Statute of Limitations on Debt: The 50-State Payment-Revival Table
Independently fact-checked against primary sources (last audited August 12, 2026). · 7 primary sources cited on this page. How we verify our legal content
A debt does not disappear when its statute of limitations runs out. What disappears is the collector's ability to win a lawsuit over it. That single distinction, between a debt going legally uncollectible-through-court and a debt ceasing to exist, is the most misunderstood idea in consumer debt collection, and it cuts both ways: readers who think an old debt is worthless to a collector are wrong, and readers who think a collector calling about old debt is automatically breaking the law are also wrong.
Every state sets its own statute of limitations (SOL) for debt, typically 3 to 10 years depending on the state and the type of debt, and every state also has its own rule for whether a payment or a signed acknowledgment can restart that clock. Those two variables, the length of the SOL and the state's revival rule, are what this page compresses into a single table so you do not have to read fifty separate statutes to find your state's answer.
What "Time-Barred" Actually Means
A statute of limitations is a deadline for filing a lawsuit, not a deadline for the debt's existence. Once the clock runs out on a particular debt, a collector or the original creditor can no longer sue you over it and win, and under federal Regulation F (discussed below) a debt collector is not even allowed to threaten to sue. That federal threat ban reaches debt collectors and debt buyers, not an original creditor still collecting its own account in its own name. But the underlying obligation is still real in every other sense: the collector can still call, still send letters, still ask you to pay voluntarily, and can still report the debt to a credit bureau if it has not aged off the credit report on its own separate schedule.
This matters because two very different mistakes both fail readers. The first is being scared into paying an old debt out of a belief that a lawsuit is imminent when the SOL has already expired and a suit is no longer legally available. The second is ignoring a debt entirely on the theory that the SOL "makes it go away," when in many states a single payment, or even a signed letter promising to pay, can restart the clock and put a lawsuit back on the table.
The Credit-Report Conflation: Two Clocks, Not One
The single most common source of confusion is treating the statute of limitations and the credit-reporting period as the same thing. They are not, and they run independently.
The state SOL governs how long a creditor or collector has to file and win a lawsuit. It varies by state and by the type of debt, generally landing somewhere between three and ten years, occasionally longer for notes or judgments.
The credit-reporting period is federal and separate. Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, most negative information, including accounts placed for collection or charged off, generally must come off a credit report seven years after the reporting clock starts, regardless of what any state's statute of limitations says. That clock does not start on the date of the original delinquency itself: 15 U.S.C. section 1681c(c)(1) starts the seven-year period 180 days after the delinquency begins, which puts the true outer limit closer to seven and a half years from the original delinquency than a flat seven.
Because these clocks are unrelated, all four combinations happen in real life. A debt can still be inside its statute of limitations while it has already aged off the credit report. A debt can be fully off the credit report while a collector can still sue over it in a state with a longer SOL. A debt can be time-barred for lawsuit purposes while still showing up on a credit report if it has not yet hit the seven-year mark. And a debt can be both time-barred and off the report at the same time. Neither clock controls the other, and a collector telling you a debt "just fell off your credit report so the SOL must be up" (or the reverse) is describing something that is not how either law works.
Reg F: Suing or Threatening to Sue on Time-Barred Debt Is Flatly Banned
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's Regulation F, effective 2021, addresses the lawsuit side of old debt directly. Its text is short: "A debt collector must not bring or threaten to bring a legal action against a consumer to collect a time-barred debt. This paragraph (b) does not apply to proofs of claim filed in connection with a bankruptcy proceeding" (12 CFR 1006.26(b)). The rule defines a time-barred debt as one for which the applicable statute of limitations has expired, and as written the prohibition carries no knowledge or intent qualifier, meaning the bar applies to the act of suing or threatening to sue itself, not to whether the collector believed the debt was still within the window. The bankruptcy proof of claim is the one exception written into the rule itself: filing a proof of claim on a time-barred debt in a bankruptcy case is not covered by this prohibition.
What Reg F does not do is ban collection contact on time-barred debt. Calls, letters, and requests for voluntary payment on an old debt remain legal; only the threat or filing of a lawsuit is off limits once the debt is time-barred. The separate FDCPA ban on false or misleading representations (15 U.S.C. section 1692e) reinforces this: misrepresenting the legal status of a debt, including implying a lawsuit is possible when it is not, is independently prohibited.
Reg F also binds a narrower set of parties than many readers assume. The rule reaches a "debt collector," which 12 CFR 1006.2 defines as a person whose principal purpose is the collection of debts or who regularly collects debts owed or due to another, and that definition expressly excludes any officer or employee of a creditor while the officer or employee is collecting debts for the creditor in the creditor's name. An original creditor that still holds your old account and collects it under its own name is therefore not subject to 12 CFR 1006.26(b) at all. Your state's statute of limitations still defeats any lawsuit it files, but the federal ban on threatening to sue does not reach it. Reg F does apply once the account has been placed with a third-party collection agency or sold to a debt buyer, and it also applies to a creditor that collects its own debts under a name other than its own.
Does Partial Payment Restart the Clock? The State-by-State Revival Table
This is the highest-stakes question on this page, and it has no single national answer. Some states let a bare payment on an old debt restart the entire limitations period with no writing involved, meaning a $5 goodwill payment on a debt that is 29 years and 11 months old can hand the collector a brand-new multi-year window to sue. Other states require a signed written acknowledgment before anything revives. A smaller group of states have gone the other direction entirely and now bar revival altogether once a debt is time-barred, no matter what the consumer says, signs, or pays.
The table below sorts every state into these tracks based on that state's current statute and, where the statute is silent, notes it honestly as an open question rather than guessing. Because several states split the rule between "payment restarts the clock" and "only a signed writing counts as acknowledgment," the two are listed as separate columns.
The table below covers 9 states in the Northeast.
| State | Does payment alone restart the clock? | Is a signed writing required to revive? | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Connecticut | No, for debt purchased by a debt buyer | Not applicable, anti-revival applies regardless of writing | Scoped to purchased consumer debt; original-creditor debt follows different rules |
| Maine | Unverified | Unverified | No revival statute located |
| Massachusetts | Yes, if provable independent of the creditor's own record | Writing required only for a bare acknowledgment or promise | A written notation of payment made by the creditor alone is not enough proof |
| New Hampshire | Likely, under common law | Unclear | No revival statute; based on case-law doctrine |
| New Jersey | Unclear whether payment alone is enough | Yes, per statute | Whether bare payment also revives is an open question |
| New York | No, for consumer credit debt | Yes, for other debt types | Consumer Credit Fairness Act bars revival entirely on consumer credit |
| Pennsylvania | Unresolved | Unresolved | No revival statute; governed by case-law doctrine |
| Rhode Island | Unverified | Unverified | No revival statute located |
| Vermont | Yes | Yes, for acknowledgment | Both mechanisms exist side by side |
The table below covers 12 states in the Midwest.
| State | Does payment alone restart the clock? | Is a signed writing required to revive? | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Illinois | Only if made in writing | Yes | A verbal or unwritten payment does not restart the clock |
| Indiana | Unverified | Unverified | Primary source blocked this session; treat as varies/unverified |
| Iowa | No | Yes | Payment alone does not revive under the statute's text |
| Kansas | Yes | Only for acknowledgment or promise, not for payment | Payment needs no writing at all |
| Michigan | Unclear whether payment alone counts as acknowledgment | Yes, for acknowledgment | Statute has no separate part-payment clause |
| Minnesota | Likely, common-law effect preserved | Yes, for acknowledgment | Precise mechanics not fully settled |
| Missouri | Yes | Only for acknowledgment or promise | Payment needs no writing |
| Nebraska | Yes | Only for acknowledgment or promise | Payment needs no writing |
| North Dakota | Yes | Only for acknowledgment | Payment needs no writing |
| Ohio | Yes | Yes, either one restarts the clock | Payment or a signed acknowledgment both work independently |
| South Dakota | Likely, effect preserved | Yes, for acknowledgment | Exact mechanics of a bare payment not fully confirmed |
| Wisconsin | No | Not applicable | The debt itself is extinguished at expiration, not merely time-barred |
The table below covers 16 states in the South, plus the District of Columbia.
| State | Does payment alone restart the clock? | Is a signed writing required to revive? | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alabama | Yes, but only before the original period expires | Writing required for acknowledgment/promise (payment alone is enough on its own) | Ala. Code 6-2-16 |
| Arkansas | Yes | Written acknowledgment also works | Ark. Code 16-56-111(b) |
| Delaware | Varies, unverified | Unverified | No revival statute located; treat as open question |
| District of Columbia | No | Not applicable | Payment or affirmation after expiration does not extend the period |
| Florida | No | Yes, required | Payment alone is not enough |
| Georgia | Only if entered on written evidence of the debt or paired with a written acknowledgment | Effectively yes | A bare payment on an oral account is not a statutory revival |
| Kentucky | Unverified | Unverified | No statutory revival provision located; described only in secondary sources |
| Louisiana | Acknowledgment "interrupts" and restarts the period | Unclear if oral acknowledgment is enough | Uses "interruption," not the common-law revival vocabulary |
| Maryland | No, for any creditor | Not applicable | Payment or affirmation after expiration never revives, by statute |
| Mississippi | No, once already time-barred (a pre-expiry payment is just an ordinary clock reset, not revival) | Only after expiration, for a new promise | The debt itself is extinguished at expiration; only a new signed promise creates fresh liability afterward |
| North Carolina | Yes | Only for acknowledgment | Statute expressly preserves payment's restart effect |
| Oklahoma | Likely, on a plain-text reading, but unconfirmed against case law | Only for acknowledgment or promise | The signed-writing requirement grammatically attaches to an acknowledgment or promise, not to payment, so a plain-text reading suggests payment alone restarts the clock, but that has not been confirmed against Oklahoma case law |
| South Carolina | Yes | Unclear | Part payment alone revives the period |
| Tennessee | Unverified | Unverified | Primary source access blocked this session |
| Texas | No, for debt bought by a debt buyer | Yes, for an original creditor | Debt buyers can never revive; original creditors need a signed writing |
| Virginia | Not confirmed as sufficient alone | Yes | Statute centers on a signed writing |
| West Virginia | Unresolved | Yes, for a new promise | Statute is silent on payment alone |
The table below covers 13 states in the West.
| State | Does payment alone restart the clock? | Is a signed writing required to revive? | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alaska | Yes, by statute | Written acknowledgment also works | Whether this applies to an already-expired debt is unresolved in the statute's text |
| Arizona | Unclear, statute is silent on payment | Yes, for acknowledgment | Do not assume payment alone revives; case law unconfirmed |
| California | No, once the debt is already time-barred | Signed writing needed while the clock is still running | Statutorily bars suit and arbitration on time-barred debt; stronger than Reg F |
| Colorado | Varies, unverified | Unverified | No revival statute located; treat as open question |
| Hawaii | Likely, under case law | Unclear | No current revival statute confirmed; treat as an open question |
| Idaho | Yes, even an unwritten payment | No | Payment alone is treated as equivalent to a new signed promise |
| Montana | Yes | Only for acknowledgment | Payment needs no writing |
| Nevada | Yes | No | Broadest payment-alone rule; no writing requirement anywhere |
| New Mexico | Yes | No | Confirmed through a state regulation's required consumer-disclosure language |
| Oregon | Yes | Yes, for acknowledgment | Both mechanisms exist side by side |
| Utah | Yes, even a third party's payment | No | Broad statutory payment-restart rule |
| Washington | No, once already time-barred (a pre-expiry payment is just an ordinary clock reset, not revival) | Yes, same before-expiration limit | Nothing revives an already-time-barred Washington debt |
| Wyoming | Yes, possibly even after expiration | Unclear | Case law on the post-expiration question is unconfirmed; treat with caution |
Read this table by category, not just by row. States fall into a handful of real groups: states where the debt itself legally dies at expiration (Mississippi, Wisconsin); states with a hard anti-revival rule that survives any payment or writing (Maryland, New York's consumer-credit track, Connecticut's purchased-debt track, Texas's debt-buyer track, the District of Columbia); states where only a signed writing revives a time-barred debt (Florida, Iowa, Illinois, Virginia, and others); and the largest group, states where a bare payment with no writing at all can restart the whole period (Kansas, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and roughly a dozen more). A handful of states are honest gaps in the published record, no revival statute has been located, and this page will not guess at what a court might rule.
Why the Type of Debt Changes the Answer
The SOL "for debt" in a given state is rarely a single number. States commonly split contract claims into separate buckets, written contracts, oral or open accounts, and promissory notes or negotiable instruments, and each bucket can carry its own period within the same state. A credit card balance is frequently litigated as either a written contract or an open account depending on whether the creditor produces a signed cardmember agreement, and the two characterizations can carry different limitations periods in the same state. A signed promissory note is usually governed by that state's enactment of UCC Article 3 rather than its general contract statute, which is why note periods often diverge sharply from credit-card periods, for example Iowa gives negotiable notes a materially different treatment than its general contract statute, Maine gives a witnessed note 20 years, Vermont gives one 14 years, and Maryland gives a note under seal 12 years while an ordinary note runs 6. A handful of states, including Hawaii, North Dakota, and Ohio's consumer-transaction carve-out, collapse everything into one uniform period regardless of whether the underlying obligation was written, oral, or an open account, which is the exception rather than the rule nationally.
The practical consequence: do not assume that because you found "your state's SOL" as one number online, that number governs the specific debt you have. A collector suing on old debt sometimes characterizes it favorably, arguing for whichever bucket carries the longer period, and knowing which bucket actually applies to your debt type is often the difference between a live claim and a time-barred one.
What To Do When a Collector Calls About Old Debt
Find out how old the debt actually is before you say or send anything. The clock generally runs from the date of the last payment or the last charge, not from when the account was opened, so a debt that looks old at a glance may be more recent than it seems, or vice versa.
Do not assume a small "good faith" payment is harmless. In a payment-alone-revives state, even a token payment can hand the collector a fresh limitations period on the entire remaining balance, not just the amount paid. In a state that requires a signed writing, an unwritten and unsigned payment by itself generally will not revive the debt, though the safer course is still not to pay or promise anything on a debt you have not confirmed is within the window.
Do not assume ignoring the debt is risk-free either. If the debt is still within its statute of limitations, a collector or the original creditor can still sue and, if you fail to respond to that lawsuit, can win a default judgment regardless of how weak the underlying debt might have been. A default judgment opens far more aggressive collection tools, including wage garnishment and bank account levies, than the debt collector had before suing. Silence is not a defense; it forfeits one.
If a collector sues you on a debt you believe is time-barred, the expiration of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense you generally must raise yourself, a court will not apply it automatically on your behalf. Responding to the lawsuit and raising the time-barred defense is very different from ignoring it and hoping the case goes away.
If you are unsure whether your state's rule allows payment to revive a debt, that uncertainty is itself a reason to get the exact date of last activity and your state's specific SOL and revival rule confirmed before making any payment, written acknowledgment, or promise, however small.
Information last verified on 2026-08-12. This article has not yet been reviewed by a licensed lawyer.
Related Resources
For state-specific detail, including your state's exact wage-garnishment cap and repossession rules alongside its debt SOL, see debt collection laws by state. If a collector is threatening your paycheck, how to stop wage garnishment covers the exemption and default-judgment process. If a vehicle is at risk, see car repossession laws, and if Social Security or another federal benefit is involved, see can Social Security be garnished. Individual state deep dives are available for Texas, Wisconsin, Ohio, and California, four states that fall into different revival categories above. If unmanageable debt is the bigger issue regardless of what is time-barred, bankruptcy laws by state explain how the automatic stay stops collection entirely while a case is pending.
Last updated: 2026-08-12.
Frequently Asked Questions
Does a debt disappear once the statute of limitations runs out?
No. A statute of limitations bars a lawsuit over the debt, not the debt's existence. A collector can still contact you and ask you to pay a time-barred debt; federal Regulation F only prohibits a debt collector from suing or threatening to sue on it.
Is the statute of limitations the same as the 7-year credit report rule?
No, they are two separate and unrelated clocks. The statute of limitations governs how long a creditor can sue, and it varies by state. The credit-reporting period is federal, generally seven years from the original delinquency under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and runs independently of any state's lawsuit deadline.
Can a collector sue me on a debt that is past the statute of limitations?
They should not. Regulation F bans a debt collector from bringing or threatening a lawsuit on a time-barred debt, and the rule's only stated exception is a proof of claim filed in a bankruptcy case. That federal ban binds third-party collectors and debt buyers rather than an original creditor collecting its own account in its own name, though your state's statute of limitations still defeats any suit either one files. If you are sued on old debt anyway, the expiration of the statute of limitations is a defense you generally must raise yourself in court.
Will making a small payment restart the clock on an old debt?
It depends entirely on your state. In many states, any payment, even a small one, restarts the full limitations period with no writing required. In others, only a signed written acknowledgment revives a time-barred debt, and in a few states nothing revives it once expired. Check your state's rule before paying anything on old debt.
Does the statute of limitations depend on the type of debt?
Yes. Many states set different limitations periods for written contracts, oral or open accounts, and promissory notes, and credit card debt in particular is sometimes characterized differently depending on whether a signed cardmember agreement exists. The number that applies can vary even within one state depending on which category your specific debt falls into.
What should I do if a collector calls about a debt I think is too old to be sued over?
Find out the exact date of last activity and confirm your state's statute of limitations and revival rule before making any payment or written acknowledgment. Avoid paying or promising to pay until you know whether that action could restart the clock in your state.
Updates
Corrected the description of federal Regulation F: the rule's ban on suing or threatening to sue on time-barred debt carries an express exception for bankruptcy proofs of claim, has no "knows or should know" element, and binds debt collectors rather than an original creditor collecting its own account in its own name.
Independently fact-checked against the cited primary sources
The Law Behind This Article
This article rests on the statutory provisions below, held in our own legal record and retrieved from the official source. Tap a section to read the operative text.
Code of Federal Regulations Title 12
§ 1006.26Collection of time-barred debts.In forcecited in 37 of our articles
(a) Definitions. For purposes of this section: (1) Statute of limitations means the period prescribed by applicable law for bringing a legal action against the consumer to collect a debt. (2) Time-barred debt means a debt for which the applicable statute of limitations has expired. (b) Legal actions and threats of legal actions prohibited. A debt collector must not bring or threaten to bring a legal action against a consumer to collect a time-barred debt. This paragraph (b) does not apply to proofs of claim filed in connection with a bankruptcy proceeding.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-02 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at ecfr.gov
Cited in 3 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2025
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Hanover v. Real Time Resolutions, Inc. (2024) dismissed FDCPA claims built on 12 CFR 1006.26(b), reasoning it bars only collection of time-barred debts and the loans at issue were not time barred. Raja v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (2025) dismissed a Regulation F claim because nonjudicial foreclosure is not covered by the FDCPA.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Hanover v. Real Time Resolutions, Inc. (District Court, S.D. Ohio 2024)✓A borrower claimed a servicer's letter and billing statement lacked language required by 12 CFR 1006.26(b); the court granted the servicer summary judgment, since the rule only bars collecting time-barred debts and it had already found her HELOC and mortgage enforceable.
- Raja v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (District Court, E.D. Virginia 2025)✓Pro se homeowners alleged a servicer and foreclosure attorneys pursued a time-barred, discharged second mortgage in violation of 12 CFR 1006.26(b); the court dismissed that claim, holding parties carrying out a nonjudicial foreclosure are not FDCPA debt collectors.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Idaho Debt Collection Laws: Garnishment Limits, Debt Deadlines, and Repossession, Maine Debt Collection Laws: Wage Garnishment, Statute of Limitations, and Repossession, Michigan Debt Collection Laws: Wage Garnishment, Statute of Limitations, and Repossession
United States Code Title 15
§ 1681cRequirements relating to information contained in consumer reportsIn forcecited in 55 of our articles
Except as authorized under subsection (b), no consumer reporting agency may make any consumer report containing any of the following items of information: Cases under title 11 or under the Bankruptcy Act that, from the date of entry of the order for relief or the date of adjudication, as the case may be, antedate the report by more than 10 years. Civil suits, civil judgments, and records of arrest that, from date of entry, antedate the report by more than seven years or until the governing statute of limitations has expired, whichever is the longer period. Paid tax liens which, from date of payment, antedate the report by more than seven years. Accounts placed for collection or charged to profit and loss which antedate the report by more than seven years. Any other adverse item of information, other than records of convictions of crimes which antedates the report by more than seven years.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-09-16 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 383 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Katz v. Donna Karan Co. (2017) addressed the FACTA truncation rule in 1681c(g) and affirmed dismissal for lack of Article III standing, treating material risk of harm as a fact question. Edward Seamans v. Temple University (2014) held the seven-year window in 1681c(a)(4) is extended for an education loan only until that loan is repaid.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Katz v. Donna Karan Co. (Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 2017, 872 F.3d 114)✓A shopper sued two stores whose receipts printed the first six digits of his credit card number; the Second Circuit affirmed dismissal for lack of standing, seeing no clear error in the finding that those digits show only the card issuer, not a material risk of identity theft.
- Edward Seamans v. Temple University (Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 2014, 744 F.3d 853)✓A defaulted university loan kept appearing on a borrower's credit reports after he repaid it because the school never reported the delinquency date; the Third Circuit held the Higher Education Act suspends section 1681c(a)(4)'s aging-off rule only until repayment.
- Gonzales v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC (Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 2011, 660 F.3d 1055)✓A debt buyer offered to settle health club debts over seven years old, saying that if it was reporting the account the bureaus would be told it was settled; the Ninth Circuit, treating those debts as unreportable under section 1681c(a)(4), called that implication misleading.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: How Long Does a Felony Stay on Your Record? (2026), Alabama Background Check Laws (2026 Guide), Louisiana Background Check Laws (2026 Guide)
§ 1692eFalse or misleading representationsIn forcecited in 10 of our articles
A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: The false representation or implication that the debt collector is vouched for, bonded by, or affiliated with the United States or any State, including the use of any badge, uniform, or facsimile thereof. The false representation of— the character, amount, or legal status of any debt; or any services rendered or compensation which may be lawfully received by any debt collector for the collection of a debt. The false representation or implication that any individual is an attorney or that any communication is from an attorney. The representation or implication that nonpayment of any debt will result in the arrest or imprisonment of any person or the seizure, garnishment, attachment, or sale of any property or wages of any person unless such action is lawful and the debt collector or creditor intends to take such action. The threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at uscode.house.gov
Cited in 3,533 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2026
In the courts (editorial summary, independently checked):Courts read Section 1692e through the least sophisticated consumer test. Christ Clomon v. Philip D. Jackson (1993) held that mass-mailed letters bearing an attorney signature, sent without file review, violated subsections (3) and (10); Gonzalez v. Kay (2009) held a back-page disclaimer did not defeat the claim on a motion to dismiss.
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P. (Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 2003, 321 F.3d 292)✓Debt letters went out on law firm letterhead after an attorney reviewed only a file showing the debt was outstanding; the Second Circuit held that merely being told by a client that a debt is overdue is not enough attorney involvement, and vacated summary judgment.
- William C. Lewis v. Acb Business Services, Inc., (96-3093/3498), American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. James P. Connors, (96-3498) (Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 1998, 135 F.3d 389)✓A collection letter told the debtor to contact 'M. Hall,' a name no employee at the agency actually used; the Sixth Circuit held the alias was not a false or deceptive means under 1692e(10) because the account had been assigned to a real representative and no harm was shown.
- Gonzalez v. Kay (Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 2009, 577 F.3d 600)✓A law firm collecting a $448.97 phone debt sent an unsigned letter on its letterhead with the disclaimer of attorney review only on the back; the Fifth Circuit held the least sophisticated consumer might think a lawyer was involved and reversed dismissal of the 1692e claim.
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Alabama Debt Collection Laws: Wage Garnishment, Statute of Limitations, and Repossession, Alaska Debt Collection Laws: Wage Garnishment, Statute of Limitations, and Repossession, Arizona Debt Collection Laws: The 10% Garnishment Cap, Statute of Limitations, and Repossession
Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article
§ 5-1202In forcecited in 2 of our articles
§5–1202. (a) A creditor or a collector may not initiate a consumer debt collection action after the expiration of the statute of limitations applicable to the consumer debt collection action. (b) (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any payment toward, written or oral affirmation of, or any other activity on the debt that occurs after the expiration of the statute of limitations applicable to the consumer debt collection action does not revive or extend the limitations period. (2) This subsection may not be interpreted to affect the statute of limitations applicable to a cause of action arising from a separate written agreement or written payment plan entered into by the debtor and the creditor or collector before the expiration of the statute of limitations applicable to the consumer debt collection action.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at mgaleg.maryland.gov
Cited in 1 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2022
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Shadrin v. Student Loan Solutions, LLC (District Court, D. Maryland 2022)“…olation of the FDCPA and MCDCA. 15 U.S.C. §1692e; see also Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-1202 (“A creditor or collector may not init…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Maryland Debt Collection Laws: Wage Garnishment, Statute of Limitations, and Repossession
Texas Finance Code
§ 392.307COLLECTION OF CERTAIN CONSUMER DEBT BY DEBT BUYERSIn forcecited in 3 of our articles
(a) In this section: (1) "Charged-off debt" means a consumer debt that a creditor has determined to be a loss or expense to the creditor instead of an asset. (2) "Debt buyer" means a person who purchases or otherwise acquires a consumer debt from a creditor or other subsequent owner of the consumer debt, regardless of whether the person collects the consumer debt, hires a third party to collect the consumer debt, or hires an attorney to pursue collection litigation in connection with the consumer debt. The term does not include: (A) a person who acquires in-default or charged-off debt that is incidental to the purchase of a portfolio that predominantly consists of consumer debt that has not been charged off; or (B) a check services company that acquires the right to collect on a paper or electronic negotiable instrument, including an Automated Clearing House (ACH) authorization to debit an account that has not been processed. (b) Unless otherwise expressly provided, this section prevails to the extent of any conflict between this section and any other law of this state.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-28 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at statutes.capitol.texas.gov
Also relied on in: Texas Debt Collection Laws: Protected Wages, Exposed Bank Accounts, Debt Collection Laws by State: Garnishment, SOL, and Repossession Rules
Wisconsin Statutes, Chapter 893: Limitations Of Commencement Of Actions And Proceedings; Procedure For Claims Against Governmental Units
§ 893.05Relation of statute of limitations to right and remedy.In forcecited in 2 of our articles
When the period within which an action may be commenced on a Wisconsin cause of action has expired, the right is extinguished as well as the remedy. Judicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This new section is a codification of Wisconsin case law. See Maryland Casualty Company v. Beleznay, 245 Wis. 390, 14 N.W.2d 177 (1944), in which it is stated at page 393: “In Wisconsin the running of the statute of limitations absolutely extinguishes the cause of action for in Wisconsin limitations are not treated as statutes of repose. The limitation of actions is a right as well as a remedy, extinguishing the right on one side and creating a right on the other, which is as of high dignity as regards judicial remedies as any other right and it is a right which enjoys constitutional protection”. [Bill 326-A]
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at docs.legis.wisconsin.gov
Cited in 11 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2020
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Wenke Ex Rel. Laufenberg v. Gehl Co. (Wisconsin Supreme Court 2004, 274 Wis. 2d 220)“…ion and statutes of repose alluded to in *260 the Note to Wis. Stat. § 893.05 has nothing to do with how the two con…”
- Town of Burnside v. City of Independence (Court of Appeals of Wisconsin 2016, 372 Wis. 2d 802)“…347, 373 , 531 N.W.2d 386 (Ct. App. 1995); see also Wis. Stat. § 893.05 ("When the period within which an acti…”
- Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson (Supreme Court of the United States 2017, 581 U.S. 224)“…limitations period extinguishes the remedy and the right); Wis. Stat. §893.05 (2011–2012) (same). Johnson argues t…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
Also relied on in: Wisconsin Debt Collection Laws: Expired Debt Dies and Repossession Needs Permission
Code of Alabama 1975, Title 6: Civil Practice.
§ 6-2-16Sufficiency of Partial Payment or Written Promise to Remove Bar.In forcecited in 2 of our articles
No act, promise, or acknowledgment is sufficient to remove the bar to an action created by the provisions of this chapter, nor is such evidence of a new and continuing contract, except a partial payment, made upon the contract by the party sought to be charged before the bar is complete or an unconditional promise in writing signed by the party to be charged thereby.
Official text (excerpt) · last checked 2026-07-29 · Read the full text in our law library · Verify at alison.legislature.state.al.us
Cited in 4 court opinions in our collectionLatest citing opinion in our collection: 2023
Opinions citing this section in our collection:
- Defco, Inc. v. Decatur Cylinder, Inc. (Supreme Court of Alabama 1992, 595 So. 2d 1329)“…ccount. Responding to that argument, Decatur Cylinder cites Ala. Code 1975, § 6-2-16 , and argues that an oral promise to pa…”
- McKerall v. Kaiser (Supreme Court of Alabama 2010, 60 So. 3d 288)“…Alabama Comment to § 7-3-118 states, in pertinent part: "Ala.Code Section 6-2-16 continues to apply to determine the suf…”
- In re Templeton (United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Alabama 2015, 538 B.R. 578)“…trustee removed the statute of limitations’ bar pursuant to Ala.Code 1975 § 6-2-16. The creditors contend further that for…”
Identified automatically from the court opinions citing this section — not a ranking of which case controls.
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Sources and References
- 12 CFR 1006.26 (Regulation F), Prohibition on Collection of Time-Barred Debt(ecfr.gov).gov
- 15 U.S.C. section 1692e, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (false or misleading representations)(govinfo.gov).gov
- 15 U.S.C. section 1681c, Fair Credit Reporting Act (seven-year limit on reporting collection accounts)(govinfo.gov).gov
- N.Y. CPLR 214-i, Consumer Credit Fairness Act (absolute anti-revival for consumer credit)(nysenate.gov).gov
- Tex. Fin. Code section 392.307, Collection of Time-Barred Consumer Debt by Debt Buyers(statutes.capitol.texas.gov).gov
- Wis. Stat. section 893.05, Effect of Bar (extinguishment of the underlying right)(docs.legis.wisconsin.gov).gov
- Md. Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings section 5-1202, Consumer Debt Collection (no revival by post-expiration payment)(mgaleg.maryland.gov).gov
- 12 CFR 1006.2 (Regulation F), Definitions (scope of "debt collector"; exclusion for a creditor collecting in its own name)(consumerfinance.gov)