Connecticut
How Long Is a Life Sentence in Connecticut? (2026 Guide)
Independently fact-checked against primary sources (last audited August 20, 2026). · Reviewed by the RecordingLaw editorial team. · Law checked current as of August 20, 2026. · 9 primary sources cited on this page. How we verify our legal content
Under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-35b, Connecticut defines a life sentence as a definite 60-year term. A person convicted of murder may receive 25 to 60 years, but under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-125a(b)(1), murder committed on or after July 1, 1981 is a parole-INELIGIBLE offense for an adult; the sentence is served in full absent executive clemency or a successful appeal. Only an offender who was under 18 at the time of the offense can reach parole, under the separate juvenile carve-out in § 54-125a(f). Life without the possibility of release became the maximum sentence when Connecticut abolished the death penalty in 2012.
This article was last reviewed and updated on March 17, 2026. All statutes, case law, and sentencing data have been verified against current Connecticut government sources.
In Connecticut, a "life sentence" is defined as a 60-year term under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-35b, but for an adult it functions much like true life without parole in practice: § 54-125a(b)(1) makes murder committed on or after July 1, 1981 a parole-ineligible offense, so the 60-year term is served in full absent executive clemency or a successful appeal. The only parole path is a narrow carve-out for offenders who were under 18 at the time of the offense.
Connecticut's sentencing framework has undergone dramatic transformation over the past two decades. The state abolished the death penalty, first for future cases in 2012 and then retroactively for all cases in 2015. That legal journey from capital punishment to abolition is one of the most significant in modern American criminal law.
Connecticut Life Sentence Statutes
Connecticut's criminal code addresses murder and its penalties through several key statutes.
Murder (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-54a): A person is guilty of murder when, with intent to cause the death of another person, they cause the death of such person or of a third person. Murder carries a sentence of 25 to 60 years: § 53a-35a(2) sets a term of 25 years to life, and § 53a-35b defines life as 60 years.
Felony Murder (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-54c): A person is guilty of felony murder when, acting alone or with others, they commit or attempt to commit certain felonies and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime, a participant causes the death of a person other than one of the participants. Felony murder also carries a potential life sentence.
Murder with Special Circumstances (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-54b): This statute formerly defined capital felony. Since the 2012 abolition of the death penalty, it defines murder with special circumstances, committed by a person 18 or older. The listed circumstances include murder of a police officer or other covered law enforcement or correctional officer, murder for hire, murder by someone previously convicted of murder or already serving a life sentence, murder of a kidnapped person, murder during a first-degree sexual assault, murder of two or more people in a single transaction, and murder of a child under 16. Under § 53a-35a(1)(B), the sentence is mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of release.
Aggravated Sexual Assault (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-70a): First-degree aggravated sexual assault is a class B felony with a minimum of 10 years, or a class A felony when the victim is under 16. A class A felony other than murder carries 10 to 25 years under § 53a-35a(4). This offense does not carry a life sentence.
Parole Eligibility and the 60-Year Term
Connecticut's approach to life sentences is distinctive. Rather than an indeterminate "life" designation, the state defines its maximum sentence as a fixed 60-year term.
How the 60-Year Structure Works
An adult sentenced to 60 years (life) for murder has NO parole eligibility at all; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-125a(b)(1) explicitly lists murder under § 53a-54a as parole-ineligible for offenses committed on or after July 1, 1981, confirmed by the Connecticut Board of Pardons and Paroles' own parole-ineligible-offenses list. The only exception is an offender who was under 18 at the time of the offense, who becomes parole-eligible after 30 years on a 60-year sentence under § 54-125a(f), for example, at age 46 for a person sentenced at 16.
Parole eligibility does not guarantee release. The Connecticut Board of Pardons and Paroles reviews each case individually. The board considers the nature and circumstances of the offense, the inmate's institutional conduct, participation in programming, risk assessment results, and input from victims and their families.
Earning Time and Good Conduct Credits
Connecticut allows inmates to earn credits that can reduce the time served before parole eligibility. Good conduct credits and program participation credits can be applied, though the specifics depend on the offense date and the applicable sentencing rules.
For the most serious offenses, including murder, these credits are limited. Connecticut law restricts the amount of credit that can reduce a sentence for violent felonies, ensuring that life-sentenced individuals serve a substantial portion of their term.
Life Without the Possibility of Release
Connecticut also imposes life without the possibility of release (LWOP). This sentence means the individual will never become eligible for parole. The only paths to freedom are executive clemency from the governor or a successful appeal resulting in resentencing.
LWOP is reserved for the most serious offenses. Under § 53a-35a(1)(B), it is the mandatory sentence for murder with special circumstances under § 53a-54b. Following the abolition of the death penalty, LWOP became the maximum possible sentence in Connecticut.
Abolition of the Death Penalty: A Two-Part Story
Connecticut's path to abolishing the death penalty is one of the most legally fascinating in the country. It happened in two distinct stages, and the second stage was far more dramatic than the first.
Part 1: Prospective Abolition (2012)
On April 25, 2012, Governor Dannel Malloy signed Public Act 12-5 into law. The legislation abolished the death penalty for all crimes committed after the effective date of the law.
The new law replaced the death penalty with life imprisonment without the possibility of release as the maximum sentence. At the time, 11 people remained on Connecticut's death row.
The legislature was explicit that the law applied only prospectively. Lawmakers intended for the 11 existing death sentences to stand. The political compromise that allowed the bill to pass depended on this distinction.
Part 2: Retroactive Abolition, State v. Santiago (2015)
The prospective-only approach did not survive legal challenge. In State v. Santiago (2015), the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled 4-3 that carrying out existing death sentences after the legislature had abolished the punishment for future offenders would violate the Connecticut constitution's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
The court's reasoning was powerful: once the legislature declared the death penalty no longer necessary for public safety or justice, continuing to execute people sentenced under the old law would be arbitrary. The death penalty had become constitutionally excessive.
Justice Richard Palmer, writing for the majority, noted that the 2012 repeal was itself strong evidence of an evolving standard of decency within the state. Connecticut could not simultaneously declare the death penalty unnecessary and execute people under it.
All 11 death sentences were commuted to life without the possibility of release.
Pre-Abolition Aggravating Factors
Before abolition, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-46a defined the aggravating factors that could lead to a death sentence. These included murder committed during the commission of a felony, murder of a law enforcement officer, murder for hire, murder involving kidnapping, and multiple murders. Several of these categories, such as murder of a law enforcement officer, murder for hire, murder of a kidnapped person, and multiple murders, now appear in § 53a-54b as murder with special circumstances, a separate offense that carries mandatory life without the possibility of release rather than death.
Last Execution
Connecticut's last execution took place on May 13, 2005, when Michael Ross was put to death by lethal injection at Osborn Correctional Institution. Ross, a serial killer convicted of murdering four young women, dropped his appeals and was considered a "volunteer" execution. He was the first person executed in New England since 1960.
Notable Cases
The Cheshire Home Invasion: Hayes and Komisarjevsky
The Cheshire home invasion of July 23, 2007, is one of the most notorious criminal cases in Connecticut history and played a significant role in the death penalty debate.
Steven Hayes and Joshua Komisarjevsky invaded the Petit family home in Cheshire, Connecticut. Over the course of several hours, they assaulted Dr. William Petit, sexually assaulted his wife Jennifer Hawke-Petit and their 11-year-old daughter Michaela, and set the house on fire. Jennifer, Michaela, and 17-year-old Hayley Petit died. Dr. Petit survived.
Both defendants were convicted of capital felony, murder, sexual assault, kidnapping, robbery, burglary, and arson. Both received death sentences: Hayes in 2010, Komisarjevsky in 2011.
The Cheshire case became central to the death penalty debate in Connecticut. Opponents of abolition pointed to it as the clearest justification for capital punishment. Supporters of abolition argued that the case was being used to maintain a broken system that disproportionately affected people of color and was applied arbitrarily.
Following State v. Santiago in 2015, both Hayes and Komisarjevsky had their death sentences commuted to life without the possibility of release. Dr. Petit, who later became a state legislator, was a vocal opponent of abolition and the Santiago decision.
State v. Santiago (2015)
Eduardo Santiago was convicted of a 2000 gang-related murder in Hartford. He was sentenced to death in 2005. His case became the vehicle through which the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled the death penalty unconstitutional under the state constitution.
The decision was groundbreaking because it used the state's own legislative action, the 2012 prospective repeal, as evidence that capital punishment no longer served a legitimate purpose. It established a framework that other states considering abolition have examined closely.
Fotis Dulos
Fotis Dulos was charged with the 2019 murder of his estranged wife, Jennifer Dulos, in a case that drew national media attention. The case involved allegations of a carefully planned murder and elaborate cover-up during a contentious divorce and custody battle.
Before standing trial, Fotis Dulos died by suicide on January 30, 2020, after attempting to take his own life with carbon monoxide poisoning in his garage. He had been free on $6 million bond. Two co-defendants, Michelle Troconis and Kent Mawhinney, faced separate trials. Troconis was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder and other charges in 2024.
The Dulos case never resulted in a life sentence but remains one of Connecticut's most prominent modern criminal cases and raised significant questions about pretrial release procedures.
Recent Legislative Changes
| Year | Change |
|---|---|
| 2015 | State v. Santiago: CT Supreme Court retroactively abolishes death penalty; all death sentences commuted to LWOP |
| 2012 | Public Act 12-5: Death penalty abolished prospectively; LWOP becomes maximum sentence |
| 2005 | Last execution in Connecticut (Michael Ross) |
Connecticut has not enacted major changes to its life sentence structure in recent years. The 60-year term remains the framework, and adult murder convictions remain parole-ineligible under § 54-125a(b)(1). Legislative efforts have focused more broadly on criminal justice reform, including bail reform, police accountability, and reentry programs.
The state has also expanded earned risk reduction credits and programming opportunities for incarcerated individuals, which can affect the timeline for parole eligibility for some offenders, though the impact on life-sentenced prisoners is limited for the most serious offenses.
Juvenile Life Sentences
Connecticut has banned juvenile life without parole (JLWOP). The state was among the earlier adopters of this reform, consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Miller v. Alabama (2012) that mandatory LWOP for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment.
Connecticut law requires that juveniles convicted of serious offenses receive individualized sentencing that accounts for their youth, capacity for change, and rehabilitative potential. The state's juvenile justice system emphasizes rehabilitation over punishment.
Under Connecticut's "Raise the Age" legislation, the state also raised the age of juvenile court jurisdiction. This means that younger offenders are more likely to be handled within the juvenile system rather than being automatically transferred to adult court.
For those rare cases where a juvenile is tried as an adult for murder, the sentence must allow for a meaningful opportunity for release. Under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-125a(f), a juvenile offender serving a sentence of more than 50 years, which includes the 60-year murder term, becomes parole-eligible after 30 years, not 25. A 60-year sentence imposed on a 16-year-old would make the individual eligible for a parole hearing at age 46, meeting the constitutional standard for a meaningful opportunity.
Historical Context
Connecticut's history with severe sentencing has evolved considerably over the past several decades.
Colonial era: Connecticut was among the original colonies that applied the death penalty for a range of offenses, including murder, treason, and certain religious crimes. The state's Puritan legal code imposed capital punishment more broadly than modern sensibilities would consider appropriate.
20th century: Connecticut used the death penalty sparingly compared to southern states. Between 1894 and 2005, the state executed only nine people. In Furman v. Georgia (1972), the U.S. Supreme Court held that imposing and carrying out the death penalty in the cases before it was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. When the Court decided Gregg v. Georgia (1976), holding that the punishment of death does not invariably violate the Constitution, it listed Connecticut among at least 35 states whose legislatures had already enacted new death penalty statutes in response to Furman.
The abolition era: The movement to abolish the death penalty in Connecticut gained momentum in the 2000s. A bill to repeal capital punishment passed the legislature in 2009 but was vetoed by Governor M. Jodi Rell. When Governor Dannel Malloy took office in 2011, he signaled support for repeal, and the legislature passed Public Act 12-5 in 2012.
Post-abolition: Connecticut became the 17th state to abolish the death penalty. The Santiago decision in 2015 made it one of the few states where judicial action extended legislative abolition retroactively. Since then, the former death row at Northern Correctional Institution has been emptied. Northern Correctional, Connecticut's only supermax facility, was closed entirely in 2021.
Connecticut Life Sentence at a Glance
| Category | Details |
|---|---|
| Life sentence definition | 60-year term (§ 53a-35b) |
| Parole eligibility (adult) | None: murder is parole-ineligible under § 54-125a(b)(1); only clemency or appeal |
| Parole eligibility (juvenile offender) | 30 years into a 60-year sentence, under § 54-125a(f) |
| LWOP available | Yes |
| Death penalty | Abolished (2012 prospectively; 2015 retroactively) |
| Last execution | 2005 (Michael Ross) |
| Key abolition case | State v. Santiago (2015) |
| JLWOP banned | Yes |
| Key murder statute | Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-54a |
| Parole authority | CT Board of Pardons and Paroles |
| Former death row inmates | 11 (all commuted to LWOP) |
Related Pages
- How Long Is a Life Sentence? State-by-State Guide
- Murder Sentencing Guidelines for Every State
- What Is Capital Murder?
- How Long Is a Life Sentence in New York?
- How Long Is a Life Sentence in Massachusetts?
Frequently Asked Questions
How long is a life sentence in Connecticut?
In Connecticut, a life sentence is defined as a 60-year term. An adult convicted of murder is not parole-eligible at all; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-125a(b)(1) bars parole for murder committed on or after July 1, 1981, so the 60-year term is served in full absent executive clemency or a successful appeal. Only an offender who was under 18 at the time of the offense can become parole-eligible, after 30 years on a 60-year sentence. Life without the possibility of release (LWOP) means the person will never be eligible for parole under any circumstance.
Does Connecticut have the death penalty?
No. Connecticut abolished the death penalty prospectively in 2012 through Public Act 12-5 and retroactively in 2015 through the Connecticut Supreme Court's ruling in State v. Santiago. All 11 former death row inmates had their sentences commuted to life without the possibility of release. The last execution in Connecticut was in 2005.
What happened to the Cheshire home invasion killers?
Steven Hayes and Joshua Komisarjevsky were both sentenced to death for the 2007 Cheshire home invasion that killed Jennifer Hawke-Petit and her daughters Hayley and Michaela. After the Connecticut Supreme Court retroactively abolished the death penalty in State v. Santiago (2015), both sentences were commuted to life without the possibility of release.
Can a juvenile get life without parole in Connecticut?
No. Connecticut has banned juvenile life without parole (JLWOP). Juveniles convicted of serious offenses must receive individualized sentencing that accounts for their youth and capacity for rehabilitation, consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Miller v. Alabama (2012).
How does parole work for life sentences in Connecticut?
For an adult, it does not; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-125a(b)(1) makes murder committed on or after July 1, 1981 parole-ineligible, so a 60-year sentence is served in full absent executive clemency or a successful appeal. The only parole path is for an offender who was under 18 at the time of the offense, who becomes eligible after 30 years on a 60-year sentence. When parole applies, the Connecticut Board of Pardons and Paroles considers the nature of the offense, institutional conduct, program participation, risk assessment, and victim input; eligibility does not guarantee release.
Updates
Corrected the descriptions of Furman v. Georgia and Gregg v. Georgia: Furman struck down the death sentences in the cases before the Court rather than declaring the death penalty unconstitutional nationwide, and Gregg lists Connecticut among the states that had already enacted new death penalty statutes after Furman.
Punctuation restored where an automated edit had produced comma splices.
Corrected which statute defines a Connecticut life sentence as 60 years (§ 53a-35b), updated § 53a-54b to reflect current law on murder with special circumstances and its mandatory life without release, and corrected the penalty for aggravated sexual assault in the first degree.
Corrected the central parole-eligibility claim: an adult convicted of murder in Connecticut is not parole-eligible at all (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-125a(b)(1) bars parole for murder committed on or after July 1, 1981), so the 60-year 'life' sentence is served in full absent clemency or a successful appeal; the only parole path is for offenders who were under 18 at the time of the offense, who become eligible after 30 years on a 60-year sentence (not 25, as the page previously stated). Also fixed a dead Public Act 12-5 citation link.
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources; governing law re-checked for recent changes
Reviewed and approved by an editor
The Law Behind This Article
This article rests on the statutory provisions below, held in our own legal record and retrieved from the official source. Tap a section to read the operative text.
Connecticut General Statutes, Title 53a (Penal Code), Chapter 952
§ 53a-35b“Life imprisonment” defined.In force
A sentence of life imprisonment means a definite sentence of sixty years, unless the sentence is life imprisonment without the possibility of release, imposed pursuant to subparagraph (A) or (B) of subdivision (1) of section 53a-35a, in which case the sentence shall be imprisonment for the remainder of the defendant's natural life.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-24 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at cga.ct.gov
§ 53a-54aMurder.In forcecited in 2 of our articles
(a) A person is guilty of murder when, with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person or causes a suicide by force, duress or deception; except that in any prosecution under this subsection, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be, provided nothing contained in this subsection shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime. (b) Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease, mental defect or other mental abnormality is admissible, in a prosecution under subsection (a) of this section, on the question of whether the defendant acted with intent to cause the death of another person.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-23 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at cga.ct.gov
Cited in 1,490 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. Sivri (Supreme Court of Connecticut 1994, 231 Conn. 115)“…nviction, following a jury trial, of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a. 2 The defendant claims that the trial…”
- State v. Cobb (Supreme Court of Connecticut 1999, 251 Conn. 285)“…eneral Statutes § 53a-70 (a); 5 (4) murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a; 6 and (5) two counts of capital felon…”
- State v. Chicano (Supreme Court of Connecticut 1990, 216 Conn. 699)“…three counts of the crime of mur *701 der in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), 2 one count of the crime of capit…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Wrongful Death Laws in Connecticut (2026): Deadlines
§ 53a-35aImprisonment for felony committed on or after July 1, 1981. Definite sentence. Authorized term.In forcecited in 6 of our articles
For any felony committed on or after July 1, 1981, the sentence of imprisonment shall be a definite sentence and, unless the section of the general statutes that defines or provides the penalty for the crime specifically provides otherwise, the term shall be fixed by the court as follows: (1) (A) For a capital felony committed prior to April 25, 2012, under the provisions of section 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012, a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of release unless a sentence of death is imposed in accordance with section 53a-46a, or (B) for the class A felony of murder with special circumstances committed on or after April 25, 2012, under the provisions of section 53a-54b in effect on or after April 25, 2012, a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of release; (2) For the class A felony of murder, a term not less than twenty-five years nor more than life; (3) For the class A felony of aggravated sexual assault of a minor under section 53a-70c, a term not less than twenty-five years or more than fifty years; (4) For a class A felony other than an offense specified in subdivision (2) or (3) of this section, a term not less than ten years…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at cga.ct.gov
Cited in 164 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. Salamon (Supreme Court of Connecticut 2008, 287 Conn. 509)“…a portion of which sentence may not be suspended. [20] See General Statutes §§ 53a-35a and 53a-94 (b). Since 1977, we have h…”
- State v. Webb (Supreme Court of Connecticut 1996, 238 Conn. 389)“…imprisonment without the possibility of release pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-35a (l). 68 Pursuant to this review, “[t]h…”
- State v. Collins (Supreme Court of Connecticut 2011, 299 Conn. 567)“…2001); and is subject to the same sentencing provision; see General Statutes § 53a-35a; 41 the trial court’s canvass did not…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Connecticut Hit and Run Laws: Penalties and What to Do, Connecticut AI Meeting Recording Laws (2026), Connecticut Embezzlement Laws: Larceny, Forgery and Penalties
§ 53a-54cFelony murder.In force
A person is guilty of murder when, acting either alone or with one or more persons, such person commits or attempts to commit robbery, home invasion, burglary, kidnapping, sexual assault in the first degree, aggravated sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the third degree, sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm, escape in the first degree, or escape in the second degree and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of flight therefrom, such person, or another participant, if any, causes the death of a person other than one of the participants, except that in any prosecution under this section, in which the defendant was not the only participant in the underlying crime, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant: (1) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause or aid the commission thereof; and (2) was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any dangerous instrument; and (3) had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon or instrument; and (4) had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at cga.ct.gov
Cited in 448 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Lozada v. Warden, State Prison (Supreme Court of Connecticut 1992, 223 Conn. 834)“…leaded guilty to the crime of felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c 1 and, *836 on December 9, 1983,…”
- State v. Jones (Supreme Court of Connecticut 1984, 193 Conn. 70)“…nt on February 22,1979, with felony murder, in violation of General Statutes §53a-54c. 1 The jury returned a verdict of guil…”
- State v. Hernandez (Supreme Court of Connecticut 1987, 204 Conn. 377)“…nd charged with the crimes of felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c, arson in the first degree in violation…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
§ 53a-54bMurder with special circumstances.In force
A person is guilty of murder with special circumstances who is convicted of any of the following and was eighteen years of age or older at the time of the offense: (1) Murder of a member of the Division of State Police within the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection or of any local police department, a chief inspector or inspector in the Division of Criminal Justice, a state marshal who is exercising authority granted under any provision of the general statutes, a judicial marshal in performance of the duties of a judicial marshal, a constable who performs criminal law enforcement duties, a special policeman appointed under section 29-18, a conservation officer or special conservation officer appointed by the Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection under the provisions of section 26-5, an employee of the Department of Correction or a person providing services on behalf of said department when such employee or person is acting within the scope of such employee's or person's employment or duties in a correctional institution or facility and the actor is confined in such institution or facility, or any firefighter, while such victim was acting within the…
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at cga.ct.gov
Cited in 144 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2021
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. Reynolds (Supreme Court of Connecticut 2003, 264 Conn. 1)“…the second proprietor could receive the death penalty; see General Statutes § 53a-54b (8) (murder of two or more persons at s…”
- State v. Ross (Supreme Court of Connecticut 1994, 230 Conn. 183)“…efendant of six counts of capital felony 2 in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54b. 3 At a separate sentencing hearing pu…”
- State v. Webb (Supreme Court of Connecticut 1996, 238 Conn. 389)“…he judgment of conviction of capital felony in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54b (5), 2 of murder *393 in violation of…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
§ 53a-46aImposition of sentence for capital felony committed prior to April 25, 2012. Hearing. Special verdict. Mitigating and aggravating factors. Factors barring death sentence.In force
(a) A person shall be subjected to the penalty of death for a capital felony committed prior to April 25, 2012, under the provisions of section 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012, only if (1) a hearing is held in accordance with the provisions of this section, and (2) such person was eighteen years of age or older at the time the offense was committed. (b) For the purpose of determining the sentence to be imposed when a defendant is convicted of or pleads guilty to a capital felony, the judge or judges who presided at the trial or before whom the guilty plea was entered shall conduct a separate hearing to determine the existence of any mitigating factor concerning the defendant's character, background and history, or the nature and circumstances of the crime, and any aggravating factor set forth in subsection (i) of this section. Such hearing shall not be held if the state stipulates that none of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section exists or that any factor set forth in subsection (h) of this section exists.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at cga.ct.gov
Cited in 88 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2021
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. Reynolds (Supreme Court of Connecticut 2003, 264 Conn. 1)“…63 tencing statutes. As we explained in Ross , “[i]n General Statutes §§ 53a-46a through 53a-46c, the legislature has es…”
- State v. Ross (Supreme Court of Connecticut 1994, 230 Conn. 183)“…54b. 3 At a separate sentencing hearing pur *189 suant to General Statutes § 53a-46a, 4 the same jury considered further ev…”
- State v. Webb (Supreme Court of Connecticut 1996, 238 Conn. 389)“…court conducted a separate sentencing hearing, pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-46a, 10 before the *396 same jury. The ju…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
§ 53a-70aAggravated sexual assault in the first degree: Class B or A felony.In force
(a) A person is guilty of aggravated sexual assault in the first degree when such person commits sexual assault in the first degree as provided in section 53a-70, and in the commission of such offense (1) such person uses or is armed with and threatens the use of or displays or represents by such person's words or conduct that such person possesses a deadly weapon, (2) with intent to disfigure the victim seriously and permanently, or to destroy, amputate or disable permanently a member or organ of the victim's body, such person causes such injury to such victim, (3) under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life such person recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of death to the victim, and thereby causes serious physical injury to such victim, or (4) such person is aided by two or more other persons actually present. No person shall be convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and aggravated sexual assault in the first degree upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at cga.ct.gov
Cited in 49 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2021
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- State v. Sandoval (Supreme Court of Connecticut 2003, 263 Conn. 524)“…ed sexual assault in the first degree *527 in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-70a (a) (2) 1 2and 53a-49 (a) (2), 2 sexu…”
- State v. Shockley (Supreme Court of Connecticut 1982, 188 Conn. 697)“…assault in the first degree with a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70a and burglary in the second degree with…”
- State v. Scott (Supreme Court of Connecticut 2001, 256 Conn. 517)“…gravated sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70a (a) (1) 1 and attempted sexual assault…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Connecticut General Statutes, Title 54 (Criminal Procedure), Chapter 961
§ 54-125aParole of inmate serving sentence of more than two years. Eligibility. Hearing to determine suitability for parole release of certain inmates.In forcecited in 2 of our articles
(a) A person convicted of one or more crimes who is incarcerated on or after October 1, 1990, who received a definite sentence or total effective sentence of more than two years, and who has been confined under such sentence or sentences for not less than one-half of the total effective sentence less any risk reduction credit earned under the provisions of section 18-98e or one-half of the most recent sentence imposed by the court less any risk reduction credit earned under the provisions of section 18-98e, whichever is greater, may be allowed to go at large on parole (1) in accordance with the provisions of section 54-125i, or (2) in the discretion of a panel of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, if (A) it appears from all available information, including any reports from the Commissioner of Correction that the panel may require, that there is a reasonable probability that such inmate will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and (B) such release is not incompatible with the welfare of society.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at cga.ct.gov
Cited in 98 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction (Supreme Court of Connecticut 2002, 258 Conn. 804)“…95-255, § 1. Public Act 95-255, § 1, which is codified at General Statutes § 54-125a (b), provides in relevant part: “(2) A…”
- Gilchrist v. Commissioner of Correction (Supreme Court of Connecticut 2020, 334 Conn. 548)“…te sentences for the ‘‘other’’ charges pursuant to General Statutes § 54-125a (b) (2) (B).3 On Ju…”
- State v. Williams-Bey (Supreme Court of Connecticut 2019, 333 Conn. 468)“…No. 15-84 of the 2015 Public Acts (P.A. 15-84), codified at General Statutes § 54-125a, has the possibil- ity of parole after…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Connecticut Jury Duty Laws: Pay, Exemptions and Employer Rules
Sources and References
- Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-54a(cga.ct.gov).gov
- Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-54c(cga.ct.gov).gov
- Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-54b(cga.ct.gov).gov
- Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-70a(cga.ct.gov).gov
- Connecticut Board of Pardons and Paroles(portal.ct.gov).gov
- Public Act 12-5(cga.ct.gov).gov
- State v. Santiago(scholar.google.com)
- Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-46a(cga.ct.gov).gov
- *Miller v. Alabama*(law.cornell.edu).gov
- CT Board of Pardons and Paroles — Parole Eligibility Info(portal.ct.gov).gov
- Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-35b (life imprisonment defined)(cga.ct.gov)
- Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-35a (felony sentence terms)(cga.ct.gov)