Illinois Court Reverses Order of Protection Over Missing Findings

Illinois Court Reverses Order of Protection Over Missing Findings

An Illinois appellate panel threw out a Cook County order of protection and the $2,290.97 damages award attached to it on September 8, 2026, holding that the trial judge never made two of the three findings the Illinois Domestic Violence Act requires before granting a remedy.

Information last verified on September 9, 2026.

Jurisdiction scope: This article covers Illinois only. It reports a September 8, 2026 opinion of the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, applying the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986, codified at 750 ILCS 60/. Every other state sets its own protective order standards, its own definition of abuse, and its own findings requirements, so nothing here transfers across a state line.

What Happened

After a five-month long-distance relationship, Aida Vasquez moved from Florida into a condominium unit Robinson Aguilar owned. The couple signed a lease in September 2023 because Vasquez needed one for insurance purposes, though the opinion records that she was not required to pay rent or any other cost (2026 IL App (1st) 250894, paragraph 4).

The relationship ended in April 2024. On April 9, 2024, Aguilar locked Vasquez out of the condominium. She learned of it when Aguilar texted her brother a photograph of two packed suitcases (paragraph 6). Over the following weeks she recovered some belongings with police assistance but not all of them (paragraph 7).

Vasquez petitioned for an emergency order of protection on May 14, 2024, in Cook County case No. 24 OP 74299. The circuit court declined to enter one on an emergency basis but continued the case for a plenary hearing. On May 15 it granted her amended request in part and ordered that she "shall be allowed into the Residence to collect her belongings" and that Aguilar "shall not prevent [Aida] from retrieving her belongings" (paragraph 8). A June 4, 2024 order repeated that language and permitted service at a different address, which the Cook County Sheriff's office completed on June 7 (paragraphs 8 and 9).

The move-out then proceeded. A police officer who assisted testified that Aguilar was present with his attorney and did not obstruct the process in any way (paragraph 10). The same paragraph records that Aguilar went through the house placing sticky notes on items Vasquez was not permitted to take, and that she left many larger items behind, which he later moved into storage at his own expense with the court's permission. By the November 2024 plenary hearing, Vasquez had returned to Florida and the parties had no remaining interaction. During her closing statement the trial judge asked her, "You got everything now, right?" She answered, "Yes" (paragraph 12).

Judge Jonathan Clark Green found that the lockout and the ensuing delay in allowing Vasquez to gather her belongings constituted abuse under the Act, and told her she was "very credible" on that point (paragraph 13). He reached the opposite conclusion on her claims of future harm, describing her allegations about missing documents as "a little fishy frankly" and stating that the investigation and document claims had not "risen to the level" of an order of protection (paragraphs 14 and 39). He nonetheless entered a three-month plenary order running from November 12, 2024 to February 12, 2025, describing it as "one of the shortest times I've given in any of these cases" (paragraph 16).

The court denied a motion to extend the order on February 5, 2025. On April 9, 2025, it denied Aguilar's motion to reconsider and awarded Vasquez $2,290.97 for expenses incurred in moving and for a temporary hotel stay under 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(13) (paragraph 20). Aguilar filed his notice of appeal on May 9, 2025, and briefing closed in April 2026 (paragraph 21).

Presiding Justice Ellis wrote for a unanimous panel, joined by Justices McBride and D.B. Walker. The court framed the outcome in its opening paragraphs:

"On appeal, Robinson argues the court erred in failing to make the findings required to enter an OP under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act, 750 ILCS 60/101 et seq. (West 2024) (the 'IDVA'). We agree. We have no choice but to reverse the order of protection." (paragraph 2)

Two threshold issues came first. The panel held it had no jurisdiction over the points of error Vasquez raised in her pro se response brief, because she filed neither a notice of appeal nor a notice of cross-appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(b)(1)(iii) (paragraph 28). It also rejected her argument that the appeal was moot even though the order had expired in February 2025, reasoning that the monetary judgment entered under the Act survived and could still be undone (paragraphs 32 and 33).

On the merits the panel found the record silent. Nowhere in the oral ruling or the written order did the trial court find that Aguilar's conduct, unless prohibited, would likely cause irreparable harm or continued abuse, and nowhere did it find the relief necessary to protect Vasquez (paragraph 37). The panel read that silence as deliberate rather than accidental: the judge had credited the lockout testimony while rejecting the fear-of-future-harm testimony, so "[t]he court clearly found that abuse (the lockout) had occurred in the past, but it found no threat of future harm to Aida" (paragraph 41).

That distinction did not save the order. Vasquez argued the evidence would have supported the findings, and the panel answered that "the sufficiency of the proof is not the issue" (paragraph 43). It reversed the order of protection and, because the expense award was "part and parcel of the OP under the IDVA," reversed the $2,290.97 judgment along with it (paragraph 44). The disposition was a straight reversal, with no remand (paragraphs 47 and 48).

What the Law Actually Says

The Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 sits at 750 ILCS 60/101 and following. It defines abuse broadly and without any requirement of violence. Section 103(1) defines abuse as "physical abuse, harassment, intimidation of a dependent, interference with personal liberty or willful deprivation but does not include reasonable direction of a minor child by a parent or person in loco parentis." Section 103(9) defines interference with personal liberty as committing or threatening physical abuse, harassment, intimidation or willful deprivation "so as to compel another to engage in conduct from which she or he has a right to abstain or to refrain from conduct in which she or he has a right to engage." Section 103(7) defines harassment as knowing conduct that is not necessary to accomplish a purpose reasonable under the circumstances, that would cause a reasonable person emotional distress, and that does cause the petitioner emotional distress.

The Act reaches only a defined class of relationships. Section 103(6) lists "family or household members" to include spouses and former spouses, parents and children, people related by blood or by present or prior marriage, "persons who share or formerly shared a common dwelling," people who have or allegedly have a child in common, and "persons who have or have had a dating or engagement relationship." A dating couple sharing a residence falls inside that list twice over, which is why the Act applied here at all rather than only the ordinary rules governing a dispute between a property owner and an occupant. For the fuller picture of who may petition and how the stages run, our guide to how Illinois protective orders work and who can request one walks through the emergency, interim and plenary tracks.

Section 214 supplies both the authority and the limits. Subsection (a) directs that an order shall issue if the court finds the petitioner has been abused by a family or household member, provided the petitioner also satisfies section 217 on emergency orders, section 218 on interim orders, or section 219 on plenary orders. The same subsection tells courts they "shall not require physical manifestations of abuse on the person of the victim." Subsection (b) then lists the available remedies, which run from prohibiting abuse and granting exclusive possession of a residence through counseling, physical care of a minor child, temporary significant decision-making responsibility, and parenting time. Because that remedy menu reaches parental responsibilities, the same findings duty attaches in protective order cases that touch children, a point worth reading against the ordinary framework described in our overview of how Illinois allocates parental responsibilities and parenting time.

The findings requirement is subsection (c). Paragraph (c)(1) directs that "[i]n determining whether to grant a specific remedy, other than payment of support, the court shall consider relevant factors," including the nature, frequency, severity, pattern and consequences of past abuse and "the likelihood of danger of future abuse," plus any danger that a minor child will be abused, neglected, improperly relocated or separated from a primary caretaker. Paragraph (c)(2) lists the factors for comparing relative hardships when possession of the family home is at stake.

Paragraph (c)(3) is the provision the First District enforced. It reads, in full:

"Subject to the exceptions set forth in paragraph (4) of this subsection, the court shall make its findings in an official record or in writing, and shall at a minimum set forth the following: (i) That the court has considered the applicable relevant factors described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection. (ii) Whether the conduct or actions of respondent, unless prohibited, will likely cause irreparable harm or continued abuse. (iii) Whether it is necessary to grant the requested relief in order to protect petitioner or other alleged abused persons." (750 ILCS 60/214(c)(3))

Three features of that text carry the case. First, the duty is mandatory in form. The court "shall" make the findings and "shall at a minimum" set out all three. Second, the findings must appear in an official record or in writing, which means an oral ruling from the bench counts, but silence does not. Third, the only escape hatch is paragraph (c)(4), and it is narrow. That paragraph applies "[f]or purposes of issuing an ex parte emergency order of protection," where a court may, as an alternative to or as a supplement to those findings, examine the petitioner on oath or affirmation and issue the order if the petition and that examination indicate abuse and support relief. A plenary order entered after a contested two-day hearing sits outside that exception, so all three findings were required.

Section 219 confirms the linkage. A plenary order issues only if the petitioner served notice of the hearing under section 211 and establishes, for each requested remedy, that the court has jurisdiction under section 208, that "the requirements of Section 214 are satisfied," that the respondent appeared or was served, and that the respondent answered or is in default.

The damages provision the trial court used is section 214(b)(13), which authorizes an order directing the respondent to pay the petitioner "for losses suffered as a direct result of the abuse, neglect, or exploitation," expressly including "court costs and moving or other travel expenses, including additional reasonable expenses for temporary shelter and restaurant meals." Because that remedy exists only as a component of an order of protection, reversing the order removed its foundation.

None of this displaces ordinary civil law. Section 9-101 of the Code of Civil Procedure, headed Forcible entry prohibited, provides that "[n]o person shall make an entry into lands or tenements except in cases where entry is allowed by law, and in such cases he or she shall not enter with force, but in a peaceable manner" (735 ILCS 5/9-101), and section 9-102 sets out when a person entitled to possession may be restored to it, including where "a peaceable entry is made and the possession unlawfully withheld" (735 ILCS 5/9-102(a)(2)). The opinion itself names no statute and no cause of action at paragraph 45; it says only that a traditional civil lawsuit is available. Those possession rules are covered in our explainer on the rules that govern possession, notice and lockouts between Illinois landlords and occupants.

Analysis: Why This Matters

The following is analysis from the Recording Law Editorial Team.

The notable feature of this opinion is that it is not really about whether a lockout can be abuse. The panel accepted, without reviewing, that the trial judge found it was. What the opinion polices is the gap between a finding of past abuse and the statutory predicate for a forward-looking remedy.

Read together, subparagraphs (c)(3)(ii) and (c)(3)(iii) both point at the future. One asks whether unprohibited conduct will likely cause irreparable harm or continued abuse. The other asks whether the relief is necessary to protect the petitioner. An order of protection is an injunction, and the First District noted that Illinois treats it that way for appeal purposes, citing In re Marriage of Sanchez, 2018 IL App (1st) 171075, at paragraph 34 (2026 IL App (1st) 250894, paragraph 25). An injunction restrains future conduct. The statute therefore asks a court to say, on the record, that there is future conduct worth restraining.

The panel did not make the outcome depend on why the findings were missing; it said at paragraph 42 that reversal follows "whether inadvertent or intentional." It inferred at paragraph 41 that the trial court skipped the two findings because it did not believe them, having credited the lockout account while rejecting the identity theft and future-investigation allegations. On that reading, the order rested on a finding of completed past harm and on nothing else.

The opinion also records the collateral consequences that attach to an order of protection beyond its nominal three-month duration. The trial court acknowledged that the order would cause Aguilar to lose his gunowner rights and suspend his Illinois firearm licenses, which would affect his ability to discharge his duties as a federal law enforcement officer, and reasoned that federal provisions might allow limited access for work purposes (paragraph 17). Those collateral consequences returned at the mootness stage. The panel observed that the effect on his gunowner rights and job was "likely enough by itself to overcome the mootness doctrine," before resting the point on the surviving money judgment instead (paragraph 32).

The panel also added a line that matters to petitioners in the same position. Paragraph 45 says a petitioner in this situation is not without recourse to seek damages for an illegal eviction, even where the eviction is in the past and presents no threat of future harm, because "[a] traditional civil lawsuit is available in that instance." The Act is not the only route to money for a past lockout, and the opinion says so directly.

This is not a break with existing Illinois law. The panel stacked prior authority to the same effect, including Hedrick-Koroll v. Bagley, 352 Ill. App. 3d 590, 594 (2004), which collected cases for the proposition that "The failure to make the required findings is reversible error," along with People ex rel. Minteer v. Kozin, 297 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 1043 (1998), Landmann v. Landmann, 2019 IL App (5th) 180137, and People v. Brand, 2020 IL App (1st) 171728, at paragraph 54 (paragraph 42). The string cite also includes In re Marriage of Healy, 263 Ill. App. 3d 596, 602 (1994), which held that the amended statute plainly requires specific findings but reversed on insufficient evidence and expressly reserved whether missing findings alone require reversal. The panel's own string cite at paragraph 42 is entirely pre-existing authority, and the closest factual analog it relies on, Martinez v. Singh, 2021 IL App (1st) 201027-U, is an unpublished order. What the September 8 decision adds is a published application on a record where the trial court expressly found past abuse and expressly disbelieved the claim of future risk, which makes the statutory distance between the two unusually visible.

Other states have been moving the other way on protective order scope, broadening who may petition and what conduct qualifies. Our earlier report on a New Hampshire statute expanding protective order eligibility covers one such change. Vasquez is a reminder that a broader statute still runs through whatever procedural findings its own text demands.

How This Affects You

For anyone dealing with an Illinois order of protection, the implications here are procedural rather than dramatic.

A finding of past abuse is not, by itself, the whole statutory test. Section 214(c)(3) asks separately about likely future harm and about the necessity of the relief. A record that establishes one and says nothing about the other two is incomplete on the face of the statute.

The findings can be spoken rather than written. Section 214(c)(3) requires them "in an official record or in writing," so findings stated from the bench and captured in the record of proceedings satisfy the text. The First District also held that hearing the evidence and giving it due consideration is not a substitute for stating the findings, and that sufficient proof does not cure their absence (paragraph 43).

Appellate rights depend on filing. Vasquez raised her own claims of error, including that the court erred in reducing her cost award to just over $2,000 when she had sought well over $10,000, and the panel could not reach any of them because she filed no notice of appeal or cross-appeal (paragraphs 27 and 28). A response brief is not a substitute for that filing.

An expired order can still be worth appealing. The panel treated the surviving monetary judgment as enough to defeat mootness, and flagged that firearm and employment consequences may independently do so (paragraphs 31 through 33).

A protective order is not the only remedy for a past lockout. Paragraph 45 points to ordinary civil litigation without naming a theory. Separately, 735 ILCS 5/9-101 prohibits forcible entry into lands or tenements.

None of the procedural detail above narrows the emergency relief the Act provides. Section 217 still allows an emergency order, and section 214(c)(4) still lets a court issue one on the petitioner's sworn examination. If you are in immediate danger, call 911.

This article is general legal information about Illinois law, not legal advice, and reading it creates no attorney-client relationship. The details were verified against the published opinion and the Illinois Compiled Statutes on September 9, 2026, and the law can change after that date. Orders of protection turn on the specific record in a specific case, so consult a licensed Illinois attorney about your own situation. If you are in immediate danger, call 911.

Related articles

• Illinois Restraining Order Laws: How to Get an Order of Protection
• Illinois Landlord-Tenant Laws: Deposits, Notice, and Tenant Rights
• Illinois Child Custody Laws: Allocation of Parental Responsibilities
• New Hampshire Expands Domestic Violence Law and Adds a Sexual Assault Protective Order

Last updated: 2026-09-09. Details verified as of 2026-09-09.

Frequently Asked Questions

What did the Illinois Appellate Court decide in Vasquez v. Aguilar?

On September 8, 2026, the First District held that the Cook County circuit court entered a plenary order of protection without making two of the three findings section 214(c)(3) of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act requires, and that the omission was reversible error. The panel reversed both the order of protection and the $2,290.97 monetary judgment entered under 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(13). The citation is 2026 IL App (1st) 250894.

Did the court hold that no abuse occurred?

No. The panel did not review the abuse finding. The trial judge had found that the April 9, 2024 lockout and the delay in returning belongings amounted to abuse under the Act, and the appellate court took that as given. That was not raised on appeal (paragraph 35). Answering the argument that the evidence would have supported the two absent findings, it wrote at paragraph 43 that the sufficiency of the proof is not the issue, and it reversed solely because those two forward-looking findings were absent from the record.

What three findings does section 214(c)(3) require?

Under 750 ILCS 60/214(c)(3), a court must set out in an official record or in writing: (i) that it considered the applicable relevant factors described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (c); (ii) whether the conduct or actions of respondent, unless prohibited, will likely cause irreparable harm or continued abuse; and (iii) whether it is necessary to grant the requested relief in order to protect petitioner or other alleged abused persons. The paragraph opens with the limiting phrase 'subject to the exceptions set forth in paragraph (4) of this subsection.'

Can an Illinois court ever skip those findings?

Section 214(c)(4) is the only exception inside subsection (c), and it applies '[f]or purposes of issuing an ex parte emergency order of protection.' In that setting a court may, as an alternative or a supplement to the findings, examine the petitioner on oath or affirmation and issue an emergency order if the petition and that examination indicate abuse by the respondent and support the relief. A plenary order entered after a contested hearing does not fall within the exception.

Can a lockout count as abuse under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act?

The Act does not require physical violence. Section 103(1) defines abuse to include harassment, intimidation of a dependent, interference with personal liberty and willful deprivation. Section 214(a) also states that a court deciding whether to issue an order shall not require physical manifestations of abuse on the person of the victim. In this case the trial court found the lockout was abuse, and the appellate panel did not review that finding. It reversed the order of protection on the separate ground that two required findings were never made. Whether any particular lockout qualifies is a fact question for the trial court.

Why was the money award reversed as well?

The $2,290.97 covered moving and hotel expenses awarded under 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(13), which authorizes payment for losses suffered as a direct result of abuse as a remedy within an order of protection. The panel held at paragraph 44 that the award was 'part and parcel of the OP under the IDVA' and did not stand independently, so reversing the order removed the award with it.

Does a dating relationship qualify under the Act?

Section 103(6) defines family or household members to include 'persons who share or formerly shared a common dwelling' and 'persons who have or have had a dating or engagement relationship,' among other categories such as spouses, former spouses and people related by blood. The parties in this case had both a shared residence and a dating relationship. Whether a given relationship fits the statutory list is decided case by case.

Why did the appeal survive after the order had already expired?

The three-month order ran from November 12, 2024 to February 12, 2025 and had long expired. The panel acknowledged that an appeal from an expired order of protection is often moot, citing Landmann v. Landmann, 2019 IL App (5th) 180137, but held this one was not, because the monetary judgment entered under the Act survived and could be reversed. It also noted that the effect on the respondent's gunowner rights and job was likely enough on its own.

Can someone still recover money for a past lockout after this ruling?

The opinion addresses only the protective order route. At paragraph 45 the panel wrote that a petitioner in this situation is not without recourse to seek damages for an illegal eviction, and that '[a] traditional civil lawsuit is available in that instance.' Illinois separately prohibits forcible entry under 735 ILCS 5/9-101. Whether a specific claim works depends on the facts and on filing deadlines, which a licensed Illinois lawyer can assess.

Where can I read the opinion and the statute myself?

The slip opinion is posted by the Illinois Courts as Vasquez v. Aguilar, 2026 IL App (1st) 250894, filed September 8, 2026, on the appellate opinions listing at illinoiscourts.gov. The statutory text of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986, including sections 103, 214 and 219, is published by the Illinois General Assembly at ilga.gov under 750 ILCS 60/.