EEOC Sues Call 4 Health Under PWFA Over Childbirth Leave

EEOC Sues Call 4 Health Under PWFA Over Childbirth Leave

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission sued a Delray Beach, Florida medical call center on September 29, 2026, alleging it denied pregnant employees leave for childbirth because they did not qualify for FMLA leave. The agency says the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act required its own separate accommodation analysis.

Information last verified on October 9, 2026. This is a developing story; we update it as the record changes.

Status: The complaint in EEOC v. Call 4 Health, Inc., No. 9:26-cv-81333 (S.D. Fla.), was docketed on September 29, 2026, and the EEOC announced the suit on September 30, 2026. The case is assigned to U.S. District Judge Ed Artau. As of October 9, 2026, the public docket, whose free mirror was last refreshed on October 7, 2026, shows no answer from the company and no ruling on the merits. The court has acted procedurally: docket entry 4, dated October 7, 2026, is a document labeled "Extension of Time to File Response/Reply/Answer," available only for purchase through PACER, and a separate unnumbered entry later the same day is labeled "Order on Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply/Answer," with no document offered at all. Nothing has been proved and Call 4 Health has not been found liable. Every description of the employer's conduct below is an allegation by the EEOC.

Jurisdiction scope: This article covers federal law, specifically the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act, in a case pending in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. It does not address Florida state-law claims, and it does not cover the separate pregnancy accommodation laws that the EEOC says more than 30 states and cities have enacted. For background on the default employment rule that these federal statutes cut into, see our guide to at-will employment and its statutory limits.

What Happened

The EEOC announced the lawsuit in a press release dated September 30, 2026. The agency's Miami District Office, which has jurisdiction over Florida, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, states that it filed suit after first trying to reach a pre-litigation settlement through its administrative conciliation process.

The core allegation in the release is that the employer ran the leave requests through one statute and stopped there:

According to the EEOC's suit, Call 4 Health denied multiple pregnant employees' requests for leave in 2023 and 2024 because the women did not qualify for leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The company failed to separately consider whether the requested leave constituted a reasonable accommodation under the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA).

EEOC press release, "EEOC Sues Call 4 Health Under Pregnant Workers Fairness Act," September 30, 2026

The release describes the asserted consequence in the same terms: the agency charges that the company "failed to provide a class of female employees leave for childbirth as a reasonable accommodation, and instead required them to resign and reapply for their positions once medically cleared to work, resulting in their terminations." Those remain the agency's allegations, which the company has not yet answered on the docket.

Kristen Foslid, regional attorney for the EEOC Miami District, framed the agency's legal theory in one sentence: "An employee does not have to qualify for FMLA leave to be entitled to a reasonable accommodation under the PWFA. The EEOC will demand compliance with the PWFA in court when necessary." Evangeline Hawthorne, director of the Miami District, added: "No worker should have to choose between childbirth and employment."

The public docket adds the procedural detail. The complaint was filed on September 29, 2026, the day before the press release; the clerk issued the summons on September 30. The cause of action is recorded as 42:2000e job discrimination in employment, the nature of suit as civil rights jobs, and the jury demand as the plaintiff's. Judge Ed Artau drew the case, with Magistrate Judge Bruce E. Reinhart noted as available on consent under 28 U.S.C. 636(c). Docket entry 4, dated October 7, 2026, is a document labeled "Extension of Time to File Response/Reply/Answer," and it is available only for purchase through PACER. A separate unnumbered entry later the same day is labeled "Order on Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply/Answer" and offers no document at all. Neither was read for this article, so it does not state who moved, what the order holds, or what deadline it sets.

One limit on this report deserves stating plainly. The complaint itself, docket entry 1, is not available without charge through the federal courts' public access system, so this article does not describe its counts, the number of employees in the alleged class, the named allegations or the relief sought beyond what the EEOC's own release says.

What the Law Actually Says

The PWFA requires an accommodation analysis of its own

The Pregnant Workers Fairness Act was enacted on December 29, 2022 as division II of Public Law 117-328, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, and section 109 of that division set its effective date 180 days later. The EEOC puts that date at June 27, 2023, and began accepting PWFA charges the same day.

The operative prohibition is at 42 U.S.C. 2000gg-1(1). It is an unlawful employment practice for a covered entity to "not make reasonable accommodations to the known limitations related to the pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions of a qualified employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity."

Three defined terms do the work. A "known limitation" under 42 U.S.C. 2000gg(4) is a physical or mental condition related to, affected by, or arising out of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions that the employee or the employee's representative has communicated to the employer, "whether or not such condition meets the definition of disability" under the ADA. A "qualified employee" under 2000gg(6) includes an employee who cannot currently perform an essential function, provided the inability is temporary, the function could be performed in the near future, and the inability can be reasonably accommodated. "Reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship" carry their ADA meanings under 2000gg(7), including with respect to the interactive process.

Coverage is the first place the two statutes part company. Under 42 U.S.C. 2000gg(2)(B)(i), a covered employer is a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce with 15 or more employees, tracking Title VII's threshold at 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b). Title VII states that element in full: fifteen or more employees "for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year," so the count is a sustained one rather than a single-day snapshot. There is no length-of-service test and no hours test anywhere in the PWFA.

Leave is on the PWFA accommodation list

The EEOC's implementing regulation, 29 C.F.R. Part 1636, lists leave expressly. Section 1636.3(i)(2) names "permitting the use of paid leave (whether accrued, as part of a short-term disability program, or any other employer benefit) or providing unpaid leave for reasons including, but not limited to, recovery from childbirth" among the examples of reasonable accommodation, and section 1636.3(i)(3) sets out the leave examples in more detail, including leave to recover from childbirth and leave to attend health care appointments.

Section 1636.3(f)(1) explains how the qualified-employee test applies to leave: the relevant inquiry is whether the employee is reasonably expected to be able to perform the essential functions, with or without a reasonable accommodation, at the end of the leave.

Appendix A to Part 1636 is the EEOC's interpretive guidance rather than regulatory text, and it addresses a closely related situation. Under the heading "Particular Matters Regarding Leave as a Reasonable Accommodation," paragraph 60 states that a covered entity should evaluate whether to offer leave as a PWFA accommodation even where "the employee is not eligible for leave under the employer's leave policy, or the employee has exhausted the leave the covered entity provides as a benefit (including leave exhausted under a workers' compensation program, the FMLA, or similar State or local laws)."

The accompanying footnote states the relationship between the two regimes directly:

If an employee has a right to leave under the FMLA, an employer policy, or a State or local law, the employee is entitled to leave regardless of whether they request leave as a reasonable accommodation. An employee who needs leave beyond what they are entitled to under those laws or policies may request a reasonable accommodation.

Appendix A to 29 C.F.R. Part 1636, Interpretive Guidance, note 74

Paragraph 62 of the same appendix addresses what happens at the end of the leave: "A qualified employee with a known limitation who is granted leave as a reasonable accommodation under the PWFA is entitled to return to their same position unless the employer demonstrates that holding open the position would impose an undue hardship."

Leave also runs in the other direction under the PWFA. Section 2000gg-1(4) makes it unlawful to "require a qualified employee to take leave, whether paid or unpaid, if another reasonable accommodation can be provided to the known limitations related to the pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions of the qualified employee." The regulation restates that at 29 C.F.R. 1636.4(d)(1) and then clarifies at 1636.4(d)(2) that nothing in the bar prohibits leave as an accommodation where leave is what the employee requested or selected, or where it is the only accommodation that does not cause undue hardship.

The FMLA asks a different question

The Family and Medical Leave Act creates an entitlement rather than an accommodation duty, and it screens for it with tests the PWFA does not use. Under 29 U.S.C. 2611(2)(A), an "eligible employee" must have been employed for at least 12 months by the employer and for at least 1,250 hours of service during the previous 12-month period. Under 2611(2)(B)(ii), an employee at a worksite with fewer than 50 employees is excluded if the employer has fewer than 50 employees within 75 miles of that worksite. Under 2611(4)(A)(i), a covered "employer" is one who employs 50 or more employees for each working day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the current or preceding calendar year. Section 2611(4)(A)(iii) separately includes any "public agency" as defined in 29 U.S.C. 203(x), without regard to headcount, so the 50-employee threshold is a private-employer threshold.

An eligible employee of a covered employer is entitled under 29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1) to a total of 12 workweeks of leave in a 12-month period, including for the birth of a child under 2612(a)(1)(A) and for a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position under 2612(a)(1)(D). Section 2612(c) permits that leave to be unpaid.

Set those tests side by side and the practical point is straightforward. A worker can fail the FMLA test for reasons that say nothing at all about whether a PWFA accommodation is reasonable: too new, too few hours, or a workplace too small. A private employer with 20 employees, counted as 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b) and 29 U.S.C. 2611(4)(A)(i) each require, is covered by the PWFA under 42 U.S.C. 2000gg(2)(B)(i) and is not an FMLA employer under 29 U.S.C. 2611(4)(A)(i). That comparison is a private-employer comparison, because the FMLA reaches public agencies of any size under 29 U.S.C. 2611(4)(A)(iii). Failing one statute's eligibility screen is not an answer under the other statute, which is the EEOC's stated theory in this case.

Title VII and the ADA, and the gap the PWFA filled

The PWFA did not replace the two statutes that already addressed pregnancy at work. Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, provides at 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k) that "because of sex" includes "because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions," and that affected women "shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes" as "other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work." That is a comparative non-discrimination rule: it measures an employer's treatment of a pregnant worker against its treatment of comparable non-pregnant workers. It does not, by its terms, create a free-standing duty to accommodate.

The ADA does create an accommodation duty, at 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(5)(A), but only for "an otherwise qualified individual with a disability." The EEOC's position is that some pregnancy-related conditions may be disabilities while pregnancy itself is not a disability under the ADA.

The PWFA sits in between: an accommodation duty keyed to pregnancy, childbirth and related medical conditions, without requiring a disability and without requiring a comparator. Section 2000gg-5(a)(1) provides that nothing in the PWFA limits any federal, state or local law that gives greater or equal protection, and the EEOC states that more than 30 states and cities have their own pregnancy accommodation laws.

Where the regulation stands

The EEOC issued the final rule implementing the PWFA on April 15, 2024. It was published at 89 Fed. Reg. 29096 on April 19, 2024 and took effect on June 18, 2024.

One part of that rule has been set aside. On May 21, 2025, Judge David C. Joseph of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, in State of Louisiana v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, No. 2:24-cv-00629, and the consolidated United States Conference of Catholic Bishops v. EEOC, No. 2:24-cv-00691, vacated the provision of the final rule "to the extent that it includes 'abortion' as a 'related medical condition' of pregnancy and childbirth," namely 29 C.F.R. 1636.3(b). The same order vacated any implementing regulations or guidance inconsistent with it, but only, in the order's own words, "to the extent that they require or suggest to employers that they are required to provide employees with accommodation for purely elective abortions that are not necessary to treat a medical condition related to pregnancy," and it remanded the final rule to the EEOC. A footnote to that decretal paragraph states that "terminations of pregnancy or abortions stemming from the underlying treatment of a medical condition related to pregnancy are not affected by this Order." The court entered the ruling as a partial final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), ordered the preliminary injunctions already in place in both consolidated matters to "remain in place until final dismissal of these matters or further order of the Court," and set an in-person status conference for June 17, 2025 to address de-consolidation and the remaining issues raised by the Bishops plaintiffs.

Nothing in that order reached the leave provisions at issue in the Call 4 Health suit. The site's own observation, which is not a legal conclusion: the codified text of 29 C.F.R. 1636.3(b) as published on the eCFR for October 1, 2026, and in the 2025 annual edition of the Code of Federal Regulations, still prints the abortion language, so the published text and the court's order read differently. We make no claim here about that provision's current legal effect.

The PWFA's enactment is itself the subject of pending litigation, separately from the rule. In State of Texas v. Bondi, No. 24-10386, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held on August 15, 2025 that the Constitution's Quorum Clause "does not require physical presence for a house of Congress to conduct business." The panel reversed the judgment the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas had entered for Texas and vacated that court's "permanent injunction limiting enforcement of the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act against Texas." That panel opinion no longer stands, for the reason set out in the next paragraph.

The appellate docket, now captioned State of Texas v. Blanche, records a court order granting Texas's petition for rehearing en banc on January 14, 2026 at entry 220, and en banc oral argument heard on May 12, 2026 at entry 326. No en banc decision appears on that docket through its last filing as mirrored on October 9, 2026, and Fifth Circuit Rule 41.3 provides that "the granting of a rehearing en banc vacates the panel opinion and judgment of the court and stays the mandate" unless the court expressly provides otherwise.

The relief at issue in that case ran to enforcement of the PWFA against the State of Texas. The Call 4 Health suit is against a private Florida employer in the Eleventh Circuit, so the Fifth Circuit litigation does not govern it. This article makes no prediction about how the en banc court will rule.

Analysis: Why This Matters

The following is analysis from the Recording Law Editorial Team.

The conduct the EEOC describes is not framed as hostility toward pregnant workers. On the agency's account, the leave requests were denied on FMLA grounds and the PWFA was not separately considered. The complaint is not publicly available, so that account is an allegation and nothing more at this stage.

If the EEOC's account is established, the legal problem is one of sequence rather than motive. The duty in 42 U.S.C. 2000gg-1(1) is triggered by a known limitation that the employee has communicated to the employer under 42 U.S.C. 2000gg(4) and 29 C.F.R. 1636.3(d), not by the outcome of an eligibility test under a different statute. The EEOC's interpretive guidance in Appendix A to 29 C.F.R. Part 1636, paragraph 60, states that a covered entity should evaluate whether to offer leave as a PWFA accommodation even where the employee "is not eligible for leave under the employer's leave policy" or has exhausted the leave the employer provides as a benefit, including leave exhausted under the FMLA.

The resign-and-reapply step the agency alleges is where the legal exposure concentrates, if the allegation is established. The EEOC's guidance sets the baseline at return to the same position absent undue hardship, in Appendix A paragraph 62, and 42 U.S.C. 2000gg-1(5) separately makes it unlawful to take adverse action in the terms, conditions or privileges of employment against a qualified employee on account of the employee requesting or using an accommodation.

The agency alleges the employees were required to resign and reapply rather than that they left voluntarily, and the statute also limits what an employer may do with such a reapplication. 42 U.S.C. 2000gg-1(3) makes it unlawful to "deny employment opportunities to a qualified employee if such denial is based on the need of the covered entity to make reasonable accommodations to the known limitations" related to pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions. Florida's default employment rule is the backdrop to that sequence rather than the operative constraint on it. Our page on Florida At-Will Employment Laws: Exceptions and Your Rights covers that default and the narrow exceptions Florida courts recognize.

One structural difference between the two statutes is coverage, and it turns on a headcount rather than on a judgment about the accommodation itself. A private employer with 15 to 49 employees, counted as 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b) and 29 U.S.C. 2611(4)(A)(i) each require, is inside the PWFA under 42 U.S.C. 2000gg(2)(B)(i) and outside the FMLA under 29 U.S.C. 2611(4)(A)(i). That band describes private employers, since the FMLA covers public agencies at any size under 29 U.S.C. 2611(4)(A)(iii). An employer in that band has no FMLA program to point at, which means "this is not FMLA-qualifying" cannot function as a response to a PWFA request. The same logic applies to a large FMLA-covered employer facing a request from a worker in her first year.

This is also an early data point on how the PWFA is being enforced rather than how it is being interpreted by courts. The statute took effect in June 2023 and the implementing rule in June 2024, so the conduct the EEOC describes, in 2023 and 2024, sits in the window right after the statute became effective. We are not predicting how this case resolves, and nothing in the record we could read establishes any fact about the company's conduct.

How This Affects You

For covered employers, the structural point in the statutes is that a PWFA request and an FMLA request are separate questions that need separate answers. The regulation sets a low bar for making the request: under 29 C.F.R. 1636.3(h)(2), an employee need only communicate that they need an adjustment or change at work due to a limitation, with no specific words, form or medical terminology required, and under 1636.3(d) the communication can go to a supervisor, a manager, human resources or another appropriate official. The regulation also limits when supporting documentation may be sought, at 1636.3(l).

For workers, the general shape of the federal law is that PWFA coverage turns on the employer's size, the existence of a communicated limitation and whether the accommodation causes undue hardship, and not on how long the worker has been there. Separate state or local pregnancy accommodation laws may apply on top of the federal floor, which 42 U.S.C. 2000gg-5(a)(1) expressly preserves. This article does not tell any reader what to do in their own situation.

What Happens Next

The ordinary course in a civil enforcement action of this kind is that the defendant responds to the complaint, either by answer or by a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12, after which the case moves into discovery and, if it is not resolved, toward summary-judgment briefing and trial. The docket's most recent activity is dated October 7, 2026: numbered entry 4, for an extension of time to file a response, followed by an unnumbered entry for an order on that motion. The one document offered is pay-only on PACER and was not read for this article. No answer appears on the public docket as of October 9, 2026. The EEOC's complaint carries a jury demand.

The matter becomes settled only when the court enters judgment or the parties resolve it and the case is dismissed. Until then, the EEOC's description of the employer's conduct is an allegation. We will update this page as the docket develops.

This is general legal information, not legal advice. It covers federal employment law in the United States and a case pending in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, and it reflects sources verified on October 9, 2026. Laws change and this story is developing; consult a lawyer licensed in your jurisdiction about your specific situation.

Related articles

• Florida At-Will Employment Laws: Exceptions and Your Rights
• At-will employment and the statutes that limit it
• Kentucky at-will employment rules and exceptions

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Last updated: 2026-10-09. This is a developing story; details verified as of 2026-10-09.

Frequently Asked Questions

Has Call 4 Health been found liable?

No. The EEOC filed a complaint on September 29, 2026 and announced it on September 30, 2026. A complaint is an allegation. As of October 9, 2026 the public docket in EEOC v. Call 4 Health, Inc., No. 9:26-cv-81333 (S.D. Fla.), shows no answer from the company and no ruling on the merits. The court has acted on a procedural matter: docket entry 4, dated October 7, 2026, is a document labeled 'Extension of Time to File Response/Reply/Answer', and a separate unnumbered entry later the same day is labeled 'Order on Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply/Answer' with no document offered. The one document available is pay-only on PACER, so its contents are not described here.

Does an employee have to be eligible for FMLA leave to get leave as a PWFA accommodation?

The two statutes set different tests. FMLA eligibility is defined at 29 U.S.C. 2611(2) by 12 months of employment, 1,250 hours of service and a 50-employee, 75-mile worksite rule. The PWFA at 42 U.S.C. 2000gg-1(1) requires a covered employer to accommodate a known limitation absent undue hardship, with no tenure or hours test, and the EEOC's interpretive guidance at Appendix A to 29 C.F.R. Part 1636, paragraph 60, says the PWFA analysis applies even where the employee is not eligible for leave under the employer's policy. The EEOC's regional attorney stated the agency's position in this case as follows: 'An employee does not have to qualify for FMLA leave to be entitled to a reasonable accommodation under the PWFA.'

Which employers does the PWFA cover, and how is that different from the FMLA?

Under 42 U.S.C. 2000gg(2)(B)(i) the PWFA reaches employers in an industry affecting commerce with 15 or more employees, the same threshold Title VII uses at 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b), which requires fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. The FMLA at 29 U.S.C. 2611(4)(A)(i) reaches employers with 50 or more employees for each working day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and separately covers any public agency regardless of size under 29 U.S.C. 2611(4)(A)(iii). A private employer with 20 employees, counted as each statute requires, is therefore covered by the PWFA and not by the FMLA.

How much leave does the PWFA provide?

The PWFA does not set a fixed number of weeks. The FMLA grants an entitlement of 12 workweeks in a 12-month period under 29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1). The PWFA instead requires a reasonable accommodation for a known limitation unless the employer demonstrates undue hardship, and 29 C.F.R. 1636.3(i)(3) lists paid and unpaid leave among the possible accommodations, including leave to recover from childbirth. The amount is the product of that case-specific analysis, not a statutory figure.

Can an employer require a pregnant employee to take leave instead of another accommodation?

42 U.S.C. 2000gg-1(4) makes it an unlawful employment practice to require a qualified employee to take leave, paid or unpaid, if another reasonable accommodation can be provided for the known limitation. The regulation restates this at 29 C.F.R. 1636.4(d)(1) and adds at 1636.4(d)(2) that leave is not prohibited where the employee requested or selected it, or where it is the only accommodation that does not cause undue hardship.

Does an employee who takes leave as a PWFA accommodation get the same job back?

Appendix A to 29 C.F.R. Part 1636, paragraph 62, states that a qualified employee with a known limitation who is granted leave as a reasonable accommodation under the PWFA is entitled to return to the same position unless the employer demonstrates that holding the position open would impose an undue hardship, and that the employee must still be qualified on return under 29 C.F.R. 1636.3(f)(1) or 1636.3(f)(2).

Is the EEOC's PWFA regulation still in effect?

The final rule was published at 89 Fed. Reg. 29096 on April 19, 2024 and took effect on June 18, 2024. On May 21, 2025 the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, in State of Louisiana v. EEOC, No. 2:24-cv-00629, vacated 29 C.F.R. 1636.3(b) to the extent it includes abortion as a related medical condition, vacated inconsistent implementing regulations and guidance only to the extent they require or suggest that employers must accommodate purely elective abortions that are not necessary to treat a medical condition related to pregnancy, and remanded the rule to the EEOC. That order did not reach the leave-as-accommodation provisions at 29 C.F.R. 1636.3(i)(3) or the forced-leave provision at 1636.4(d).

What do Title VII and the ADA add for a pregnant worker?

Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, provides at 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k) that discrimination because of sex includes discrimination because of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions, and requires that affected workers be treated the same as others similar in their ability or inability to work. The ADA requires reasonable accommodation at 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(5)(A), but only for a qualified individual with a disability, and the EEOC's position is that pregnancy itself is not a disability under the ADA even though some related conditions may be. The PWFA adds an accommodation duty that does not require a disability or a comparator.

Where can the court filings in this case be read?

The docket for EEOC v. Call 4 Health, Inc., No. 9:26-cv-81333 (S.D. Fla.), is public. The complaint itself, docket entry 1, was not available free of charge through the federal courts' public access system when this article was prepared, so the allegations summarized here come from the EEOC's own press release rather than from the complaint.