CNIL Fines Unnamed Company EUR 5 Million Over Clear-Text Passwords
Independently fact-checked against primary sources (last audited November 21, 2026). · 10 primary sources cited on this page. How we verify our legal content

France's data protection regulator has fined an unnamed company EUR 5 million for storing customer account passwords in clear text and for keeping personal data far longer than it needed. The CNIL's formation restreinte adopted deliberation SAN-2026-016 on 12 November 2026 and published its account on 18 November 2026.
Information last verified on November 21, 2026. This is a developing story; we update it as the record changes.
Status: The sanction has been imposed. Under the CNIL's own description of its ordinary sanction procedure, an organisation that has been notified of a deliberation has two months to lodge an appeal before the Conseil d'État, France's supreme administrative court. Because the company is not named and the full deliberation was not reachable from our systems, we do not know whether it has appealed or intends to, as at 21 November 2026.
Jurisdiction scope: This article addresses an enforcement decision by the Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés (CNIL), the French supervisory authority, applying Articles 32 and 5(1)(e) of the EU General Data Protection Regulation in France. It does not address enforcement by other EU supervisory authorities, the UK GDPR, or US state privacy statutes. For the French framework the CNIL enforces, see how the Informatique et Libertés law sits on top of the GDPR.
What Happened
The CNIL opened the file after being alerted about how one company stored its customers' passwords, and the answers to the security questions used to reach the customer area on its website. The regulator then carried out an inspection, which it says revealed breaches of several obligations under the GDPR.
The matter went to the formation restreinte, the CNIL organ charged with imposing sanctions. On 12 November 2026 it adopted deliberation SAN-2026-016 and imposed a fine of EUR 5 million. The CNIL published its account of the decision on 18 November 2026, naming the deliberation and linking it on Légifrance, but not naming the company.
On security, the formation restreinte found that at the date of the inspections, and until the sanction procedure was opened, the company had not implemented certain elementary security measures. Its central finding is stated plainly:
"les mots de passe d’accès aux espaces clients étaient conservés en clair" Source: CNIL, Conservation des mots de passe clients en clair, published 18 November 2026 (the passwords used to access customer areas were stored in clear)
The second security finding has nothing to do with cryptography. The CNIL held that the arrangements for accessing the customer databases, and the tool the company used to reach those databases, were inadequate because logins and passwords were shared between several employees. The formation restreinte recalled that only individual accounts make it possible to trace accesses and actions on a system effectively, in particular when investigating a security incident or a data breach.
On retention, the CNIL found that at the time of the inspection the company was keeping the data customers entered in its contact form for more than 10 years, which the regulator describes as excessive once the customer's request has been dealt with. The formation restreinte restated the three lawful endpoints for data whose retention is no longer necessary: anonymisation, archiving where retention answers a legal obligation, or deletion.
The company also failed to follow its own rules. The CNIL found it had kept customers' connection data beyond the one-year period its own retention policy defined, and that those logs were no longer necessary for the purposes pursued.
The published summary records remediation on both counts. On security, the formation restreinte noted that the company took several measures during the procedure that raised its security to the expected level. On retention, it noted that the company deleted the history of data whose retention was no longer useful and moved to a monthly purge of customer data. The CNIL does not say that either step reduced the fine. Its only statement about the amount is that it takes account of the gravity of the breaches found, which it says bear on essential principles of data security, the number of people concerned, and the company's financial capacity.

What the Law Actually Says
Article 32 of the GDPR does not prescribe hashing, salting or any other specific technique. It requires the controller and the processor to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk, taking account of the state of the art, the costs of implementation and the nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing. It then lists measures to be used as needed, beginning with pseudonymisation and encryption of personal data.
That open wording is why a regulator's own published view of the state of the art matters so much in practice. The CNIL adopted its current password recommendation as deliberation No. 2022-100 of 21 July 2022, replacing its 2017 text. The recommendation is explicit that passwords must never be stored in clear, and that where authentication happens on a remote server the password must be transformed using a secure, non-reversible cryptographic function incorporating a salt or a key, naming scrypt and Argon2 as examples. The CNIL is careful to say the recommendation is not a binding standard, but describes it as the state of the art a controller can rely on under Articles 5(1)(f) and 32 when it protects personal data with password authentication.
Article 5(1)(e) is the storage limitation principle. It requires that personal data be kept in a form permitting identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which they are processed, with a carve-out for longer retention where data are processed solely for archiving in the public interest, scientific or historical research, or statistical purposes under Article 89(1), and only where the appropriate safeguards are in place. The principle carries no fixed number of years. A retention period is lawful or not by reference to the purpose, which is why the CNIL's finding attaches to a specific moment: once the customer's request from the contact form has been handled. For how different legal systems structure that question, see our survey of retention rules country by country.
The two breaches sit in different fine brackets. Article 83(4) caps breaches of the controller's Articles 25 to 39 obligations, which includes the Article 32 security duty, at EUR 10,000,000 or 2% of total worldwide annual turnover for the preceding financial year, whichever is higher. Article 83(5) raises the ceiling to EUR 20,000,000 or 4% of turnover for breaches of the basic principles in Articles 5, 6, 7 and 9, which is where a retention finding lands. Article 83(3) adds that where a controller deliberately or negligently breaches several provisions in the same or linked processing operations, the total fine cannot exceed the amount set for the gravest breach. Our GDPR fines and penalties tracker sets out that two-tier structure in more detail.
Article 83(1) requires every administrative fine to be effective, proportionate and dissuasive, and Article 83(2)(a) directs the authority to weigh the nature, gravity and duration of the breach together with the number of data subjects affected. Two of the three reasons the CNIL gives for the amount sit squarely in that paragraph; financial capacity is the input that turns a proportionate figure into a dissuasive one.

Analysis: Why This Matters
The following is analysis from the Recording Law Editorial Team.
The notable thing about this decision is not the number. It is which failures the CNIL chose to describe as elementary.
Clear-text password storage is the headline, and it is the finding the regulator built its publication decision around. But the second Article 32 finding is the one that will be unfamiliar to many organisations: shared logins to a customer database. The CNIL's stated reason is traceability, not confidentiality. A shared account does not make the data more readable; it defeats attribution, because nobody can say which human being did what. The CNIL's point is that only individual accounts allow accesses and actions on a system to be traced effectively, in particular when a security incident is being investigated. That is an access-governance finding, and shared accounts keep recurring in the CNIL's recent security files: it made the same traceability point in its 17 November 2026 round-up of simplified sanctions, and shared contractor accounts, incomplete logging and weak remote authentication all appear in the ten cybersecurity fines it issued to French public bodies three days before this deliberation, on 9 November 2026.
The retention findings are worth separating. One is a substantive assessment: ten years of contact-form data is excessive once the enquiry is closed, a judgment the CNIL reached by reference to the purpose rather than to any tariff. The other is self-inflicted. The company had written a one-year limit for connection logs into its own policy and then exceeded it. Under Article 5(2) a controller is responsible for demonstrating compliance with the Article 5(1) principles, so a published retention policy is a standard the controller sets against itself. A regulator reading that document does not need to form a view on the right period; it only needs to compare the stated period with the database.
The transparency choice is the other reason this decision carries beyond its facts. In the CNIL's simplified procedure, anonymity is structural: the president of the formation restreinte or one of its members decides alone, the fine cannot exceed EUR 20,000, and the CNIL cannot disclose the name of the sanctioned organisation. The CNIL used that route 38 times between June and October 2026, for EUR 302,800 in total. This matter went through the ordinary procedure, where the formation restreinte deliberates in camera and may decide on publicity. It chose to publish the deliberation for educational purposes and to withhold the name, reasoning that securing data behind passwords is one of the essential principles of data security and that reminding economic actors of the applicable rules did not require naming the company. Publication without naming is a deliberate middle setting: it gets the rule into circulation while sparing the reputational penalty that usually travels with a named EUR 5 million fine.
One consequence of that choice is a limit on what anyone outside the file can verify. The CNIL's published summary is the only account of the reasoning available to us, because the deliberation on Légifrance was behind an access challenge that blocked every route we tried. We therefore do not know how the formation restreinte allocated the amount between the two breaches, which Article 83(2) factors it discussed expressly, or whether it coupled the fine with an injunction or a periodic penalty payment (astreinte). Readers should treat every characterisation of the reasoning above as the CNIL's own published summary rather than as the text of the decision.
What Happens Next
The CNIL describes its ordinary procedure as ending with notification of the deliberation to the organisation some weeks after the hearing, at which point the organisation has two months to lodge an appeal before the Conseil d'État. The deliberation is dated 12 November 2026, but the CNIL has not published the notification date and the company is not named, so the start and end of that window are not publicly knowable. We are not stating a calendar deadline.
Two events would change the picture. An appeal to the Conseil d'État, if one is lodged and reported, would put the findings and the amount before the administrative court. Separately, if the deliberation on Légifrance becomes reachable, the per-breach reasoning and any injunction or astreinte will be visible. Fines imposed by the CNIL are collected by the Trésor public and paid into the state budget, so the regulator gains nothing financially from the figure it set.
How This Affects You
This decision tells an account holder nothing about which company was involved, and the CNIL deliberately left it that way. The general point is narrower. Where a controller detects a breach involving a person's password, the CNIL's published guidance describes the expected response as notifying the regulator within 72 hours, forcing a password change at the user's next login, and advising the user to change the same password anywhere else they have reused it.
A person who believes an organisation is mishandling their personal data in France can complain to the CNIL, which can inspect and sanction. It cannot award compensation. The CNIL states plainly that it is unable to indemnify individuals who have suffered harm, so a damages claim is a separate matter for the courts. Our guide to what a complaint to the CNIL can and cannot achieve sets out that division.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. It covers the GDPR as applied in France by the CNIL and reflects sources verified on 21 November 2026. The full text of deliberation SAN-2026-016 was not reachable from our systems, so the reasoning described here is the CNIL's own published summary. Laws change and this story is developing; consult a lawyer licensed in your jurisdiction about your specific situation.
Related articles
- How the Informatique et Libertés law sits on top of the GDPR in France
- Retention rules country by country
- GDPR fines and penalties tracker
- CNIL issues ten cybersecurity fines to French public bodies
- What a complaint to the CNIL can and cannot achieve
Last updated: 2026-11-21. This is a developing story; details verified as of 2026-11-21.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is the EUR 5 million CNIL fine final, and can the company appeal?
The sanction has been imposed: the formation restreinte adopted deliberation SAN-2026-016 on 12 November 2026 and the CNIL published its account on 18 November 2026. The CNIL states that an organisation notified of such a deliberation has two months to lodge an appeal before the Conseil d'Etat. Because the company is not named and the notification date is not public, we cannot say whether an appeal has been lodged, as at 21 November 2026.
Which company did the CNIL fine EUR 5 million?
The CNIL did not say. The formation restreinte decided to publish deliberation SAN-2026-016 of 12 November 2026 for educational purposes while concluding that it was not useful in this case to name the company concerned. We do not speculate about the identity, and no third-party guess should be treated as confirmation.
Is storing passwords in clear text a breach of the GDPR?
Article 32 GDPR requires security measures appropriate to the risk and does not name a technique. In this decision the CNIL treated clear-text storage of customer account passwords as a failure to implement elementary security measures. Its own password recommendation, deliberation No. 2022-100 of 21 July 2022, states that passwords must never be stored in clear.
How long can a company keep data from a website contact form?
Article 5(1)(e) GDPR sets no fixed period; data may be kept in identifiable form only as long as necessary for the purpose. In this file the CNIL found retention of more than 10 years excessive once the customer's request had been handled, and said the data should instead be anonymised, archived where a legal obligation requires it, or deleted.
What is the maximum GDPR fine for a security breach?
Article 83(4) caps breaches of Article 32 at EUR 10,000,000 or 2% of total worldwide annual turnover for the preceding financial year, whichever is higher. Breaches of the Article 5 principles, including storage limitation, fall under Article 83(5), where the ceiling is EUR 20,000,000 or 4% of turnover.
Why does the CNIL sometimes fine a company without naming it?
Anonymity is automatic in the CNIL's simplified procedure, where the fine cannot exceed EUR 20,000 and the regulator cannot disclose the name. In the ordinary procedure the formation restreinte decides on publicity itself, and here it published the deliberation to remind businesses of the rules while withholding the name.
Did the company's data purge reduce the fine?
The CNIL's published summary does not say so. It records that the company strengthened security during the procedure, deleted historical data whose retention was no longer useful and began monthly purges, but the only factors it names for the amount are the gravity of the breaches, the number of people concerned and the company's financial capacity.
Updates
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources
Sources and References
- CNIL, Conservation des mots de passe clients en clair : la CNIL prononce une sanction de 5 millions d'euros, published 18 November 2026 (the regulator's published account of deliberation SAN-2026-016 of 12 November 2026: the EUR 5 million amount, the Article 32 finding that customer-area passwords were stored in clear and that database credentials were shared between employees, the Article 5(1)(e) findings on contact-form data kept more than 10 years and connection logs kept beyond the company's own one-year policy, the remediation taken during the procedure, the three factors stated for the amount, and the decision to publish without naming the company)(cnil.fr).gov
- Deliberation SAN-2026-016 of 12 November 2026, CNIL formation restreinte, official text on Legifrance (the decision itself; its full text was not accessible to us at the time of writing, so this article relies on the CNIL's published summary of 18 November 2026)(legifrance.gouv.fr).gov
- Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR), Article 32 (security of processing), French text as reproduced by the CNIL (the appropriate-measures standard, the state-of-the-art and cost factors, and the illustrative list beginning with pseudonymisation and encryption)(cnil.fr).gov
- Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR), Article 5, French text as reproduced by the CNIL (Article 5(1)(e) storage limitation: data kept in identifiable form no longer than necessary for the purposes, with the Article 89(1) archiving, research and statistics carve-out; and Article 5(2), under which the controller is responsible for compliance with Article 5(1) and must be able to demonstrate it)(cnil.fr).gov
- Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR), Article 83 (general conditions for imposing administrative fines), French text as reproduced by the CNIL (the effective, proportionate and dissuasive requirement in 83(1); the 83(2)(a) gravity and number-of-data-subjects factors; the 83(3) cap at the gravest breach; the EUR 10,000,000 / 2% ceiling in 83(4) and the EUR 20,000,000 / 4% ceiling in 83(5))(cnil.fr).gov
- CNIL, Mots de passe : recommandations pour maitriser sa securite, published 14 October 2022 (deliberation No. 2022-100 of 21 July 2022 adopting the password recommendation and repealing deliberation No. 2017-012: passwords must never be stored in clear, remote authentication requires a secure non-reversible cryptographic function with a salt or key, scrypt and Argon2 named as examples, and the expected response to a password-related breach including notification within 72 hours)(cnil.fr).gov
- CNIL, Les etapes de la procedure de sanction ordinaire, page dated 25 September 2019 (the ordinary sanction procedure: the president designates a rapporteur and refers the matter to the formation restreinte, composed of five college members and a chair; members deliberate in camera and may decide on publicity of the sanction; the organisation has two months from notification of the deliberation to lodge an appeal before the Conseil d'Etat; fines are collected by the Tresor public and the CNIL cannot compensate individuals)(cnil.fr).gov
- CNIL, La CNIL a prononce 38 nouvelles sanctions en procedure simplifiee depuis juin 2026, published 17 November 2026 (how the simplified procedure differs from the ordinary one: a single decision-maker, a EUR 20,000 ceiling, and a bar on the CNIL disclosing the name of the sanctioned organisation; 38 sanctions totalling EUR 302,800 between June and October 2026)(cnil.fr).gov
- CNIL, Cybersecurite des collectivites territoriales : la CNIL prononce dix sanctions, published 9 November 2026 (Article 32 findings against French local authorities and a public body, including shared accounts used by outside contractors, incomplete logging, weak remote authentication for privileged users, and passwords transmitted in clear or stored insecurely)(cnil.fr).gov
- CNIL, Les procedures de sanction (overview hub) (confirms that the formation restreinte or the CNIL president may impose sanctions following inspections or complaints, and that the formation restreinte's powers are those set out in Article 20, III of the loi Informatique et Libertes)(cnil.fr).gov