoted in the order, alleges that Trump "had received the equivalent of more than $400 million from his father, much of it through fraudulent tax evasion schemes" (Doc. 109 at 8, quoting Doc. 99 at paragraph 32). Others concern gift and estate tax avoidance, invoice padding, and, in the surviving statement from the October 2024 article, that authorities "looked into his ties with the Mafia, found violations of money laundering rules and penalized him for skirting stock trade rules" (Doc. 109 at 9). The court made no finding that any of these statements is false; the motion to dismiss the counts those statements belong to was denied, and no answer has yet been filed.
In citing the surviving statements the order prints two paragraph numbers that do not match the complaint. Statement (2) is complaint paragraph 55, not 59, and statement (4) is paragraph 80, not 81. Paragraph 59 is a different statement, one the order correctly lists among the 27 held not actionable, and paragraph 81 is the paragraph following statement (4) that explains why the complaint alleges it is false (Doc. 99 at paragraphs 55, 59, 80, 81). Read with the complaint's own numbering, the 27 and the seven together account for all 34 challenged statements.
What distinguished the seven was a specific pleaded theory. As the order quotes the complaint, the authors and publishers knew a responsible assessment of the Trump family's tax compliance "would have required forensic auditing, expert tax and legal advice, and other expensive investigatory tools," and knew that neither Trump nor his father had been investigated for, charged with, or convicted of tax fraud (Doc. 109 at 9, quoting the complaint; the allegations appear at Doc. 99 paragraph 232, which the order cites as 231).
The defendants responded that their conclusions were informed by numerous experts, citing an expert in gift and estate tax law who called the arrangement "highly suspicious," a former chief of investigations for the Manhattan district attorney's office who said it "smells like a crime," and a tax law professor who explained how gift tax returns can evade IRS scrutiny. As the order sets out that passage, the defendants drew those three quotations from a 2018 Times article rather than from any of the three publications in suit. They also pointed to page 451 of the book's acknowledgements, thanking a prominent New York estate and trust lawyer (Doc. 109 at 10).
The court found that insufficient at the pleading stage:
"Knowing of the necessity for that opinion but failing to procure that opinion is a fine example of the purposeful avoidance of the truth, a knowing failure that remains actionable, even after Times v. Sullivan." Source: Order, Trump v. New York Times Co., No. 8:25-cv-2487-SDM-NHA, Doc. 109, at 11 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2026)
Reaching that line, the court reasoned that a characterization that a transaction is "suspicious" or "could" violate the law, or the "smell" of crime, is "far from a formal legal opinion sufficient to remove serious doubt" about an accusation that a specific person committed a specific crime (Doc. 109 at 11). The court then stated the proposition narrowly. Anyone who publishes a claim that someone else has committed "a crime of the complex nature described in some of the challenged statements," and who has not received "an explicit opinion from a qualified source after a thorough examination of pertinent facts," the court wrote, "necessarily proceeds with particularized reason to doubt the truth of their statements and with knowledge of a high degree of probable falsity of the statements"; in the order's phrase, "they know that they don't know, but they are undeterred." The court described the crimes it had in mind as tax and money-laundering offenses whose detection is "intensely fact-dependent" and whose governing law is "singularly complex and within the immediate competence of only a relatively small cohort of specialized practitioners" (Doc. 109 at 11).
Three procedural rulings close the order. The plaintiff's request to amend again was denied, the court finding no reason, even after initial discovery, to conclude that a further amendment would not be futile. The defendants must answer within 28 days of the November 19 order, which falls on December 17, 2026. And the court expressly reserved the evidentiary question, stating that "nothing in this order constitutes a ruling as to the admissibility at trial of evidence of the content and circumstances of any of the twenty-seven challenged statements listed above but not actionable as defamation" (Doc. 109 at 12).
This is not the first pleading ruling in the case. On September 19, 2025, the same court struck the original 85-page complaint sua sponte under Rule 8, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, observing that a complaint "[a]lleging only two simple counts of defamation . . . consumes eighty-five pages" and that "a complaint is not a megaphone for public relations." It granted leave to amend within 28 days and capped the amended complaint at 40 pages excluding the caption, signature and attachments (Doc. 5 at 2 to 4).

What the Law Actually Says
Both sides agreed on the governing standard, and the order says so at the outset. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), holds that the First Amendment bars a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves the statement was made with actual malice, which the Court defined as "knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not" (376 U.S. at 279 to 280). Twenty-five years later, the Court opened its opinion in Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989), by stating the rule in public-figure terms: "A public figure may not recover damages for a defamatory falsehood without clear and convincing proof" of actual malice, citing Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162 (1967) (491 U.S. at 659). That is why public-figure and public-official claims rarely resemble ordinary defamation suits. Our explainer on the heightened standard public figures must meet walks through how the two categories differ.
Three features of the standard matter for understanding this order.
Actual malice is subjective, not about ill will. Despite the name, ill will, improper motive and personal animosity play no role in determining whether a defendant acted with actual malice, as the order recites at page 4. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968), framed the test in terms of the publisher's own state of mind: "There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication" (390 U.S. at 731). The order recites the defendants' correct statement of the same principle, that "the beliefs or actions of a reasonable person are irrelevant" (Doc. 109 at 3).
Failing to investigate is not enough, but purposefully avoiding the truth can be. This is the doctrinal hinge of the November 19 order. In Harte-Hanks, the Supreme Court held that "failure to investigate before publishing, even when a reasonably prudent person would have done so, is not sufficient to establish reckless disregard," while adding that recklessness "may be found where there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports" (491 U.S. at 688). It then drew the distinction the Tampa order builds on: "Although failure to investigate will not alone support a finding of actual malice, the purposeful avoidance of the truth is in a different category" (491 U.S. at 692). The Tampa order applies that category to a publisher who, on the complaint's allegations, knew a qualified professional opinion was needed to support a criminal accusation and did not get one.
Pleading actual malice is not proving it. This is the distinction most likely to be lost in coverage of the order, and it is the one that matters most. At the motion-to-dismiss stage, a court accepts the complaint's factual allegations as true and asks only whether they state a plausible claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), which the order quotes at length, puts it this way: a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and "the plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully" (556 U.S. at 678). Nothing in that inquiry weighs evidence, resolves disputed facts, or decides whether a statement is true.
So the seven surviving statements have cleared a pleading threshold and nothing more. The plaintiff still bears the burden of proving actual malice by clear and convincing proof, as to each defendant and each statement, through discovery, summary judgment and any trial (Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 659). The order itself says the parties disputed "exactly how Times v. Sullivan and intervening precedent apply to the pleadings in this action" (Doc. 109 at 2). Pleadings, not proof.
Two further points frame the counts. They arrive in matched pairs because the complaint pleads each publication twice, once as defamation per se and once as defamation per quod. The defendants' motion stated the difference between them: a per quod claim requires the plaintiff to allege special damages, meaning "actual, out of pocket losses which must be proven by specific evidence as to the time, cause and amount" (Doc. 44 at 44). And because every publication at issue was written rather than spoken, the claims sound in libel, a distinction we unpack in libel compared with spoken defamation. Neither the order nor the complaint states which state's substantive law supplies the elements: the complaint pleads its six counts simply as defamation per se and defamation per quod, and the order addresses only the federal actual-malice pleading standard. Florida's defamation chapter does add a pre-suit step for suits brought under it: a plaintiff must serve written notice at least five days before bringing a civil action for a libel published in a newspaper, periodical or other medium, specifying the statements alleged to be false and defamatory (Fla. Stat. section 770.01 (2026)). Florida's defamation framework covers how that notice rule and the state's other requirements operate.

Analysis: Why This Matters
The following is analysis from the Recording Law Editorial Team.
The headline number in this order is 27 to 7, and the ratio is the story. On the site's reading, the order spends more than half of its 12 pages cataloguing how formidable the actual-malice standard is, in the court's own word, before carving out a narrow exception. The court recites from the defendants' motion, and then adopts those reasons wholesale for the 27 statements, that reliance on unnamed sources, declining to interview witnesses who could refute a statement, failure to investigate, failure to review public records, departures from journalistic standards, reliance on a biased source, and ill will toward the subject all fail to establish actual malice. Of those propositions the order marks only the ill-will point as its own conclusion, one that "appears correct" (Doc. 109 at 4 to 5, 8). That is a long list of things a plaintiff cannot use, and it is why 27 of the 34 challenged statements are no longer a basis for liability.
What survived is a theory with a specific shape. The order does not say that strong reporting on a public figure is actionable, nor that a publisher must investigate more. It says that where a publication asserts that a named person committed a particular complex crime, in an area of law the court described as "singularly complex and within the immediate competence of only a relatively small cohort of specialized practitioners," and where the complaint alleges the publisher knew a qualified opinion was necessary and declined to obtain one, that is pleaded purposeful avoidance rather than pleaded negligence (Doc. 109 at 11).
Two things are genuinely notable about that. First, it converts the Harte-Hanks purposeful-avoidance category, which arose from a newspaper that declined to listen to tapes and interview a key witness, into something closer to a professional-opinion predicate for criminal accusations in technical fields. Second, the court distinguished between consulting experts and obtaining an opinion. The defendants had experts. The court's reading of the complaint is that what the experts gave was characterization rather than conclusion, and that the gap between the two was known. Whether that distinction survives contact with the evidentiary record is a different question from whether it states a claim, and the order decides only the second.
It is worth saying plainly what this order is not. It is not a finding that the Times, Penguin Random House or any individual defendant published anything false, and it is not a finding that anyone acted with actual malice. It is also not a final judgment on Counts III and IV in any appellate sense while the rest of the case proceeds. Readers who see "judge rules against" framing in either direction are seeing a pleading ruling described as a merits ruling.
How This Affects You
For readers tracking defamation law rather than this case, the generalizable points are narrow.
A public official or public figure who wants to survive a motion to dismiss must plead facts, specific to each defendant and each statement, supporting a plausible inference that the speaker knew the statement was false or seriously doubted it. Conclusory assertions of malice, and allegations that the speaker was biased, hostile or sloppy, do not carry that burden under the authorities the order recites.
A denied motion to dismiss means a case continues, not that a claim is meritorious. If you are following any defamation matter, the procedural posture is the single most important fact about it, and "survived dismissal," "survived summary judgment" and "won at trial" are three very different things.
If you publish, the order is a reminder that accusations that a named person committed a crime occupy their own category in defamation law, both because they are typically defamation per se and because, on this court's reasoning, an accusation of a technically complex crime puts the basis for the accusation itself under scrutiny. Nothing here establishes a duty to investigate. What a general reader should take from it is that a court examined what the publisher knew about the limits of its own basis for a criminal accusation. Anyone weighing an actual dispute should read what a defamation claim actually requires and then consult counsel, because the elements, the privileges and the deadlines vary by state.
What Happens Next
As of November 20, 2026, the case is at the answer stage on four counts. The defendants must answer the second amended complaint within 28 days of the November 19 order, placing that deadline on December 17, 2026. Discovery had already begun before the order, which referenced "initial discovery" in denying further amendment.
The ordinary sequence from here is answer, discovery on the seven surviving statements, and a summary judgment motion testing whether the plaintiff can produce clear and convincing evidence of actual malice as to each defendant and each statement. The dismissal of Counts III and IV, combined with the denial of leave to amend, removes the September 2024 article as a basis for liability, though the order leaves open whether evidence of its content and circumstances is admissible; whether that disposition is reviewed, and when, is governed by appellate timing rules the order does not address. The matter will be settled, in the sense of having a resolved legal outcome, only on a final judgment or a dismissal of the whole action. We make no prediction about any of it.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. It covers a federal district court order in the Middle District of Florida applying the First Amendment actual-malice standard to state-law defamation claims brought in Florida, and reflects sources verified on November 20, 2026. Laws change and this story is developing; consult a lawyer licensed in your jurisdiction about your specific situation.
Related articles
- How courts treat defamation claims by public figures
- Florida defamation law and its five-day pre-suit notice rule
- The difference between libel and slander
Last updated: 2026-11-20. This is a developing story; details verified as of 2026-11-20.
Frequently Asked Questions
What did the judge actually decide on November 19, 2026?
The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted the defendants' motion to dismiss Counts III and IV and denied it as to Counts I, II, V and VI in Trump v. New York Times Co., No. 8:25-cv-2487-SDM-NHA. The order held 27 challenged statements not actionable and allowed seven to proceed (Doc. 109 at 12).
Does the ruling mean the court found the New York Times defamed Trump?
No. The order decides a motion to dismiss. At that stage a court accepts the complaint's factual allegations as true and asks only whether they state a plausible claim. The order makes no finding that any statement is false and no finding that anyone acted with actual malice.
What is the actual-malice standard?
Under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), a public official cannot recover for a defamatory falsehood about his official conduct unless he proves the statement was made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not (376 U.S. at 279 to 280). St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968), framed it as whether the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts about the truth of the publication. It is a subjective test, and ill will or improper motive is not enough.
What does 'purposeful avoidance of the truth' mean?
It comes from Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 692 (1989), which held that while failure to investigate alone will not support a finding of actual malice, purposeful avoidance of the truth 'is in a different category.' The November 19 order applied that category to allegations that the publishers knew a qualified professional tax opinion was necessary to support a criminal accusation and did not obtain one (Doc. 109 at 11).
Which statements survived, and what are they about?
Seven. Six are quoted from the book 'Lucky Loser' and one from an October 2024 New York Times article. All concern alleged tax fraud, alleged gift and estate tax evasion, or alleged ties to the Mafia and related financial violations (Doc. 109 at 8 to 9). The court made no finding that any of them is false.
Why were two of the six counts dismissed?
Counts III and IV were the per se and per quod counts tied to the September 14, 2024 article (Doc. 99 at 54 to 57). None of the statements the complaint challenged from that article was held actionable, so both counts tied to it fell. Counts I and II (the book) and Counts V and VI (the October 2024 article) each retained at least one statement the court held plausibly pleaded.
Can the 27 non-actionable statements still come up at trial?
The order does not decide that. It states expressly that nothing in it rules on the admissibility at trial of evidence of the content and circumstances of the 27 statements that are not actionable as defamation (Doc. 109 at 12). That is an evidentiary question left for later.
Can Trump file another amended complaint?
The order denied the request to amend again, finding no reason, even after initial discovery, to conclude that an additional amendment would not be futile (Doc. 109 at 12). An earlier order in the same case had struck the original 85-page complaint under Rule 8 on September 19, 2025 and capped the amended version at 40 pages (Doc. 5 at 4).
What happens next in the case?
The defendants must answer the second amended complaint within 28 days of the November 19, 2026 order (Doc. 109 at 12). By our count that period ends December 17, 2026; the order states only the 28-day period. After that the ordinary sequence is discovery on the surviving statements and a summary judgment motion. We do not predict outcomes.
Updates
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources
Sources and References
- Order on motions to dismiss, Trump v. New York Times Co., No. 8:25-cv-2487-SDM-NHA, Doc. 109, at 1 to 12 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2026) (granting dismissal of Counts III and IV, denying as to Counts I, II, V and VI; 27 statements not actionable at 8 and 12; seven surviving statements at 8 to 9; purposeful-avoidance reasoning at 11; answer deadline, denial of amendment and admissibility reservation at 12)(storage.courtlistener.com)
- Second Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Trump v. New York Times Co., No. 8:25-cv-02487-SDM-NHA, Doc. 99 (M.D. Fla. filed Aug. 27, 2026) (parties at 2 to 3; diversity jurisdiction at 3; publications identified at 1 to 2; Counts I through VI at 52 to 59; prayer for not less than $15,000,000,000 at 59)(storage.courtlistener.com)
- Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and Supporting Memorandum of Law, Trump v. New York Times Co., No. 8:25-cv-02487-SDM-NHA, Doc. 44, at 1 to 2 and 44 (M.D. Fla. filed Dec. 15, 2025) (Rule 12(b)(6) motion; special-damages requirement for defamation per quod at 44)(storage.courtlistener.com)
- Order striking the original complaint, Trump v. New York Times Co., No. 8:25-cv-2487-SDM-NHA, Doc. 5, at 2 to 4 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2025) (85-page complaint struck under Rule 8 with leave to amend within 28 days; amended complaint capped at 40 pages)(storage.courtlistener.com)
- New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 to 280 (1964) (actual-malice standard: knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of whether the statement was false or not), United States Reports vol. 376(tile.loc.gov).gov
- St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) (reckless conduct not measured by the reasonably prudent publisher; sufficient evidence that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the publication), United States Reports vol. 390(tile.loc.gov).gov
- Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 659, 688, 692 (1989) (public figure may not recover without clear and convincing proof of actual malice, citing Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162 (1967), at 659; failure to investigate insufficient and obvious reasons to doubt the informant at 688; purposeful avoidance of the truth is in a different category at 692), United States Reports vol. 491(tile.loc.gov).gov
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (facial-plausibility standard on a motion to dismiss; plausibility is not akin to a probability requirement), United States Reports vol. 556(tile.loc.gov).gov
- Fla. Stat. section 770.01 (2026), Notice condition precedent to action or prosecution for libel or slander (written notice at least 5 days before instituting a civil action for a libel published in a newspaper, periodical or other medium)(flsenate.gov).gov