Rubinsky Roofing Judgment: $1.52M Penalty, $500K Restitution Fund

Texas Judge Signs $1.52 Million DTPA Judgment Against Rubinsky Roofing, Ordering a $500,626.64 Restitution Fund

A Texas district judge has signed a final judgment and permanent injunction against Rubinsky Roofing, LLC and its owner, ordering $1,520,000 in civil penalties and a $500,626.64 consumer restitution fund. The Attorney General announced the result on October 8, 2026.

Information last verified on October 14, 2026. This is a developing story; we update it as the record changes.

Jurisdiction scope: This article addresses a single Texas state court judgment under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and the Texas statutes that judgment applies. It does not address private DTPA suits brought by individual consumers, insurance coverage disputes, criminal charges, or the law of any other state. For the broader state framework, see how Texas handles consumer fraud complaints and private claims.

What Happened

On September 30, 2026, the Consumer Protection Division of the Texas Attorney General's Office e-filed a proposed final judgment and permanent injunction in State of Texas v. Rubinsky Roofing, LLC and Gilad Rubinsky, Cause No. 429-03480-2026, in the 429th Judicial District Court of Collin County, Texas. The copy the Attorney General has published carries the Collin County District Clerk's filing stamp of 9/30/2026 2:29 PM and envelope ID 120593405, a handwritten signature over the "PRESIDING JUDGE" line on page 9, and a typed date of 10/5/2026 above the signature line.

The Attorney General announced the outcome on October 8, 2026, in a release titled "Attorney General Ken Paxton Secures Repayment for Texans Who Were Scammed by Rubinsky Roofing Company," and the release's closing "To read the judgement, click here" link resolves to the same nine-page order plus its e-service certificate.

The underlying suit was announced on May 19, 2026. According to that earlier announcement, Rubinsky Roofing was founded in 2018, operated primarily in the Dallas-Fort Worth area, and advertised roof repair and replacement work often tied to insurance-funded storm damage claims. The Attorney General alleged that after collecting contracts and payments, including insurance proceeds, the company delayed projects for months or never performed the work at all. Those are the State's allegations; Recording Law has not reviewed the First Amended Petition itself.

What the Judgment Finds

The court's findings are numbered in section 4 of the order. Finding 4.D records that Rubinsky Roofing's answer was due at 10:00 a.m. on August 10, 2026 and Gilad Rubinsky's on September 14, 2026, and that neither defendant filed an answer or any pleading constituting one. Finding 4.F states that "by failing to answer, each Defendant admits the material factual allegations properly pleaded against that Defendant." That is the engine of the whole judgment: the facts were established by default, not by trial.

Finding 4.G identifies the specific provisions violated: Texas Business and Commerce Code sections 17.46(a), 17.46(b)(5), 17.46(b)(9), 17.46(b)(13), and 17.46(b)(24). Finding 4.J states that the defendants committed twenty-seven DTPA violations and that five of them "involved acts or practices calculated to acquire or deprive money or other property from consumers who were 65 years of age or older when the acts or practices occurred."

Finding 4.K walks through the statutory penalty factors and concludes that "the maximum civil penalty is appropriate for each violation," setting $10,000 per violation for all twenty-seven and an additional $250,000 for each of the five elder-related violations.

What the Judgment Orders

The decree that follows the findings is separately numbered 1 through 18. Its operative terms:

Paragraph 1 permanently enjoins the defendants, their officers, agents, employees, and anyone acting in concert with them who receives actual notice, anywhere in Texas, from representing that they will timely begin or complete roofing work when they lack the ability or intent to do so, representing that a roof needs repair or replacement when it does not, misrepresenting costs or fees, advertising services with intent not to perform them, knowingly making false statements about the need for roof repair including the cause or date of claimed damage, and failing to disclose material information about their ability or willingness to perform.

Paragraph 2 requires that every future contract with a Texas consumer include a start date and a completion date, and that if the defendants cannot meet either date they must give the consumer a written reason and a new date no more than 30 days from the start or completion date stated in the contract.

Paragraph 3 orders the preservation of five years of records concerning Texas consumers until all restitution has been paid.

Paragraph 4 orders the defendants, within 30 days after entry, to build a list of every Texas consumer who paid either defendant for roofing services, with the amount paid, the consumer's address and telephone number, and whether the promised work was completed, partially completed, or never begun. Insurance payments made to the defendants on a consumer's behalf count as amounts paid. Consumers who paid in full or in part for work that was not completed must be specifically highlighted. The list goes to the Attorney General's Office and the court no later than the 35th day after entry.

Paragraph 5 orders the defendants, within 30 days after entry, to deposit $500,626.64 into a separate, segregated account established solely for consumer restitution under Texas Business and Commerce Code section 17.47(d), and bars withdrawals except as the judgment or a later court order directs.

Paragraph 6 requires the Consumer Protection Division to notify potentially affected consumers within 15 days after it receives the list.

Paragraph 7 gives any consumer seeking restitution 90 days after the date notice is sent to submit documentation to the defendants sufficient to establish payment to them and resulting loss, requires the defendants to report every such consumer to the Division and the court every 30 days, and directs the defendants to pay each consumer the amount supported by the documentation submitted.

Paragraph 8 adds that the defendants "are liable for paying consumer restitution even if the restitution amount exceeds $500,626.64." Paragraph 9 leaves any remaining funds in the account pending further order. Paragraph 10 orders the removal of a lien affidavit filed against one consumer's property within 30 days after entry.

Paragraph 11 orders $1,520,000 in civil penalties under section 17.47(c), broken out as $270,000 under subsection (c)(1) and $1,250,000 under subsection (c)(2), assessed jointly and severally, with the signed copy filling in $760,000.00 against each defendant. Paragraph 12 awards the State $53,440.00 in attorney's fees under Texas Government Code section 402.006(c), apportioned at $26,720.00 against each defendant. Paragraph 13 routes penalty and fee payments to the Attorney General's accounting division within 30 days and directs that penalties be disbursed under Texas Government Code section 402.007(b)(1). Paragraph 17 states the judgment "is effective immediately upon signing" and that its injunctive provisions are enforceable by contempt. Paragraph 18 states the judgment disposes of all parties and all claims and is final and appealable.

What the Published Copy Shows, and What It Does Not

Two features of the document deserve to be stated plainly rather than smoothed over.

First, the printed signature block still reads "SIGNED this ______ day of ____________________, 2026" with the day and month blanks empty. What appears over it is a cursive judicial signature, applied to the filed PDF as an image rather than typed, sitting on the "PRESIDING JUDGE" line, and a separately typed 10/5/2026 above the blanks. Collin County's own district courts directory lists Judge Jill Renfro Willis as the presiding judge of the 429th District Court. The signature on the published copy is handwritten and reads "Jill Renfro Willis," the judge Collin County lists for the 429th District Court, but the document carries no typed attribution naming the signing judge.

Second, the automated eService certificate bound to the same PDF still carries the filing code description "Proposed Order" and a status line of "Status as of 10/5/2026 10:25 AM CST," reflecting the September 30 submission by the Attorney General's office. Recording Law did not obtain a separately clerk-stamped entered copy; the Collin County online court records search returned an access error when we attempted it on October 14, 2026.

So the accurate description of this document is the one used throughout this article: an order the State e-filed on September 30, 2026, bearing a judge's handwritten signature and a typed date of October 5, 2026, published by the Texas Attorney General as the judgment in the case. The compliance deadlines in paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5 and 10 run from "entry of this Final Judgment," a date this article does not assert. The others run from different events: paragraph 13 sets payment of the penalties and fees at 30 days from the date of the Order, paragraph 6 runs 15 days from the Division's receipt of the consumer list, and paragraph 7 runs 90 days from the date notice is sent.

What the Law Actually Says

The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Consumer Protection Act is Subchapter E of Chapter 17 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code. Section 17.46(a) declares false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in trade or commerce unlawful, and section 17.46(b) lists specific examples. Three of the subsections cited in this judgment map directly onto roofing work: 17.46(b)(9) covers "advertising goods or services with intent not to sell them as advertised"; 17.46(b)(13) covers "knowingly making false or misleading statements of fact concerning the need for parts, replacement, or repair service"; and 17.46(b)(24) covers failing to disclose information known at the time of a transaction where the nondisclosure was intended to induce a consumer into a transaction they would not otherwise have entered.

Section 17.47 is the enforcement provision, and it is the Attorney General's tool rather than a consumer's. Subsection (a) lets the Consumer Protection Division sue in the name of the state for injunctive relief. Subsection (c) sets the penalties: "(1) not more than $10,000 per violation; and (2) if the act or practice that is the subject of the proceeding was calculated to acquire or deprive money or other property from a consumer who was 65 years of age or older when the act or practice occurred, an additional amount of not more than $250,000." Subsection (g) lists the six factors the trier of fact must weigh in setting that amount, including seriousness, history of previous violations, and the amount necessary to deter. The current text of subsection (c) dates to a 2019 amendment, Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 237 (S.B. 2140), effective September 1, 2019.

Subsection 17.47(d) is the restitution authority. It lets a court "make such additional orders or judgments as are necessary to compensate identifiable persons for actual damages or to restore money or property," limits damages to a period beginning two years before the Division filed suit, and, importantly for enforcement, allows the appointment of a receiver or sequestration of assets where a person ordered to make restitution has failed to do so within three months after the restitution order becomes final and nonappealable.

Two further Texas provisions sit close to this fact pattern even though the judgment does not invoke them. Texas Business and Commerce Code section 27.02 requires any contract for goods or services reasonably expected to be paid wholly or partly from property insurance proceeds, with a contract price of $1,000 or more, to carry a notice in at least 12-point boldfaced type stating that Texas law requires the insured to pay the applicable deductible and that it violates Texas law for a seller to knowingly allow or assist the insured in not paying it. Texas Insurance Code section 4102.163 separately provides that "a contractor may not act as a public adjuster or advertise to adjust claims for any property for which the contractor is providing or may provide contracting services," regardless of licensure or any power of attorney.

The procedural posture matters as much as the substance. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 239 permits a plaintiff to take a default judgment against a defendant who has not filed an answer once the return of service has been on file for the period Rule 107 requires. Rule 306a(1) provides that the date a judgment is signed starts the periods the civil rules prescribe for the trial court's plenary power and for post-judgment filings, and Rule 329b(a) and (d) set that window at 30 days after signing absent a timely motion. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 30 allows a party who did not participate in the hearing that resulted in the judgment complained of, either in person or through counsel, and who did not timely file a post-judgment motion, a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law, or a notice of appeal within the time Rule 26.1(a) permits, to file a restricted appeal. Rule 26.1(c) sets that deadline at six months after the judgment is signed.

For readers trying to work out which agency handles which kind of problem, our explainer on where different consumer complaints actually go separates the state attorney general route from federal and private ones, and our guide to the realistic paths for recovering money after a fraud walks through what each one can and cannot do.

Analysis: Why This Matters

The following is analysis from the Recording Law Editorial Team.

The arithmetic in paragraph 11 is the most instructive part of this judgment. Twenty-seven violations produced $270,000. Five of those same violations produced an additional $1,250,000. Roughly 19 percent of the counts generated roughly 82 percent of the penalty, entirely because section 17.47(c)(2) attaches a separate $250,000 ceiling to conduct calculated to take money from a consumer who was 65 or older. A Texas enforcement case involving older victims is not the same case with a sympathetic label attached; it is a structurally different penalty exposure, and the court here took the cap on both prongs.

The second point readers consistently get wrong is where the money goes. The $1,520,000 is a civil penalty payable to the State of Texas. Paragraph 13 directs that it be disbursed under Texas Government Code section 402.007(b)(1), which credits the net penalty recovered in an Attorney General action under the Business and Commerce Code to the judicial fund for supreme-court-approved programs providing basic civil legal services to the indigent, capped at $50 million per state fiscal year by section 402.007(d). The decree adds "or general revenue fund as appropriate." It is not a pool for homeowners. The homeowner pool is the separate $500,626.64 segregated account under paragraph 5. Those two numbers answer different questions, and a headline that merges them into "more than $2 million for victims" would be wrong.

Third, this judgment is a no-answer default. Finding 4.F says so directly: the material factual allegations were admitted because nobody answered. A default judgment is a real, enforceable judgment, and nothing here suggests otherwise. But it is worth being precise that the twenty-seven violations were established by the defendants' failure to appear rather than by a factfinder weighing contested evidence. That distinction does not reduce the judgment's force; it describes how the force was obtained.

Fourth, the gap between an order and a payment is the part of a case like this that the record is least able to predict. A defendant who never filed an answer is, by definition, a defendant who has not been engaging with the court. Paragraph 4 asks that same party to produce a complete customer list, and paragraph 5 asks it to fund an account with half a million dollars. The Legislature anticipated this: section 17.47(d) gives the court receivership and sequestration tools if restitution is not made within three months after the order becomes final and nonappealable, and paragraph 17 makes the injunctive terms enforceable by contempt. Those tools exist precisely because compliance is not automatic.

Finally, the injunction's forward-looking terms are more interesting than they first appear. Paragraph 2 does not merely forbid lying; it imposes an affirmative contracting practice, requiring written start and completion dates and a written explanation plus a replacement date within 30 days when either slips. That is closer to conduct regulation than to a prohibition, and it reflects the specific failure mode the State pleaded: not phantom companies, but contracts signed, money collected, and work that drifted.

How This Affects You

If you paid a North Texas roofing company for work that stalled, the general shape of this process is worth understanding, without reading it as a prediction about your own situation.

The judgment puts the defendants, not consumers, under the first obligation. They must compile and submit the customer list. Only after the Consumer Protection Division receives that list does the notice step begin, and only after notice is sent does the 90-day documentation window in paragraph 7 start to run. That means the sequence is driven by compliance with paragraph 4, and no consumer can accelerate it.

Nothing in the judgment promises any individual a payment, an amount, or a date. Paragraph 7 ties each consumer's recovery to documentation submitted to the defendants, sufficient to establish payment to them and resulting loss, and paragraph 8 confirms total liability can exceed the deposited sum, which also means the deposited sum may not cover every claim in full. Whether a given household receives anything, and how much, is not something this judgment determines in advance.

Separately, the Texas Attorney General's office maintains a consumer complaint process that is independent of this case and of any restitution window it creates. Readers who want the wider picture on documenting a loss and choosing a venue can start with our overview for people who have been defrauded.

This is general legal information, not legal advice. This article covers Texas state law, specifically the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and a single judgment of the 429th Judicial District Court of Collin County, Texas, and was verified against primary sources on October 14, 2026. It does not describe the law of any other state, and it does not tell any reader what to do about a particular roofing contract, insurance claim, or potential restitution claim. Consult a lawyer licensed in your jurisdiction about your specific situation.

Related articles

• Texas rules on reporting fraud and suing over it
• Getting money back once a payment has already gone out
• Choosing the right agency to complain to

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Last updated: 2026-10-14. This is a developing story; details verified as of 2026-10-14.

Frequently Asked Questions

Did a judge actually sign the Rubinsky Roofing judgment?

The copy published by the Texas Attorney General shows a handwritten signature over the PRESIDING JUDGE line on page 9 and a typed date of 10/5/2026 above the signature line, although the printed day and month blanks in the SIGNED this ___ day of ___ line remain empty. The eService certificate attached to the same PDF still carries the filing code Proposed Order from the September 30, 2026 submission. Recording Law verified the signature by rendering page 9 as an image on October 14, 2026, and did not obtain a separately clerk-stamped entered copy.

How much money is set aside for Rubinsky Roofing customers?

Paragraph 5 of the decree orders the defendants to deposit $500,626.64 into a separate, segregated restitution account within 30 days after entry of the judgment, under Texas Business and Commerce Code section 17.47(d). Paragraph 8 states the defendants remain liable for restitution even if the total exceeds that figure, so it operates as a required deposit rather than a cap on liability.

Who receives the $1.52 million in civil penalties?

The State of Texas. Paragraph 11 assesses $1,520,000 under Texas Business and Commerce Code section 17.47(c), and paragraph 13 directs payment to the Office of the Attorney General's accounting division, with disbursement under Texas Government Code section 402.007(b)(1) to the Supreme Court judicial fund or general revenue as appropriate. Civil penalties are not consumer restitution and do not go to homeowners.

Why were five violations worth so much more than the other twenty-two?

Texas Business and Commerce Code section 17.47(c)(2) authorizes an additional civil penalty of not more than $250,000 where the act or practice was calculated to acquire or deprive money or property from a consumer who was 65 years of age or older when it occurred. The court found five such violations and, in finding 4.K, set the maximum for each, producing $1,250,000 on top of the $270,000 assessed at $10,000 per violation under section 17.47(c)(1).

What does the judgment require a consumer to do to be considered for restitution?

Paragraph 7 provides that any consumer seeking restitution must submit documentation to the defendants sufficient to establish payment to the defendants and resulting loss, within 90 days after the date notice is sent. That window opens only after the defendants produce the customer list required by paragraph 4 and the Consumer Protection Division sends notice under paragraph 6. This article describes the process the order creates and does not advise any reader on what to file.

What is a no-answer default judgment?

It is a judgment entered against a defendant who was properly served but never filed an answer. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 239 permits the plaintiff to take it once the return of service has been on file for the period Rule 107 requires. Finding 4.F of this judgment states that by failing to answer, each defendant admitted the material factual allegations properly pleaded against it, which is how the twenty-seven violations were established rather than through a trial on contested evidence.

Can the judgment still be challenged?

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b(d) gives a trial court plenary power to vacate, modify, correct, or reform a judgment for 30 days after it is signed, and Rule 329b(a) sets the same 30-day window for a motion for new trial. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 30 allows a party who did not participate in the hearing and filed no timely post-judgment motion to bring a restricted appeal, with Rule 26.1(c) setting that deadline at six months after the judgment is signed. Recording Law has not reviewed any post-judgment filing in this case.

What happens if the defendants do not pay?

Texas Business and Commerce Code section 17.47(d) allows a court to appoint a receiver or order sequestration of assets where a person ordered to make restitution has failed to do so within three months after the restitution order has become final and nonappealable. Paragraph 17 of the judgment separately states that its injunctive provisions are enforceable by contempt, and paragraph 16 allows the State all writs and processes needed for enforcement.

Does the injunction shut the company down?

No. Paragraph 1 bars specific conduct, including representing that work will be timely completed without the ability or intent to do so and representing that a roof needs repair when it does not. Paragraph 2 goes further and regulates future contracting practice, requiring written start and completion dates in Texas consumer contracts and a written reason plus a replacement date within 30 days if either is missed. The order restricts how the defendants may operate rather than dissolving the business.

What does Texas law require of roofing contracts paid with insurance money?

Texas Business and Commerce Code section 27.02 requires a contract for goods or services reasonably expected to be paid wholly or partly from property insurance proceeds, at a contract price of $1,000 or more, to carry a notice in at least 12-point boldfaced type about the insured's obligation to pay the deductible. Texas Insurance Code section 4102.163 provides that a contractor may not act as a public adjuster or advertise to adjust claims for property for which the contractor is providing or may provide contracting services. Neither provision was invoked in this judgment.